When can we say 'if'?

In this study, we focus on the conditions which permit people to assert a conditional statement of the form 'if p then q' with conversational relevance. In a broadly decision-theoretic approach, also drawing on hypothetical thinking theory [Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.], we predicted that conditional tips and promises would appear more useful and persuasive and be more likely to encourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the cost of the action p was lower and (c) the benefit of the consequence q was higher. Similarly, we predicted that conditional warnings and threats would be seen as more useful and persuasive and more likely to discourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the benefit of the action p was lower and (c) the cost of the consequence q was higher. All predictions were strongly confirmed, suggesting that such conditionals may best be asserted when they are of high relevance to the goals of the listener.     

Expectation of outgroup behaviour: can you trust the outgroup?

Outgroups are usually viewed with suspicion and expected to discriminate against the ingroup. The present study demonstrated that ingroup members attributed past discriminatory behaviour committed by individuals of unknown group membership more to outgroup members than to either ingroup members or members of a neutral group. In contrast, past egalitarian behaviour was attributed less to outgroup members than to members of a neutral group. Ingroup members also expected more discrimination from a future outgroup allocator than from a future neutral group allocator. Finally, the study showed that ingroup members' own behaviour in allocating money became more biased in favour of ingroup members vis-á-vis outgroup members when the future allocator was from an outgroup rather than from a neutral group and when they had witnessed the discriminatory behaviour of an allocator in the past.     

When can we introspect accurately about mental processes?

Some theorists have suggested that the cognitive processes determining a person’s perforance in a given task are unconscious, making introspection a poor research tool for studying these processes. Others have argued that the relevant processes usually are consciously conrolled and can be detailed by asking the person to introspect. Here, a synthesis of these two positions, a dual-factor approach, is proposed. Some of the processes involved in achieving a cognitive goal, such as learning a new concept, are viewed as unconscious and automatic; howver, other processes are intentionally allocated conscious attention, in certain tasks, to accomlish othe goal. To illustrate this dual-factor position, evidence is presented in support of the view that when concept learning occurs solely by automatic frequency processing, introspective reports are inaccurate, but when the nature of the task prompts intentional hypothesis testing, introspective reports are accurate, revealing clues that subjects engage in a conscious hypothesisesting strategy.     

The integrity of Web-delivered experiments: can you trust the data?

Data from Web-delivered experiments conducted in browsers by remote users of PsychExperiments, a public on-line psychology laboratory, reveal experiment effects that mirror lab-based findings, even for experiments that require nearly millisecond accuracy of displays and responses. Textbook results are obtained not just for within-subjects effects, but for between-subjects effects as well. These results suggest that existing technology is adequate to permit Web delivery of many cognitive and social psychological experiments and that the added noise created by having participants in different settings using different computers is easily compensated for by the sample sizes achievable with Web delivery.     

In money we trust? The use of financial compensations to repair trust in the aftermath of distributive harm

Trust is vital yet vulnerable in economic exchange relations. In these relations, a widely used strategy in response to distributive harm consists of having the transgressor pay a financial compensation to the victim. This research examines whether financial compensations can increase trust towards a transgressor, and whether the size of the compensation is relevant to this process. We hypothesized and found that whether larger compensations will elicit more trust, depends on how clear the perpetrator’s intention to transgress was. Experiment 1 revealed that trust perceptions increased more by a slight overcompensation of the inflicted harm as compared to an exact or a partial compensation, but not if the transgressor’s bad intentions became clear through the use of deception in the violation. In Experiments 2 and 3, we replicated these findings and further showed that it is not the use of deception per se, but rather the attribution of bad intent that moderates the effect of compensation size. Experiment 4, using a trust game paradigm revealed that this effect not only occurs for small overcompensations, but also for larger overcompensations.     

