THE TRANSMITTER-PERSISTENCE EFFECT:

Abstract— In four studies, Boninger, Brock, Cook, Cruder, and Romer (1990) found thai altitude change following exposure to a persuasive message persisted longer if recipients were expecting to have to transmit the message to someone else. The present experiment demonstrated thai this effect obtains only if the people preparing to transmit, as was the case in the studies of Boninger et a!., are denied the opportunity to do so. It is argued, then, that the findings of Boninger et at. may be attributable to a tendency toward thought perseveration triggered hy the failure to complete the transmission task, rather than being a consequence of the preparation to transmit per se.     

Exploring the informational sources of metaperception: the case of Change Blindness Blindness

Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as “Change Blindness” (CB). They are, in addition, “blind to their own blindness”. A common explanation of this “Change Blindness Blindness” (CBB) is that it derives from an inadequate, “photographical” folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their self-evaluations on two activity-dependent cues, namely search time and perceived success in prior trials. These cues were found to influence self-evaluation in two orthogonal ways: success-feedback influenced self-evaluation in a global, contextual way, presumably by recalibrating the norm of adequacy for the task. Search time influenced it in a local way, predicting the success of a given trial from its duration.     

Working memory load but not multitasking eliminates the prepared reflex: further evidence from the adapted flanker paradigm

The prepared reflex (PR) metaphor (Exner, 1879; Woodworth, 1938) suggests that stimulus-response (S-R) instructions held in working memory (WM) can lead to autonomous response activation without any practice. Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran (2007) showed flanker compatibility effects immediately following the instructions (First Trials Flanker Compatibility Effect, FTFCE) and also showed that FTFCE was eliminated when participants had to hold an additional novel task rule in mind. They attributed the elimination of the FTFCE to WM load, but did not rule out multitasking and associated increased control demands as a possible alternative explanation. In the present experiment, the authors compared a no-load condition, a load condition involving a secondary task that was changed in every block (thus requiring WM) and a multi-tasking condition involving a secondary that remained the same throughout the experiment. The results show FTFCE without load and in the multi-tasking condition but no FTFCE in the WM load condition, establishing the critical involvement of WM storage capacity in the FTFCE.     

Similarity, alignment, and conceptual combination: Comment on Estes and Glucksberg

In their paper “Interactive Property Attribution in Concept Combination,” Estes and Glucksberg (2000) suggest an alternative to the alignment view of property interpretation— one based on salience and relevance of features. I suggest that alignment as well as feature salience and relevance are crucial to property interpretation. In making their claims, Estes and Glucksberg also assume that similarity has inverse effects on two important ways of interpreting combinations (i.e., property and relation interpretations). I show that this assumption does not generally hold and provide an alternative explanation for their results (one based on the plausibility of relation interpretations).     

“I Want to Know More!”: Children Are Sensitive to Explanation Quality When Exploring New Information

When someone encounters an explanation perceived as weak, this may lead to a feeling of deprivation or tension that can be resolved by engaging in additional learning. This study examined to what extent children respond to weak explanations by seeking additional learning opportunities. Seven‐ to ten‐year‐olds (N = 81) explored questions and explanations (circular or mechanistic) about 12 animals using a novel Android tablet application. After rating the quality of an initial explanation, children could request and receive additional information or return to the main menu to choose a new animal to explore. Consistent with past research, there were both developmental and IQ‐related differences in how children evaluated explanation quality. But across development, children were more likely to request additional information in response to circular explanations than mechanistic explanations. Importantly, children were also more likely to request additional information in direct response to explanations that they themselves had assigned low ratings, regardless of explanation type. In addition, there was significant variability in both children's explanation evaluation and their exploration, suggesting important directions for future research. The findings support the deprivation theory of curiosity and offer implications for education.     

