Knowing One’s Own Self: An Analysis of Vivekananda’s Approach to One’s Identity

A successful declaration of one’s identity in saying “ahaṃ Brahmāsmi” is a result of knowing one’s own self as indistinguishable from Brahman. The non-difference between oneself and the Brahman is one’s true identity, and it goes without saying, knowledge of one’s true identity constitutes the correct knowing of one’s own self. That the said non-difference is upheld by vedānta, and we need to put this ideal non-difference into practice is the crux of Vivekananda’s practical vedānta. Vivekananda gives certain reasons for the practicability of vedānta. This paper’s part I is an exposition of Vivekananda’s practical vedānta, focussing on those reasons for practical vedānta and orienting each towards an analytical understanding. In part II, a linguistic analysis of Vivekananda’s approach to one’s identity has been carried out after introducing J. Hintikka’s interpretation of Descartes’ “I think, therefore, I am” and G. Misra’s interpretation of sat (existence, reality or being) cit (consciousness, knowledge or cognition) ānanda (bliss, intense happiness or felicity). The latter’s interpretation displays a positivist’s linguistic analysis of vedānta, whereas the former’s does a speech act theorist’s analysis of Descartes’ cogito principle. The present analysis indicates that practical vedānta can be read in the light of analytic philosophy and Vivekananda’s approach to one’s identity can be understood in terms of speech acts.

     

Antiphasis as Homonym in Aristotle

Antiphasis is a case of core-dependent homonymy, and has three significations in Aristotle's philosophy: (1) antiphasis as an opposition between propositions (a propositional signification); (2) antiphasis as the opposition between ‘subject’ and ‘not a subject’ in coming-to-be and perishing (an ontological signification); and (3) antiphasis as the opposition between possession and privation (an ontological signification). Argument based on the fifth type of priority described in Cat. 12 shows that, for Aristotle, the ontological significations are prior to the propositional.     

Quine’s Behaviorism and Linguistic Meaning: Why Quine’s Behaviorism is not Illicit

Some of Quine’s critics charge that he arrives at a behavioristic account of linguistic meaning by starting from inappropriately behavioristic assumptions (Kripke 1982, 14; Searle 1987, 123). Quine has even written that this account of linguistic meaning is a consequence of his behaviorism (Quine 1992, 37). I take it that the above charges amount to the assertion that Quine assumes the denial of one or more of the following claims: (1) Language-users associate mental ideas with their linguistic expressions. (2) A language-user can have a private theory of linguistic meaning which guides his or her use of language. (3) Language learning relies on innate mechanisms. Call an antecedent denial of one or more of these claims illicit behaviorism. In this paper I show that Quine is prepared to grant, if only for the sake of argument, all three of the above claims. I argue that his claim that “there is nothing in linguistic meaning beyond what is to be gleaned from overt behavior in observable circumstances” is unscathed by these allowances (Quine 1992, 38). And I show that the behaviorism which Quine does assume should be viewed as a largely uncontroversial aspect of his evidential empiricism. I conclude that if one sets out to dismiss Quine’s arguments for internal-meaning skepticism, this dismissal should not be motivated by the charge that his conclusions rely on the illicitly behavioristic assumptions that some have suggested that they do.     

