表征变化及其影响因素的微观发生研究

Karmiloff-Smith的表征重述理论认为表征重述是人类获取知识的重要途径,并且表征变化的过程包括程序、元程序和概念化三个阶段。采用微观发生法（包括前测、练习和迁移3个阶段,共8个期间）,以数字分解组合任务为研究材料,探讨了120名小学一、二年级儿童问题解决中的表征变化及所受年龄和练习模式等因素的影响。结果表明,前测中存在发展性差异,即二年级儿童达到概念化阶段的人数显著多于一年级儿童,但前测处于程序阶段的儿童接受5次解题练习过程中以及在近迁移题目上都没有表现出年级差异,而在远迁移题目上二年级儿童的完成情况好于一年级儿童。练习模式对表征变化的影响主要体现在三个方面：（1）从变化的路线看,与简单模式相比,复杂模式更能促进儿童的表征发生变化,而且这时儿童表征变化的路线更丰富,表征变化发生循环的人数比例也更高。（2）从变化的速度看,复杂模式下儿童在插入难题的两次练习期间表征变化比较迅速,其余期间变化较小;简单模式下儿童在第二次和第三次练习期间表征变化比较迅速,随后变化比较平稳。（3）从变化的广度看,练习中所获表征能力（在最后三次练习中达到元程序或概念化阶段）的推广,无论是在近迁移题还是远迁移题上两种练习模式之下的被试没有明显差异;但两组被试在近迁移题上的表现均好于远迁移题     

Lexical Representation and Processing of Morphologically Complex Words: Evidence from the Reading Performance of an Italian Agrammatic Patient

The study of patients with acquired language disorders has provided crucial evidence for contemporary theories on mental lexical representation. This is particularly true for the representation of morphologically complex words. In this paper we analyzed the performance of a patient (M.B.) affected by agrammatism and dyslexia. M.B. was required to read aloud simple and morphologically complex words. The patient's pattern of errors was interpreted as the result of a predominant use of the lexical routine (phonological dyslexia). Three reading tasks were developed which allowed us to test M.B.'s ability to read morphologically complex words (reading of regular and irregular plurals; reading of high- and low-frequency singular and plural nouns; reading of evaluative suffixes). Errors were determined by frequency effect rather than by type of suffix (i.e., inflectional or derivational). High-frequency morphologically complex items seemed to meet stored representations, thus avoiding the parsing procedures that are required for less frequent items. These results are in keeping with dual route models of lexical representation of morphologically complex words.     

Recognition of natural scenes from global properties: seeing the forest without representing the trees

Human observers are able to rapidly and accurately categorize natural scenes, but the representation mediating this feat is still unknown. Here we propose a framework of rapid scene categorization that does not segment a scene into objects and instead uses a vocabulary of global, ecological properties that describe spatial and functional aspects of scene space (such as navigability or mean depth). In Experiment 1, we obtained ground truth rankings on global properties for use in Experiments 2-4. To what extent do human observers use global property information when rapidly categorizing natural scenes? In Experiment 2, we found that global property resemblance was a strong predictor of both false alarm rates and reaction times in a rapid scene categorization experiment. To what extent is global property information alone a sufficient predictor of rapid natural scene categorization? In Experiment 3, we found that the performance of a classifier representing only these properties is indistinguishable from human performance in a rapid scene categorization task in terms of both accuracy and false alarms. To what extent is this high predictability unique to a global property representation? In Experiment 4, we compared two models that represent scene object information to human categorization performance and found that these models had lower fidelity at representing the patterns of performance than the global property model. These results provide support for the hypothesis that rapid categorization of natural scenes may not be mediated primarily though objects and parts, but also through global properties of structure and affordance.     

