An individual difference analysis of false recognition

Two studies with moderately large samples of participants were conducted to examine correlates of false recognition. In Experiment 1 false recognition of words was found to be a robust and reliable phenomenon at the level of individuals, and the tendency to classify critical lures as old was more closely related to the correct classification of old items as old than to the incorrect classification of unrelated new items as old. False recognition was not significantly related to any of the cognitive abilities that were assessed, including episodic memory, or to other factors such as personality and chronic mood. In Experiment 2 these findings were extended to include dot pattern and face stimuli. Although measures of veridical memory were significantly correlated across the different types of stimulus material, false recognition rates only had modest and generally not significant correlations, which suggests that the tendency to produce false recognitions may be a task-specific characteristic of individuals.     

Retroactive pessimism: a different kind of hindsight bias

In an attempt to regulate disappointments people may sometimes change their perceptions of the events leading to an undesirable outcome so that in retrospect this outcome seems almost inevitable. This retroactive pessimism effect was demonstrated in three studies. In the first, sports fans rated the likelihood of success for their team and its opponent before and after an important soccer match. Evidence for significant pre‐ and post‐game probability shifts was found for the fans of the defeated team but not for the supporters of the winning opponent. In the second and the third experiments participants responded to a scenario depicting a loss of stipend that was either large or small in value. Participants were expected to show more evidence of retroactive pessimism with greater disappointment. Indeed, estimates of the probability of a more favorable counterfactual outcome were sensitive to the magnitude of the loss with lower estimates of the probability that things could have turned out better in the large stipend condition. The effect was attenuated, however, when the loss was not personal but rather that of a friend (Experiment 2), or when the disappointment was mitigated (Experiment 3). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An investigation of weight bias against women and its associations with individual difference factors

This study explored weight bias against women from different weight categories in relation to occupational decisions, child adoption, and helping behaviour, as well as individual difference correlates of weight bias. A total of 1024 participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions in which they were asked to select the women they would most and least likely hire, promote, or terminate, select for parental adoption, or assist following a traffic accident. They also completed measures of anti-fat attitudes, fat phobia, and attitudes toward obese persons. Results showed bias against both emaciated and obese women across conditions, and suggested that bias was strongest in relation to hiring and weakest in relation to helping behaviour. Further results showed that only greater concern about becoming fat significantly predicted weight bias. These results suggest that weight bias may affect women at both ends of the weight continuum, which require measures to reduce discrimination.     

Emotion regulation goals: An individual difference perspective

Goals are widely understood to be central to the initiation, maintenance, and cessation of emotion regulation (ER). Recent studies have shown that there are profound individual differences in the types of ER goals people pursue and the extent to which they pursue them. Here, we highlight the importance of taking an individual difference approach to studying ER goals. First, we use the extended process model of ER to provide conceptual clarity on what ER goals are and describe the crucial role of goals in each stage of ER. We then identify five promising directions for future research using an individual difference approach to ER goals.     

Being wise after the event: an investigation of hindsight bias

Two experiments are reported which invesigate hindsight bias (the tendency to overestimate the probability of an event when one knows it has occurred and is asked to ignore the fact). Experiment I focuses upon the influence of commitments and desires upon subjective probability assessments in hindsight and foresight. Using the British General Election of May 1979 and Conservative and Labour Party members as subjects, only weak support for hindsight bias was found. However, party affiliation did exert a strong influence over likelihood assessments; outcomes favourable to the preferred party were perceived as more likely, in both foresight and hindsight, than outcomes favourable to the other party, and vice versa. Experiment 11 required subjects to make estimates in foresight and hindsight concerning the numbers of percentages of women in various roles in society. Strong evidence for hindsight bias was found. The paper concludes by considering the judgemental strategies subjects might have used in the two experiments. This is done by drawing on the heuristics of thinking proposed by Tversky and Kahneman.     

An individual difference model for the multidimensional analysis of preference data

A model for the analysis of paired comparison data is presented which combines features of the BTL-model with features of the Unfolding model. The model is metric, mathematically tractable, and has an exact algebraic solution. Since it is multidimensional and allows for individual differences, it is thought to be more realistic for some choice situations than either the Thurstone model or the BTL-model. No claim is made that the present model will be appropriate for all conceivable choice situations. Rather, it is argued that the fact that it is explicitly falsifiable is a point in its favor.This work was supported by a grant of the United States Public Health Service (1 R03 MH19139 01 MSM) and a David Ross (XR) grant of the Purdue Research Foundation (PRF 2132), both of which are gratefully acknowledged. We also owe thanks to Dr. Terry Cooper, whose careful scrutiny of an earlier draft of this paper allowed us to reduce the number of errors from n to n-1.     

The "saw-it-all-along" effect: demonstrations of visual hindsight bias

The authors address whether a hindsight bias exists for visual perception tasks. In 3 experiments, participants identified degraded celebrity faces as they resolved to full clarity (Phase 1). Following Phase 1, participants either recalled the level of blur present at the time of Phase 1 identification or predicted the level of blur at which a peer would make an accurate identification. In all experiments, participants overestimated identification performance of naive observers. Visual hindsight bias was greater for more familiar faces--those shown in both phases of the experiment--and was not reduced following instructions to participants to avoid the bias. The authors propose a fluency-misattribution theory to account for the bias and discuss implications for medical malpractice litigation and eyewitness testimony.     