Free Will and Mental Powers

In this paper, we investigate how contemporary metaphysics of powers can further an understanding of agent-causal theories of free will. The recent upsurge of such ontologies of powers and the understanding of causation it affords promises to demystify the notion of an agent-causal power. However, as we argue pace (Mumford and Anjum in Analysis 74:20–25, 2013; Am Philos Q 52:1–12, 2015a), the very ubiquity of powers also poses a challenge to understanding in what sense exercises of an agent’s power to act could still be free—neither determined by external circumstances, nor random, but self-determined. To overcome this challenge, we must understand what distinguishes the power to act from ordinary powers. We suggest this difference lies in its rational nature, and argue that existing agent-causal accounts (e.g., O’Connor in Libertarian views: dualist and agent-causal theories, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002; Lowe in Personal agency: the metaphysics of mind and action, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) fail to capture the sense in which the power to act is rational. A proper understanding, we argue, requires us to combine the recent idea that the power to act is a ‘two-way power’ (e.g., Steward in A metaphysics for freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012b; Lowe (in: Groff, Greco (eds) Powers and capacities in philosophy: the new aristotelianism, Routledge, New York, 2013) with the idea that it is intrinsically rational. We sketch the outlines of an original account that promises to do this. On this picture, what distinguishes the power to act is its special generality—the power to act, unlike ordinary powers, does not come with any one typical manifestation. We argue that this special generality can be understood to be a feature of the capacity to reason. Thus, we argue, an account of agent-causation that can further our understanding of free will requires us to recognize a specifically rational or mental variety of power.

     

Anti-Skepticism Under a Linguistic Guise

In this paper I consider the plausibility of developing anti-skepticism by framing the question in linguistic terms: instead of asking whether we know, we ask what falls within the extension of the word “know”. I first trace two previous attempts to develop anti-skepticism in this way, from Austin (particularly as presented by Kaplan) and from epistemic contextualism, and I present reasons to think that both approaches are unsuccessful. I then focus on a recently popular attempt to develop anti-skepticism from the “function-first” approach associated with Craig, which I also show to be problematic. I then argue that the apparent prima facie plausibility of fighting skepticism on linguistic grounds is due to a methodological spill-over from linguistics. Once we recognize this, it becomes clear that the skepticism debate should not be conducted in linguistic terms.

     

The illocutionary force of laws

This article provides a speech act analysis of ‘crime-enacting’ provisions in criminal statutes, focusing on the illocutionary force of these provisions. These provisions commonly set out not only particular crimes and their characteristics but also their associated penalties. Enactment of a statute brings into force new social facts, typically norms, through the official utterance of linguistic material. These norms are supposed to guide behaviour: they tell us what we must, may, or must not do. Our main claim is that the illocutionary force of such provisions is primarily ‘world-creating’, i.e. effective, or declarational, rather than directive (behaviour-guiding). We assume that directive illocutionary force is either direct or indirect, showing that provisions need not contain the linguistic items that make for direct directives and that according to standard tests no indirect directive is present. A potential counter-argument is that any utterance serving to direct behaviour is necessarily a directive. We show that this behaviour-directing property is shared by some clear non-directives.     

The Awful English Language

Abstract

The ever-increasing dominance of English within analytic philosophy is an aspect of linguistic globalisation. To assess it, I first address fundamental issues in the philosophy of language. Steering a middle course between linguistic universalism and linguistic relativism, I deny that some languages might be philosophically superior to others, notably by capturing the essential categories of reality. On this background I next consider both the pros and cons of the Anglicisation of (analytic) philosophy. I shall defend the value of English as a lingua franca, while denying both the feasibility and the desirability of English as the sole universal language of philosophy. Finally I turn to the linguistic inequality in contemporary analytic philosophy. While it does not per se amount to an injustice, there is a need to level the playing field. But the remedy does not lie in linguistic academic sectarianism. Instead, what might be called for are piecemeal measures to reduce explicit and implicit biases against analytic philosophers on the geographic fringes, biases that are only partly connected to the predominance of English.     

Saying and Doing: Speech Actions,Speech Acts and Related Events

The question which this paper examines is that of the correct scope of the claim that extra‐linguistic factors (such as gender and social status) can block the proper workings of natural language. The claim that this is possible has been put forward under the apt label of silencing in the context of Austinian speech act theory. The ‘silencing’ label is apt insofar as when one's ability to exploit the inherent dynamic of language is ‘blocked’ by one's gender or social status then one might justly be said to be silenced. The notion that factors independent of any person's linguistic competence might block her ability to exploit the inherent dynamic of language is of considerable social as well as theoretical significance. I shall defend the claim that factors independent of a person's linguistic competence can indeed block her ability to do things with words but I will show that the cases that have been previously considered to be cases of illocutionary failure are instances of rhetic or locutionary act failure instead. I shall refine the silencing claim as previously advanced in the debate in at least one fundamental respect. I also show that considering the metaphysics of speech acts clarifies many of the issues previously appearing as thorny bones of contention between those who hold that the only notion of silencing that is coherent is that of physically preventing someone from speaking or writing and those who hold the opposite sort of claim sketched above.     

