Adult Age‐Related Differences in the Misinformation Effect for Context‐Consistent and Context‐Inconsistent Objects

The present study examined age‐related differences in the misinformation effect for objects that were consistent or inconsistent with their environmental settings. Young and older adults viewed one of two slide sequences, each containing context‐consistent items (e.g., a blender in a kitchen setting or a saw in a woodshop setting) and context‐inconsistent items (a saw in a kitchen setting or a blender in a woodshop setting). After receiving misinformation through post‐event narratives, participants received tests of yes/no recognition requiring remember/know judgments (Experiments 1–3) and source monitoring (Experiments 2 and 3) for slide details. Although age‐related differences in the misinformation effect were nonreliable, older adults tended to report misinformation as remembered more often than young adults, and source monitoring tests reduced the misinformation effect for both age groups. Misinformation effects were equivalent or larger for inconsistent objects than for consistent objects. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Adolescent Diabetic Control: Using the Process‐Person‐Context‐Time Model

This investigation used the Process‐Person‐Context‐Time Model (U. Bronfenbrenner, 1979, 1995) to study adolescent diabetic control. The dependent variable was a blood test measuring diabetic control (i.e., HbA1 C [glycosylated hemoglobin]). Independent variables included adolescent/maternal perceptions of family environment and communication, blood glucose monitoring frequency, age of disease onset, disease duration, race/ethnicity, gender, and mother's education level. Stepwise regression revealed that glucose monitoring and problem communication explained 17% of the variance.     

On Value‐Attributions: Semantics and Beyond

This paper is driven by the idea that the contextualism‐relativism debate regarding the semantics of value‐attributions turns on certain extra‐semantic assumptions that are unwarranted. One is the assumption that the many‐place predicate of truth, deployed by compositional semantics, cannot be directly appealed to in theorizing about people's assessments of truth value but must be supplemented (if not replaced) by a different truth‐predicate, obtained through certain “postsemantic” principles. Another is the assumption that semantics assigns to sentences not only truth values (as a function of various parameters, such as contexts, worlds and times), but also semantic contents, and that what context‐sensitive expressions contribute to content are contextually determined elements. My first aim in this paper will be to show how the two assumptions have shaped two ways of understanding the debate between contextualism and relativism. My second aim will be to show that both assumptions belong outside semantics and are, moreover, questionable.     

Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics

In order to defend the Cornell variety of naturalistic moral realism from Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth objection, several philosophers have proposed what I call Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics (NEMMS). According to NEMMS, the natural properties that serve as the contents of moral predicates are fixed (at least in part) by non‐moral normative facts. In this paper, I elucidate two versions of NEMMS: one proposed by David Brink, and the other proposed by Mark van Roojen. I show what these meta‐semantics have in common, and how each one promises the Cornell realist a response to the Moral Twin Earth objection. I then argue that Cornell realists ought to be wary of adopting NEMMS. A naturalist realist who adopts this meta‐semantics confronts a trilemma. The proponent of NEMMS owes a meta‐ethical account of the relevant content‐fixing normative facts. Such facts are either reducible to recognizably natural facts or they are not. If they are not reducible, then NEMMS entails the denial of ethical naturalism (and so, the denial of Cornell realism). If such facts are taken to be reducible to facts about agents’ actual or hypothetical attitudes, then (among other problems) the account renders moral facts stance‐dependent. Consequently, moral realism is false. Alternatively, one might propose that the content‐fixing normative facts are reducible to attitude‐independent natural facts. However, such a proposal is refuted by its own Twin Earth objection.     

Possible World Semantics and True‐True Counterfactuals

The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter should be a consequence of rejecting the former. Instead I consider how one might defuse putative counterexamples to the truth of true‐true counterfactuals.     

