Contribution of perceptual fluency to recognition judgments.

Following a shallow (count vowels) or deep (read) study task, old and new words were tested for both fluency of perception and recognition memory. Subjects first identified a test word as it came gradually into view and then judged it as old or new. Old words were identified faster than new words, indicating implicit, perceptual memory for old words. Independently of this effect, words judged old were identified faster than words judged new, especially after shallow study. Eight experiments examined the possible causal relationship between perceptual fluency and recognition judgements. Experiments 1 to 4 showed that fast identifications per se do not promote old judgments. Accelerating the identification of test items by semantically priming them or making them come more quickly into view did not affect recognition judgments. Experiment 5 showed that the usual association of fast identifications with old judgments is not an artifact of item selection because the association disappeared when the identifications and judgements were segregated into different phases of the test task. Experiments 6 and 7 showed tha the likelihood of old judgments increases directly with the pretested perceptibility of test words, but only after shallow study. Experiment 8 showed that the dependency of recognition judgments on perceptual fluency continues to hold when the requirement to identify the words before judging them is eliminated. We conclude that fluency of perception contributes to recognition judgments, but only when the fluency is produced naturally (e.g., through perceptual memory) and explicit memory is minimal.     

Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal past

The nature of recollective experience was examined in a recognition memory task. Subjects gave “remember” judgments to recognized items that were accompanied by conscious recollection and “know” judgments to items that were recognized on some other basis. Although a levels-of-processing effect (Experiment 1) and a picture-superiority effect (Experiment 2) were obtained for overall recognition, these effects occurred only for “remember” judgments, and were reversed for “know” judgments. In Experiment 3, targets and lures were either preceded by a masked repetition of their own presentation (thought to increase perceptual fluency) or of an unrelated word. The effect of perceptual fluency was obtained for overall recogrntion and “know” judgments but not for “remember” judgments. The data obtained for confidencejudgments using the same design (Experiment4) indicated that “remember”/”know” judgments are not made solely on the basis of confidence. These data support the two-factor theories of recognition memory by dissociating two forms of recognition, and shed light on the nature of conscious recollection.     

Easily perceived, easily remembered? Perceptual interference produces a double dissociation between metamemory and memory performance

A recent candidate for explaining metamemory judgments is the perceptual fluency hypothesis, which proposes that easily perceived items are predicted to be remembered better, regardless of actual memory performance (Rhodes & Castel Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 137:615–625, 2008). In two experiments, we used the perceptual interference manipulation to test this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with intact and backward-masked words during encoding, followed by a metamemory prediction (a list-wide judgment of learning, JOL) and then a free recall test. Participants predicted that intact words would be better recalled, despite better actual memory for words in the perceptual interference condition, yielding a crossed double dissociation between predicted and actual memory performance. In Experiment 2, JOLs were made after each study word. Item-by-item JOLs were likewise higher for intact than for backward-masked words, despite similar actual memory performance for both types of words. The results are consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis of metamemory and are discussed in terms of experience-based and theory-based metamemory judgments.     

Direct versus indirect tests of memory for source: judgments of modality

We studied the relation between performance on direct versus indirect tests of memory for modality. Subjects read or heard words in a mixed list and then were tested by visual perceptual identification (the indirect test) and direct report of items as read, heard, or new. There was a dependent relation between perceptual identification performance and modality judgments, in accord with the hypothesis that subjects base their judgments of modality on relative perceptual fluency. In Experiment 2, we attempted to change the degree of dependence by providing subjects with an alternative basis for modality judgments. Subjects given a mnemonic to encode modality exhibited less dependence between perceptual identification performance and modality judgments than did subjects who encoded modality incidentally. The relation between direct and indirect tests of memory for source characteristics depends on the basis used for each.     

Effects of processing fluency on comparative performance judgments

Research has shown that performance predictions are biased by the impact of processing fluency. However, existing data are inconclusive with regard to comparative judgments of performance. In five experiments, participants in an easy condition gave more favorable comparative judgments than participants in a difficult condition. Participants judged their performance more favorably if they named colors of non-color words rather than non-matching color words (Experiment 1), if they had to generate six words of a category rather than 12 words (Experiment 2), if they had to run in place for 15 s rather than 2 min (Experiment 3), but the latter result holds only true if participants were not active in sports (Experiment 4). When 67% of the items in a recognition test were old words, participants thought that their recognition performance was better than when 33% of the items were old words, although recognition performance did not differ between groups (Experiment 5). We discuss this result in the light of recent theories about effects of processing fluency on judgments.     