Tools for the body (schema)

What happens in our brain when we use a tool to reach for a distant object? Recent neurophysiological, psychological and neuropsychological research suggests that this extended motor capability is followed by changes in specific neural networks that hold an updated map of body shape and posture (the putative "Body Schema" of classical neurology). These changes are compatible with the notion of the inclusion of tools in the "Body Schema", as if our own effector (e.g. the hand) were elongated to the tip of the tool. In this review we present empirical support for this intriguing idea from both single-neuron recordings in the monkey brain and behavioural performance of normal and brain-damaged humans. These relatively simple neural and behavioural aspects of tool-use shed light on more complex evolutionary and cognitive aspects of body representation and multisensory space coding for action.     

The influence of depression symptoms on exploratory decision-making

People with symptoms of depression show impairments in decision-making. One explanation is that they have difficulty maintaining rich representations of the task environment. We test this hypothesis in the context of exploratory choice. We analyze depressive and non-depressive participants’ exploration strategies by comparing their choices to two computational models: (1) an “Ideal Actor” model that reflectively updates beliefs and plans ahead, employing a rich representation of the environment and (2) a “Naïve Reinforcement Learning” (RL) model that updates beliefs reflexively utilizing a minimal task representation. Relative to non-depressive participants, we find that depressive participants’ choices are better described by the simple RL model. Further, depressive participants were more exploratory than non-depressives in their decision-making. Depressive symptoms appear to influence basic mechanisms supporting choice behavior by reducing use of rich task representations and hindering performance during exploratory decision-making.     

MULTI-STAGE SELECTION STRATEGIES: A MONTE CARLO INVESTIGATION OF EFFECTS ON PERFORMANCE AND MINORITY HIRING

This study explores alternative selection strategies available when a firm has two valid predictors that differ in the magnitude of subgroup differences. We examine 14 different selection rules (e.g., select on a composite of the two predictors versus screen on the first and then select on the second versus screen on the first and then select on a composite of the two), and document through a Monte Carlo simulation that the various selection rules can produce markedly different consequences in terms of the level of job performance achieved and the level of minority representation achieved. The selection rules examined include the use of within-group norming, whichwas restricted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the study examines how selection rules that do and do not include within-group norming fare in terms of the tradeoffs between performance and minority representation. The study shows that the preferred selection strategy will depend on the relative value the firm places on performance and on minority representation, and that the effects of different screen-then-select selection strategies vary as a result of the selection ratios at the screening and selection stages, thus precluding simple conclusions about the merits of each selection strategy.     

Hemisphere-dependent holistic processing of familiar faces

In two behavioral experiments involving lateralized stimulus presentation, we tested whether one of the most commonly used measures of holistic face processing—the composite face effect—would be more pronounced for stimuli presented to the right as compared to the left hemisphere. In experiment 1, we investigated the composite face effect in a verbal identification task, similar to its original report (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). Aligning top and bottom halves of composite face stimuli led to performance decreases irrespective of hemifield, indicating holistic processing of comparable magnitude for inputs provided separately to either hemisphere. However, when matching of the same top parts was required in experiment 2, an alignment-dependent performance decrease was found for stimuli presented in the left, but not right visual field. These observations suggest that the right hemisphere dominates in early stages of holistic processing, as indexed by the composite face effect, but that later processes such as face identification and naming are based on unified representations that are independent of input lateralization. Moreover, the composite face effect may not rely on the exact same representation(s) when measured in matching and identification tasks.     

Methodological issues in measures of imitative reaction times

Ideomotor (IM) theory suggests that observing someone else perform an action activates an internal motor representation of that behaviour within the observer. Evidence supporting the case for an ideomotor theory of imitation has come from studies that show imitative responses to be faster than the same behavioural measures performed in response to spatial cues. In an attempt to replicate these findings, we manipulated the salience of the visual cue and found that we could reverse the advantage of the imitative cue over the spatial cue. We suggest that participants utilised a simple visuomotor mechanism to perform all aspects of this task, with performance being driven by the relative visual salience of the stimuli. Imitation is a more complex motor skill that would constitute an inefficient strategy for rapid performance.     

