Cognitive parallels between moral judgment and modal judgment

A central question in the study of moral psychology is how immediate intuition interacts with more thoughtful deliberation in the generation of moral judgments. The present study sheds additional light on this question by comparing adults’ judgments of moral permissibility with their judgments of physical possibility—a form of judgment that also involves the coordination of intuition and deliberation (Shtulman, Cognitive Development 24:293–309, 2009). Participants (N = 146) were asked to judge the permissibility of 16 extraordinary actions (e.g., Is it ever morally permissible for an 80-year-old woman to have sex with a 20-year-old man?) and the possibility of 16 extraordinary events (e.g., Will it ever be physically possible for humans to bring an extinct species back to life?). Their tendency to judge the extraordinary events as possible was predictive of their tendency to judge the extraordinary actions as permissible, even when controlling for disgust sensitivity. Moreover, participants’ justification and response latency patterns were correlated across domains. Taken together, these findings suggest that modal judgment and moral judgment may be linked by a common inference strategy, with some individuals focusing on why actions/events that do not occur cannot occur, and others focusing on how those same actions/events could occur.     

Suspended judgment

In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third option should be thought of as an attitude or not. In this paper I argue that suspended judgment is (or at least involves) a genuine attitude.     

Processes of similarity judgment

Similarity underlies fundamental cognitive capabilities such as memory, categorization, decision making, problem solving, and reasoning. Although recent approaches to similarity appreciate the structure of mental representations, they differ in the processes posited to operate over these representations. We present an experiment that differentiates among extant structural accounts of similarity in their ability to account for patterns of similarity ratings. These data pose a challenge for transformation-based models and all but one mapping-based model, the Similarity as Interactive Activation and Mapping (SIAM) model of similarity.     

Temporal order judgment criteria are affected by synchrony judgment sensitivity

Synchrony perception for audio-visual stimulus pairs is typically studied by using temporal order judgment (TOJ) or synchrony judgment (SJ) tasks. Research has shown that estimates of the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) obtained using these two methods do not necessarily correspond. Here, we investigate the hypothesis that the PSS estimate obtained in a TOJ task is shifted in the direction of the most sensitive part of the synchrony judgment curve, as obtained in an SJ task. The results confirm that criterion shifts in the TOJ task move the PSS toward regions of the audio-visual temporal interval continuum where discriminations are most sensitive.     

Psychophysical judgment of curvatures

In this study we explored psychophysical judgments (magnitude estimation) of the curvature of visual lines. Prior research has lacked a rigorous definition of curvature, but here it was defined as the reverse of the ray of the osculating circle tangent to the curve in the given point. Four different functions were evaluated: hyperbole, sinusoid, parabola, and a cubic function. Using the method of magnitude estimation to judge 20 exemplar curves from each of the families, three respondents made a total of 1440 estimations each. Responses to all four families of curves were fit well by Stevens' power function with an exponent less than 1. One application of this research is the use of such curves as variables in assessing illusions of curvature.     

Confidence in judgment

Experiments have shown that, generally, people are overconfident about the correctness of their answers to questions. Cognitive psychologists have attributed this to biases in the way people generate and handle evidence for and against their views. The overconfidence phenomenon and cognitive psychologists' accounts of its origins have recently given rise to three debates. Firstly, ecological psychologists have proposed that overconfidence is an artefact that has arisen because experimenters have used question material not representative of the natural environment. However, it now appears that some overconfidence remains even after this problem has been remedied. Secondly, it has been proposed that overconfidence is an artefactual regression effect that arises because judgments contain an inherently random component. However, those claiming this appear to use the term overconfidence to refer to a phenomenon quite different from the one that the cognitive psychologists set out to explain. Finally, a debate has arisen about the status of perceptual judgments. Some claim that these evince only underconfidence and must, therefore, depend on mechanisms fundamentally different from those subserving other types of judgment. Others have obtained overconfidence with perceptual judgments and argue that a unitary theory is more appropriate. At present, however, no single theory provides an adequate account of the many diverse factors that influence confidence in judgment.     

Sentential synonymity judgment

Despite the acknowledged theoretical importance of sentential synonymity, there has been little interest in the psychological mechanisms responsible for recognizing it. Here an attempt is made to explore ways in which specific models originally devised for other particular psycholinguistic tasks (e.g., sentence-picture verification, three-term series problems, syllogistic reasoning) can be generalized to synonymity judgment and ways in which recent psychosemantic theories can be made more specific to deal with this same paradigm. Differential predictions from these models are derived for a set of spatiotemporal bidimensional comparative synonym pairs (e.g., High before Low, First above Second), and an experiment to test these predictions is reported. It is argued that, although the results are consonant with predictions from one type of model, they do not favor it definitively. This is because models of this type do not detail how bidimensional comparatives can be parsed into the same propositional representation and because other models can be subjected to further post hoc modifications to account for the data. Finally, general problems arising from attempts to adapt existing models to new tasks are discussed.     

