Introspection and perception

Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one's mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one's being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one's states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one's mental states the self plays the role of external reality in discourse about physical objects. Discourse about any sort of entity or property can be viewed as involving a domain or frame of reference which constrains what can be said about the entities; this view is related to Johnson-Laird's theory of mental models. On my approach evidence, including sensory evidence, may be involved in decisions about one's mental states. I conclude that while Shoemaker may well be right about different roles for sense impressions in introspection and perception, the exact differences and their significance remain to be established.     

Introspection and Necessity

What is the connection between being in a conscious mental state and believing that you yourself are currently in that state? On the one hand, it is natural to think that this connection is, or involves, a necessary connection of some sort. On the other hand, it is hard to know what the nature of this necessary connection is. For there are plausible arguments according to which this connection is not metaphysically necessary, not rationally necessary, and not merely naturally necessary. If these arguments are correct, and if these options are exhaustive, while there is a necessary connection between a conscious state and the belief that you are in it, there is apparently no necessary connection it could be! This paper sets out this problem—the necessary connection problem, I will call it—and defends and explores a novel proposal about how to solve it.     

Introspection and inference

In this paper I develop the idea that, by answering the question whether p, you can answer the question whether you believe that p. In particular, I argue that judging that p is a fallible yet basic guide to whether one believes that p. I go on to defend my view from an important skeptical challenge, according to which my view would make it too easy to reject skeptical hypotheses about our access to our minds. I close by responding to the opposing view on which our beliefs themselves constitute our only source of first-person access to our beliefs.     

Introspection and subliminal perception

Subliminal perception (SP) is today considered a well-supported theory stating that perception can occur without conscious awareness and have a significant impact on later behaviour and thought. In this article, we first present and discuss different approaches to the study of SP. In doing this, we claim that most approaches are based on a dichotomic measure of awareness. Drawing upon recent advances and discussions in the study of introspection and phenomenological psychology, we argue for both the possibility and necessity of using an elaborated measure of subjective states. In the second part of the article, we present findings where these considerations are implemented in an empirical study. The results and implications are discussed in detail, both with reference to SP, and in relation to the more general problem of using elaborate introspective reports as data in relation to studies of cognition.     

哲学的反思与超验

哲学作为“思想的思想”之认识论定位,表明它具有强烈的反思性,亦构成了它的超验性。哲学反思与超验思想的特质,由哲学之认识对象及其与对象的本质关系所规定,亦由哲学之穷是究理的至上性思维使命与中介性递进过程所规定。它们是哲学之谓的重要思想理据。     

Introspection and phenomenological method

It is argued that the work of Husserl offers a model for self-knowledge that avoids the disadvantages of standard introspectionist accounts and of a Sellarsian view of the relation between our perceptual judgements and derived judgements about appearances. Self-knowledge is based on externally directed knowledge of the world that is then subjected to a cognitive transformation analogous to the move from a statement to the activity of stating. Appearance talk is (contra Sellars) not an epistemically non-committal form of speech, but talk to which we are fully committed. However, it is a commitment to a certain kind of claim about our experiences, viewed as cognitive phenomena, after a process of transformation. Such reductive and hypostatizing transformations can exhibit the intentional structure of consciousness. Phenomenology thus gives a form of knowledge about our mental states that is first personal but not introspective knowledge in any philosophically problematic sense. The account offered is also, in key respects, dissimilar to Sellars's outer directed view of the origin of self-knowledge.     

Introspection and Authoritative Self-Knowledge

In this paper I outline and defend an introspectionist account of authoritative self-knowledge for a certain class of cases, ones in which a subject is both thinking and thinking about a current, conscious thought. My account is distinctive in a number of ways, one of which is that it is compatible with the truth of externalism—the view that the contents of subjects’ intentional states are individuation-dependent on factors external to their minds. It is thus decidedly anti-Cartesian, despite being introspectionist. My argument proceeds in three stages. A virtue of the position I develop is that the epistemic features on which it is based also apply to sensations and to non-episodic intentional states, to the extent that one has authoritative knowledge of them. However, despite the appeal to analogies with observable properties of objects of perception, the account is not a ‘perceptual’ model of such knowledge in the sense that those such as Shoemaker, Burge and others have in mind. Because the features on which the analogy is based are abstract and general, they are not tied to cases of observation alone. Those who appeal to such phenomena as ‘intellectual experience’ (Burge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, 91–116, 1996) or ‘intellectual intuition’ (Bealer, Philosophical perspectives, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 29–55, 1999) in their accounts of authoritative self-knowledge may well appeal to such features. This, amongst other factors, distinguishes the position from other introspectionist ones in a way that makes it immune to standard objections to perceptual models of self-knowledge.

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Divided attention: Storing and classifying briefly presented objects

Although in many studies divided attention has been examined by having people perform the same task (e.g., report or search) with a large number of objects, in few studies have people had to perform two logically independent tasks involving the same brief display. In two experiments, subjects saw 200-msec arrays of characters. In dual-task blocks, theyclassified the color of some or all of the items (making an immediate response) andstored the shape of some of the items for a later recognition test. There was not much mutual interference between classifying and storing per se. However, the tasks were by no means independent: there was substantial interference whendifferent objects from the array had to be stored for one task and classified for the other. The results confirm that wholly unrelated visual tasks depend on the same input-attention system and suggest that attending to an object for any purpose may entail storing a representation of it in visual short-term memory.     

Review Essay: The Divided Church and its Theology

Book reviewed in this article:
Ephraim Radner, The end of the Church: A Pneumatology of Christian Division in the West     

内省的心理学新探─—自我观察与心理调适

本文对内省作为一种心理学的基本方法作了历史回顾。作者还把内省看作人的某种个性倾向或心理特征尝试进行实证研究。调查结果表明,内省在被试看来,是自我概念形成与发展所必不可少的。结果还使作者确信,对内省联系个体心理与行为的调适作实证研究,不仅可行,而且有益。     

Prospective Memory and Divided Attention

In three experiments, we manipulated the processing demands of a concurrent task to test the hypothesis that an event-based prospective memory task satisfies a criterion of automaticity proposed by Hasher and Zacks (1979). As in the previous studies, a prospective memory task (pressing a key whenever a target word was presented) was embedded within a short-term memory task (remembering seven words). In addition, participants performed a concurrent memory task which varied in difficulty. Participants repeated either 0 to 6 randomly generated digits or a single word. In all three experiments, short-term memory performance was influenced by the concurrent memory load. Prospective performance, in contrast, was not affected by the memory load even though an attempt was made to increase the difficulty of the prospective task by manipulating the specificity of the target instructions (Experiment 2) and the number of target words (Experiments 2 and 3). The results are discussed within the framework of automatic processing.     

A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection

Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature of their referents in a partial and incomplete manner, a posteriori physicalism is safe.