Psychological distance and emotional experience: what you see is what you get

Recent research suggests that perceiving negative emotion-eliciting scenes approaching intensifies the associated felt emotion, while perceiving emotion-eliciting scenes receding weakens the associated felt emotion (Muhlberger, Neumann, Wieser, & Pauli, 2008). In the present studies, we sought to extend these findings by examining the effects of imagining rather than perceiving such changes to negative emotion-eliciting scenes. Across three studies, we found that negative scenes generally elicited less negative responses and lower levels of arousal when imagined moving away from participants and shrinking, and more negative responses and higher levels of arousal when imagined moving toward participants and growing, as compared to the responses elicited by negative scenes when imagined unchanged. Patterns in responses to neutral scenes undergoing the same imagined transformations were similar on ratings of emotional arousal, but differed on valence-generally eliciting greater positivity when imagined moving toward participants and growing, and less positivity when imagined moving away from participants and shrinking. Moreover, for these effects to emerge, participants reported it necessary to explicitly imagine scenes moving closer or farther. These findings have implications for emotion regulation, and suggest that imagined spatial distance plays a role in mental representations of emotionally salient events.     

What you think is what you get: comparative evaluations of close relationships

Three studies tested the hypothesis that focus of comparison moderates the influence of comparison standards on relationship satisfaction. Participants were asked to evaluate either their current relationships or their alternative relationships relative to an external comparison standard: a romantic stereotype (Study 1) or others' relationships (Studies 2 and 3). Consistent with the focusing hypothesis, the results show that people are more satisfied when they assimilate their relationship outcomes to a high standard or when they contrast them away from a low standard. Satisfaction, however, also increases when alternative relationships are contrasted away from a high standard or when they are assimilated to a low standard of comparison. Perceived quality of alternatives partially mediated the impact of focus of comparison on satisfaction. This finding is consistent with interdependence theory's distinction between a comparison level and a comparison level for alternative relationships, which are not completely independent from each other.     

What you see is what you want to see: Motivationally relevant stimuli can interrupt current resource allocation

Arousing stimuli, either threat-related or pleasant, may be selected for priority at different stages within the processing stream. Here we examine the pattern of processing for non-task-relevant threatening (spiders: arousing to some) and pleasant stimuli (babies or chocolate: arousing to all) by recording the gaze of a spider Fearful and Non-fearful group while they performed a simple “follow the cross” task. There was no difference in first saccade latencies. Saccade trajectories showed a general hypervigilance for all stimuli in the Fearful group. Saccade landing positions corresponded to what each group would find arousing, such that the Fearful group deviated towards both types of images whereas the Non-fearful group deviated towards pleasant images. Secondary corrective saccade latencies away from threat-related stimuli were longer for the Fearful group (difficulty in disengaging) compared with the Non-fearful group. These results suggest that attentional biases towards arousing stimuli may occur at different processing stages.     

What you see is what you set: sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness

This article reports a theoretical and experimental attempt to relate and contrast 2 traditionally separate research programs: inattentional blindness and attention capture. Inattentional blindness refers to failures to notice unexpected objects and events when attention is otherwise engaged. Attention capture research has traditionally used implicit indices (e.g., response times) to investigate automatic shifts of attention. Because attention capture usually measures performance whereas inattentional blindness measures awareness, the 2 fields have existed side by side with no shared theoretical framework. Here, the authors propose a theoretical unification, adapting several important effects from the attention capture literature to the context of sustained inattentional blindness. Although some stimulus properties can influence noticing of unexpected objects, the most influential factor affecting noticing is a person's own attentional goals. The authors conclude that many--but not all--aspects of attention capture apply to inattentional blindness but that these 2 classes of phenomena remain importantly distinct.     

What you see is what you want to get: Perceived abilities outperform objective test performance in predicting mate appeal in speed dating

Are intelligent, creative, and emotionally competent people more desirable? Evolution-based theories and studies on the ideal partner suggest that they are. We aimed to assess whether verbal, numerical, and spatial intelligence, creativity, and intra- and interpersonal emotional competence are associated with higher real-life mate appeal. In speed dates, 87 women and 88 men met up to 14 members of the opposite sex (2188 observations). While only one measured ability—women’s creativity—was significantly associated with mate appeal, ability perceptions by speed-dating partners could broadly predict mate appeal. Effects of perceived and measured abilities were substantially reduced after controlling for physical attractiveness. These results suggest that the investigated abilities play a lesser role in initial attraction than proposed in the past.     