Strength of hindsight bias as a consequence of meta-cognitions

Hindsight bias is the tendency of people to falsely believe that they would have correctly predicted the outcome of an event once it is known. The present paper addresses the ongoing debate as to whether the hindsight bias is due to memory impairment or biased reconstruction. The memory impairment approach maintains that outcome information alters the memory trace of the initial judgement, whereas the biased reconstruction approach assumes that people who have forgotten their initial judgements are forced to guess and, in the presence of outcome information, are likely to use this information as an anchor. Whereas the latter approach emphasises the role of meta-cognitive considerations, meta-cognitions are not included in the memory impairment explanation. Two experiments show that the biased reconstruction approach provides a better explanation for empirical findings in hindsight bias research than does the memory impairment explanation.     

Strength of hindsight bias as a consequence of meta-cognitions

Hindsight bias is the tendency of people to falsely believe that they would have correctly predicted the outcome of an event once it is known. The present paper addresses the ongoing debate as to whether the hindsight bias is due to memory impairment or biased reconstruction. The memory impairment approach maintains that outcome information alters the memory trace of the initial judgement, whereas the biased reconstruction approach assumes that people who have forgotten their initial judgements are forced to guess and, in the presence of outcome information, are likely to use this information as an anchor. Whereas the latter approach emphasises the role of meta-cognitive considerations, meta-cognitions are not included in the memory impairment explanation. Two experiments show that the biased reconstruction approach provides a better explanation for empirical findings in hindsight bias research than does the memory impairment explanation.     

A cross-cultural study of hindsight bias and conditional probabilistic reasoning

Hindsight bias is a mistaken belief that one could have predicted a given outcome once the outcome is known. Choi and Nisbett (2000 Choi, I. and Nisbett, R. E. 2000. Cultural psychology of surprise: Holistic theories and recognition of contradiction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79: 890–905. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) reported that Koreans showed stronger hindsight bias than Americans, and explained the results using the distinction between analytic cognition (Westerners) and holistic cognition (Easterners). The purpose of the present study was to see whether hindsight bias is stronger among Easterners than among Westerners using a probability judgement task, and to test an “explicit–implicit” hypothesis and a “rule-dialectics” hypothesis. We predicted that the implicit process is more active among Easterners to generate hindsight bias, and that Easterners are more dialectical thinkers, whereas Westerners are more rule-based thinkers. French, British, Japanese, and Korean participants were asked to make probabilistic judgements in a Good Samaritan scenario (Experiment 1) and in a scenario including conditional probabilistic judgement (Experiment 2). In both Experiments, we presume that the implicit revision of causal models is made just by being given unexpected outcome information, and that explicit revision is made by being asked to point out possible factors for an unexpected outcome. In the results Easterners showed greater hindsight bias generally and it was greater in the Good Samaritan scenario. We conclude that the reason why hindsight bias was lower among Westerners is primarily that they tried to follow a rule to suppress the bias.     

We saw it all along: visual hindsight bias in children and adults

Abstract— We traced the developmental origins and trajectory of the hindsight bias. Three-, 4-, and 5-year-old children and adults identified gradually clarifying images of degraded common objects on a computer. Half the time, observers did not know in advance what the object would become. The rest of the time, observers knew the object's identity in advance and estimated when a naive same-age peer would identify the clarifying object. In two experiments, children and adults demonstrated hindsight bias by using advance knowledge to overestimate their same-age peers' ability to identify the objects. The magnitude of this bias declined across age in one experiment, but remained relatively stable over age in the other experiment. These findings link developmental psychology and adult cognitive science.     

SARA: a cognitive process model to simulate the anchoring effect and hindsight bias

The cognitive process model "SARA" aims to explain the anchoring effect and hindsight bias by making detailed assumptions about the representation and alteration of item-specific knowledge. The model assumes that all processes, namely generating an estimate, encoding new information (i.e., the "anchor"), and reconstructing a previously generated estimate, are based on a probabilistic sampling process. Sampling probes long-term memory in order to retrieve information into working memory. Retrieval depends on the associative strength between this information and the currently active retrieval cues. Encoding the anchor may alter this associative pattern ("selective activation") or the anchor may serve as a retrieval cue, thus directing memory search ("biased reconstruction"). Both processes lead to systematically changed retrieval probabilities, thus causing the anchoring effect or hindsight bias. The model is completely formalised and implemented as a computer program. A series of simulations demonstrates the power of SARA to reproduce empirical findings and to predict new ones.     

Evaluating scientific research: Belief,hindsight bias,ethics, and research evaluation

Students may exhibit two forms of cognitive biases, belief and hindsight bias, in evaluating a scientific experiment. Counter to disagreement, they may only believe an outcome that agrees with their belief to be more predictable in hindsight than foresight. The focus of this research is on the relationship between these biases. Students were queried about their dichotomous beliefs (learned vs. genetic) about behavior for an animal experiment and then assigned randomly to a no‐outcome or genetic outcome condition. With agreement between students' belief and outcome, the findings revealed hindsight bias (foreseeability) supported by the outcomes for surprise, disappointment, ethics, and research evaluation. With disagreement, hindsight bias was trumped along with perceiving the experiment as being less ethical and scientifically sound. Regardless of the outcome, students seem to adhere to their beliefs. Hence, students may believe that the outcome is inconsequential because it is obvious or contrary to their beliefs.     