Cogmic space for narrative-based world representation

Representing a world or a physical/social environment in an agent’s cognitive system is essential for creating human-like artificial intelligence. This study takes a story-centered approach to this issue. In this context, a story refers to an internal representation involving a narrative structure, which is assumed to be a common form of organizing past, present, future, and fictional events and situations. In the artificial intelligence field, a story or narrative is traditionally treated as a symbolic representation. However, a symbolic story representation is limited in its representational power to construct a rich world. For example, a symbolic story representation is unfit to handle the sensory/bodily dimension of a world. In search of a computational theory for narrative-based world representation, this study proposes the conceptual framework of a Cogmic Space for a comic strip-like representation of a world. In the proposed framework, a story is positioned as a mid-level representation, in which the conceptual and sensory/bodily dimensions of a world are unified. The events and their background situations that constitute a story are unified into a sequence of panels. Based on this structure, a representation (i.e., a story) and the represented environment are connected via an isomorphism of their temporal, spatial, and relational structures. Furthermore, the framework of a Cogmic Space is associated with the generative aspect of representations, which is conceptualized in terms of unconscious- and conscious-level processes/representations. Finally, a proof-of-concept implementation is presented to provide a concrete account of the proposed framework.     

The role of visual short-term memory in empty cell localization

Three experiments examined the visual memory representation supporting performance at long interstimulus intervals (ISIs) in an empty cell localization task. Two arrays of dots within a 4 x 4 grid were displayed briefly in succession. One grid cell did not contain a dot in either array, and the task was to localize the empty cell. In Experiment 1, we replicated previous findings of recovery to high levels of performance at long ISIs. In Experiment 2, we tested whether figural grouping in visual short-term memory (VSTM) supports long-ISI performance by manipulating the complexity of the array pattern. Pattern complexity had no effect on empty cell localization at 0-msec ISI, suggesting dependence on high-capacity visible persistence, but there was a large simple pattern advantage at long ISIs, suggesting dependence on figural grouping in VSTM. Experiment 3 demonstrated that participants typically remember the empty cells of the first array, and not the dots, for comparison with Array 2.     

Recent Scholarship on Hume's Theory of Mental Representation

In a recent paper, Karl Schafer argues that Hume's theory of mental representation has two distinct components, unified by their shared feature of having accuracy conditions. As Schafer sees it, simple and complex ideas represent the intrinsic imagistic features of their objects whereas abstract ideas represent the relations or structures in which multiple objects stand. This distinction, however, is untenable for at least two related reasons. Firstly, complex ideas represent the relations or structures in which the impressions that are the objects of their simple components stand. Secondly, abstract ideas are themselves instances of complex ideas. I draw two important conclusions from these facts. Firstly, contra Schafer and Garrett (to whom Schafer responds), the Copy Principle, properly emended, constitutes the entirety of Hume's theory of mental representation. Secondly, whereas paradigm examples of complex ideas, e.g. ideas of spatial and temporal complexes, are structured by relations of contiguity, abstract ideas are those complex ideas instead structured by relations of resemblance. As such, they represent their objects not as spatially or temporally contiguous but rather as resembling.     

时空隐喻研究的新问题:时间表征的左右方向性

传统的时空隐喻研究主要通过启动范式来研究空间中的前后轴线和上下轴线与时间表征的关系;而近年来,研究者们通过综合运用排序法、判断法、比较法和线索范式,证明了个体会用左右轴线来表征时间.由于传统的理论无法很好地解释时间表征的左右方向性,研究者们倾向于用具身理论(embodiment theory)来解释这一现象.为了深化对空间轴线和时间表征之间的关系的认识,需要统一研究方法、整合不同理论并在神经机制层面上开展新的研究.     

Spatial Scaling in Young Children

This article examines the emergence of the ability to use a simple map to acquire information about distance in a larger space. It is commonly believed that scaling is a late achievement in childhood. The present study examined the origins of this ability by using the simplest of situations. In two experiments, we presented preschool children with a dot in a long thin rectangle, and asked them to use that representation to find an object in a corresponding location in a much larger sandbox. All 4-year-olds and a majority of 3-year-olds performed well on this task. We present a model that posits a simpler mechanism for scaling than that proposed in the existing literature.     