Change in perceptual form attenuates the use of the fluency heuristic in recognition

Four experiments (total N=295) were conducted to determine whether within-modality changes in perceptual form between the study and the test phases of an experiment would moderate the role of the fluency heuristic in recognition memory. Experiment 1 showed that a change from pictures to words reduced the role of fluency in recognition memory. In Experiment 2, the same result was found using counterfeit study lists that supposedly consisted of pictures or words. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that changes in the font used to present the study and test words also attenuated the contribution of fluency to the recognition decision when font change was manipulated between subjects, but not within subjects. Results suggest that the fluency heuristic is subject to metacognitive control, since participants' attributions of perceptual fluency depend on the perceived usefulness of fluency as a cue to recognition.     

The role of spurious feature familiarity in recognition memory

In two experiments, we investigated the role of perceptual information in spurious recognition judgments. Participants viewed lists of words in various unusual fonts. The frequency with which each font was presented was manipulated at study: Each font was presented with 1 or 12 different words in Experiment 1 and with 1 or 20 words in Experiment 2. Although the participants were instructed in a word recognition test to judge only on the basis of the word, regardless of font, there were significantly more false alarms for new words seen in a previously presented font than for new words presented in a novel (not seen at study) font in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, the participants were significantly more likely to make a false alarm to a new word seen in a font that had been used to present 20 words during study than to a font that had been used to present only 1 word during study. The data show a mirror effect, in which words tested in low-frequency fonts produced more hits and fewer false alarms than did words tested in high-frequency fonts. These results show that irrelevant perceptual information plays a role in recognition judgments by providing spurious sources of familiarity and, thus, provide evidence that perceptual information is represented and processed in the same way as semantic information.     

Judgments of duration, figure-ground contrast, and size for words and nonwords

Does the word-superiority effect on letter discrimination result in a word-superiority effect on duration judgments? We examined this question in five experiments. In the first four experiments, we have demonstrated that (1) words shown for 32-80 msec were judged as presented longer than non-words shown for the same duration; (2) this word-superiority effect persists if the stimuli are shown for an objective duration of up to 250 msec; and (3) these effects can be extended to judgments of figure-ground contrast and letter size. These findings extend existing data on effects of processing fluency on perceptual judgments. In Experiment 5, we found that duration judgments were higher for words than for pronounceable nonwords, and duration judgments were higher for pronounceable non-words than for nonpronounceable nonwords. We discuss the implications of this finding for the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis.     

Effects of Perceptual Fluency on Affective Judgments

According to a two-step account of the mere-exposure effect, repeated exposure leads to the subjective feeling of perceptual fluency, which in turn influences liking. If so, perceptual fluency manipulated by means other than repetition should influence liking. In three experiments, effects of perceptual fluency on affective judgments were examined. In Experiment 1, higher perceptual fluency was achieved by presenting a matching rather than nonmatching prime before showing a target picture. Participants judged targets as prettier if preceded by a matching rather than nonmatching prime. In Experiment 2, perceptual fluency was manipulated by figure-ground contrast. Stimuli were judged as more pretty, and less ugly, the higher the contrast. In Experiment 3, perceptual fluency was manipulated by presentation duration. Stimuli shown for a longer duration were liked more, and disliked less. We concluded (a) that perceptual fluency increases liking and (b) that the experience of fluency is affectively positive, and hence attributed to positive but not to negative features, as reflected in a different impact on positive and negative judgments.     

On the contribution of perceptual fluency and priming to recognition memory

Repetition priming has been shown to be independent of recognition memory. Thus, the severely amnesic patient E.P. has demonstrated intact stem completion priming and perceptual identification priming, despite at-chance performance on recognition memory tasks. It has also been shown that perceptual fluency can influence feelings of familiarity, in the sense that items perceived more quickly tend to be identified as familiar. If studied items are identified more fluently, due to perceptual priming, and fluency leads to familiarity, why do severely amnesic patients perform no better than chance on recognition memory tasks? One possibility is that severely amnesic patients do not exhibit normal fluency. Another possibility is that fluency is not a sufficiently strong cue for familiarity. In two experiments, 2 severely amnesic patients, 3 moderately amnesic patients, and 8 controls saw words slowly clearing from a mask. The participants identified each word as quickly as possible and then made a recognition (old/new) judgment. All the participants exhibited fluency, in that old responses were associated with shorter identification times than new responses were. In addition, for the severely amnesic patients, priming was intact, and recognition memory performance was at chance. We next calculated how much priming and fluency should elevate the probability of accurate recognition. The tendency to identify studied words rapidly (.6) and the tendency to label these rapidly identified words old (.6) would result in 36% of the studied words being labeled old. Other studied words were identified slowly (.4) but were still labeled old (.4), resulting in an additional 16% of studied words labeled old. Thus, the presence of fluency increases the probability of accurate recognition judgments to only 52% (chance = 50%). This finding explains why amnesic patients can exhibit both priming and fluency yet still perform at chance on recognition tests.     