Working Memory Capacity Offers Resistance to Mind‐Wandering and External Distraction in a Context‐Specific Manner

The present study examined the impact of mind‐wandering and distraction in silent and noisy studying environments and how individual differences in working memory capacity offered resistance to these two distinct forms of attention failure. Two groups of participants read a text in different environments and answered reading comprehension questions. While reading, thought probes asked participants to indicate the current focus of their attention. Results showed that the relationship between working memory capacity and reading comprehension was partially driven by resistance to mind‐wandering in the silent condition and by resistance to external distraction in the noise condition. The findings support the distinction between mind‐wandering and external distraction, two separate yet related types of attention failure that impact task performance. Further, executive abilities seem to offer resistance to these two types of attention failure differentially depending on the context. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Context‐Constrained Judgment of the Perceived Risk of HIV/AIDS1

This study introduces a computer method for assessing perception of stimuli presented in a constrained context. The method is illustrated through experiments on perception of the risk of becoming infected with HIV and AIDS. In five experiments, context‐constrained judgments (CCJ) or context‐independent judgments were obtained from 258 undergraduates. Participants judged the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS for a variety of target populations, including themselves. The CCJ method results in greater response discrimination among the salience of perceived risk factors than does a context independent method. This outcome has potential implications for education and intervention programs to control the spread of HIV.     

Sensitivity and Higher‐Order Knowledge

Vogel, Sosa, and Huemer have all argued that sensitivity is incompatible with knowing that you do not believe falsely, therefore the sensitivity condition must be false. I show that this objection misses its mark because it fails to take account of the basis of belief. Moreover, if the objection is modified to account for the basis of belief then it collapses into the more familiar objection that sensitivity is incompatible with closure. (But that is an objection which sensitivity theorists are already prepared to meet, one way or another.)     

Individual Differences in the Context‐Dependent Recruitment of Cognitive Control: Evidence From Action Versus State Orientation

The ability to flexibly adapt to deviations from optimal performance is an important aspect of self‐control. In the present study, the authors present first evidence that the personality trait action versus state orientation (Kuhl, 2000) modulates the ability of adaptive control adjustments in response to experienced conflicts. Sixty‐two German individuals with extreme scores on the action‐state dimension performed a response interference task, that is, 31 extreme action‐oriented individuals (30 females; M_age = 20.35 years) and 31 extreme state‐oriented individuals (20 females; M_age = 23.23 years), respectively. Action‐oriented individuals displayed a stronger conflict adaptation effect as evidenced by a stronger reduction of interference on trials following conflict. These results were further corroborated by a correlational analysis including a sample of 105 participants: the higher the score on the action‐state dimension, the lower the interference effect following conflict (i.e., stronger conflict adaptation). The results provide evidence that even low‐level, bottom‐up‐driven processes of self‐control such as conflict adaptation are systematically moderated by individual differences in control modes and provide insights into the cognitive mechanisms underlying action versus state orientation.     

Getting Expression‐Based Semantics Right: Its Proper Objects of Evaluation and Limits

Often those attempting to resolve the answering machine paradox appeal to Kaplan's claim that the objects of semantic evaluation are expression‐types evaluated with respect to indices, instead of utterances, as part of their solution. This article argues that Dylan Dodd and Paula Sweeney exemplify the kind of mistakes theorists make in applying such expression‐based semantic theories in that (1) they conflate what is asserted with semantic content, and (2) they take their approach to utterance interpretation as having semantic significance. In light of these mistakes, we learn two things. First, we learn how expression‐based semantic theorists can avoid making these kinds of mistakes. Second, we learn how the limits of expression‐based semantics can contribute to what we should expect a semantic theory to explain regarding how semantics fits into a more general theory of linguistic communication and linguistic understanding.     

Context‐induced placebo effects—An investigation of contrast effects in response expectations and actual product efficacy

Recent research on the placebo effect of marketing actions has demonstrated that characteristics that are not inherent to a product's physical properties per se, such as its price, brand, or packaging can considerably shape consumers' expectations about and actual efficacy of a marketed product. However, potential contextual effects that other products may have on the construction of consumers' efficacy beliefs and objective consumption outcomes remain unexplored. Across two experimental studies, we show that people's response expectations regarding a focal product are inversely related to the alleged superiority of context options and that such context‐induced expectations can carry over to behavioural performance metrics; a phenomenon we refer to as context‐induced placebo effects.