Medieval theories of mental representation

Throughout most of the Middle ages, it was generally held that stored mental representations of perceived objects or events preserved the forms or species of such objects. This belief was consistent with a metaphor used by Plato. It was also consistent with the medieval belief that a number of cognitive processes took place in the ventricles of the brain and with the phenomenology of afterimages and imagination itself. In the 14th century, William of Ockham challenged this belief by claiming that mental representations are not stored but instead constructed in the basis of past learned experiences.     

A new characterization of scientific theories

First, I discuss the older “theory-centered” and the more recent semantic conception of scientific theories. I argue that these two perspectives are nothing more than terminological variants of one another. I then offer a new theory-centered view of scientific theories. I argue that this new view captures the insights had by each of these earlier views, that it’s closer to how scientists think about their own theories, and that it better accommodates the phenomenon of inconsistent scientific theories.     

Applying idealized scientific theories to engineering

The problem for the scientist created by using idealizations is to determine whether failures to achieve experimental fit are attributable to experimental error, falsity of theory, or of idealization. Even in the rare case when experimental fit within experimental error is achieved, the scientist must determine whether this is so because of a true theory and fortuitously canceling idealizations, or due to a fortuitous combination of false theory and false idealizations. For the engineer, the problem seems rather different. Experiment for the engineer reveals the closeness of predictive fit that can be achieved by theory and idealization for a particular case. If the closeness of fit is good enough for some practical purpose, the job is done. If not, or there are reasons to consider variation, then the engineer needs to know how well the experimentally determined closeness of fit will extrapolate to new cases. This paper focuses on engineering measures of closeness of fit and the projectibility of those measures to new cases.     

The justification and selection of scientific theories

This paper is a critique of a project, outlined by Laudan et al. (1986) recently in this journal, for empirically testing philosophical models of change in science by comparing them against the historical record of actual scientific practice. While the basic idea of testing such models of change in the arena of science is itself an appealing one, serious questions can be raised about the suitability of seeking confirmation or disconfirmation for large numbers of specific theses drawn from a massive list of claims abstracted from the writings of a few philosophers of science. The present paper discusses what one might reasonably expect from a model of change in science and then compares some clusters of theses from Laudan et al. with developments in recent theoretical physics. The results suggest that such straightforward testing of theses may be largely inconclusive.The research reported in this paper was partially supported by NSF grants SES-8318884 and SES-8606472. A preliminary version of this paper was read at the Conference on Testing Theories of Scientific Change held at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, October 20–22, 1986.     

Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation

It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.     

On the nature of scientific laws and theories

Ist der Unterschied zwischen wissenschaftlichen Gesetzen und Theorien ein qualitativer oder lediglich von quantitativer Art? Der Autor versucht zu zeigen, daß Gesetze und Theorien fundamental verschieden sind und daß die Kenntnis ihrer verschiedenen Natur notwendig für ein richtiges Wissenschaftsverständnis ist. Aus seiner Sicht sind Theorien geistigeKonstruktionen mit dem Ziel,kausale Erklärungen von empirischen Gesetzen zu geben, während diese Gesetze auf der Grundlage von Messungenentdeckt werden und dieTatsachen der Wissenschaft konstituieren. Erkenntnistheoretisch sind daher Theorien und (der Ausdruck der) Gesetze auf verschiedenen Ebenen anzusiedeln: während GesetzeWissen liefern, liefern TheorienVerstehen. Der Kern der Theorien besteht ausModellen, die idealisierte Abstraktionen aus Zustandsarten darstellen. Theoretische Modelle konstituierenOntologien, die kausale Mechanismen aufzeigen. SolcheOntologien betreffen den Bedeutungsaspekt (real aspect) des Gegenstandsbereichs, auf den die Theorie angewendet wird, während empirische Gesetze den Ausdrucksaspekt (nominal aspect) des gleichen Gegenstandsbereichs betreffen. Theorien erklären Gesetze, indem sie zeigen, wie der Ausdrucksaspekt lediglich der natürliche Ausdruck der Auswirkungen der Kausalmechanismen im Bedeutungsaspekt sind.     

《科学理念宣言》中的反科学陈述

2007年2月26日,中国科学院向社会发布了《关于科学理念的宣言》。宣言基本上正确陈述了科学的理念,对于公众了解科学理念起到了正面的作用。与此同时,也必须指出宣言中有部分陈述宣扬了反科学的主张,对于公众理解科学造成了负面影     

An agent-based conception of models and scientific representation

I argue for an intentional conception of representation in science that requires bringing scientific agents and their intentions into the picture. So the formula is: Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world, W; (4) for some purpose, P. This conception legitimates using similarity as the basic relationship between models and the world. Moreover, since just about anything can be used to represent anything else, there can be no unified ontology of models. This whole approach is further supported by a brief exposition of some recent work in cognitive, or usage-based, linguistics. Finally, with all the above as background, I criticize the recently much discussed idea that claims involving scientific models are really fictions.     

Addiction as a functional representation

This study examined how perceptions of the addicted state vary as a function of social conditions, personal circumstances and type of substance. University students (n = 144) were presented with portrayals of drug users in which sex, drug type and social setting were varied. A questionnaire determined the degree to which participants thought that the person portrayed was (i) addicted, (ii) prone to use drugs due to his/her personality, and (iii) perceived as a problem to society. The pattern of results fitted a functional model of the addiction concept rather than an attempt to describe an ‘objective’ state. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.