On Magari's concept of general calculus: notes on the history of tarski's methodology of deductive sciences

This paper is an historical study of Tarski's methodology of deductive sciences (in which a logic S is identified with an operator Cn _S , called the consequence operator, on a given set of expressions), from its appearance in 1930 to the end of the 1970s, focusing on the work done in the field by Roberto Magari, Piero Mangani and by some of their pupils between 1965 and 1974, and comparing it with the results achieved by Tarski and the Polish school (?o?, Suszko, S?upecki, Pogorzelski, Wójcicki). In the last section of the paper we will then compare these works with some recent developments in algebraic logic: this will lead to a better understanding of the results of the methodology of deductive science, but at the same time will show some intrinsic limits to such an approach to logic.

Even if Magari's work on diagonizable algebras and universal algebra and Mangani's axiomatization of MV-algebras and results in model theory are rather famous, the articles on closure operators, published in the 1960s, are almost totally unknown outside Italy (mainly because of a linguistic limitation, the papers we analyse having been written and published in Italian). This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature and to enable the international community to get acquainted with this part of Italian logic. The same applies to some works published in Barcelona (in Catalan) at the end of the 1970s, analysed in the last section.     

Axiomatic world theory: An overview the general theory of evolution in brief

The world, its many subsystems and all their theories, starting with logic, can be reduced to two related functions: a combinatorial system generator and a hamiltonian system organizer. These can be derived, in turn, from an Axiom of Lawfulness, the expansion being guided by pseudo‐category and pseudo‐functor analysis to produce an axiomatic theory of the world or general theory of evolution. Specifically, world evolution is generated by a constrained combinatorial world generator, F:G_(X), deduced from two related axioms: I. The Axiom of World Lawfulness and II. The Axiom of World Constraint Constants, c = c₁, c₂, of primordial physical combinatee (substance), c₁, and physical combinator (motion), c₂.

Axiom I postulates a lawful analysis by an analyzer adhering to appropriate coordinate systems, CS, of a lawful analysand obeying a conservation law, X = X. The analysand consists of a base combinatee (the set and elements), X = {x₁, x₂,… x_n}, and a base combinator, namely, the universal Boolean operator, NOR = NOT + OR. Base combinatee and combinator both have attributes of quantity combinatorially generated by NOR operating on the universal number, 1, and of quality generated by NOR operating on the universal dimensions, MLT (mass, length, time), including the null sets.

Axiom II fixes the base constants, c, = c₁, c₂, thereby converting X to material substance using c₁ and NOR to material motion using c₂. This comprehensive, quality and quantity‐competent foundational science is called Universal Combinatorics. Its elements comprise the logical alphabet or metavector, A = {c, 1, MLT; X, NOR}, where c is obtained from the remaining terms. These give: (1) the attributive pseudo‐functor, F = P_(c,1,MLT), where P is the power set of the indicated attributes, and (2) the logic generator, G_(X), where G = NOR_(NOR). F then maps G_(X) into world evolution, F:G_(X) → world evolution, as follows:

Expanding the abstract generator, F₁:G,_(x), with world constants eliminated, i.e., c = 0, generates Universal Grammar consisting of (1) the substantive content of the abstract science chain running from linguistic grammar to mathematics and logic and (2) a comprehensive epistemology equivalent to an explicit theory of the strategic aspects of the scientific method, including a universal hamiltonian theory structure informally related to a mathematical category. The four epistemological theorems are:

1. I. The Combinatorial System Generator, F:G_(X), (read as “The attributive functor, F, maps the logic generator, G_(X), into world theory” or “The world is an attributive combinatorial function of logic").

