Photography as unconcealment: revisiting the idea of photographic transparency

What distinguishes photography from other visual mediums? This deceptively simple but fundamental question has been at the centre of both past and current debates on the aesthetics of photography for quite some time. In this article, I will first address the premise that this question is intrinsically ontological and unfolded in pioneering debates as a sequence of implications about photographic indexicality. I will then argue that the ontological implications of photographic indexicality have been largely overlooked in subsequent research due to scholars’ concerns with how photography appears to us rather than what photography is in itself. To this end, I will specifically examine Kendall Walton's highly contested transparency thesis and some of its rebuttals, which have exerted a sprawling influence on debates on the aesthetics of photography. I will also argue that, having been exceedingly implicit in his account, what appears as indexicality to Walton and the implications thereof with respect to the transparency argument has operated on a phenomenological level; thus, the thesis itself has failed in instances in which the problem of representation and the very existence of the medium come into play. Finally, I will suggest that indexicality can be regarded as a distinctive feature of photography only when it is considered a predicate of transparency as an interstice of ‘unconcealment’ in the Heideggerian sense that would call into question the very existence of the representation and the photographic medium.     

Bogen and Woodward’s data-phenomena distinction,forms of theory-ladenness,and the reliability of data

Some twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the received view, namely the theory-observation dichotomy and argued for the introduction of the further category of scientific phenomena. The latter, Bogen and Woodward stressed, are usually unobservable and inferred from what is indeed observable, namely scientific data. Crucially, Bogen and Woodward claimed that theories predict and explain phenomena, but not data. But then, of course, the thesis of theory-ladenness, which has it that our observations are influenced by the theories we hold, cannot apply. On the basis of two case studies, I want to show that this consequence of Bogen and Woodward’s account is rather unrealistic. More importantly, I also object against Bogen and Woodward’s view that the reliability of data, which constitutes the precondition for data-to-phenomena inferences, can be secured without the theory one seeks to test. The case studies I revisit have figured heavily in the publications of Bogen and Woodward and others: the discovery of weak neutral currents and the discovery of the zebra pattern of magnetic anomalies. I show that, in the latter case, data can be ignored if they appear to be irrelevant from a particular theoretical perspective (TLI) and that, in the former case, the tested theory can be critical for the assessment of the reliability of the data (TLA). I argue that both TLI and TLA are much stronger senses of theory-ladenness than the classical thesis and that neither TLI nor TLA can be accommodated within Bogen and Woodward’s account.     

The Limits of Photography

Abstract

This paper is about what counts as a photograph and what does not. One way in which this question arises stems from new technologies that keep changing our way of producing photographs, such as digital photography, which not only has now widely replaced traditional film photography but also challenges the very limits of what we count as a photograph. I shall discuss below at some length different aspects of digital photography, but also want to focus here on a new striking type of photographic camera, announced in early 2012 by Lytro, Inc., namely, the so-called ‘Light Field Camera’, which is said to represent a revolution in the photographic world. Indeed, unlike in the case of any previously available cameras, the photographs produced by a Light Field Camera can be re-focused after the photograph has been taken, which harbours many interesting consequences with regard to the resulting image and the way we interact with it. But of course, the initial question also arises in the case of traditional film photography as well as ‘traditional’ digital photography. The question amounts to asking about what the essential features of photographs are – in short, what their nature is.     

Photographing in the Art Museum: Visitor Attitudes and Motivations

There is an animated debate in popular media about whether or not photography should be allowed in art museums. However, there is limited research that examines how visitors themselves feel about visitor photography and the reasons why they choose to take (or not take) photographs in museums. This research, conducted at the Smithsonian National Portrait Gallery in Washington, DC, uses semistructured, in-depth interviews and photo elicitation with 40 adults to examine visitors' attitudes to using photography inside art museums and their motivations for doing so. The research results suggest that visitors with positive attitudes towards visitor photography see photographic devices as tools that enhance certain aspects of the museum experience, promote further education, and provide entry points to exhibitions and a more interactive, personal experience. Those with negative attitudes see photographic devices as mediating and distracting lenses that have a detrimental effect on intimate experiences with artworks. Many of the participants with negative attitudes still use photographic devices because they believe that the risk of diminishing art experiences in the museum is worth taking, considering the potential uses of photography. The six main motivations for taking photographs in museums are (a) to aid memory, (b) to share, (c) for further research, (d) to inspire, (e) as building material for self-identity, and (f) as an art form in its own right.     

