Activation of action rules in action observation

Visually perceiving an action may activate corresponding motor programs. This automatic motor activation can occur both for higher level (i.e., the goal of an action) and for lower level (i.e., the specific effector with which it is executed) aspects of an action. The authors used a tool-use action paradigm to experimentally dissociate priming effects for observing the target, the movement, or the target-to-movement mapping of a tool-use action. In 3 experiments, participants took turns in acting, observing the tool-use action of another person in trial n-1, and executing an action in trial n. Trial transitions from n-1 to n were manipulated in 4 conditions with (a) mapping repeated and movement and target changed, (b) target repeated and movement and mapping changed, (c) movement repeated and target and mapping changed, or (d) all components repeated. Results indicate priming effects for repeating the target-to-movement mapping (i.e., the action rule) of a tool-use action and suggest that a rather abstract action schema is activated during action observation.     

Joint action and group action made precise

The paper argues that there are two main kinds of joint action, direct joint bringing about (or performing) something (expressed in terms of a DO-operator) and jointly seeing to it that something is the case (expressed in terms of a Stit-operator). The former kind of joint action contains conjunctive, disjunctive and sequential action and its central subkinds. While joint seeing to it that something is the case is argued to be necessarily intentional, direct joint performance can also be nonintentional. Actions performed by social groups are analyzed in terms of the notions of joint action (basically DO and Stit).A precise semantical analysis of the aforementioned kinds of joint action is given in terms of time-trees. With each participant a tree is connected, and the trees are joined defining joint possible worlds in terms of state-expressing nodes from the trees. Sentences containing DO and Stit are semantically evaluated with respect to such joint possible worlds. Intentional joint actions are characterized in terms of the notion of we-intention (joint intention), characterized formally by means of a special operator.     

The impact of anticipated action effects on action planning

Three experiments with a total of 72 participants investigated the assumption that motor actions are planned in terms of their sensorial effects. Participants had to prepare a certain action A that consistently led to a sensorial effect (a tone of certain pitch). Instead of (in Experiment 1) or before (in Experiments 2 and 3) the execution of the prepared action, another response B had to be carried out, which either resulted in the same or in a different auditory effect (a tone of same or different pitch). It was found that a to-be-executed response B was in general initiated more quickly when it resulted in the same effect as a concurrently prepared response A. The results are considered as evidence for the basic notion that the preparation and initiation even of very simple actions is mediated by an anticipation of their reafferences.     

The influence of action observation on action execution: Dissociating the contribution of action on perception,perception on action,and resolving conflict

For more than 15 years, motor interference paradigms have been used to investigate the influence of action observation on action execution. Most research on so-called automatic imitation has focused on variables that play a modulating role or investigated potential confounding factors. Interestingly, furthermore, a number of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have tried to shed light on the functional mechanisms and neural correlates involved in imitation inhibition. However, these fMRI studies, presumably due to poor temporal resolution, have primarily focused on high-level processes and have neglected the potential role of low-level motor and perceptual processes. In the current EEG study, we therefore aimed to disentangle the influence of low-level perceptual and motoric mechanisms from high-level cognitive mechanisms. We focused on potential congruency differences in the visual N190 ? a component related to the processing of biological motion, the Readiness Potential ? a component related to motor preparation, and the high-level P3 component. Interestingly, we detected congruency effects in each of these components, suggesting that the interference effect in an automatic imitation paradigm is not only related to high-level processes such as self-other distinction but also to more low-level influences of perception on action and action on perception. Moreover, we documented relationships of the neural effects with (autistic) behavior.     

Role of action observation and action in sequence learning and coding

A complex sequence learning task was used to determine if the type of coding acquired through physical practice (PP), observation of the stimulus (Obs-S), or observation of stimulus and action (Obs-SA) differs between conditions and whether the type of observation influences subsequent learning of the task when physical practice was permitted. Participants in the Obs-S group were permitted to watch the sequentially illuminated stimuli on the screen. In the Obs-SA group participants could see both flexion-extension movements of the model's arm performing the sequence and the sequentially illuminated stimuli on the screen. Participants in the PP group actually performed the 16-element sequence with their dominant right arm. Delayed retention tests and two inter-manual transfer tests were completed following each of two acquisition sessions. First, the data indicated that learning the sequence structure, as revealed by response time per element, occurred similarly irrespective of the initial practice condition. Secondly, the movement sequence appeared to be coded in abstract visual-spatial coordinates resulting in effector-independent performance. Finally, observing the model's action and sequential stimuli allows participants to transfer the perceived aspects of the movement sequence into efficient coordination patterns when additional physical practice is permitted.     

putting action back into action planning: experiences of career clients

This study used the critical incident technique to investigate what helped and hindered unemployed and career‐changing people in implementing the action plans they developed while participating in career or employment counseling. Information from interviews with 23 women and 16 men generated 9 categories of helping incidents and 9 categories of hindering incidents. These categories increase understanding of the nature of action planning and reveal implications for preparing clients to engage in action planning activities.     