Use of current explanations in multicausal abductive reasoning

In multicausal abductive tasks a person must explain some findings by assembling a composite hypothesis that consists of one or more elementary hypotheses. If there are n elementary hypotheses, there can be up to 2ⁿ composite hypotheses. To constrain the search for hypotheses to explain a new observation, people sometimes use their current explanation—the previous evidence and their present composite hypothesis of that evidence; however, it is unclear when and how the current explanation is used. In addition, although a person's current explanation can narrow the search for a hypothesis, it can also blind the problem solver to alternative, possibly better, explanations. This paper describes a model of multicausal abductive reasoning that makes two predictions regarding the use of the current explanation. The first prediction is that the current explanation is not used to explain new evidence if there is a simple (i.e., nondisjunctive, concrete) hypothesis to account for that evidence. The second prediction is that the current explanation is used when attempting to discriminate among several alternative hypotheses for new evidence. These hypotheses were tested in three experiments. The results are consistent with the second prediction: the current explanation is used when discriminating among alternative hypotheses. However, the first prediction—that the current explanation is not used when a simple hypothesis can account for new data—received only limited support. Participants used the current explanation to constrain their interpretation of new data in 46.5% of all trials. This suggests that context-independent strategies compete with context-dependent ones—an interpretation that is consistent with recent work on strategy selection during problem solving.     

Do infants understand simple arithmetic? A replication of Wynn (1992)

Numerical competence in 5-month-old infants is investigated using a violation-of-expectation paradigm. An experiment is reported which replicates the findings of Wynn (1992). In additional conditions, 5-month-olds are shown to be sensitive to impossible outcomes following addition or subtraction operations on small sets of objects, regardless of identity changes. Results support Wynn's interpretation that infants' responses are based on arithmetical ability. An alternative explanation, that infants' responses are based on their knowledge of the principles of physical object behavior, is also discussed.     

Information becomes evidence when an explanation can incorporate it into a causal framework

Recognizing information as evidence is central to the development of scientific reasoning. When does information about an event come to be treated as evidence relevant to explaining the event? We asked whether this was increasingly likely to happen when an explanation becomes available that can incorporate both the event and the information into a single causal framework. In three studies, we presented participants with events for which there were two possible and plausible explanations (a baseline and one of two alternative explanations), as well as with two pieces of background information. While all explanations could account for the event, only one alternative explanation (the “target” explanation) could incorporate both the event and the background information into a single causal framework. The results indicated that information is more likely to be seen as evidentially relevant to an event when there is an explanation available that can accommodate both the event and the information into a single casual framework than when such an explanation is lacking. Furthermore, the presence of this information renders the target alternative increasingly plausible. That is, it is the interdependence of explanation or theory and evidence that allows us to realize that some information is likely to be evidential. However, for this to happen, the relation between explanation and information must be made salient, either by explicitly asking about it (as we did in Study 1) or by fleshing out the target explanation (as we did in Study 3).     

Uncovering an existential barrier to breast self-exam behavior

The present research applies an analysis derived from terror management theory to the health domain of breast examination, and in doing so uncovers previously unrecognized factors that may contribute to women’s reluctance to perform breast self-examinations (BSEs). In Study 1, when concerns about mortality were primed, reminders of human beings’ physical nature (i.e., creatureliness) reduced intentions to conduct BSEs compared to reminders of humans’ uniqueness. In Study 2, women conducted shorter exams on a breast model (an experience found to increase death-thought accessibility) when creatureliness was primed compared to a uniqueness and no essay condition. In Study 3, after a creatureliness prime, women performed shorter BSEs when a placebo did not provide an alternative explanation for their discomfort compared to when it did. Advances for theory and breast self-exam promotion are discussed.     

Reduction of the elevator illusion from continued hypergravity exposure and visual error-corrective feedback

Ten subjects served as their own controls in two conditions of continuous, centrifugally produced hypergravity (+2 Gz) and a 1-G control condition. Before and after exposure, open-loop measures were obtained of (1) motor control, (2) visual localization, and (3) hand-eye coordination. During exposure in the visual feedback/hypergravity condition, subjects received terminal visual error-corrective feedback from their target pointing, and in the no-visual feedback/hypergravity condition they pointed open loop. As expected, the motor control measures for both experimental conditions revealed very short lived underreaching (the muscle-loading effect) at the outset of hypergravity and an equally transient negative aftereffect on returning to 1 G. The substantial (approximately 17°) initial elevator illusion experienced in both hypergravity conditions declined over the course of the exposure period, whether or not visual feedback was provided. This effect was tentatively attributed to habituation of the otoliths. Visual feedback produced a smaller additional decrement and a postexposure negative aftereffect, possible evidence for visual recalibration. Surprisingly, the target-pointing error made during hypergravity in the no-visual-feedback condition was substantially less than that predicted by subjects’ elevator illusion. This finding calls into question the neural outflow model as a complete explanation of this illusion.     