Wofür sprechen die Daten?

What Do the Data Tell Us? Justification of scientific theories is a three-place relation between data, theories, and background knowledge. Though this should be a commonplace, many methodologies in science neglect it. The article will elucidate the significance and function of our background knowledge in epistemic justification and their consequences for different scientific methodologies. It is argued that there is no simple and at the same time acceptable statistical algorithm that justifies a given theory merely on the basis of certain data. And even if we think to know the probability of a theory, that does not decide whether we should accept it or not.     

Empirical evidence claims are a priori

This paper responds to Achinstein’s criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein’s objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues that the a priori and empirical accounts of evidence are on a par when we consider scientific practice, but that a study of artificial intelligence might serve to differentiate them.     

Diagonalisation and Church's Thesis: Kleene's Homework

In this paper we will discuss the active part played by certain diagonal arguments in the genesis of computability theory.

These enigmatical words by Kleene were our point of departure:

When Church proposed this thesis, I sat down to disprove it by diagonalizing out of the class of the λ–definable functions. But, quickly realizing that the diagonalization cannot be done effectively, I became overnight a supporter of the thesis. (1981, p. 59)     

Davidson and Sellars on “Two Images”

Davidson’s anomalous monism is based on the assumption that a human being can be described or accounted for in two very different ways, using two very different and indeed incommensurable conceptual frameworks, namely the physicalistic vocabulary of science and the mentalistic vocabulary employed by the ‘theories’ we make about each other when we interact and communicate. Also Sellars maintains that we have two alternative pictures of the world and especially of us humans as its parts, namely the scientific image and the manifest image. At first sight, the views of the two philosophers may seem quite similar; however, the true extent of this apparent similarity is worth exploring. To that end, in this paper we tackle the following questions: Are Sellars’ reasons for claiming the irreducibility of his manifest image to the scientific image the same or similar to those that Davidson has for asserting the irreducibility of his mentalistic idiom to the scientific one? Is the normativity informing Sellars’ manifest image of the same kind as that informing Davidson’s mentalistic idiom? Do the notions of rationality considered by Sellars and Davidson coincide?     

Idealizations and scientific understanding

In this paper, I propose that the debate in epistemology concerning the nature and value of understanding can shed light on the role of scientific idealizations in producing scientific understanding. In philosophy of science, the received view seems to be that understanding is a species of knowledge. On this view, understanding is factive just as knowledge is, i.e., if S knows that p, then p is true. Epistemologists, however, distinguish between different kinds of understanding. Among epistemologists, there are those who think that a certain kind of understanding??objectual understanding??is not factive, and those who think that objectual understanding is quasi-factive. Those who think that understanding is not factive argue that scientific idealizations constitute cognitive success, which we then consider as instances of understanding, and yet they are not true. This paper is an attempt to draw lessons from this debate as they pertain to the role of idealizations in producing scientific understanding. I argue that scientific understanding is quasi-factive.     

On the process of comparing sentences against pictures

The present study outlines a theory of how people compare sentences against pictures. This theory was tested in four experiments in which Ss were timed as they judged whether a sentence (e.g., Star isn't above plus) was true or false of a picture (e.g., ⁺_∗). The latencies in these tasks were consistent with the thesis that: (1) sentences are represented in terms of elementary propositions; (2) pictures are encoded in the same interpretive format; (3) these two codes are compared in an algorithmic series of mental operations, each of which contributes additively to the response latency; and (4) sentence encoding, picture encoding, comparing, and responding are four serially ordered stages, and their component latencies are additive. From these results, it was also possible to rule out certain explanations based on visual imagery, conversion (e.g., converting isn't above into is below), reading time, normative word frequencies, and other factors. Finally, it was shown that this theory is consistent with previous studies on sentence comprehension, sentence verification, concept verification, and other related phenomena.     