Observers' reactions to genetic testing: the role of hindsight bias and judgements of responsibility

In 3 studies, we examined the effect of birth outcome on observers' reactions to genetic testing. Participants read a scenario in which a woman declined to take a genetic screening test and subsequently gave birth to a child with a genetic disorder (negative outcome) or a healthy child (positive outcome). Retrospective judgments of the likelihood that the child would have a genetic disorder were higher given negative than positive outcome knowledge under conditions of high genetic risk. Moreover, the more likely a negative outcome was perceived to be, the more responsible the mother was held for not taking the genetic screening test. Consistent with Weiner's (1993) theory, responsibility judgments were linked to displeasure and sympathy, with sympathy in turn being related to help judgments.     

SARA: A cognitive process model to simulate the anchoring effect and hindsight bias

The cognitive process model "SARA" aims to explain the anchoring effect and hindsight bias by making detailed assumptions about the representation and alteration of item-specific knowledge. The model assumes that all processes, namely generating an estimate, encoding new information (i.e., the "anchor"), and reconstructing a previously generated estimate, are based on a probabilistic sampling process. Sampling probes long-term memory in order to retrieve information into working memory. Retrieval depends on the associative strength between this information and the currently active retrieval cues. Encoding the anchor may alter this associative pattern ("selective activation") or the anchor may serve as a retrieval cue, thus directing memory search ("biased reconstruction"). Both processes lead to systematically changed retrieval probabilities, thus causing the anchoring effect or hindsight bias. The model is completely formalised and implemented as a computer program. A series of simulations demonstrates the power of SARA to reproduce empirical findings and to predict new ones.     

Bias versus bias: Harnessing hindsight to reveal paranormal belief change beyond demand characteristics

Psychological change is difficult to assess, in part because self-reported beliefs and attitudes may be biased or distorted. The present study probed belief change, in an educational context, by using the hindsight bias to counter another bias that generally plagues assessment of subjective change. Although research has indicated that skepticism courses reduce paranormal beliefs, those findings may reflect demand characteristics (biases toward desired, skeptical responses). Our hindsight-bias procedure circumvented demand by asking students, following semester-long skepticism (and control) courses, to recall their precourse levels of paranormal belief. People typically remember themselves as previously thinking, believing, and acting as they do now, so current skepticism should provoke false recollections of previous skepticism. Given true belief change, therefore, skepticism students should have remembered themselves as having been more skeptical than they were. They did, at least about paranormal topics that were covered most extensively in the course. Our findings thus show hindsight to be useful in evaluating cognitive change beyond demand characteristics.     

Debiasing the hindsight bias: The role of accessibility experiences and (mis)attributions

Two studies tested the role of accessibility experiences and attributions in debiasing the hindsight bias. Participants listed 4 or 12 thoughts about how a college football game, or the 2000 US Presidential election, might have turned out differently. Listing 12 thoughts was experienced as difficult, suggesting to participants that there were few ways in which the event could have turned out otherwise. Hindsight biases increased under this condition, unless participants attributed the difficulty of the thought generation to their own lack of knowledge, which resulted in a trend in the opposite direction. The interplay of accessible content, accessibility experiences and attribution in mental simulation is discussed.     

The effects of disappointment on hindsight bias for real‐world outcomes

Examined the effects of motivated processing on hindsight bias. One hundred fifty three college students estimated and later recalled the likelihood that 30 self‐relevant events would occur during the next 2 months. Multi‐level modelling was used to determine the (within‐subject) effects of expectations, event valence and event controllability on hindsight bias and the extent to which these effects were moderated by participants' need for cognition (NFC) scores (between‐subjects). For events that actually occurred, we found support for defensive processing in that the bias was smaller for negative events. Also, for events that actually occurred, those judged as more controllable produced a larger bias. Neither valence nor controllability had any effect on the size of the bias for events that did not occur. The size of the bias for occurrences did not differ significantly from that for non‐occurrences. Finally, NFC did not moderate the effects of valence or controllability, nor did it directly affect the size of the bias. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Not the same old hindsight bias: Outcome information distorts a broad range of retrospective judgments

The hindsight bias (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975) illustrates that outcome information can make people believe that they would have (or did) predict an outcome that they would not (or did not) actually predict. In two experiments, participants (N = 226) made a prediction immediately before receiving outcome information. Therefore, participants could not distort or misremember their predictions to make them align with the outcome information. In both experiments, participants distorted their reports of how certain they recalled having been in their prediction, how good of a basis they had for making the prediction, how long they took to make the prediction, and so forth. Experiment 2 showed that these effects were diminished when participants engaged in private thought about the upcoming questions prior to receiving outcome information, suggesting that the effect is not due to impression management concerns.