Consciousness,Higher-Order Content,and the Individuation of Vehicles

One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is thepeculiar self-awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. Accordingto a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence.According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinctrepresentation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-ordercontent. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by Mitself or by a different state. While theNeo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it isoften felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the Neo-Brentanian andHigher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that theNeo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima faciepreferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory.     

The Continuum of Consciousness

Research in a wide variety of domains provides converging evidence for the psychological unconscious—percepts, memories, and other mental contents that influence experience, thought, and action outside of phenomenal awareness. Studies of preconscious processing indicate that two continua underlie conscious experience—one having to do with the quality of the stimulus event or its mental representation, and the other having to do with the cognitive resources brought to hear on the processing of that representation. However, evidence of subconscious processing violates these conclusions and suggests that something more is involved—perhaps a link between mental representations of events and of the self as the agent or experiencer of them.     

The Problem of Consciousness

This paper attempts to begin to answer four questions. 1. What is consciousness? 2. What is the relation of consciousness to the brain? 3. What are some of the features that an empirical theory of consciousness should try to explain? 4. What are some common mistakes to avoid?     

历史意识问题(下)

在这一部分,伽达默尔讨论了亚里士多德伦理学中实践智慧概念对解释学的特殊贡献。伽达默尔以此为基础,逐步展开哲学解释学的核心内容,如解释学的应用、解释学循环、成见以及如何对待传统等。他强调,解释学的理解应忠实于其开始和结束于此的事情本身,理解即处理处于他者地位的传统。     

The Question of Animal Consciousness

Conscious awareness of some cognitive processes is a central and important part of human behavior. It may be possible to assess these experiences through introspection and common verbal and nonverbal labels, allowing them to be related to overt behavior and electrophysiological activity in the nervous system. Conscious awareness in other animals is a closed world about which we can do no more than speculate. Empirical investigations should be limited to questions about the extent and nature of mental representations.

     

历史意识问题(上)

历史意识问题,即如何对待精神科学的历史。具备历史意识需要关注精神科学发展过程中对反身性的运用、对他者的关注,同时摒弃自然科学模式在精神科学中的运用。在本演讲中,伽达默尔论述了狄尔泰生命哲学寻求精神科学基础的得与失,强调了海德格尔关于理解的形而上学意义的重要价值,并在二者的基础上发展了精神科学的历史,推进了对历史意识问题的讨论。     

意识新论

重新思考审视意识的特性:(1)意识是生命的重要组成.(2)在经典物理学领域,意识是生命的独特功能.在量子物理学领域,意识是宇宙万物的特性,以规则、意义和规律来表达.(3)意识包含精神与物质两种性状,但同时也是非物质非精神的.(4)意识可以穿越不同的时空.(5)意识能够产生能量.(6)意识可以分成四大类.(7)不同机体的意识可以相互交流.(8)意识可以遗传.(9)意识永恒存在.(10)意识可以因各种原因被重叠、掩盖或者忘记(意识非记忆),但是在一定情况下.可以重新被发掘出来.     

暗意识猜想

21世纪初,暗物质与暗能量被观测证实.人类可见的物质只占宇宙的4.6％,其它95.4％的部分人类还不甚了解.在人类还未认知的世界中,是否存在不同于人类的生命结构和暗意识吗,对此,通过简述暗物质与暗能量的发现过程,以及意识的最新观点,提出暗意识可能存在的九种猜想.     

Consciousness: The transcendentalist manifesto

Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted in the articulation of an intuition: no matter how much we know about the brain, this will not allow us to see how it produces or constitutes phenomenal consciousness. Developing a theme first explored by Kant, and then later by Sartre, this paper argues that the real problem posed by phenomenal consciousness is quite different. Consciousness, it will be argued, is not an empirical but a transcendental feature of the world. That is, what it is like to have an experience is not something of which we are aware in the having of that experience, but an item in virtue of which the genuine (non-phenomenal) objects of our consciousness are revealed as being the way they are. Phenomenal consciousness, that is, is not an empirical object of awareness but a transcendental condition of the possibility of there being empirical objects of awareness.     

The Scientific Untraceability of Phenomenal Consciousness

It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all, they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach of psychology, so that they may be said to lie beyond the reach of science.

The Paradox of Self–Consciousness Revisited

The so–called paradox of self–consciousness suggests that self–consciousness, understood as the capacity to think about oneself in a first–person way, cannot be explained. The author of the paradox contends that the only way to avert this result is by invoking the notion of nonconceptual first–person thought. This contention is rooted in adherence to the Linguistic Priority Principle, which dictates that pre–and nonlinguistic creatures lack concepts. I argue that the latter claim is dubious, and that the paradox of self–consciousness can be better disarmed by denying the dependence of first–person conceptual thought on first–person language.     

Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness

Book Information Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness Levine Joseph New York Oxford University Press 2001 204 Hardback £22.50 By Levine Joseph. Oxford University Press. New York. Pp. 204. Hardback:£22.50,     

The Field of Consciousness and Extended Cognition

Extended cognition theorists claim that the definition of cognition can be extended to include not only the brain, but also the body and environment. In a series of works, Mark Rowlands has envisioned a new science of mind that explores the externalism of consciousness and cognition. This paper connects Rowlands’ work with the phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch. It shows how Gurwitsch’s field of consciousness, in particular his conception of the marginal halo, can provide a distinct, organized way of thinking about extended cognition. A key question considered is from where do cognitive processes project and disclose meanings? By thinking of location as locus—a projecting pathway of points of intentional opportunity—organization in extended cognition becomes organization in a field of consciousness. The marginal halo in the field of consciousness is articulated as this locus of intentionality, what Rowlands (The new science of the mind: from extended mind to embodied phenomenology, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010) calls “the noneliminable intentional core”. Problems of cognitive bloat and personal character are addressed in light of the findings. In addition to situating Gurwitsch’s work within the extended mind movement for the first time, this study highlights the importance of the marginal halo, largely neglected in previous Gurwitsch scholarship.