When do children trust the expert? Benevolence information influences children's trust more than expertise

How do children use informant niceness, meanness, and expertise when choosing between informant claims and crediting informants with knowledge? In Experiment 1, preschoolers met two experts providing conflicting claims for which only one had relevant expertise. Five‐year‐olds endorsed the relevant expert's claim and credited him with knowledge more often than 3‐year‐olds. In Experiment 2, niceness/meanness information was added. Although children most strongly preferred the nice relevant expert, the children often chose the nice irrelevant expert when the relevant one was mean. In Experiment 3, a mean expert was paired with a nice non‐expert. Although this nice informant had no expertise, preschoolers continued to endorse his claims and credit him with knowledge. Also noteworthy, children in all three experiments seemed to struggle more to choose the relevant expert's claim than to credit him with knowledge. Together, these experiments demonstrate that niceness/meanness information can powerfully influence how children evaluate informants.     

When educational supervision meets clinical supervision: what can we learn from the discrepancies?

The authors question the taken-for-granted notion of supervision. Their concerns arose out of an attempt to introduce 'clinical' supervision into academia as a way of addressing an increasing number of the ethical issues which confront lecturers. They recognise that knowledge can impact adversely on students and that lecturers at times find themselves compromised. They settled on supervision as an organisational space in the domain of power in which to address the distress they observed. However, through their different experiences of supervision, they soon found themselves talking past each other. When clinical supervision meets educational supervision, several anomalies are brought to the fore. The authors draw on Foucault's notion of discourse, and of knowledge as power, in order to foreground these and conclude by cautioning against an uncritical acceptance of supervision as an ethical practice. They believe there is a benefit in bringing together the two discourses of clinical and educational supervision for further discussion.     

When Should we Regret?

In this paper, I develop and defend the ‘Justified Decision Perspective’ (JDP) in answer to the question of when we should regret the things we have done. I claim that one should not regret a past decision one has made so long as it was justified in relation to the kind of person one was at the time of acting. On this time-indexing account, judging a decision to be justified – at least for the purposes of assessing one’s regrets – is a matter of identifying the practical reasons that were epistemically available to the agent when she was deliberating about what to do. Accordingly, when responding to her regrets, an agent should not invoke (a) reasons that existed but were epistemically unavailable to her when she was deliberating; or (b) reasons that only came into existence after she acted. The JDP has important implications for prospective regret. In particular, it implies we should worry less about experiencing regret in the future than many of us do. Thus, my overall aim is to show that we often have reason to reject our regrets, which means that regret should play a less prominent and painful role in our lives than it does currently.     

What can we learn about physical laws from the fact that we have memories only of the past?

Not much. I demonstrate this by constructing a model of a memory system governed by deterministic, time reversible laws only, thereby showing that the mere fact of our having memories solely of the past does not necessitate an indeterministic, time asymmetric or stochastic physics, essentially thermodynamic processes or a primitive notion of time asymmetric causation.     

When can we choose to forget? An ERP study into item-method directed forgetting of emotional words

Emotionally arousing information is treated in a specialised manner across a number of different processing stages, and memory for affective events is often found to be heightened by virtue of this. However, in some cases, emotional experiences might be the very ones that we would like to forget. Here, two item-method directed forgetting studies are presented which investigate people's ability to intentionally forget affective words when stimuli and memory instructions are presented simultaneously. In the first experiment an interaction between task instruction and emotional content was evident in a diminished directed forgetting effect for emotional words, suggesting that they may be relatively resistant to deliberate forgetting. The interaction between instruction and emotion appeared both in free recall of words and in a yes-no recognition task. In the second study, an ERP procedure was utilised to investigate whether emotion modulates the effects of instruction during the initial encoding of stimuli. Recognition data again showed a clear interaction between instruction and emotion, with a reduced directed forgetting effect for emotional words. The ERP data demonstrated evidence for individual effects of both emotion and instruction during encoding; however, despite this, no evidence for an interaction between these factors was evident in the ERP data. As such, we conclude that even when study items are presented simultaneously with their associated memory instructions, neither does emotion prevent differential processing of directed forgetting instruction, nor does memory instruction prevent differential processing of emotion during early encoding. Implications are discussed in relation to the directed forgetting literature and more broadly with respect to circumstances under which emotion and cognitive processing work in parallel or in competition with each other.     