A Critique of Wolfhart Pannenberg's Scientific Theology

Abstract

In Theology and the Philosophy of Science, Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that theology is on a par with the natural sciences, insofar as theological statements are hypotheses subject to confirmation or disconfirmation by experience. He defends his thesis by claiming that theology makes truth-claims about reality; and, second, that these are verifiable in the same sense that scientific statements are. I will argue that this thesis is wrong; and that the first claim could be right in a sense that has yet to be made clear; the second is not defensible even if fleshed out by some conceivable scientific scenario.     

Understanding the ‘active’ in ‘enactive’

Much recent work on cognition is characterized by an augmentation of the role of action coupled with an attenuation of the role of representation. This coupling is no accident. The appeal to action is seen either as a way of explaining representation or explaining it away. This paper argues that the appeal to action as a way of explaining, supplementing, or even supplanting, representation can lead to a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the concept of action to which we appeal cannot, on pain of circularity, be a representational concept. Such an appeal would presuppose representation and therefore can neither explain it nor explain it away. On the other hand, I shall argue, if the concept of action to which we appeal is not a representational one, there is every reason for supposing that it will not be the sort of thing that can explain, or supplement, let alone supplant, representation. The resulting dilemma, I shall argue, is not fatal. But avoiding it requires us to embrace a certain thesis about the nature of action, a thesis whose broad outline this paper delineates. Anyone who wishes to employ action as a way of explaining or explaining away representation should, I shall argue, take this conception of action very seriously indeed. I am going to discuss these issues with respect to a influential recent contribution to this debate: the sensorimotor or enactive model of perception developed by Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë.     

Apparent depth of pictures reflected by a mirror: The plastic effect

We investigated the plastic effect in picture perception, in which the apparent depth of a picture is increased when it is reflected by a mirror. The plastic effect was well known in the mid-18th century, but very few studies have elucidated its nature. In Experiment 1, we examined how often the plastic effect occurs in different ocular conditions. A group of 22 observers compared directly observed pictures and their mirror-reflected images in each of free-binocular, free-monocular, and restrictive-monocular conditions. When the observers were forced to choose the picture that appeared greater in depth, 73?% of them chose the reflected pictures, regardless of oculomotor condition. In Experiment 2, we examined how often the plastic effect is detected as a function of observation time. When 22 observers compared a directly watched movie and its mirror-reflected movie for 5?min, the number of observers who judged the reflected movie to be greater in depth was about 55?% at the onset of the trial but was 86?% at the end. In Experiment 3, we examined transfer of the plastic effect. Ten observers judged the change in apparent depth of directly observed pictures after prolonged exposure to the same reflected or actual pictures. Transfer was confirmed and was greater for pictures that represented greater depth (r = .88). We suggested that the plastic effect is mainly induced by the double apparent locations of a reflected picture. From the long incubation time and the transfer to real pictures, we also suggested that it involves perceptual learning regarding visual skill.     

Kuhn’s notion of scientific progress: “Reduction” between incommensurable theories in a rigid structuralist framework

In the last two sections of Structure, Thomas Kuhn first develops his famous threefold conception of the incommensurability of scientific paradigms and, subsequently, a conception of scientific progress as growth of empirical strength. The latter conception seems to be at odds with the former in that semantic incommensurability appears to imply the existence of situations where scientific progress in Kuhns sense can no longer exist. In contrast to this seeming inconsistency of Kuhns conception, we will try to show in this study that the semantic incommensurability of scientific terms appears to be fully compatible with scientific progress. Our argumentation is based on an improved version of the formalization of Kuhns conception as developed in the 1970s by Joseph Sneed and Wolfgang Stegmüller: In order to be comparable, incommensurable theories need the specification of relations that refer to the concrete ontologies of these theories and involve certain truth claims. The original structuralist account of reduction fails to provide such relations, because (1) it is too structural and (2) it is too wide. Moreover, the original structuralist account also fails to cover important cases of incommensurable theories in being too restrictive for them. In this paper, we develop an improved notion of “reduction” that allows us to avoid these shortcomings by means of a more flexible device for the formalization of (partially reductive) relations between theories. For that purpose, we use a framework of rigid logic, i.e., logic that is based on a fixed collection of objects.     