What I think you see is what you get: Influence of prejudice on assimilation to negative meta‐stereotypes among Dutch Moroccan teenagers

This research examined how Dutch Moroccan teenagers in the Netherlands deal with the negative stereotype that they believe the Dutch have about their group. We hypothesize that Moroccans act in line with this negative image when they are prejudiced against the Dutch and feel personally meta‐stereotyped. A survey study among 88 Dutch Moroccan teenagers revealed that Moroccan teenagers who felt negative about the Dutch and thought that they were personally negatively stereotyped, expressed attitudes in line with this negative “meta‐stereotype.” That is, they act in line with the outgroup's negative image by legitimizing criminality, aggression, loitering teenagers, and Muslim extremism. These findings suggest that being confronted with a negative stereotype about one's group might sometimes lead to a reaction that is both harmful for the stereotyped group as well as society in general. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What you learn is what you see: using eye movements to study infant cross-situational word learning

Recent studies show that both adults and young children possess powerful statistical learning capabilities to solve the word-to-world mapping problem. However, the underlying mechanisms that make statistical learning possible and powerful are not yet known. With the goal of providing new insights into this issue, the research reported in this paper used an eye tracker to record the moment-by-moment eye movement data of 14-month-old babies in statistical learning tasks. Various measures are applied to such fine-grained temporal data, such as looking duration and shift rate (the number of shifts in gaze from one visual object to the other) trial by trial, showing different eye movement patterns between strong and weak statistical learners. Moreover, an information-theoretic measure is developed and applied to gaze data to quantify the degree of learning uncertainty trial by trial. Next, a simple associative statistical learning model is applied to eye movement data and these simulation results are compared with empirical results from young children, showing strong correlations between these two. This suggests that an associative learning mechanism with selective attention can provide a cognitively plausible model of cross-situational statistical learning. The work represents the first steps in using eye movement data to infer underlying real-time processes in statistical word learning.     

What you see is what will change: Evaluative conditioning effects depend on a focus on valence

This study investigated whether evaluative conditioning (EC) effects depend on an evaluative focus during the learning phase. An EC effect is a valence change of an originally neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus or CS) that is due to the former pairing with a positive or negative stimulus (unconditioned stimulus or US). In three experiments, the task focus during the conditioning phase was manipulated. Participants judged CS–US pairings either with respect to their valence or with respect to another stimulus dimension. EC effects on explicit and implicit measures were found when valence was task relevant but not when the non-valent stimulus dimension was task relevant. Two accounts for the valence focus effect are proposed: (1) An additional direct learning of the relation of CS and evaluative responses in the valence focus condition, or (2) a stronger activation of US valence in the valence focus condition compared to the non-valent focus condition.     

What you see is what will change: evaluative conditioning effects depend on a focus on valence

This study investigated whether evaluative conditioning (EC) effects depend on an evaluative focus during the learning phase. An EC effect is a valence change of an originally neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus or CS) that is due to the former pairing with a positive or negative stimulus (unconditioned stimulus or US). In three experiments, the task focus during the conditioning phase was manipulated. Participants judged CS-US pairings either with respect to their valence or with respect to another stimulus dimension. EC effects on explicit and implicit measures were found when valence was task relevant but not when the non-valent stimulus dimension was task relevant. Two accounts for the valence focus effect are proposed: (1) An additional direct learning of the relation of CS and evaluative responses in the valence focus condition, or (2) a stronger activation of US valence in the valence focus condition compared to the non-valent focus condition.     

Spatial reasoning with external visualizations: what matters is what you see, not whether you interact

Three experiments examined the effects of interactive visualizations and spatial abilities on a task requiring participants to infer and draw cross sections of a three-dimensional (3D) object. The experiments manipulated whether participants could interactively control a virtual 3D visualization of the object while performing the task, and compared participants who were allowed interactive control of the visualization to those who were not allowed control. In Experiment 1, interactivity produced better performance than passive viewing, but the advantage of interactivity disappeared in Experiment 2 when visual input for the two conditions in a yoked design was equalized. In Experiments 2 and 3, differences in how interactive participants manipulated the visualization were large and related to performance. In Experiment 3, non-interactive participants who watched optimal movements of the display performed as well as interactive participants who manipulated the visualization effectively and better than interactive participants who manipulated the visualization ineffectively. Spatial ability made an independent contribution to performance on the spatial reasoning task, but did not predict patterns of interactive behavior. These experiments indicate that providing participants with active control of a computer visualization does not necessarily enhance task performance, whereas seeing the most task-relevant information does, and this is true regardless of whether the task-relevant information is obtained actively or passively.     

What you expect is not always what you get: The roles of extremity, optimism, and pessimism in the behavioral confirmation process

Do pessimists and optimists elicit the very behavior they expect from others? What if their expectations are fairly extreme? Using a simulated job interview paradigm, evidence was found for behavioral confirmation of generalized future-event expectancies (optimism/pessimism) and for the moderating role of extremity. Interviewers with nonextreme expectancies gathered information in an expectancy-biased fashion and elicited expectancy-confirming behavior from applicants. However, as interviewer expectancies became more extreme, these effects were attenuated. Further evidence suggested that extremity is associated with effortful correction processes and awareness of bias. Interestingly, pessimistic applicants were more strongly influenced by interviewers’ expectancies than were optimistic applicants. The current study extends research on the social-cognitive consequences of generalized future-event expectancies and extremity to the behavioral domain.     

