The time course of task switching: A speed—accuracy trade-off analysis

On each trial of this study, participants either switched between or repeated two simple, two-choice tasks involving either letter or digit classifications. Speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) curves were obtained using the responsesignal method of eliciting speeded responses at various response time lags after the presentation of the stimulus for the second task. The key finding from separate analyses of the three SAT-curve parameters (intercept, rate, and asymp tote) was that the location of the intercept of the SAT function (i.e., the point at which responding rises above chance) was shifted upward for both short and long response-stimulus intervals under task-switch conditions but only when the responses associated with each of the letter-digit stimulus components were incompatible.     

Investigating the speed–accuracy trade-off: Better use deadlines or response signals?

Deadlines (DLs) and response signals (RSs) are two well-established techniques for investigating speed–accuracy trade-offs (SATs). Methodological differences imply, however, that corresponding data do not necessarily reflect equivalent processes. Specifically, the DL procedure grants knowledge about trial-specific time demands and requires responses before a prespecified period has elapsed. In contrast, RS intervals often vary unpredictably between trials, and responses must be given after an explicit signal. Here, we investigated the effects of these differences in a flanker task. While all conditions yielded robust SAT functions, a right-shift of the curves pointed to reduced performance in RS conditions (Experiment 1, blocked; Experiments 2 and 3, randomized), as compared with DL conditions (Experiments 1–3, blocked), indicating that the detection of the RS imposes additional task demands. Moreover, the flanker effect vanished at long intervals in RS settings, suggesting that stimulus-related effects are absorbed in a slack when decisions are completed prior to the signal. In turn, effects of a flat (Experiment 2) versus a performance-contingent payment (Experiment 3) indicated that susceptibility to response strategies is higher in the DL than in the RS method. Finally, the RS procedure led to a broad range of slow responses and high accuracies, whereas DL conditions resulted in smaller variations in the upper data range (Experiments 1 and 2); with performance-contingent payment (Experiment 3), though, data ranges became similar. Together, the results uncover characteristic procedure-related effects and should help in selection of the appropriate technique.     

Reversing the picture superiority effect: A speed—accuracy trade-off study of recognition memory

Speed-accuracy trade-off methods have been used to contrast single- and dual-process accounts of recognition memory. With these procedures, subjects are presented with individual test items and required to make recognition decisions under various time constraints. In three experiments, we presented words and pictures to be intentionally learned; test stimuli were always visually presented words. At test, we manipulated the interval between the presentation of each test stimulus and that of a response signal, thus controlling the amount of time available to retrieve target information. The standard picture superiority effect was significant in long response deadline conditions (i.e., > or = 2,000 msec). Conversely, a significant reverse picture superiority effect emerged at short response-signal deadlines (< 200 msec). The results are congruent with views suggesting that both fast familiarity and slower recollection processes contribute to recognition memory. Alternative accounts are also discussed.     

Reply to: A comment on and : How to investigate whether personality items form a hierarchical scale?

We reply to the comment by Meijer (2009) on our recent papers investigating the hierarchical properties of personality scale items. We conclude that Mokken scaling is an appropriate method for investigating the existence of hierarchical scales in general and, specifically, addresses the issue of invariant item ordering in polychotomous data.     

Cross-modal interaction between vision and hearing: A speed—accuracy analysis

Cross-modal facilitation of response time (RT) is said to occur in a selective attention task when the introduction of an irrelevant sound increases the speed at which visual stimuli are detected and identified. To investigate the source of the facilitation in RT, we asked participants to rapidly identify the color of lights in the quiet and when accompanied by a pulse of noise. The resulting measures of accuracy and RT were used to derive speed-accuracy trade-off functions (SATFs) separately for the noise and the no-noise conditions. The two resulting SATFs have similar slopes and intercepts and, thus, can be treated as overlapping segments of a single function. That speeded identification of color with and without the presence of noise can be described by one SATF suggests, in turn, that cross-modal facilitation of RT represents a change in decision criterion induced by the auditory stimulus. Analogous changes in decision criteria might also underlie other measures of cross-modal interactions, such as auditory enhancement of brightness judgments.     

The consistency test does not–and cannot–deliver what is advertised: A comment on Francis (2013)

The statistical consistency test of  Ioannidis and Trikalinos (2007) has been used recently by  Francis, 2012a, Francis, 2012c, Francis, 2012d, Francis, 2012e, Francis, 2013, Francis, in press, to argue that specific sets of experiments show evidence of publication bias. I argue that the test is unnecessary because publication bias exists almost everywhere as property of the research process, not individual studies. Furthermore, for several reasons, the test does not support the claims made on its behalf. Instead of focusing on testing sets of experiments for publication bias, we should focus on changes to scientific culture to reduce the bias.     

Process models deserve process data: comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006)

Comments on the article by E. Brandst?tter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig. Resolution of debates in cognition usually comes from the introduction of constraints in the form of new data about either the process or representation. Decision research, in contrast, has relied predominantly on testing models by examining their fit to choices. The authors examine a recently proposed choice strategy, the priority heuristic, which provides a novel account of how people make risky choices. The authors identify a number of properties that the priority heuristic should have as a process model and illustrate how they may be tested. The results, along with prior research, suggest that although the priority heuristic captures some variability in the attention paid to outcomes, it fails to account for major characteristics of the data, particularly the frequent transitions between outcomes and their probabilities. The article concludes with a discussion of the properties that should be captured by process models of risky choice and the role of process data in theory development.     