A theory of relative judgment

This paper is concerned with the scaling method of “ratio estimation.” The simple theory that equates reported ratio judgments to ratios of psychological magnitudes is first considered, then two close relatives of this theory are formulated, each of which places weaker constraints on the structure of the data. Structural conditions are stated that express the relations that must hold among observed ratio judgments for each of the models. The models proposed are “cumulative” in the sense that the second is a weakened version of the first, and the third a weakened version of the second. A special feature of the models is that they may be tested entirely in terms of observables, avoiding the necessity of scale construction prior to testing. Tests were carried out on data from 9 published studies. The strongest model, typically used in scale construction using ratio estimation data, was generally inadequate, showing large systematic errors. However, the weakest version generally passed the tests of internal consistency, and the model equation provided a basis for constructing ratio scales utilizing bias parameters.     

Consistency and modification of judgment

In an investigation of minority influence, it was predicted that a consistent preference for paintings based on nationality by a confederate would cause previously neutral subjects to increase their preference in the direction of this minority viewpoint. Further, it was predicted that ethnic origin of the confederate could be seen as a biasing factor which could diminish influence. Four naive subjects were paired with one experimental confederate who was presented as being of either Italian, German, or unknown ethnic origin. On every trial, subjects were asked to indicate their preference between two paintings, one labeled “Italian” and the other labeled “German.” Labels were actually assigned at random. The confederate consistently chose the Italian or the German paintings on every one of the 19 trials. Results indicate that Control subjects rather than being neutral, exhibited a preference for the Italian paintings. Further, the presence of a confederate who took a consistent standard, whether it was Italian or German, had the effect of making subjects significantly more pro-German (or less pro-Italian) than the control group. The findings are explained on the basis that the German position was actalternative minority position, whereas the Italian position was actually an extreme of the majority position. While the former situation leads to minority influence as predicted, the latter situation appears to have polarized subjects. An alternative in terms of a norm of fairness is suggested, also.     

Electrophysiological manifestations of typicality judgment

Ten male subjects participated in an event-related potential study of typicality judgment of words that were of either high or low frequency of usage. The amplitude of a negative wave with an average peak latency of 490 msec (N400) correlated with the goodness-of-fit of a word to a particular category independent of frequency, with poor examples of the category evoking a significantly more negative waveform. The relative insensitivity of the N400 to word frequency suggests that the N400 reflects some postlexical evaluation rather than lexical access.     

Multimethod study of clinical judgment

Expert and novice clinicians judged the likelihood of disease alternatives and gave thinking-aloud protocols as they evaluated simulated cases of congenital heart disease. Specific combinations of cues in the patient data were manipulated to create alternate versions of a single case so that the use of critical cues could be identified. Analyses of variance of subjects' disease judgments revealed differences between expert and novice clinicians in their use of critical cues and cue combinations. Analyses of the thinking-aloud protocols revealed that clinicians with different degrees of expertise employed different interpretations of patient data cues as well as qualitatively distinct "lines of reasoning" in reaching clinical judgments.     

Competency and practical judgment

At least four different frameworks — psychiatric, cognitive, functional and decision-making — are used in the evaluation of competence, all of which remain more or less unrelated in the literature. In the first section of this paper we consider various meanings of “competence,” in order to arrive at a definition of the term relevant to the medical and legal setting. Patient or client “competence,” we conclude, refers to the practical abilities that individuals employ in pursuing their own autonomous goals in life. We then show how a systematic categorization of these practical abilities — which we call a taxonomy of practical judgment — allows us to show when the traditional frameworks for the evaluation of competence may or may not be useful in the evaluation of a particular competence. In the final section we explore some of the normative considerations underlying the taxonomy. For instance, competence is not only related to intrinsic abilities but to resources available in the community. Here we touch on questions related to the fair distribution of community resources.     

Person memory and judgment

Two general types of information about a person are considered in this article: One pertains to specific behaviors a person has manifested, and the other refers to more abstract personality dispositions or behavioral tendencies. A theoretical model of person memory that incorporates both types of information is developed. The model accounts for a large number of factors that are known to affect the recall of social information, the making of interpersonal judgments, and the relation between what is recalled and the judgments that are made. A major strength of the model is its applicability to a wide range of person memory and judgment phenomena that are observed in several different experimental paradigms.