When your brain decides what you see: grouping across monocular, binocular, and stimulus rivalry

Research suggests that the neural concomitants of visual rivalry are contingent on the stimulus parameters, implying the existence of three different types of rivalry. Binocular rivalry (dissimilar patterns are presented, one to each eye) is seemingly mediated by interactions between pools of monocular neurons. Monocular rivalry (superimposed patterns are presented to one or both eyes) is presumably the result of competition between neural representations of the patterns. Stimulus rivalry (dissimilar patterns are swapped rapidly between the two eyes) is independent of eye of origin. In the experiment reported here, we integrated these three different types of rivalry into one stimulus. We found that perceptual alternations span the three types of rivalry, demonstrating that the brain can produce a coherent percept sourced from three different types of visual conflict. This result is in agreement with recent work suggesting that the resolution of competitive visual stimuli is mediated by a general mechanism spanning different levels of the visual-processing hierarchy.     

What you want (and do not want) affects what you see (and do not see): avoidance social goals and social events

Two studies examined the influence of approach and avoidance social goals on memory for and evaluation of ambiguous social information. Study 1 found that individual differences in avoidance social goals were associated with greater memory of negative information, negatively biased interpretation of ambiguous social cues, and a more pessimistic evaluation of social actors. Study 2 experimentally manipulated social goals and found that individuals high in avoidance social motivation remembered more negative information and expressed more dislike for a stranger in the avoidance condition than in the approach condition. Results suggest that avoidance social goals are associated with emphasizing potential threats when making sense of the social environment.     

Stability of functional equivalence and stimulus equivalence: effects of baseline reversals

Functional equivalence and stimulus equivalence classes were established, reversed, and tested for stability with college students. Functional stimulus classes were established using a task in which students were trained to say nonsense words in the presence of arbitrarily assigned sets of symbols. Computer-controlled speech-recognition technology was used to record and analyze students' vocal responses for accuracy. After the establishment of stimulus classes was demonstrated with a transfer-of-function test, the effects of reversing selected baseline simple discriminations were assessed during an additional transfer-of-function test and a follow-up test that occurred several weeks later. With the same students, stimulus equivalence classes were established and demonstrated with computerized matching-to-sample procedures. The effects of reversing selected baseline conditional discriminations also were assessed during a postreversal equivalence test and a follow-up test. Both functional stimulus classes and stimulus equivalence were sensitive to contingency reversals, but the reversals with stimulus equivalence closses affected stimulus class organization whereas reversals with functional stimulus classes did not. Follow-up performances were largely consistent with the original baseline contingencies. The similarities and differences between stimulus equivalence and functional equivalence are related to the specific contingencies that select responding in the presence of the stimuli that form the classes.     

When what you have is who you are: self-uncertainty leads individualists to see themselves in their possessions

Four studies tested whether uncertainty about the self-concept can motivate people, particularly individualists who define themselves in terms of their personal traits and characteristics, to perceive their material possessions as extensions of themselves (i.e., as self-expressive). In Study 1, European American participants rated their favorite pair of blue jeans as more self-expressive after being induced to feel self-uncertain, whereas Asian American participants did not. In Study 2, participants who scored high on a measure of individualism rated their cars as more self-expressive following a self-uncertainty manipulation. In Study 3, individualists (but not collectivists) rated their favorite possessions as more self-expressive after being subject to self-uncertainty; a manipulation of self-irrelevant uncertainty did not produce these results. In Study 4, thinking about a self-expressive (relative to utilitarian) possession bolstered self-certainty among individualists, but not collectivists. Implications for research on culture, the self-concept, and possessions are discussed.     

The (non-)benefit of choosing: If you get what you want it is not important that you chose it

Self-Determination Theory argues that autonomy plays a major role in intrinsic motivation. Autonomy can be operationalized as choice. Whether positive effects on motivation are caused by the mere act of choosing or by confounding variables is still unclear. In this study (N?=?299, M_age?=?13.1?±?0.6 years), students could work with two polarizing animals. The first group was allowed to choose (choosing & match), two groups were not. In these groups, the teacher allocated the animals to the students resulting in a second group that received the wanted animal (no choosing & match), and a third group that received the unwanted animal (no choosing & no match). Situational motivation and flow experience were assessed. Regarding intrinsic motivation and flow, students in the no choosing & match treatment scored the highest, students of the no choosing & no match group the lowest. In conclusion, matching and not choosing made the difference.     

When you don't quite get what you want: psychological and interpersonal consequences of claiming inclusion

People's success or failure to gain inclusion in groups may result from their own actions or the actions of others. Two studies compared the personal and interpersonal consequences of inclusion and exclusion when they resulted from these two processes. People's own failure to "claim" inclusion in a computerized ballgame was equally detrimental for fundamental needs and made people equally unlikely to behave prosocially to group members, as being denied inclusion by others. In contrast, the beneficial effects of inclusion depended on the process with which it was obtained, and meta-perceptions of warmth mediated these differences; people who succeeded to claim inclusion thought their interaction partners liked them less than people who were granted inclusion, and as a result, their fundamental needs were satisfied less, and they behaved less prosocially.