Learning abstract relations from using categories

When people learn categories, the importance of the features and relations in the category representation reflects both their diagnosticity for classification and their relevance to the use of the category. In earlier work in which the influence of category use on the representation has been shown, only cases in which the features and relations were simple, observable, and very specific were examined. Learners may begin to understand the underlying similarities of category members by using the categories. In the four experiments presented here, learners applied a simple category-specific formula to category members. The test results showed that the learners had incorporated relations among features from this use, including cases in which the relations were abstract. This learning occurred even though the relations were actually not predictive of category membership but just perceived to be so as a function of the use.     

A computational unification of cognitive behavior and emotion

Existing models that integrate emotion and cognition generally do not fully specify why cognition needs emotion and conversely why emotion needs cognition. In this paper, we present a unified computational model that combines an abstract cognitive theory of behavior control (PEACTIDM) and a detailed theory of emotion (based on an appraisal theory), integrated in a theory of cognitive architecture (Soar). The theory of cognitive control specifies a set of required computational functions and their abstract inputs and outputs, while the appraisal theory specifies in more detail the nature of these inputs and outputs and an ontology for their representation. We argue that there is a surprising functional symbiosis between these two independently motivated theories that leads to a deeper theoretical integration than has been previously obtained in other computational treatments of cognition and emotion. We use an implemented model in Soar to test the feasibility of the resulting integrated theory, and explore its implications and predictive power in several task domains.     

The intention interference effect and aging: similar magnitude of effects for young and old adults

In young adults, intentions have been shown to be more accessible (e.g. faster reaction times and higher accuracy) compared to other sorts of to‐be‐remembered information, a result termed an ‘intention superiority effect’ (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993 ). In the current study, we assessed whether older adults also demonstrate this superiority of intention‐related material and we used a new interference paradigm to examine performance. On each trial, participants performed a Stroop‐like colour‐naming task on a short series of words, including words related to an intention that they encoded at the beginning of the trial. In Experiment 1, results revealed an ‘intention interference effect’ for both young and older adults in which performance was slower for words belonging to an intention that participants intended to carry out versus an intention that did not have to be executed. In Experiment 2, we tested the effect that completing an intention had on the representation of intentions. For both groups, completing an intention led to a decrease in interference in Stroop task performance. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Separating perceptual processes from decisional processes in identification and categorization

Four observers completed perceptual matching, identification, and categorization tasks using separable-dimension stimuli. A unified quantitative approach relating perceptual matching, identification, and categorization was proposed and tested. The approach derives from general recognition theory (Ashby & Townsend, 1986) and provides a powerful method for quantifying the separate influences of perceptual processes and decisional processes within and across tasks. Good accounts of the identification data were obtained from an initial perceptual representation derived from perceptual matching. The same perceptual representation provided a good account of the categorization data, except when selective attention to one stimulus dimension was required. Selective attention altered the perceptual representation by decreasing the perceptual variance along the attended dimension. These findings suggest that a complete understanding of identification and categorization performance requires an understanding of perceptual and decisional processes. Implications for other psychological tasks are discussed.     

Separating perceptual processes from decisional processes in identification and categorization.

Four observers completed perceptual matching, identification, and categorization tasks using separable-dimension stimuli. A unified quantitative approach relating perceptual matching, identification, and categorization was proposed and tested. The approach derives from general recognition theory (Ashby & Townsend, 1986) and provides a powerful method for quantifying the separate influences of perceptual processes and decisional processes within and across tasks. Good accounts of the identification data were obtained from an initial perceptual representation derived from perceptual matching. The same perceptual representation provided a good account of the categorization data, except when selective attention to one stimulus dimension was required. Selective attention altered the perceptual representation by decreasing the perceptual variance along the attended dimension. These findings suggest that a complete understanding of identification and categorization performance requires an understanding of perceptual and decisional processes. Implications for other psychological tasks are discussed.