HOW RADICALLY CAN GOD BE RECONCEIVED BEFORE CEASING TO BE GOD? THE FOUR FACES OF PANENTHEISM

Panentheism has often been put forward as a means for bringing theology and science into dialogue, perhaps even resolving some of the major tensions between them. A variety of “faces” of panentheism are distinguished, including conservative, metaphysical, apophatic, and naturalist panentheisms. This series of increasingly radical panentheisms is explored, each one bringing its own core commitments, and each describing very different relationships between religion and science. We consider, for example, the diverse ways that the radical panentheisms construe emergent phenomena in the natural world. In the end, comparing the increasingly radical forms of panentheism yields a new understanding of the state of the religion/science dialogue today.     

GOD OF THE GAPS OR THE GOD OF “DESIGN AND DOMINION”? RE-VISITING NEWTON'S THEOLOGY

Starting with Gottfried Leibniz, Isaac Newton's theology has often been caricatured as putting forward a “God of the gaps” argument for God's existence and continued involvement in the world. Peter Harrison has pointed out that this characterization of Newton's theology is “not entirely clear.” A closer look at Newton's letters and the drafts to the Opticks reveals that, rather than arguing God's providential ordering and care over the world, he takes these for granted and is reluctant to specify instances of this order and care based on his physical research. He certainly believes in gaps in mechanical causes but is more eager to fill those gaps with nonmechanical natural causes than with God. Further, his system does not exhibit the two most prevalent weaknesses attributed to “God of the gaps” theologies: (1) that by describing God as intervening in natural causes his skill as a designer is maligned and (2) that by describing the physical details of God's involvement in the world one puts too much weight on theories likely to be replaced as science advances. Newton avoids the former weakness because it is only God's masterfulness as designer that he ties in any way to his theories of the physical world. He avoids the latter because he never points to God as the direct cause of any specific physical processes. Newton hoped that his system would cause his readers to marvel not only at God's providence but also at humankind's inability to sufficiently understand it.     

DOES GOD PLAY DICE? INSIGHTS FROM THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE

Abstract Albert Einstein and Huston Smith reflect the old metaphor that chaos and randomness are bad. Scientists recently have discovered that many phenomena, from the fluctuations of the stock market to variations in our weather, have the same underlying order. Natural beauty from plants to snowflakes is described by fractal geometry; tree branching from trunks to twigs has the same fractal scaling as our lungs, from trachea to bronchi. Algorithms for drawing fractals have both randomness and global determinism. Fractal statistics is like picking a card from a stacked deck rather than from one that is shuffled to be truly random. The polarity of randomness (or freedom) and law characterizes the self‐creating natural world. Polarity is in consonance with Taoism and contemporary theologians such as Paul Tillich, Alfred North Whitehead, Gordon Kaufman, Philip Hefner, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Joseph Ford's new metaphor is replacing the old: “God plays dice with the universe, but they're loaded dice.”     

IS SCIENCE THE ONLY WAY TO TRUTH?

Abstract. In the context of contemporary life questions, especially that of world peace, this essay first develops the view that truth is essentially scientific truth. Although religion gives insights for living, as science encompasses more and more of human experience it reinforces and modifies religious truths with its own firm knowledge. However, because of several limitations, it is concluded that science alone cannot give a complete account of humanity and the universe. For our first beliefs and principles we must look to other kinds of truth, which are in accord with scientific truth but go beyond scientific method in their justification.     

GOD VERSUS TECHNOLOGY? SCIENCE,SECULARITY, AND THE THEOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY

Abstract. In debate with John Caiazza, we clarify the meaning of the terms technology and secular, arguing that technology is not really secular. Only when combined with antireligious secularism do we get the modern techno‐secular worldview. Science is not secular in the strong sense, nor does its practice automatically lead to the techno‐secular. As a complete worldview, techno‐secularism is antireligious, but it also is dehumanizing and destructive of our environment. Religion may provide a transcendent source for a humanizing morality that might move technology in a more ecofriendly, humane direction. The alternative is not a happy one for our posthuman technological future.     