How to trigger elaborate processing? A comment on Kunde, Kiesel, and Hoffmann (2003)

Recently, [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2003). Conscious control over the content of unconscious cognition. Cognition, 88, 223-242] used a masked priming paradigm to argue that neither the 'elaborate processing' or the 'evolving automaticity' view can account for the processing of unconscious numerical stimuli. In our Experiment 1 we replicated [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2003). Conscious control over the content of unconscious cognition. Cognition, 88, 223-242] Experiment 4 and show that with a less demanding mask than that used by Kunde et al., 'elaborate processing' can explain priming results given that there are side conditions to trigger elaborate processing of unconscious stimuli. The second experiment further explores this influence of the masks by increasing the relevance of the symbols by which the mask is composed. The results show that an increase in relevance of the mask is accompanied by a decrease in the priming effect, though there was no significant change in conscious awareness of the prime.     

Configurational coincidence among six phenomena: a comment on van Lier and Csathó (2006)

This study focuses on a configurational coincidence among six different illusions, two being motion illusions (reversed phi movement and phi movement), two being binocular stereo effects (Anstis-Rogers type and Gregory-Heard type), one being a position illusion (Gregory-Heard illusion), and one being an orientation illusion (Café-Wall-like tilt illusion). The stimuli of these six illusions or effects share the same configuration, in which a thin region is flanked by thick regions of different luminances. A phenomenological comparison is conducted with the use of dynamic demonstrations as well as static ones. In particular, the reversed phi movement is extensively discussed.     

More on Putnam’s models: a reply to Belloti

In an earlier paper, I claimed that one version of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism turned on a subtle, but philosophically significant, mathematical mistake. Recently, Luca Bellotti has criticized my argument for this claim. This paper responds to Bellotti's criticisms.     

Improving Psychological Measurement: Does It Make a Difference? A Comment on Nesselroade and Molenaar (2016)

Nesselroade and Molenaar advocate the use of an idiographic filter approach. This is a fixed-effects approach, which may limit the number of individuals that can be simultaneously modeled, and it is not clear how to model the presence of subpopulations. Most important, Nesselroade and Molenaar's proposal appears to be best suited for modeling long time series on a few variables for a few individuals. Long time series are not common in psychological applications. Can it be applied to the usual longitudinal data we face? These are characterized by short time series (four to five points in time), hundreds of individuals, and dozens of variables. If so, what do we gain? Applied settings most often involve between-individual decisions. I conjecture that their approach will not outperform common, simpler, methods. However, when intraindividual decisions are involved, their approach may have an edge.     

The Data Box and Within-Subject Analyses: A Comment on Nesselroade and Molenaar (2016)

Nesselroade and Molenaar suggest that it is the relationships between latent variables within subjects that are invariant across subjects and thus the appropriate unit of analysis. We disagree and take the view that between-factor correlations may differ systematically across subjects. Further, individual differences in these correlations may be an important source of information about each unique individual. Following from this premise, analyses of consistencies and differences between subjects of the within-subject pattern of interfactor correlations is a step toward an integrative science of behavior. We give several examples demonstrating how this approach has the potential to yield novel insights into personality functioning.     

Explaining personality or explaining variance? A comment on Creed and Funder (1998)

Based on factor analyses of the private self‐consciousness scale, Creed and Funder (1998) posit ‘two faces of private self‐consciousness’: self‐reflectiveness, which relates to negative outcomes, and internal state awareness, which relates to positive outcomes. The significance of this distinction is questioned. I contend (i) that the existence of two subfactors is a fatal deficiency in the private self‐consciousness scale, not a benefit; (ii) that factor analysis can never discover aspects of personality; (iii) that only an underlying theoretical network, not unique variance, makes a scale useful; and (iv) that the SR and ISA distinction exemplifies the undesirable Aristotelian approach (Lewin, 1931) to personality. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Adaptation effects and reversible figures: A comment on Horlitz and O’Leary

In a recent article, Horlitz and O’Leary (1993) offer a reinterpretation of the results of several studies over the past 40 years that have employed the prolonged-inspection technique in the investigation of reversible figures. Specifically, they contend that, contrary to the favored interpretation of neural adaptation effects, the results of these studies reveal the combined influence of such topdown processes as attention and perceptual learning as well as such methodological difficulties as unwanted demand characteristics. In this note, we examine their analysis of the literature, their alternative theoretical model, and the supporting conclusions they draw from their two experiments. We argue that there is considerable evidence from a variety of studies for the joint role of bottom-up and top-down processes in reversible figures. Moreover, we propose that Horlitz and O’Leary’s own research, rather than eliminating the possibility of neural-adaptation effects, is best conceptualized as providing additional evidence for the role of higher-order processes in these phenomena.     

Is choice a reliable predictor of choice? A comment on Sagarin and Skowronski

In a recent working paper, Chen (2008) argues that a methodology central to the cognitive dissonance literature (the free-choice paradigm) has suffered from an inability to separately measure how much choices affect people’s preferences, and how much they simply reflect those preferences, by failing to fully control for the fact that subjects tend to choose goods they prefer. Although Sagarin and Skowronski concede this, they discount Chen’s argument, claiming that for revealed preferences to completely account for observed choice-effects the relationship between choice and preference would have to be unrealistically high. In this comment, we argue that their critique both misses the crux of Chen’s analysis, and is incorrect. Specifically, to properly test whether choices affect preferences, it is essential that researchers experimentally control for revealed preferences rather than speculate how much of a role they may play. Moreover, Sagarin and Skowronski’s critique rests on two fundamental errors—a misunderstanding of the function of the null-hypothesis and a misunderstanding of preference-measurement psychometrics. These errors leads Sagarin and Skowronski to suggest alternative experimental designs which while a good first step, do not address the problems identified in Chen (2008).