Are Propositions Essentially Representational?

Jeffrey King argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But – for good reason – King claims that propositions possess truth conditions essentially and intrinsically. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of truth conditions can't follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing can do the job that motivates positing propositions. Or, there is no need to explain what bestows a truth condition on a proposition.     

Contingently Existing Propositions?

It is fairly common, among those who think propositions exist, to think they exist necessarily. Here, I consider three arguments in support of that conclusion. What I hope to show is not that that claim is false, but, rather, that the arguments used in its defense tend to presuppose a certain kind of approach to modality: a roughly Plantingian view. What the arguments show, then, is that one cannot accept that approach to modality and accept contingently existing propositions. But there are other approaches to modality – I discuss three such approaches – into which contingently existing propositions fit perfectly well. This suggests that disputes over, for example, singular propositions, must be conducted within a broader agreement over modal matters if they are to be at all productive.     

Cosmic Mind?

This article explores the remote scientific possibility of something like “cosmic mind” or “cosmic minds.” Descartes proposed his famous dualism, res cogitans (mental reality) plus res extensa (physical reality). With Isaac Newton and classical physics, res extensa won in Western science and with it, we lost our minds; we lost our subjective pole. Quantum mechanics has seemed to many, since its formulation in the Schrödinger equation in 1926, to hint beyond physics to a role for the human conscious observer in quantum measurement. At least two interpretations of quantum mechanics, or its extension—the latter by Penrose and Hameroff, and the former by myself—suggest a new panpsychism where conscious awareness and possibly free will occur at quantum measurements anywhere in the universe. If so, then we live in a vastly participatory universe. More: entangled quantum variables may conceivably share some form of consciousness and free will, whether embodied in us, or living forms elsewhere in the universe, or disembodied; hence, something like cosmic mind or minds are not ruled out. If true, life anywhere in the universe will have evolved with mind and free will. Souls are not impossible.     

Mind the Gaps: Are Conclusions About Mindfulness Entirely Conclusive?

Mindfulness has emerged as an important construct in the mental health field. Although evidence suggests benefits, it also appears that excitement over the clinical applications of mindfulness has largely suspended concentrated efforts to clarify fundamental elements of the construct. This article explores conceptual confusion and contrasts primary mindfulness‐based techniques before investigating attrition factors, adverse effects of mindfulness practices, and populations contraindicated for mindfulness‐based techniques. Implications for practice are provided.     

Is Mere True Belief Knowledge?

Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. In this paper, I argue that the case Sartwell presents for his thesis fails. However, by examining why it fails, we may derive at least four important epistemological lessons: (1) being justified does not entail being able to give a justification; (2) we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as intrinsically conducive to truth and conceived of as extrinsically conducive to truth; (3) we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as an essential criterion of knowledge and conceived of as an accidental criterion of knowledge; and (4) epistemologists need to specify how the telos of inquiry involves more than the acquisition of (merely) true beliefs.Socrates: Then tell me: what definition can we give with the least risk of contradicting ourselves?Theaetetus: The one we tried before, Socrates. I have nothing else to suggest.Socrates: What was that?Theaetetus: That true belief is knowledge. Surely there can at least be no mistake in believing what is true and the consequences are always satisfactory.Theaetetus 200d–e     

How Can Pictures be Propositions?

Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of language holds that one fact can represent another, and that propositions are pictures of states of affairs. What makes a fact into a picture of a given s tate of affairs are the correlations between picture elements and objects and the correlations between relations among picture elements and relations among objects. But a problem sometimes raised is that propositions can't be pictures, as pictures—unlike propositions—do not say anything. An interpretation (e.g. Anscombe's) holds that the above-mentioned correlations do make the picture into a proposition. But this neither handles the objection, nor is it Wittgenstein's view. Further, Wittgenstein's own account faces serious difficulties in addressing these issues, and the Anscombe-type interpretation obscures this fact.     

Self-Report Measures of Intelligence: Are They Useful as Proxy IQ Tests?

Correlations between single-item self-reports of intelligence and IQ scores are rather low (.20–.25) in college samples. The literature suggested that self-reports could be improved by three strategies: (1) aggregation, (2)item weighting, and (3) use of indirect, rather than direct, questions. To evaluate these strategies, we compared the validity of aggregated and unaggregated versions of direct measures with four indirect measures (Gough's Intellectual efficiency scale, Hogan's Intellect composite scale, Sternberg's Behavior Check List, and Trapnell's Smart scale). All measures were administered to two large samples of undergraduates ( N s = 310, 326), who also took an IQ test. Although results showed some success for both direct and indirect measures, the failure of their validities to exceed .30 impugns their utility as IQ proxies in competitive college samples. The content of the most valid items referred to global mental abilities or reading involvement. Aggregation benefited indirect more than direct measures, but prototype-weighting contributed little.     

Whose Genitalia Are Involved In The Dissolution Of The Oedipus Complex In Boys?

This paper addresses the issue of whose genitalia are involved in the dissolution of the castration complex in boys. Freud and his followers suggested several different possibilities which are elaborated herein, and these alternative models are discussed from the perspective of psychological research regarding children’s emergent gender identity and their awareness of genital differences. The reviewed data show that contrary to Freudian theory, preschool children’s emergent gender identity is not dependent on their awareness of genital differences. However, preschoolers with younger siblings, primarily opposite gender ones, evidence greater understanding of genital differences, as Freud suggested. The discussion emphasizes the importance of children’s family constellation and their awareness of self-other similarity and dissimilarity in the development of their gender identity.

     

Does Counseling Need the Mind?

In this article, the author argues that the language used in counseling practice is largely a common sense language using mentalistic words. Basic mentalistic assumptions and challenges to those assumptions are outlined. The practical consequences of retaining or discarding mentalism in counseling are discussed. The author concludes that mentalistic language persists in counseling practice because it offers a useful vocabulary, but that the counseling field could benefit from adopting a path similar to that used in the cognitive sciences.     

Are All Hostility Scales Alike? Factor Structure and Covariation Among Measures of Hostility1

Few studies have examined the correlational and structural relationships between measures of hostility that may predict coronary heart disease. Using data from a population-based study (N= 2,682), we examined the factor structure among the five subscales from Siegel's (1986) Multi-dimensional Anger Inventory, the three subscales from Spielberger et al.'s (1985) anger expression scales, a Cook-Medley (Cook & Madley, 1954) hostility subscale that measures cynicism, and items measuring hostility from four scales that assess Type A behavior. Eight separate factors were identified: hostile anger expression, perceived control over the expression of one's anger, frequency of anger, ease of anger provocation, brooding, hostile outlook, cynicism, and sullenness. These results suggest that the structure of hostility measures is more complex than previous factor analyses have suggested. Our findings point to the dangers in assuming that a factor structure can be generalized beyond the data on which it is based to provide theoretical statements about psychological structure. The new scales appear to be valid because they correlate with demographic variables and indicators of social support in the expected directions.