2. II. The Hamiltonian System Operating Theorem, h (an abstract theory‐category structure).

3. III. The System Stability Theorem, PI?, where PI is the extremal Performance Index or controlling law.

4. IV. The Intersystem Abstraction Ranking Theorem given by the Attributive Functor/ Function, F.

F₂ admits the world constants, c > 0, to materialize the grammar generator, G_(X), to an homologous concrete Euler combinatorial physical wave generator, namely, the superstring equation of quantum theory, E_(NI) = A(σ,τ), where E is the permutational function, NI, is the set of nonintegers and the solution is the dual amplitude, σ,τ. Expanding generates the elementary particles of nonadaptive physics and, by inference, the substantive content of Universal Physics consisting of three additional primary systems comprising the world, where a primary system is defined as one having a distinct but derivative extremal controlling law:

1. I. Nonadaptive physics and chemistry (harmonic hamiltonian wave systems) : Minimize Action, subject to conservation constraints.

2. II. Adaptive physics or biology (membrane bound duplicating polymer‐copolymer hamiltonian systems) : Maximize Survival, subject to energy constraints.

3. III. Sentient physics or sociopsychology (neuromatrix hamiltonian systems) : Maximize subjective Happiness, subject to survival constraints and

4. IV. Representational physics or language (a symbolic combinatorial routine): Maximizes the Information Gain, subject to happiness constraints.

The world can then be viewed as a perpetual superfluid computer implicitly using the epistemology of Axiom I as a world program to process the physical data base, c > 0, of Axiom II into world evolution. After evolving through Systems I and II, mankind, i.e., System III, evolves as an internal metacomputer which makes the combinatorial program explicit and uses it to put all four primary systems in standard hamiltonian theory (pseudo‐category) format and terminology. This can be viewed as a generalization of the Darwinian variation‐and‐selection theme in which combinatorial‐variation is recursively hamiltonian‐selected thereby incrementing world logic and logic constraints on successive primary systems. Because Universal Physics and Universal Grammar are functor‐related homologous concrete and abstract combinatorial pseudocategories, related by a pseudo‐functor, thus, differing only in the presence and absence, respectively, of the World Constants, c ≥ 0, they constitute, ipso facto, Universal Science (Formal Philosophy, World Evolution, World Unification, Explicit Theory of Everything, ETOE, or Axiomatic World Theory).

QED: Because intricate verified predictions, ranging from particles to personality types, mental disorders, political parties and the abstract sciences, result from a system which is merely expanding to fill its possibility set, it is concluded that the world is lawful and that this means it is an object deterministic but not fully analytically determinable combinatorial system. In the object domain, the world is system‐number complete at four. Dually, in the analytical codomain, understanding of it is approximately complete, as measured by a world information gain function. Hence, the dualistic, analysand‐analyzer world program is finite and has dualistic completion criteria, as required of an involuted program.     

Beyond the representation field

Abstract

This article outlines the importance of representation and several Freudian concepts such as Vorstellung, Trieb, and word and object representations. The author refers to the division of the analytical process into two main fields: the field of representation, and the field of the Real, which is characterized by impossibility. He then states that this field is the proper field of psychoanalysis. The author presents two clinical vignettes in an attempt to demonstrate the significance of the analytical act as a tool to deal with such extreme psychic situations.     

Violinists Run Amuck in South Dakota: Screen Doors Down in the Badlands!

Abstract

This paper proposes and defends an account of what it is to act for reasons. In the first part, I will discuss the desire-belief and the deliberative model of acting for reasons. I will argue that we can avoid the weaknesses and retain the strengths of both views, if we pursue an alternative according to which acting for reasons involves taking something as a reason. In the main part, I will develop an account of what it is to take something as a reason for action. On the basis of this, I will then offer a new account of what it is to act for reasons.     