Better than average? When can we say that subsampling of items is better than statistical summary representations?

Myczek and Simons (2008) have described a computational model that subsamples a few items from a set with high accuracy, showing that this approach can do as well as, or better than, a model that captures statistical representations of the set. Although this is an intriguing existence proof, some caution should be taken before we consider their approach as a model for human behavior. In particular, I propose that such simulation-based research should be based on a more expanded range of phenomena and that it should include more accurate representations of errors in judgments.     

When can a lack of structure facilitate strategic processing of information?

Background: Researchers examining the effectiveness of an elaboration strategy (answering ‘why’) for learning new information have been concerned with the familiarity of the materials and how that affects learning. It may be, however, that both how information is organised and familiarity impact on the potency of the strategy. Aims: We examined the influence of presentation structures (i.e., organisation of information) on the effectiveness of an elaboration strategy. Samples: All participants were undergraduates (78 females, 67 males) enrolled in a first‐year psychology course. Fifteen students participated in Experiment One, 42 students in Experiment Two, and 88 students in Experiment Three. Methods: In Experiment One, preference for conceptual organisation was assessed. In Experiments Two and Three, students answered ‘why’ questions when different presentation structures were used. Results: Students' preferred method of organisation did not match the imposed structure found in past research, suggesting that students may have been restricted in their ability to process the information distinctively. Students who were presented with the information in a random order achieved the largest memory scores. Conclusions: When students have to reconstruct as well as encode the information, these added task demands provide an added benefit for learning.     

What can we learn by looking for the first code of professional ethics?

The first code of professional ethics must: (1)be a code of ethics; (2) apply to members of a profession; (3) apply to allmembers of that profession; and (4) apply only to members of that profession. The value of these criteria depends on how we define “code”, “ethics”, and “profession”, terms the literature on professions has defined in many ways. This paper applies one set of definitions of “code”, “ethics”, and “profession” to a part of what we now know of the history of professions, there by illustrating how the choice of definition can alter substantially both our answer to the question of which came first and (more importantly) our understanding of professional codes (and the professions that adopt them). Because most who write on codes of professional ethics seem to take for granted that physicians produced the first professional code, whether the Hippocratic Oath, Percival’s Medical Ethics, the 1847 Code of Ethicsof the American Medical Association (AMA), or some other document, I focus my discussion on these codes. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

How can we tell the Dancer from the Dance?: The Subject of Dance and the Subject of Philosophy

One of the most important aspects of Gilles Deleuzes philosophy is his criticism of the traditional concept of praxis. In Aristotelian philosophy praxis is properly oriented towards some end, and in the case of human action the ends of praxis are oriented towards the agents good life. Human goods are, for both Aristotle and contemporary neo-Aristotelians, determined by the potentials of human life such as rationality, communality, and speech. Deleuzes account of action, by contrast, liberates movement from an external end. In his books on cinema Deleuze argues that we need to think of events in terms of their power, and not as movements within an already determined image of life. In order to think events as such we need to confront the power of the virtual. This is achieved by a philosophy of life in which becoming is not a means towards the realisation of some end. Rather, becomings are best seen as counter-actualisations: ways in which the already-constituted actual world always bears a power to become other than it already is. If we consider dance in this new context, then dance is neither expressive of an already existing life, nor a pure act that is self-sufficient and self-constituting. Rather, dance is a confrontation with life as a plane of open and divergent becomings.     

When can attention not be divided?

Humans can guide simple concurrent and seemingly independent movements of digits between hands, but it is shown here that they find it impossible to do this with digits within a hand. This inability demonstrates a basic characteristic of the relation between attention and the control of the skeletal musculature. Mechanisms that are available to provide the illusion of concurrent and independent guidance of separate movements between hands are not available within a single-hand control system. There is no reason to believe that the inability to divide focal attention in the guidance of two concurrent controlled activities, as exemplified in the example of within-hand movements, does not also extend to nonmotor processes.