Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge‐how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge‐that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge‐how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge‐that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that come apart.     

Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement

According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge‐how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge‐how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge‐how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti‐intellectualism. Unlike neo‐Rylean anti‐intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge‐how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge‐how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.     

Knowledge‐first functionalism

This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.     

Knowledge‐lies re‐examined

Sorensen says that my assertion that p is a knowledge‐lie if it is meant to undermine your justification for believing truly that ～p, not to make you believe that p and that, therefore, knowledge‐lies are not intended to deceive. It has been objected that they are meant to deceive because they are intended to make you more confident in a falsehood. In this paper, I propose a novel account according to which an assertion that p is a knowledge‐lie if it is intended not to provide evidence that p but to make you stop trusting all testimonies concerning whether p (in a room full of obvious liars, you will trust no one), which is how they undermine your testimonial knowledge. Because they are not intended to provide evidence that bears on the truth of p, they are not intended to make you more confident in a falsehood; therefore, knowledge‐lies are not intended to deceive. This makes them a problem for the traditional account, which takes the intention to deceive as necessary for lying, and an interesting example of Kant's idea that allowing lies whenever one feels like it would bring it about that statements in general are not believed.     

Defeasibility And The Normative Grasp Of Context

In this article, we present an analysis of defeasible generalizations – generalizations which are essentially exception-laden, yet genuinely explanatory – in terms of various notions of privileged conditions. We argue that any plausible epistemology must make essential use of defeasible generalizations so understood. We also consider the epistemic significance of the sort of understanding of context that is required for understanding of explanatory defeasible generalizations on any topic.     

Using the Knowledge‐and‐Appraisal Personality Architecture to Predict Physically Active Leisure Self‐Efficacy in University Students1

Although self‐efficacy is a construct found throughout research literature, little is known about the psychological mechanisms that give rise to perceptions of personal confidence. This situation is changing as a result of the introduction of the knowledge‐and‐appraisal personality architecture (KAPA; Cervone, 2004 ), a theory proposed to explain the origins of self‐efficacy percepts. In the present study, KAPA's framework was utilized to predict university students' self‐efficacy toward 3 physically demanding leisure activities. The results support the theory's validity. Confidence was strongly related to how personal characteristics were thought to influence performance of a leisure activity. Self‐efficacy was significantly higher when personal attributes were thought to help with performance vs. when attributes were believed to hinder performance.     

The conflict mindset: How internal conflicts affect self‐regulation

Internal conflicts are inherent to individuals' everyday experience. In this paper, we present the idea of the “conflict mindset.” We argue that internal conflicts evoke a unique information processing strategy that builds on the simultaneous accessibility of two (or more) conflicting alternatives. Once a conflict is activated, the procedure underlying it is primed and can be applied to any relevant subsequent judgment that need not overlap in content with the conflict that originally gave rise to the mindset. We present research demonstrating that the conflict mindset broadens cognitive scope, as well as serves a proactive function for resolving subsequent conflicts. We further describe both intra‐personal and inter‐personal implications of the conflict mindset on an array of variables. We briefly discuss other mindsets that share common features with the conflict mindset, elaborate on the uniqueness of the conflict mindset compared to other cognitive and motivational processes, and present lingering questions and future directions.     

How to do a meta‐analysis

Meta‐analysis is a statistical tool for estimating the mean and variance of underlying population effects from a collection of empirical studies addressing ostensibly the same research question. Meta‐analysis has become an increasing popular and valuable tool in psychological research, and major review articles typically employ these methods. This article describes the process of conducting meta‐analysis: selecting articles, developing inclusion criteria, calculating effect sizes, conducting the actual analysis (including information on how to do the analysis on popular computer packages such as IBM SPSS and R) and estimating the effects of publication bias. Guidance is also given on how to write up a meta‐analysis.     

Pre‐registration: Why and How

In this article, we (1) discuss the reasons why pre‐registration is a good idea, both for the field and individual researchers, (2) respond to arguments against pre‐registration, (3) describe how to best write and review a pre‐registration, and (4) comment on pre‐registration’s rapidly accelerating popularity. Along the way, we describe the (big) problem that pre‐registration can solve (i.e., false positives caused by p‐hacking), while also offering viable solutions to the problems that pre‐registration cannot solve (e.g., hidden confounds or fraud). Pre‐registration does not guarantee that every published finding will be true, but without it you can safely bet that many more will be false. It is time for our field to embrace pre‐registration, while taking steps to ensure that it is done right.     