The impact of modified instructions on ego-level scores: a psychometric hazard or indication of optimal ego level?

Various modified instructions have different effects on the Washington University Sentence Completion Test for Ego Development (Loevinger, 1985). These effects were reviewed and 2 alternative explanations were explored: The "measurement unreliability explanation" versus the "optimal level explanation." Both explanations were systematically studied in 2 test-retest experiments with the Sentence Completion Test for Children and Youths (Westenberg, Treffers, & Drewes, 1998). The modified instructions were to make a favorable impression on the tester ("fake good" condition) or to complete the sentences in as adult and mature a manner as one can ("be mature" condition). Both experiments were conducted with 9- to 15-year-old children and adolescents (N = 127, 128). As was anticipated, neither the fake good nor the be mature condition yielded higher (or lower) reliability indexes as compared to the standard instructions, hence discounting the measurement unreliability explanation. Also as expected, the fake good condition did not yield significantly higher ego-level scores, whereas the be mature condition did yield significantly higher ego-level scores. The former instructions did not convey information relevant to the construct or measure of ego development, whereas the latter instructions did convey information relevant for raising ego-level scores. It is argued that the higher scores under the be mature instructions might reflect the respondents' "optimal" ego level (best functioning), whereas the ego-level score under the standard instructions might reflect their "functional" level (normal functioning).     

Toward a Process Analysis of Emotions: The Case of Surprise

Based on an earlier model of the processes elicited by surprising events, the present studies provide evidence for one of these processes, the evaluation of the surprising event's relevance for ongoing activities (action-relevance check). The central prediction tested was that, if unexpected events elicit among other processes an action-relevance check, then response delay on a concurrent task will be more pronounced in a condition where this process is more elaborate and hence takes more time. In accord with this prediction, Experiment 1 found that an unexpected appearance change of the imperative stimulus in a choice reaction time (RT) task caused greater response delay than an equivalent appearance change of a distractor stimulus. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and tested several additional predictions that concerned the effects on response delay of a second appearance change of either the imperative or the distractor stimuli. These predictions, which were also mostly confirmed, were derived by combining the logic underlying the first study with the assumption that once made, appraisals of unexpected events are stored as part of the situational schema and are reused when the same or similar events reoccur leading to an abbreviation of appraisal processes. Experiment 3 once more replicated the basic finding of the previous studies and ruled out a possible alternative explanation. It is suggested that the proposed RT method of process verification may be of broader interest as a tool to study appraisal processes in emotion.     

What a person thinks upon learning he has chosen differently from others: Nice evidence for the persuasive-arguments explanation of choice shifts

Small shifts in choice occur even without discussion, when individuals merely know each other's preference. This appears to support an interpersonal comparison explanation of group induced shifts in choice and to refute explanations based on persuasive argumentation. The present study demonstrates the contrary, that such effects are consistent with the persuasive-arguments formulation and are obtained under particular conditions specified only by the latter theory, to wit: Knowledge of other's choices is assumed to lead a person to think of reasons (arguments) others might have had for their choices-reasons which ordinarily would not come to mind without this knowledge. Such reasoning functions in the same way as persuasive argumentation during group discussion; it causes the person to persuade himself that an alternative course of action now has greater merit than the one he initially preferred. To test this analysis, an experiment was performed in which subjects responded to choice-dilemma items under three different conditions: Following their own choice (I) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in that same item; (II) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in a different item; and (III) they received no information about others' choices but merely wrote arguments on that item. As predicted, shifts in choice occurred only if the person knew what others chose and had an opportunity to think about the latter (condition I); they did not occur if an opportunity to think of others' choices was denied (condition II), nor if knowledge of others' choices was withheld (condition III). Content analysis of the arguments subjects produced in conditions I and II completely supported the hypothesis, as did analyses of responses to postexperimental questionnaire which directly asked the subjects about their feelings and thoughts upon learning what others had chosen.     

Distinguishing Between Causes and Enabling Conditions—Through Mental Models or Linguistic Cues?