“THE GOD WITH CLAY”: THE IDEA OF DEEP INCARNATION AND THE INFORMATIONAL UNIVERSE

This article explores the relations between the idea of deep incarnation and scientific ideas of an informational universe, in which mass, energy, and information belong together. It is argued that the cosmic Christologies developed in the vein of Cappadocian theology (fourth century) and the Franciscan theologian Bonaventure (thirteenth century) can be interpreted as precursors of an informational worldview by consistently blending “formative” and “material” aspects of creativity. Reversely, contemporary sciences of information can enlarge the scope of the contemporary view of deep incarnation. I propose three hypotheses for showing how and why. First, mass, energy, and information have an equal causal importance for explaining reality. Second, just as transformation presupposes communication, so communication presupposes information. Third, contemporary science can elucidate seminal concerns of the idea of deep incarnation, insofar as informational structures pave the way for information capture, communication, and transformation. At the level of organismic life, new features of embodied cognition and emotion come up, important for understanding the organismic depth of the concrete incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth.     

CAN A DECAY PROCESS EXPLAIN THE TIMING OF CONDITIONED RESPONSES?

To explain time-scale invariant distributions of response latencies, it appears to be necessary to postulate scalar noise in the remembered intervals, against which the subjective measure of the currently elapsing interval is compared. At least in some cases, the observed variability cannot be due to variability in the subjective intervals written to memory; it must come from noise (variability) in the reading of a memory. The Staddon and Higa proposal offers no explanation for the observed variability, and it is unclear what noise assumption would yield the observed variability, given their assumption that intervals are timed by a nonlinear decay process. The decay process cannot plausibly be represented by the logarithmic function, because it begins and ends at infinity. The assumption of any form of nonlinear timing is inconsistent with the most important result of the time-left experiment, which is that the changeover time increases linearly with the comparison-standard difference.     

GENESIS REVISITED: CAN WE DO BETTER THAN GOD?

Abstract. We are faced with growing powers of manipulation of our human genetic makeup. While not denying that these powers can be used for great good, it behooves us to think now of possible upper limits to the change that we might want to effect. I argue that thoughts of changing the human species into a race of supermen and superwomen are based on weak premises. Genetic fine-tuning may indeed be in order; wholesale genetic change is not.     

A SCIENTIFIC BUDDHISM?

This essay endorses the argument of Donald Lopez's Buddhism and Science and shows how the general thesis of the book is consonant with other historical work on the “discovery” of Buddhism and on the emergence of Western conceptions of religion. It asks whether one of the key claims of Buddhism and Science—that Buddhism pays a price for its flirtation with the modern sciences—might be applicable to science‐and‐religion discussions more generally.     

THE CONFLICTING LOYALTIES OF STATISM AND GLOBALISM: CAN GLOBAL DEMOCRACY RESOLVE THE LIBERAL CONUNDRUM?

Abstract: The cosmopolitan ideal of liberal universalism seems to be at odds with liberalism's insistence on national borders for liberal democratic communities, creating disparate standards of distributive justice for insiders and outsiders. The liberal's dilemma on the question of cosmopolitan justice would seem to be an extension of this broader conundrum of conflicting loyalties of statism and globalism. The challenge for liberalism, then, seems to be to show how the practices of exclusive membership embody the principle of moral equality. While discerning a variety of liberal reasons to give some scope to the claim that statism and globalism need not be an irreconcilable dilemma within liberalism, the essay argues that these reasons fail to provide a satisfactory resolution. Instead, the essay points out, global democracy can be the direction for both a statist and a cosmopolitan liberal, and the two camps a case not of conflicting loyalties but of multiple loyalties.     

CAN AN UNDERSTANDING OF BASIC RESEARCH FACILITATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRACTITIONERS? REFLECTIONS AND PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES

I have written before about the importance of applied behavior analysis to basic researchers. That relationship is, however, reciprocal; it is also critical for practitioners to understand and even to participate in basic research. Although applied problems are rarely the same as those investigated in the laboratory, practitioners who understand their basic research background are often able to place their particular problem in a more general context and thereby deal with it successfully. Also the procedures of applied behavior analysis are often the same as those that characterize basic research; the scientist-practitioner will appreciate the relation between what he or she is doing and what basic experimenters do, and as a consequence, will be able to apply therapeutic techniques more creatively and effectively.     