How Incidental Confidence Influences Self‐Interested Behaviors: A Double‐Edged Sword

The present research investigates how incidental confidence influences self‐interested behaviors. It is well established that being in a psychological state of lower confidence causes people to experience psychological aversion that they are motivated to reduce. We study the transfer effect of confidence; people strive to compensate for lower confidence in one domain by obtaining higher status in other unrelated domains. Prior research has linked money with status and suggested that money can increase confidence. Building on this research, we proposed and showed in four experiments that lower incidental confidence increased self‐interested behaviors that brought financial gains. Drawing on research on competitive altruism, we also predicted and found that when altruism, rather than money, was seen as the primary source of status, the effect of incidental confidence reversed such that lower incidental confidence decreased self‐interested behaviors. Data ruled out alternative explanations and provided consistent evidence for the proposed compensatory mechanism. We also discussed theoretical and practical implications of the present research. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Many Times and How Many Ways: The Impact of Number of Nonsuicidal Self‐Injury Methods on the Relationship Between Nonsuicidal Self‐Injury Frequency and Suicidal Behavior

Several variables have been proposed as heavily influencing or explaining the association between nonsuicidal self‐injury (NSSI) and suicidal behavior. We propose that increased comfort with bodily harm may serve as an incrementally valuable variable to consider. We sought to indirectly test this possibility by examining the moderating role of number of NSSI methods utilized on the relationship between NSSI frequency and lifetime number of suicide attempts, positing that increased variability in methods would be indicative with a greater general comfort with inflicting harm upon one's own body. In both a large sample of emerging adults (n = 1,317) and a subsample with at least one prior suicide attempt (n = 143), results were consistent with our hypothesis. In both samples, the interaction term was significant, with the relationship between NSSI frequency and suicidal behavior increasing in magnitude from low to mean to high levels of NSSI methods. Although frequency of NSSI is robustly associated with suicidal behavior, the magnitude of that relationship increases as an individual engages in a wider variety of NSSI methods. We propose that this may be due to an increased comfort with the general concept of damaging one's own body resulting from a broader selection of methods for self‐harm.     

The test taker's fallacy: How students guess answers on multiple‐choice tests

Many students and applicants take multiple‐choice tests to demonstrate their competence and achievement. When they are unsure, they guess the most likely answer to maximize their score. Despite the impact of guessing on test reliability and individual performance, studies have not examined how patterns of answer sequences in multiple‐choice tests affect guessing. This research presents the test taker's fallacy, which refers to an individual's tendency to expect a different answer to appear for the next question given a run of the same answer choices. The test taker's fallacy exhibits negative recency, similar to the gambler's fallacy. However, extending the sequential judgment literature, the test taker's fallacy shows that negative recency arises even when sequences may or may not be randomly generated. In three studies, including a survey and experiments, the test taker's fallacy is robustly observed. The test taker's fallacy is consistent with the operation of the representativeness heuristic. This research explains what and how test takers guess given a streak of answers and extends judgment under uncertainty to the test‐taking context.     

How self‐relevant imagination affects memory for behaviour

Research has demonstrated that imagination can be used to affect behaviour and also to distort memory, yet few studies have examined whether the effects of imagination on behavioural estimates and memory are related. In two experiments, the effects of imagination on self‐reported behaviour and subsequent memory for that behaviour were investigated. A comparison of behavioural estimates collected before and after imagination demonstrated that reported estimates of behaviour changed after imagination. In addition, memory for the original estimates of behaviour was also affected, suggesting that imagination may impair one's ability to remember originally reported behaviour. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the observed changes in reported behaviour were accompanied by the largest errors in memory for originally reported behaviour when participants generate images based on self‐relevant scenarios. On the other hand, memory distortion was minimized when participants read but did not imagine self‐relevant scenarios. These results have direct application to clinicians and researchers who employ imagination techniques as behavioural modifiers, and suggest that techniques that are self‐relevant but do not include imagery may be a useful alternative to imagination. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How others respond to non‐suicidal self‐injury disclosure: A systematic review

Non‐suicidal self‐injury (NSSI) is an increasing health concern. Despite the potential benefits of disclosing the behaviour, many decide not to do so because of the fear of negative social reactions. In this review, we examined the existing research on reported and perceived reactions to NSSI disclosure with the aim of identifying how an individual who discloses their NSSI perceives others' responses to this disclosure, with the ultimate goal of understanding how these reactions may impact those who disclose their NSSI. Among the initial 275 studies, 10 fit the inclusion criteria. Three studies reported perceived responses by individuals who had disclosed their NSSI; six studies examined self‐reported responses by others; one study focused on disclosures online. Individuals who disclosed their NSSI often received negative responses, which caused them to withdraw from seeking further help. On the other hand, recipients' reactions to NSSI disclosure varied based on NSSI characteristics such as its perceived cause and/or underlying motivation. Results highlight the importance of providing support rather than searching for the underlying drives of NSSI.     

Self‐Regulation and Power: How Self‐Regulatory Failures Can Enhance Social Power

Low self‐control is often associated with poor life outcomes. Here, we propose that self‐control failures may also provide social benefits by signaling and maintaining power. We identify several pathways by which reduced self‐control can assist in ascending social hierarchies. First, the self‐enhancing tendencies adopted by people with low self‐control may contribute to making positive first impressions and advertising power to new acquaintances. The direct and disinhibited communication styles that stem from self‐control failures may also enhance power and lubricate difficult social interactions. Disinhibited aggression can help people maintain and acquire material resources and establish dominance over rivals. Finally, the parallels between the behavior of people with low self‐control and people with power (e.g., self‐enhancement, disinhibition, approach‐orientation, aggression) suggest that people with impaired self‐control will be perceived as more powerful than people with intact self‐control. Evidence for these propositions and directions for future research are discussed.