Context change as the mechanism of reinstatement in causal learning

Four experiments were conducted to explore the mechanism of reinstatement in human causal learning. After a retroactive interference treatment in which a stimulus was first followed by an outcome (A+) and then followed by a different outcome (A*), simple exposure to the original outcome (+) in the interference-test context produced partial reinstatement of the first-learned information (A+). When exposure to the outcome took place in a context different from the interference-test context, reinstatement was not observed (Experiment 1). Equivalent results appeared when the outcome presented during reinstatement was different from the one originally related to the stimulus affected by interference, independent of whether the interfering outcome (Experiments 2, 3, and 4) or a new outcome (Experiments 3 and 4) was presented before the test. These results suggest an interpretation of reinstatement in terms of a context change between interference and testing.     

Knowing who dunnit: Infants identify the causal agent in an unseen causal interaction

Preverbal infants can represent the causal structure of events, including distinguishing the agentive and receptive roles and categorizing entities according to stable causal dispositions. This study investigated how infants combine these 2 kinds of causal inference. In Experiments 1 and 2, 9.5-month-olds used the position of a human hand or a novel puppet (causal agents), but not a toy train (an inert object), to predict the subsequent motion of a beanbag. Conversely, in Experiment 3, 10- and 7-month-olds used the motion of the beanbag to infer the position of a hand but not of a toy block. These data suggest that preverbal infants expect a causal agent as the source of motion of an inert object.     

Absorption as a therapeutic agent

The process of absorption is therapeutically adaptive for patients in a variety of contexts. Absorption is defined as the temporary loss of self through immersion in an object that eventuates in self-enhancement. Patients who become absorbed in animate and/or inanimate objects are better able to cope with a variety of problems and experience a heightened sense of well-being. Absorption is distinguished from symbiosis, mystic experiences and religion. The recognition, validation and employment of absorption in the analytic session is elucidated.     

Prediction of environmental change: Wish-fulfillment revisited

Two experiments are reported which examine the relationship between a person's estimate of the likelihood of a future change in his environment and his assessment of its desirability. The first experiment showed a general tendency for probability and desirability ratings to be positively correlated. This correlation was higher when the desirability of a predicted change was seen, on average, as matching its probability of occurrence, e.g., if the change was seen as both desirable and probable rather than probable but undesirable. In the second experiment subjects wrote an essay arguing either that a predicted change was probable, improbable, desirable or undesirable. Arguing for desirability of the predicted change had as much effect on subjects' probability estimates as arguing for its probability; similarly, arguing for its probability had as much effect on desirability ratings as arguing for its desirability. These results are taken to imply that individuals may seek to achieve greater cognitive simplicity by treating probability and desirability as a single dimension.     

Toward a causal realist account of causal understanding

Within a limited domain, humans can perceive causal relations directly. The term causal realism is used to denote this psychological hypothesis. The domain of causal realism is in actions upon objects and haptic perception of the effects of those actions: When we act upon an object we cannot be mistaken about the fact that we are acting upon it and perceive the causal relation directly through mechanoreceptors. Experiences of actions upon objects give rise to causal knowledge that can be used in the interpretation of perceptual input. Phenomenal causality, the occurrence of causal impressions in visual perception, is a product of the application of acquired causal knowledge in the automatic perceptual interpretation of appropriate stimuli. Causal realism could constitute the foundation on which all causal perception, judgment, inference, attribution, and knowledge develop.     

The family therapist as a change agent: Using principles and strategies of organization development in family therapy

Abstract

Families are compared to work organizations from a systems perspective, establishing parallels in needs for change and growth. The theoretical underpinnings of Organization Development (O.D.) are reviewed and discussed in light of their use in conceptualizing family therapy. From this systems viewpoint, the consultant role, systems diagnosis and a variety of O.D. interventions are proposed to the family therapist.     

Learned associability and associative change in human causal learning.

The Mackintosh (1975) model of associative learning specifies that processing of both the cues presented on a trial and the outcome of that trial will interact to determine the amount of associative change undergone by a given cue. Experiments looking at the distribution of associative change among the elements of a reinforced compound in animal conditioning studies indicate that processing of the outcome of a trial does indeed influence associative change. The work reported here investigates the distribution of associative change among the elements of a reinforced compound in a human causal judgement paradigm, and it indicates that processing of the cues presented on a trial also plays a role in determining associative change (in terms of changes in the associability of cues as a result of experience). Taken in combination, these results provide good support for Mackintosh (1975) and the characterizations of both cue and outcome processing that it offers.     

Thought-action fusion as a causal factor in the development of intrusions

Thought-action fusion refers to the tendency to treat thoughts and actions as equivalents. Some authors (e.g., Rachman, 1997; Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 793-802) have suggested that thought-action fusion plays a role in the etiology of obsessive intrusions. The present study sought to test this idea. Subjects (n = 19) in the experimental condition underwent a bogus EEG recording session. They were informed that the apparatus was able to pick up the word 'apple' and that thoughts of that word could result in the administration of electrical shocks to another person. After having spent 15 minutes in the EEG laboratory, experimental subjects and controls (n = 26) completed a short questionnaire containing items about characteristics of the target thought (e.g., frequency, aversiveness). Results indicate that thought-action fusion, indeed, promotes intrusive thinking in that it results in a higher frequency of target thoughts, more discomfort, and more resistance. Thus, the current findings support the idea that thought-action fusion may contribute to the development of obsessive intrusions.     

The causal structure of situations: The generation of plausible causal attributions as a function of type of event situation

The causal structures for each of four types of situations—interpersonal failure, noninterpersonal failure, interpersonal success, and noninterpersonal success—were explored and compared. A first group of subjects generated plausible causes for five specific situations in each of the four general types of situations. A second group of subjects provided similarity data on these causes, which were used in a cluster analysis of the causes. A third group of subjects rated the generated causes on each of six dimensions reported in the attribution literature: changeability, locus, stability, intentionality, globality, and controllability. Analyses of the clusters of causes and the ratings revealed (a) different types of causes were generated for different types of situations, (b) different types of situations led people to generate causes that differ in dimensional location, (c) the various causal dimensions were highly intercorrelated. These findings were applied to A. W. Kruglanski's (Psychological Review, 1980, 87) model of attribution processes. In addition, implications for the study of interpersonal situations and for the cognition-motivation debate over “self-serving” bias in attribution were discussed. Finally, several methodological issues were examined.     

Color name as a function of wavelength and instruction

A series of experiments were performed to determine the effects of instructions upon color naming data. Although color name is basically a function of stimulus wavelength, even slight changes in the response categories available for the 5 led to substantial changes in the pattern of Ss’ response allocation.