Moral Testimony and its Authority

A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person's moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person's actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes fails to meet this requirement when she relies on another person's moral testimony, and so there are moral limits on such reliance.     

Moral Testimony: Transmission Versus Propagation

The status of moral testimony has recently been challenged, for both epistemic and non-epistemic reasons. This paper distinguishes two methods of teaching: transmission, “classic” learning from testimony, that results in second hand knowledge, and propagation which results in first hand knowledge and understanding. Moral propagation avoids most of the epistemic and non-epistemic problems of transmission. Moreover, moral propagation can develop and refine non-cognitive attitudes too. Therefore moral testimony should (and normally does) take the form of moral propagation, not transmission.     

What Pessimism about Moral Deference Means for Disagreement

Many writers have recently argued that there is something distinctively problematic about sustaining moral beliefs on the basis of others’ moral views. Call this claim pessimism about moral deference. Pessimism about moral deference, if true, seems to provide an attractive way to argue for a bold conclusion about moral disagreement: moral disagreement generally does not require belief revision. Call this claim steadfastness about moral disagreement. Perhaps the most prominent recent discussion of the connection between moral deference and moral disagreement, due to Alison Hills, uses pessimism about the former to argue for steadfastness about the latter. This paper reveals that this line of thinking, and others like it, are unsuccessful. There is no way to argue from a compelling version of pessimism about moral deference to the conclusion of steadfastness about moral disagreement. The most plausible versions of pessimism about moral deference have only very limited implications for moral disagreement.     

道德证词及其问题探析

证词是我们了解世界的一个重要途径,但关于道德证词能否作为我们道德知识的来源或根据,哲学家们却有争议。一些哲学家认为,我们可以依赖非道德证词,但不能依赖道德证词,虽然道德证词能够传递道德知识或正确的道德信念,因为存在一个规范使得依赖道德证词是有问题的,这个规范就是:道德主体应该根据道德理解行动。另一些哲学家则认为,关于道德证词和非道德证词的"非对称性"观点是错误的,道德证词与非道德证词一样,完全没有问题。事实上,某些情况下依赖道德证词是有问题的--道德理解问题,但道德证词不比非道德证词更有问题,或者说,非道德证词与道德证词有同样的问题。     

Moral Compromises, Moral Integrity and the Indeterminacy of Value Rankings

Though the art of compromise, i.e. of settling differences by mutual concessions, is part of communal living on any level, we often think that there is something wrong in compromise, especially in cases where moral convictions are involved. A first reason for distrusting compromises on moral matters refers to the idea of integrity, understood in the basic sense of 'standing for something', especially standing for the values and causes that to some extent confer identity. The second reason points out the objective nature of moral values, which seems to make them immune from negotiation and barter. If one sincerely holds some moral conviction to be true, than compromising on that belief must be a sign of serious confusion.In order to reach a better understanding of these two reasons, I analyse what is involved in personal integrity and how this relates to moral integrity. I argue that the search for moral integrity naturally brings us to the question of how one could accept moral compromises and still uphold the idea that moral values and principles have an objective authority over us. To address this question I will present a version of moral pluralism which tries to capture the enormous complexity of what should matter to us as moral persons, and which explains why value-rankings are often deeply indeterminate. The general position I defend in this paper is that compromises involving moral values and norms may be morally required and, therefore, be laudable. To sustain this position I will arrive at a view of ethical objectivity that allows the possibility to negotiate about the truth of moral beliefs.     

论天人合德与道德价值的定位

中国传统伦理道德的天人合德为伦理道德价值提供了本体上的根据,这是道德价值的根本定位。其把道德价值定位于整体利益,就是定位于超越的绝对本位。这与现代伦理道德价值定位于人类个体利益一样,都存在理论和实践上的失误。伦理道德的逻辑发展,必将从此引申出集体利益与个体利益和谐一致的集体主义原则。     

Addressing the Relationships Among Moral Judgment Development,Authenticity, Nonprejudice,and Volunteerism

This study addresses how moral judgment development, authenticity, and nonprejudice account for variance in scores pertaining to various motivational functions underlying volunteerism in order to clarify certain problems associated with previous research that has considered such relationships. In the study, 127 participants completed measurements that pertain to these constructs. Correlations revealed that moral judgment had a negligible relationship with both authenticity and nonprejudice, thereby affirming that the former construct is distinct from the latter two. Linear regression analyses supported that moral judgment development and nonprejudice provided the strongest contributions to the variance of the considered indices of volunteer motivation. The motivational function underlying volunteerism was also recognized as an important factor that pertains to the observed contributions of variance. Findings are discussed in concert with and compared to prior considerations of relationships between moral judgment development and considerations of the moral self. Implications where moral education is concerned are also considered.     

论宗教的道德价值

原初的道德与宗教处于混沌一体之中。二者分化以后 ,宗教以其特殊方式提供道德规范的神圣性、道德理想人格的完满性与社会正义的至善性 ;在宗教信仰的特殊形式中蕴含着对真之笃信与对存在终极性关切的道德价值精神 ,并为道德规范提供价值合理性根据。     

Existential Authenticity: A Foundational Value for Counseling

Adopting an existential perspective in counseling is often viewed as inapplicable or a luxury for most clients. The author challenges these commonly held misconceptions. The concept of existential authenticity is presented as an organizing ethic that can bring out the positive side of existentialism in counseling. Specific values and conditions that the counselor can adopt to create an existential foundation for counseling practice are presented. The author concludes that actively incorporating these existential values into the counseling process can deepen the impact of the therapeutic work.     

诚信的道德价值

信用是市场经济运行的道德基础;信誉是企业良性发展的基石;诚信不仅是人际交往的基础,也是个人自我完善的要求。     

Foreign Aid and the Moral Value of Freedom

Peter Singer has famously argued that people living in affluent western countries are morally obligated to donate money to famine relief. The central premise in his argument is that, If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so. The present paper offers an argument to the effect that affluent people ought to support foreign aid projects based on a much weaker ethical premise. The new premise states that, If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so. This premise, supplemented with a notion of final value drawing on Amartya Sen's concept of freedom as capabilities and functionings, is conceived as a special version of a weak, egalitarian Pareto principle.     

科学家与科学的道德价值

近年来,科学的道德问题成为人们关注的话题,引起了广泛的讨论.现代人们所谈及的科学道德问题,主要是由科学家的科学道德价值观的变化引起的,"为实力而科学"取代了"为科学而科学"的科学价值观.因此,对科学的道德问题的研究,不能忽视这一道德价值观的变化.