The mental model theory of naive causal understanding and reasoning (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001, Cognitive Science, 25, 565–610) claims that people distinguish between causes and enabling conditions on the basis of sets of models that represent possible causal situations. In the tasks used to test this hypothesis, however, the proposed set of models was confounded with linguistic cues that frame which event to assume as given (the enabling condition) and which to consider as responsible for the effect under this assumption (the cause). By disentangling these two factors, we were able to show that when identifying causes and enabling conditions in these tasks, people rely strongly on the linguistic cues but not on the proposed set of models and that this set of models does not even reflect people's typical interpretation of the tasks. We propose an alternative explanation that integrates syntactic and causal considerations.     

Adjusting for the correspondence bias: Effects of causal uncertainty, cognitive busyness, and causal strength of situational information

This research examined the conditions under which people who have more chronic doubt about their ability to make sense of social behavior (i.e., are causally uncertain; [Weary and Edwards, 1994] and [Weary and Edwards, 1996]) are more likely to adjust their dispositional inferences for a target’s behaviors. Using a cognitive busyness manipulation within the attitude attribution paradigm, we found in Study 1 that higher causal uncertainty predicted increased correction of dispositional inferences, but only when participants had sufficient attentional resources to devote to the task. In Study 2, we found that higher-causal uncertainty predicted greater inferential correction, but only when the additional information provided a more compelling alternative explanation for the observed behavior. Results of this research are discussed in terms of their relevance to the Causal Uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and dispositional inference models.     

Attention to global gist processing eliminates age effects in false memories

Counterintuitive age increases have been reported for the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory illusion. The current theoretical explanation of this effect assumes that it is due to age increases in spontaneous interconnection of DRM list words' meanings. To test this explanation, 11-year-olds and young adults studied DRM lists under conditions that (a) encouraged them to form such meaning-based connections or (b) discouraged them from doing so. In line with the explanation, the usual developmental increase in false memory disappeared in the first condition but was preserved in the second condition. Also in line with the explanation, conjoint recognition analyses revealed that encouraging participants to form meaning connections increased their reliance on gist-based similarity judgments.     

Out of mind,out of sight? Investigating abnormal face scanning in autism spectrum disorder using gaze‐contingent paradigm

Diminished social motivation is hypothesized to explain abnormal face scanning pattern in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), especially reduced eye‐looking time in ASDs than typically developing (TD) people. Here, we tested an alternative explanation that children with ASD may use a compensatory strategy to avoid direct eye contact by processing the eyes through peripheral vision. We compared the face scanning patterns of children with and without ASD in two conditions: in the clear condition, the face was completely visible; in the blur condition, by using the gaze‐contingent paradigm, the whole face was blurred except for a small region being fixated at, thus children could not rely on the peripheral information to process the eyes. We found that children with ASD fixated less on the eyes than TD children in both conditions. Temporal‐course analyses further revealed the possible motivation‐based guidance of attention to process the eyes in the TD group but not in the ASD group. Additionally, we found that children with ASD scanned faces more randomly and less strategically than TD children. These results have ruled out the alternative hypothesis that the abnormal face scanning pattern in ASDs was due to their compensatory strategy to process eyes through peripheral vision, furthering our understanding of the mechanisms underlying their abnormal face scanning.     

Computation without Representation

The received view is that computational states are individuated at least in part by their semantic properties. I offer an alternative, according to which computational states are individuated by their functional properties. Functional properties are specified by a mechanistic explanation without appealing to any semantic properties. The primary purpose of this paper is to formulate the alternative view of computational individuation, point out that it supports a robust notion of computational explanation, and defend it on the grounds of how computational states are individuated within computability theory and computer science. A secondary purpose is to show that existing arguments for the semantic view are defective.     

Attitude similarity and attraction: Validation,positive affect,and trust as sequential mediators

Effectance motivation—an urge for certainty and a feeling of being able to know, predict, and control one's environment—was initially proposed as the mechanism underlying attitude similarity effects on attraction. However, this motivation was discarded as an explanation when positive affect was identified. The presence of alternative mechanisms did not deny a role for the validation of attitudes in attraction. Therefore, we investigated the validation of one's views by those of peers as an additional mediator and its relation with two previously known mediators of positive affect and trust. As hypothesized, validation mediated attitude similarity effects when measured alone (Experiment 1) and within sequential mediation patterns involving positive affect (Experiment 2A) and trust (Experiments 2B and 2C).