Moral Responsibility,Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will

In his influential paper, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible and related reactive attitudes (such as blame, resentment, indignation, and moral approval) were wholly “internal” to the practices themselves and could be insulated from traditional philosophical and metaphysical concerns, including concerns about free will and determinism. This “insulation thesis” is a controversial feature of Strawson’s influential paper; and it has had numerous critics. The first purpose of this paper is to explain my own reasons for thinking that our practices of holding responsible cannot be entirely insulated from incompatibilist concerns about freedom and determinism. The second purpose is to argue that these incompatibilist concerns are in fact legitimate concerns: There are sound reasons to believe that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible do require at least sometimes in our lives that we must be capable of acting freely in a manner that is not determined. I defend this thesis by spelling out why I believe various compatibilist strategies attempting to show that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism fail to show this. In the course of this critique, a general theme will emerge: In order to do full justice to our ordinary practices of holding persons responsible and the freedoms thus involved, one must distinguish between different types of freedom, and in particular, between freedom of action and freedom of will.     

God knows (but does God believe?)

The standard view in epistemology is that propositional knowledge entails belief. Positive arguments are seldom given for this entailment thesis, however; instead, its truth is typically assumed. Against the entailment thesis, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (Noûs, forthcoming) report that a non-trivial percentage of people think that there can be propositional knowledge without belief. In this paper, we add further fuel to the fire, presenting the results of four new studies. Based on our results, we argue that the entailment thesis does not deserve the default status that it is typically granted. We conclude by considering the alternative account of knowledge that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel propose to explain their results, arguing that it does not explain ours. In its place we offer a different explanation of both sets of findings—the conviction account, according to which belief, but not knowledge, requires mental assent.     

All things considered duties to believe

To be a doxastic deontologist is to claim that there is such a thing as an ethics of belief (or of our doxastic attitudes in general). In other words, that we are subject to certain duties with respect to our doxastic attitudes, the non-compliance with which makes us blameworthy and that we should understand doxastic justification in terms of these duties. In this paper, I argue that these duties are our all things considered duties, and not our epistemic or moral duties, for example. I show how this has the surprising result that, if deontologism is a thesis about doxastic justification, it entails that there is no such thing as epistemic or moral justification for a belief that p. I then suggest why this result, though controversial, may have some salutary consequences: primarily that it helps us make some sense of an otherwise puzzling situation regarding doxastic dilemmas.     

A Generative System for Intentional Action?

It has been proposed that intentional actions are supplied by a generative system of the sort described by Chomsky for language. In this paper I aim to provide a closer analysis of this claim for the sake of conceptual clarification. To this end, I will first clarify what is involved in the thesis of a structural analogy between language and action, and then I will consider what kind of evidence there seems to be in favour of the thesis of a neurobiological identity. On this basis, I will subsequently focus on two definitional issues. The first is whether, as the claim of a generative system for intentional action suggests, humans may perform an infinite number of possible actions. The second is whether, as the claim of a generative system for intentional action suggests, what is at issue is conscious planning of action and therefore controlled processing.     

Word Production and the Picture-Word Interference Paradigm: The Role of Learning

Psycholinguistic experiments conducted with the picture-word interference paradigm are typically preceded by a phase during which participants learn the words they will have to produce in the experiment. In Experiment 1, the pictures (e.g., a frog) were to be named and were presented with a categorically related (e.g., cat) or unrelated distracter (e.g., pen). In the related condition responses were slower relative to the unrelated condition for the participants who had gone through the learning phase. In contrast, participants who had not been previously familiarized with the materials showed facilitation. In Experiment 2 one group of participants, as usual, learned to produce the targets upon presentation of the corresponding pictures (e.g., a frog). The other group learned to produce the same targets upon presentation of unrelated pictures (e.g., a clock). They showed very similar semantic effects. The implications of the findings in the study of word production are discussed.