Emotional Intelligence and Interpersonal Relations

Abstract

In 7 studies, the authors examined the link between emotional intelligence and interpersonal relations. In Studies 1 and 2, the participants with higher scores for emotional intelligence had higher scores for empathic perspective taking and self-monitoring in social situations. In Study 3, the participants with higher scores for emotional intelligence had higher scores for social skills. In Study 4, the participants with higher scores for emotional intelligence displayed more cooperative responses toward partners. In Study 5, the participants with higher scores for emotional intelligence had higher scores for close and affectionate relationships. In Study 6, the participants' scores for marital satisfaction were higher when they rated their marital partners higher for emotional intelligence. In Study 7, the participants anticipated greater satisfaction in relationships with partners described as having emotional intelligence.     

论互联网影响下的人际关系

互联网的崛起带来了一种新型的人际关系。它的形成和发展正在从根本上改变人类的生产和生活方式,同时也对现代的人际关系产生了重大影响。本文从互联网的交往动机,互联网的人际关系特点,互联网对人际关系的影响,提高互联网人际关系的健康性的角度入手,探讨了互联网是如何影响人际关系的。并提出建立健康的网络人际关系的方法:正确运用网络、保证网络的健康与安全、树立正确的网络交往态度。     

大学生认知方式与人际交往及创造力之间关系的研究

１问题提出 关于创造力与场依存——独立性的关系,国内外学者都有过论述,但是,对认知方式与创造力之间关系的定量研究,尚不多见。关于场依存性认知方式与人际交往之间的关系,威特金（Ｗｉｔｋｉｎ）等人研究认为,场依存性的人是社会定向,他们对社会线索更敏感,更喜欢与人有联系的情境,而不喜欢独处;与他人相处,在社会行为特征和习惯方式方面表现得更熟练。场独立的人则是非社会定向,在人际关系中表现出更多自主性,较少考虑他人的意见。场依存性者的社会定向是否就说明他们社会交往技能高？在人际交往过程中不同认知方式的人会…     

Hindering Events in Interpersonal Relations Groups for Counselor Trainees

A taxonomy of hindering events that have a negative impact on the group therapy process is identified in this analogue study, A total of 40 critical incident reports collected from various times across the lives of six different interpersonal relations groups were used for the study. Student group participants completed the critical incident reports after each session and described the most hindering event occurring in each group session: the reports were then sorted into categories by judges, and the sorted categories were combined on a proximity matrix for use in cluster analysis. Eight discrete categories of hindering events were identified: absence, discounted-misunderstood, withheld self-disclosure, member disconnection, member attack, leader actions-interventions, unwanted activity, and late group.     

Intentionality and Self-Awareness

In this essay I defend both the individual plausibility and conjoint consistency of two theses. One is the Intentionality Thesis: that all mental states are intentional (object‐directed, exhibit ‘aboutness’). The other is the Self‐Awareness Thesis: that if a subject is aware of an object, then the subject is also aware of being aware of that object. I begin by arguing for the individual prima facie plausibility of both theses. I then go on to consider a regress argument to the effect that the two theses are incompatible. I discuss three responses to that argument, and defend one of them.     

Metaemotional Intentionality

This article argues against two theories that obscure our understanding of emotions whose objects are other emotions. The tripartite model of emotional intentionality holds that an emotion's relation to its object is necessarily mediated by an additional representational state; I argue that metaemotions are an exception to this claim. The hierarchical model positions metaemotions as stable, epistemically privileged higher‐order appraisals of lower‐level emotions; I argue that this clashes with various features of complex metaemotional experiences. The article therefore serves dual purposes, offering metaemotions as a counterexample to an intuitive thesis about emotional intentionality, and examining their intentional structure in its own right.     

Classical Intentionality

In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it is argued that the classical conception is more satisfactory than the two modern ones, not only regarding phenomenal adequacy, but also on the grounds of epistemological considerations. In the second part, the paper argues that classical intentionality is not naturalizable, that is, physicalizable. Since classical intentionality exists (in the experiences that display it), the non-naturalizability of classical intentionality implies psychophysical dualism.     

Intentionality and word learning

Humans intuitively think about the actions of others in terms of mental states eliefs, desires, emotions and intentions. This 'theory of mind' plays a central role in how children learn the meanings of certain words. First, it underlies how they determine the reference of a novel word. When children hear a new object name (e.g. 'Look at the fendle'), they do not use spatio-temporal contiguity to determine what the word describes; instead they focus on cues to the referential intention of the speaker, such as direction of gaze. Second, an understanding of purpose and design is sometimes necessary to enable the child to understand the entities and actions that nouns and verbs refer to. This is particularly relevant for nouns that refer to collections of objects such as 'family' and 'game', and for verbs that refer to actions defined in terms of an actor's goals, such as 'give' and 'make'. Finally, intentional considerations partially underlie the generalization of names for artifact categories, such as 'chair' and 'clock', which can refer to entities of highly dissimilar appearance.     

Intentionality and partial belief

Suppose we wish to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality. Like several other philosophers, we focus on the intentionality of belief, hoping that we may later supplement our account to accommodate other intentional states like desires and fears. Now suppose that we also take partial beliefs or credences seriously. In cashing out our favoured theory of intentionality, we may for the sake of simplicity talk as if belief is merely binary or all-or-nothing. But we should be able to supplement or modify our account to accommodate credences. I shall argue, however, that it is difficult to do so with respect to certain causal or teleological theories of intentionality-in particular, those advanced by the likes of Stalnaker (Inquiry, 1984) and Millikan (J Philos 86:281–297, 1989). I shall first show that such theories are tailor-made to account for the intentionality of binary beliefs. Then I shall argue that it is hard to extend or supplement such theories to accommodate credences. Finally, I shall offer some natural ways of modifying the theories that involve an appeal to objective probabilities. But unfortunately, such modifications face problems.     

Restructuring Attentionality and Intentionality

Phenomenology and experimental psychology have been largely interested in the same thing when it comes to attention. By building on the work of Aron Gurwitsch, especially his ideas of attention and restructuration, this paper attempts to articulate common ground in psychology and phenomenology of attention through discussion of a new way to think about multistability in some phenomena. What psychology views as an attentionality-intentionality phenomenon, phenomenology views as an intentionality-attentionality phenomenon. The proposal is that an awareness of this restructuring of attentionality and intentionality can benefit both approaches to attention. After reviewing Husserl’s position on attentionality and intentionality, this paper examines multistable phenomena, redefines the attentional transformation called restructuring, discusses disciplinary perspectives on attention and gives an example using common ground.     

Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality

The article explores and compares the accounts of empathy found in Lipps, Scheler, Stein and Husserl and argues that the three latter phenomenological thinkers offer a model of empathy, which is not only distinctly different from Lipps’, but which also diverge from the currently dominant models.