Typography and color: Effects of salience and fluency on conscious recollective experience

Within one experiment the central assumptions of the distinctiveness/fluency account of recollective experience were tested and contrasted with predictions of processing theory. To manipulate perceptual salience, the typography of words was varied. Effects of conceptual salience were induced by a variation of word color. In the study phase participants generated different word or object images according to presented words. To manipulate perceptual and conceptual fluency one test group underwent a priming procedure in the test phase, consisting of a recognition test, whereby some primes were identical to the target words typographically or by color and others were not. Additionally, all participants were asked to make judgments of recollective experience (remember, know, guess) after the old/new decisions. The results of the data analyses confirm the distinctiveness/fluency account. Words written in an unusual typography or color were judged significantly more often as "remembered" than normal words. The priming procedure uncovered some effects of fluency on reaction times: old/new decisions took less time if prime and target words were perceptually or conceptually identical.     

Fluency and response speed in recognition judgments

Previous research has suggested that perceptual fluency can contribute to recognition judgments. In this study, we examined whether fluency in recognition is based upon the speed of preceding operations, as suggested by studies of perceptual fluency. Subjects studied items in both lexical decision and naming tasks, and were then tested on two blocks of lexical decision trials with probe recognition trials. Jacoby’s process dissociation procedure was used, and results from this procedure suggested that recognition judgments in the task were based largely upon familiarity. However, the estimated discriminability available from response time distributions was significantly less than the observed recognition discriminability. Simulated memory operating characteristics confirmed this underdetermination of recognition by response times. The results demonstrate, contrary to previous suggestions, that fluency in recognition is not based upon speed.     

编码强度对字体大小效应的影响

本研究采用3个实验考察编码强度对字体大小效应的影响, 探讨由于知觉特征而引发的元认知错觉的内在产生机制(实验1)与有效的矫正措施(实验2和实验3)。结果发现:(1)大字体词语的知觉流畅性显著优于小字体, 并且贝叶斯多层中介分析结果表明, 知觉流畅性对字体大小效应起部分中介作用(实验1); (2)随着编码强度的增加, 由字体大小引起的学习判断错觉逐渐消失(实验2和实验3)。以上结果表明, 刺激的知觉特征(字体大小)对个体学习判断的影响, 随编码强度激活线索的增加而逐渐减弱。这一结果为真实教学情境中提高学习者的编码强度, 进而削弱学习判断对知觉特征线索的依赖, 并准确地监测自身的学习进程提供了科学依据。     

The effect of a prior presentation on temporal judgments in a perceptual identification task

Subjects read aloud words presented once at the rate of one per second. A perceptual identification task, involving 30- or 50-msec presentations, followed. Some of the words presented for identification had been read previously; others were new. After each presentation, in addition to identifying the word, the subjects judged its duration. The data indicate that a single presentation of a word affects its later perception, as revealed by enhanced perceptual identification, longer duration judgments, and better temporal discrimination. A second experiment showed that a single presentation influenced duration judgments even when identification was not required. The final experiment addressed the issue of what is preserved in memory from a prior presentation. The results from the three experiments indicate that duration judgments provide a valuable dependent measure of memory in the perceptual identification task and support the misattribution hypothesis: A prior presentation enhances perceptual identification, and this increase in relative perceptual fluency is incorrectly attributed to a longer presentation duration.     

