On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels

Rik Peels has ingeniously argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In this response, I defend the ??Standard View of Ignorance?? according to which they are equivalent. In the course of doing so, some important lessons will emerge concerning the nature of ignorance and its relationship to knowledge.     

A Logic for Disjunctive Ignorance

In this paper, we introduce a notion of ‘disjunctive ignorance’, which is a weak combination of two forms of ignorance in the literature. We propose a logical language with ‘disjunctive ignorance’ as a sole modality, explore the logical properties of this notion and its related notions, and axiomatize it over various frame classes. By finding suitable reduction axioms, we extend the results to the case of public announcements and apply it to Moore-like sentences.

     

On Ignorance: A Vindication of the Standard View

Rik Peels has once again forcefully argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he endeavors to refute the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and to advance what he calls the “New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. I defend the Standard View against his new attempted refutation.     

A Capacitarian Account of Culpable Ignorance

Ignorance usually excuses from responsibility, unless the person is culpable for the ignorance itself. Since a lot of wrongdoing occurs in ignorance, the question of what makes ignorance culpable is central for a theory of moral responsibility. In this article I examine a prominent answer, which I call the ‘volitionalist tracing account,’ and criticize it on the grounds that it relies on an overly restrictive conception of responsibility‐relevant control. I then propose an alternative, which I call the ‘capacitarian conception of control,’ and on the basis of it I advance an account of culpable ignorance that avoids the skeptical upshots of the volitionalist proposal. If correct, my account establishes three important truths: agents can be directly in control of their ignorance, they can be directly responsible for more than actions and omissions, and their moral obligations extend beyond the performance of intentional actions and omissions.     

Coherence and Truth: A Cognitive Model of Propositional Truth Attribution

The truth value assigned to a proposition is treated by philosophers, logicians, and most psychologists as an abstract construct, a theoretical object outside the cognitive system. Breaking away from this consensus, we propose to carry out a psychological investigation to analyse the objective, verifiable properties of representations categorized as true by human individuals. We shall reject the conception whereby attributing a truth value to a proposition is the result of the activation of knowledge about the truth of that proposition. We shall also exclude the conception of truth as the result of the establishment of a correspondence with the world. We propose that truth be understood as the result of a decision about the values taken on by the conditions for fulfilment of the act of referencing in a mental model. Our cognitive model of propositional truth attribution is built on the assumption that the truth value of a proposition is determined by the ability of that proposition to fit into the theory of the field to which it refers. This attribution is viewed as a two-stage cognitive activity. During the first stage, the features defining the coherence of the proposition in the activated mental model determine its plausibility value. This defines a generally inconsistent set of truth candidates. The second stage involves selecting the subset containing all propositions which, in context, will be considered true. Two selection criteria are used: maximum consistency and connectivity. The preliminary experimental results proved to be compatible with the proposed model.     

Willful Ignorance

Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that “the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known.” This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know what willful (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance actually is. This paper presents a novel analysis of this concept, which builds upon Moody-Adams (1994) and is contrasted with a recent account by Lynch (2016).     

真理：重温一场传统的论战

按照对"真"的结构分析,真理论可分为:内在论、符合论、融贯论和紧缩论。这四种方案各有其适用范围,但经过深入研究发现,除符合论以外的三种方案都存在棘手的难题。融贯论不能证成逻辑上的不矛盾律,不能合理地解决如何选择"支配性"信念系统的问题,并且它和内在论都不能解决偶然真问题。紧缩论的问题则是:若将"真"理解为提供一种认知担保,与其所主张的等值图式相结合,就可推出:信念p没有认知担保当且仅当非p有认知担保,这与实际情形不相符——关于p和非p,我们有可能都没有认知担保。为摆脱传统符合论的困境,可以通过列举"老生常谈"的方式,发展一种多元真理论:"真"在不同领域取决于不同的事物——在一个区域内取决于符合,在另一个领域内取决于融贯。"超可断定性"这一概念可以解释这种多元真理论的可行性。     

无知与奸诈

晋代葛洪(字稚川,号抱朴子,约公元284—364年)是一位著名的中医学家、儒家和道家,著有《抱朴子外篇》、《抱朴子内篇》、《金匮药方》、《肘后备急方》、《神仙传》、《隐逸传》、《集异》等书。受其生活年代的文化背景及现实的影响,葛洪是一位颇有成就的炼丹家,然而其对封建迷信的危害却有一定的认识,并力图破除一些迷信现象。今读到其中两则故事,遂生联想,乃作札记。     

AIDS, Authoritarianism, and Scientific Ignorance: A Comment on Witt

Witt shows that scores on the F scale predict negative affect towards AIDS. He interprets this in the light of the authoritarian personality theory of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) despite the discredited nature of that theory. An alternative explanation of the findings in the light of the view that the F scale measures primarily an old-fashioned orientation is offered.     

Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan

In this paper, I respond to Pierre Le Morvan’s critique of my thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge. I argue that the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional accounts of belief, as I made it in a previous paper, is correct as it stands. Also, I criticize the viability and the importance of Le Morvan’s distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. Finally, I provide two arguments in favor of the thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge.     

Ignorance of ignorance

I discuss the question of when knowledge of higher order ignorance is possible and show in particular that, under quite plausible assumptions, knowledge of second order ignorance is impossible.     

Rational Moral Ignorance

What should a person do when, through no fault of her own, she ends up believing a false moral theory? Some suggest that she should act against what the false theory recommends; others argue that she should follow her rationally held moral beliefs. While the former view better accords with intuitions about cases, the latter one seems to enjoy a critical advantage: It seems better able to render moral requirements ‘followable’ or ‘action-guiding.’ But this tempting thought proves difficult to justify. Indeed, whether it can be justified turns out to depend importantly on the rational status of epistemic akrasia. Furthermore, it can be argued, from premises all parties to the moral ignorance debate should accept, that rational epistemic akrasia is possible. If the argument proves successful, it follows that a person should sometimes act against her rationally held moral convictions.     

Ignorance and Virtue

Abstract

Julia Driver has argued that there is a class of virtues that are compatible with or even require that an agent be ignorant in some respect. In this paper I argue for an alternative conception of the relationship between ignorance and virtue. The dispositions constitutive of virtue must include sensitivity to human limitations and fallibility. In this way the virtues accommodate ignorance, rather than require or promote it. I develop my account by considering two virtues in particular: tolerance (the paradigm for my account) and modesty (which Driver employs as the paradigm for her account). Although several philosophers have offered alternatives to Driver's account of modesty and others have discussed tolerance as a moral virtue, an adequate account of the role of ignorance in the specification of the virtues generally has yet to be provided. I believe that similarities between the two virtues are instructive for defining that role.