Reducing women’s lack of fit with leadership positions? Effects of the wording of job advertisements

Linguistic forms which refer to individuals impact mental representations of these individuals: When masculine generics are used, women tend to be cognitively underrepresented, whereas feminine–masculine word pairs are associated with a higher cognitive inclusion of women. The present research investigates whether linguistic forms affect women’s perceived lack of fit with leadership positions, which is particularly pronounced for high-status leadership positions. In a hiring-simulation experiment (N = 363), we tested the effects of different linguistic forms used in German-language job advertisements: (1) masculine forms (e.g., Geschäftsführer, ‘CEO, masc.’); (2) masculine forms with (m/f) (e.g., Geschäftsführer (m/w), ‘CEO, masc. (m/f)’); and (3) word pairs (e.g., Geschäftsführerin/Geschäftsführer, ‘CEO, fem./CEO, masc.’). The job ads announced either a high- or low-status leadership position. Results showed that female applicants were perceived to fit less well with the high-status position than male applicants when either the masculine or the masculine form with (m/f) was used––even though they were perceived to be equally competent. However, female and male applicants were perceived as fitting the high-status leadership position similarly well when word pairs were used.     

Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions

The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be given independent philosophical motivations within anintentionalist view of truth and predication.     

An investigation of the use of linguistic probes “by” and “in order to” in assessing moral grammar

Proponents of the linguistic analogy suggest that methodologies originally developed for investigating linguistic grammar can also be fruitfully applied to the empirical study of moral grammar: the causal and intentional representations of moral events which – according to the linguistic analogy – drive moral judgements. In the current study, we put this claim to the empirical test. Participants were presented with moral dilemmas which previously have been shown to implement a central principle in moral judgements: the principle of double effect (PDE). Participants responded to by and in order to probes to assess causal and intentional representations of this principle. Results show that these linguistic probes do not relate to moral judgement in the manner predicted by proponents of the linguistic analogy and moral grammar. Although the linguistic analogy is a theoretically rich framework, the procedures posited to give it empirical traction require revision.     

Am I You?

It has been suggested that a rational being stands in what is called a “second-personal relation” to herself. According to philosophers like S. Darwall and Ch. Korsgaard, being a rational agent is to interact with oneself, to make demands on oneself. The thesis of the paper is that this view rests on a logical confusion. Transitive verbs like “asking”, “making a demand” or “obligating” can occur with the reflexive pronoun, but it is a mistake to assume that the reflexive and the non-reflexive use exhibit the same logical grammar. The thesis that they do is in part motivated by the assumption that to show that my relation to you bears the same form as my practical self-relation is to show that, fundamentally, you are not an object for me to think about and act on, but a subject with whom to think and act together. I argue, to the contrary, that if my addressing you exhibited the same form as a relation I could literally be said to stand in to myself, then the nexus between us would be such that I am irretrievably alienated from you. To allow the possibility of addressing oneself is to assume one of the following accounts of the second-person pronoun. Either one has to follow R. Heck and conceive it as a merely linguistic phenomenon whose content can be analyzed in terms of “the person to whom I'm now speaking”; or one has to internalize the second person and follow Ch. Korsgaard in taking its prior use to be entirely within and independent of its linguistic expression. But to account for the idea of mutual recognition requires a third view according to which address is an act of mind sui generis for which linguistic expression is essential.     

Jen,love and universality—Three arguments concerning jen in Confucianism

Universality, rather than partiality, is the characteristic of Confucian jen. This article puts forward three arguments to clarify confusion of interpretation: (1) that jen, rather than shu, is the main thread running through the whole system of Confucianism, and that by its two procedures of chung and shu, it presents itself as an integration of one's self with others; (2) that jen, as love, does not signify a natural preference, but an ethical refinement of an ordinary feeling of fondness, that it derives from such a feeling but goes beyond it, and that it functions as a universal commitment which begins with family affection but is not limited to it; (3) that jen, as universal love, is deontological in motive, not only in contrast to a mutuality of love but also in opposition to a utilitarianism of love.