WHAT'S THE POINT OF ELUCIDATION?

Abstract: In this article I examine three ways in which one might interpret Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (PI). In a partial response to Hans‐Johann Glock's article in this journal, I suggest that since publication PI has, broadly speaking, been interpreted in three ways: doctrinal; elucidatory; or therapeutic. The doctrinal interpretation is shown to be, at best, difficult to sustain textually. The elucidatory (standard) interpretation, though seemingly closer to the text, is shown both to implicate Wittgenstein in some unfortunate philosophical commitments and to face a problem of “motivation.” I argue that, correctly understood, any attempt to elucidate in PI is undertaken only in pursuit of the therapeutic goal. I conclude by arguing that the therapeutic interpretation is the only interpretation that can adequately make sense of Wittgenstein's text as a whole and the metaphilosophical remarks in particular. Furthermore, it is the only interpretation that can demonstrate Wittgenstein's continued importance and relevance as a philosopher.     

THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF MEN?

Recently the focus of sexual harassment research on the harassment of women by men has been challenged. Treatments of sexual harassment of men, however, have generally ignored power differentials between the genders. Our analysis predicts that behaviors identified as harassing by men stem from negotiations of gender in the workplace that challenge male dominance, whereas behaviors experienced by women as sexually harassing reinforce female subordinance. Consistent with our predictions, results indicated the following: men are considerably less threatened than women are by behaviors that women have found harassing; men find sexual coercion the most threatening form of harassment; men as well as women sexually harass men; and men identify behaviors as harassing that have not been identified for women. Results also showed signs of backlash among men against organizational measures that address sexual harassment and discrimination against women. Implications for psychological and legal definitions of sexual harassment of men are discussed.     

SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF?

'Dialectical foundationalists', including Jonathan Adler, Robert Brandom, Adam Leite and Michael Williams, claim that some asserted propositions do not require defence just because an interlocutor challenges them. By asserting such a proposition, the speaker shifts the burden of proof to the interlocutor. 'Dialectical egalitarians' claim that all asserted propositions require defence when challenged. I elucidate the dispute between dialectical foundationalists and egalitarians, and I defend a broadly egalitarian stance against several prominent objections.     

BEHAVIORISM: PART OF THE PROBLEM OR PART OF THE SOLUTION?1

The form frequently taken by behavior-modification programs is analyzed in terms of the parent science, Behaviorism. Whereas Behaviorism assumes that behavior is the result of contingencies, and that lasting behavior change involves changing the contingencies that give rise to and support the behavior, most behavior-modification programs merely arrange special contingencies in a special environment to eliminate the “problem” behavior. Even when the problem behavior is as widespread as alcoholism and crime, behavior modifiers focus on “fixing” the alcoholic and the criminal, not on changing the societal contingencies that prevail outside the therapeutic environment and continue to produce alcoholics and criminals. The contingencies that shape this method of dealing with behavioral problems are also analyzed, and this analysis leads to a criticism of the current social structure as a behavior control system. Although applied behaviorists have frequently focused on fixing individuals, the science of Behaviorism provides the means to analyze the structures, the system, and the forms of societal control that produce the “problems”.     

HOW SHOULD THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION BE WRITTEN? SOME REFLECTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE DISCIPLINE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THERECEPTION OF OUR WORK

How should history of education be written? To put the question is far more easier than to provide a concrete answer. In contemporary research, there continue to be pedagogistic complaints about finding answers to present-day educational problems via history. In our view, such an ahistorical utilitarianism as well as the legitimizing and/or mythologizing belief in a particular pedagogical system, in which the history of this field is so rich since the institutionalization of the discipline at the end of the nineteenth century, should be avoided at all costs. But the danger of presentism lurks around the corner as a sine qua non condition in any form of historical research. As can be found out via the comments on our own work, much of the criticism goes back to old conceptions of the discipline, conceived as “historical pedagogy” rather than as history of education. Apparently, in the field of pedagogy people are still convinced that the history of education, even if it does not provide edifying examples and useful lessons, must in any case have a training value for professionals – which in the light of modern, advanced research is rather a difficult idea to defend.