知觉模糊度影响学习的延迟效应

基于迁移适当加工理论,采用连续识别任务范式,通过操纵字词和图片的模糊度来考察知觉模糊非流畅的延迟效应。结果发现：（1）模糊不流畅的材料学习判断值更低;（2） 知觉模糊程度对即时的再认成绩没有影响,但在延迟再认测试中流畅性较低的模糊材料成绩更好。该结果表明实验操纵方式所引发的编码过程和记忆测试所需的检索过程性质上相匹配,而且延迟测试时,知觉非流畅可以促进学习,说明该效应存在边界。     

Processing fluency affects subjective claims of recollection

Previous studies that have used the remember-know paradigm to investigate subjective awareness in memory have shown that fluency manipulations have an impact on "know" responses but not on "remember" responses (e.g., Rajaram, 1993), a finding typically accounted for by invoking inferential processing in judgments of familiarity but not of recollection. However, in light of several researchers' criticisms of this procedure, as well as findings documenting the influence of processing fluency on various subjective judgments, the present study was conducted in order to investigate whether judgments of recollection might also be subject to inferential processes and not solely the product of conscious retrieval. When the standard remember-know procedure was used (Experiment 1), manipulations of perceptual fluency increased "know" responses but had no effect on "remember" responses, replicating previous findings. However, when an independent ratings method was employed (Higham & Vokey, 2004), manipulations of perceptual fluency (Experiment 2) and conceptual fluency (Experiment 3) reliably increased claims of both familiarity and recollection, suggesting that the conclusion that fluency affects only "know" responses may be an artifact of the standard remember-know procedure.     

Perceptual specificity and implicit auditory priming in older and younger adults.

Age differences in perceptual specificity for implicit auditory priming were examined in 3 experiments. All 3 experiments began with a study phase during which participants rated words based on perceptual (shallow encoding) or semantic (deep encoding) attributes. After the study phase, participants were asked to identify filtered versions of repeated and new words (implicit test) and then to make old/new recognition judgments (explicit test). In contrast to earlier findings (D. L. Schacter, B. Church, & D. M. Osowiecki, 1994), older and younger adults were equally sensitive to study-to-test changes in speaking rate (Experiment 1), fundamental frequency (Experiment 2), and voice (Experiment 3). Explicit memory, in contrast, was significantly poorer for older adults but was minimally affected by changes in surface features. Findings from the study are discussed with respect to their implications for establishing the mechanisms mediating perceptual specificity and for their importance in understanding age-related changes in implicit memory.     

Memory and the experience of duration in retrospect

Two experiments investigated the relationship between long-term memory for events occurring during an interval and the experience of duration of the interval in retrospect. In both, Ss attended to a sequence consisting of a standard, an experimental, and a second standard interval. Then unexpected comparative duration and memory judgments were requested. In Experiment I, either 30 or 60 unrelated words occurred during the 180-see experimental interval. When more words had occurred, judgments of duration of the experimental interval, judgments of number of words presented, and number of words recognized all increased, but free recall of words was unaffected. In Experiment II, 80 categorized words occurred during the 160-see experimental interval, with category instances in either blocked or random order. When words were blocked by category, judgments of duration of the experimental interval, free recall, and recognition all increased, but judgments of number of words were unaffected. Results were discussed in terms of Ornstein’s (1969) “storage size” hypothesis.     

Discrepant fluency increases subjective truth

The present experiment tested the hypothesis that perceptual fluency affects truth judgments especially when the fluency has changed. Participants were asked to judge the truth of statements that were printed in different colors. Perceptual fluency was manipulated by color contrast. Change versus no change of fluency was manipulated by using preceding statements that had the same or a different contrast. As expected, highly fluent statements were judged as more probably true than statements with a low fluency but this effect occurred only when the high fluency meant a change from previous fluency. The role of discrepancies in subjective experiences in terms of their informativeness for social judgments is discussed.     

Fluency does not express implicit knowledge of artificial grammars

It is commonly held that implicit knowledge expresses itself as fluency. A perceptual clarification task was used to examine the relationship between perceptual processing fluency, subjective familiarity, and grammaticality judgments in a task frequently used to produce implicit knowledge, artificial grammar learning (AGL). Four experiments examined the effects of naturally occurring differences and manipulated differences in perceptual fluency, where decisions were based on a brief exposure to test-strings (during the clarification task only) or normal exposure. When perceptual fluency was not manipulated, it was weakly related to familiarity and grammaticality judgments, but unrelated to grammatical status and hence not a source of accuracy. Counterbalanced grammatical and ungrammatical strings did not differ in perceptual fluency but differed substantially in subjective familiarity. When fluency was manipulated, faster clarifying strings were rated as more familiar and were more often endorsed as grammatical but only where exposure was brief. Results indicate that subjective familiarity derived from a source other than perceptual fluency, is the primary basis for accuracy in AGL. Perceptual fluency is found to be a dumb heuristic influencing responding only in the absence of actual implicit knowledge.