Subliminal action priming modulates the perceived intensity of sensory action consequences

The sense of control over the consequences of one’s actions depends on predictions about these consequences. According to an influential computational model, consistency between predicted and observed action consequences attenuates perceived stimulus intensity, which might provide a marker of agentic control. An important assumption of this model is that these predictions are generated within the motor system. However, previous studies of sensory attenuation have typically confounded motor-specific perceptual modulation with perceptual effects of stimulus predictability that are not specific to motor action. As a result, these studies cannot unambiguously attribute sensory attenuation to a motor locus. We present a psychophysical experiment on auditory attenuation that avoids this pitfall. Subliminal masked priming of motor actions with compatible prime–target pairs has previously been shown to modulate both reaction times and the explicit feeling of control over action consequences. Here, we demonstrate reduced perceived loudness of tones caused by compatibly primed actions. Importantly, this modulation results from a manipulation of motor processing and is not confounded by stimulus predictability. We discuss our results with respect to theoretical models of the mechanisms underlying sensory attenuation and subliminal motor priming.     

Pulling out the intentional structure of action: the relation between action processing and action production in infancy

Adults and children readily construct action representations organized with respect to an ultimate goal. These representations allow one to predict the consequences of action, interpret and describe actions, and categorize action sequences. In this paper, we explore the ontogeny of hierarchically organized action representations, and its relation to infants' ability to produce similar sequences. To do so, we examine infants' perception and performance of a means-end sequence: pulling a cloth to retrieve a toy. Using a visual habituation paradigm, we demonstrate that 12-month-old infants understand that the initial step of the cloth-pulling sequence is directed toward the ultimate goal of attaining the toy, and use their knowledge of the causal constraints of the sequence to make this goal attribution. Ten-month-olds, however, appear transitional with respect to this understanding: their ability to identify the goal of the cloth-pulling sequence is related to their own ability to planfully solve a similar sequence. These findings are consistent with a burgeoning body of literature suggesting an intimate link between action production and perception, and suggest that this link is in place by at least 10 months of age.     

Inhibition of action rules

Inhibition is often proposed as an important executive-control process, but its existence is difficult to establish empirically. Recently, Mayr and Keele (2000) reported that it takes longer to switch to a recently disengaged task set (i.e.,n−2 task-set repetitions) than to a less recently disengaged task set. Thissetalternation cost may indicate inhibition of the disengaged task set. The primary goal of the present study was to test the inhibition account of set-alternation costs against an important alternative account based on automatic episodic retrieval. The episodic retrieval account predicts reaction time facilitation instead of costs for the special case ofcomplete n−2 repetitions of both task sets and all stimulus— response aspects. A new task-switching paradigm, in which action rules varied on a trial-by-trial basis while the relevant stimulus dimension remained invariant, allowed the implementation of a high proportion of completen−2 repetitions. Consistent with the inhibition view, set-alternation costs were obtained even for these constellations.     

The shape of action

How do people understand the everyday, yet intricate, behaviors that unfold around them? In the present research, we explored this by presenting viewers with self-paced slideshows of everyday activities and recording looking times, subjective segmentation (breakpoints) into action units, and slide-to-slide physical change. A detailed comparison of the joint time courses of these variables showed that looking time and physical change were locally maximal at breakpoints and greater for higher level action units than for lower level units. Even when slideshows were scrambled, breakpoints were regarded longer and were more physically different from ordinary moments, showing that breakpoints are distinct even out of context. Breakpoints are bridges: from one action to another, from one level to another, and from perception to conception.     

The cognitive representation of action: Automatic integration of perceived action effects

Actions have been assumed to be cognitively represented by codes of relevant action features. Six experiments investigated whether irrelevant action features — conditioned response-contingent auditory events — are also coded and integrated into action codes. Subjects responded to visual stimuli by pressing a left- versus right-hand button or by touching a single key once versus twice. Responses produced certain action effects: tones on the left versus the right or tones of low versus high pitch. After subjects had some practice, an inducing stimulus was presented together with the reaction stimulus; this inducing stimulus shared features with the action effect of the correct or incorrect response. If action effects were integrated into action codes, inducing stimuli should activate or prime the associated response. Indeed, substantial effects of correspondence or compatibility between inducing stimuli and irrelevant action effects were found in a variety of tasks. Results are interpreted as evidence for an automatic integration of information about action effects and taken as support of an action-concept model of action-effect integration and stimulus-response compatibility.