Conscious control and memory awareness when recognising famous faces

We describe an experiment that investigated levels-of-processing effects in recognition memory for famous faces. The degree of conscious control over the recognition decisions was manipulated by using a response deadline procedure, and memory awareness associated with those decisions was assessed using a standard remember-know paradigm. Levels-of-processing effects were found at both short and long response deadlines, and at both deadlines those effects occurred only in remembering. Moreover, knowing, as well as remembering, increased with the greater opportunity for conscious control over recognition decisions at the long deadline. These results have implications for dual-process theories that distinguish between a slower, more controlled recollection process, reflected in remembering, and a faster, more automatic familiarity process, reflected in knowing.     

Response deadline and subjective awareness in recognition memory

Level of processing and generation effects were replicated in separate experiments in which recognition memory was tested using either short (500 ms) or long (1500 ms) response deadlines. These effects were similar at each deadline. Moreover, at each deadline these effects were associated with subsequent reports of remembering, not of knowing. And reports of both knowing and remembering increased following the longer deadline. These results imply that knowing does not index an automatic familiarity process, as conceived in some dual-process models of recognition, and that both remembering and knowing increase with the slower, more controlled processing permitted by the longer response time.     

Recognition memory and awareness: Occurrence of perceptual effects in remembering or in knowing depends on conscious resources at encoding, but not at retrieval

We report four experiments in which a remember-know paradigm was combined with a response deadline procedure in order to assess memory awareness in fast, as compared with slow,recognition judgments. In the experiments, we also investigated the perceptual effects of study-test congruence, either for picture size or for speaker's voice, following either full or divided attention at study. These perceptual effects occurred in remembering with full attention and in knowing with divided attention, but they were uninfluenced by recognition speed, indicating that their occurrence in remembering or knowing depends more on conscious resources at encoding than on those at retrieval. The results have implications for theoretical accounts of remembering and knowing that assume that remembering is more consciously controlled and effortful, whereas knowing is more automatic and faster.     

Transferring voice effects in recognition memory from remembering to knowing

In five experiments, we investigated the effects of voice congruency (same vs. different voices at study and at test) on remembering and knowing in recognition memory. With low- and medium-frequency three- or four-syllable words, a voice congruency effect occurred only in remembering. With nonwords, voice congruency effects occurred both in remembering and in knowing. With nonwords and divided attention at study, the voice congruency effect transferred almost completely from remembering to knowing. By showing a transfer of effects from remembering to knowing as encoding became more impoverished, these findings support a distinctiveness/fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the theory that remembering and knowing indicate retrieval of events from episodic and semantic memory systems, respectively.     

Reversing the picture superiority effect: A speed—accuracy trade-off study of recognition memory

Speed-accuracy trade-off methods have been used to contrast single- and dual-process accounts of recognition memory. With these procedures, subjects are presented with individual test items and required to make recognition decisions under various time constraints. In three experiments, we presented words and pictures to be intentionally learned; test stimuli were always visually presented words. At test, we manipulated the interval between the presentation of each test stimulus and that of a response signal, thus controlling the amount of time available to retrieve target information. The standard picture superiority effect was significant in long response deadline conditions (i.e., > or = 2,000 msec). Conversely, a significant reverse picture superiority effect emerged at short response-signal deadlines (< 200 msec). The results are congruent with views suggesting that both fast familiarity and slower recollection processes contribute to recognition memory. Alternative accounts are also discussed.     

Memory awareness following speeded compared with unspeeded picture recognition

A remember-know paradigm was used to assess memory awareness following speeded and unspeeded yes/no picture recognition. The beneficial effects of picture size congruency at study and test occurred with speeded as well as with unspeeded recognition. In each case, they were associated with remembering, not with knowing, which remained invariant. Thus, size congruency effects were associated with remembering even when recognition occurred more automatically and hence may be more dependent on a relatively fast familiarity process. In a second experiment, speeded remember responses were compared with remember responses that followed speeded yes/no recognition. There was more remembering when it was the remember responses that were speeded, contrary to what might be expected if remembering reflects a relatively slow recollection process. These results have implications for the ability of dual-process models of recognition memory to account for memory awareness.     

The speed of metacognition: Taking time to get to know one’s structural knowledge

The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments (conscious structural knowledge) decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure (unconscious structural knowledge), and guess responses (unconscious judgment knowledge) were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. Conversely, the deadline decreased the proportion of conscious structural knowledge in favour of guessing. Unconscious structural knowledge can be applied rapidly but becomes more reliable with additional metacognitive processing time whereas conscious structural knowledge is an all-or-nothing response that cannot always be applied rapidly. These dissociations corroborate quite separate theories of recognition (dual-process) and metacognition (higher order thought and cross-order integration).     

Dissociative effects of alcohol on recollective experience

This article reports a study comparing the effects of a single dose of alcohol with a matched placebo drink on recognition memory with and without conscious recollection. A double-blind, cross-over design was used with healthy volunteers who were all social drinkers. Processing depth at study was manipulated using generate versus read instructions. Conscious recollection at test was assessed using the remember-know-guess paradigm (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985). Alcohol significantly reduced conscious recollection (remember responses) but had no effect on recognition in the absence of conscious recollection (know responses). False alarms rates were low and unaffected by alcohol. Previous findings that generation effects are found only for remember responses were closely replicated. A further dissociation of the generation effect occurred between treatments in that deeper processing at study facilitated recognition on placebo but not on alcohol. That both alcohol and depth of processing produce dissociative effects on recollective experience provides further evidence that remembering and knowing reflect distinct memory systems.     

Mixed- versus strong right-handedness is associated with biases towards "remember" versus "know" judgements in recognition memory: role of interhemispheric interaction

Growing evidence supports the hypothesis that episodic versus semantic memories rely primarily on interhemispheric versus intrahemispheric processing, respectively. For example, a recent study found that individuals with presumed greater interhemispheric interaction were superior in episodic recall but inferior at semantic word fragment completion; however, tests of recognition memory yielded no group differences. Interestingly, recognition memory can be based on either explicitly remembering a stimulus or implicitly knowing that a stimulus had been presented. The current experiments administered recognition memory tests to strongly versus mixed handed participants who judged for each recognised item whether their response was based on remembering (episodic memory) or knowing (semantic memory) (Tulving, 1983). Results indicate that strong versus mixed handers are biased towards basing recognition responses on judgements of knowing versus remembering, respectively. As strong versus mixed handedness is associated with greater versus lesser interhemispheric processing, the results support the original hypothesis.     

Interaction between mode of learning and subjective experience: Translation effects in long-term memory

It has been suggested that writing auditorily presented words at encoding involves distinctive translation processes between visual and auditory domains, leading to the formation of distinctive memory traces at retrieval. This translation effect leads to higher levels of recognition than the writing of visually presented words, a non-translation effect. The present research investigated whether writing and the other translation effect of vocalisation (vocalising visually presented words) would be present in tests of recall, recognition memory and whether these effects are based on the subjective experience of remembering or knowing. Experiment 1 found a translation effect in the auditory domain in recall, as the translation effect of writing yielded higher recall than both non-translation effects of vocalisation and silently hearing. Experiment 2 found a translation effect in the visual domain in recognition, as the translation effect of vocalisation yielded higher recognition than both non-translation effects of writing and silently reading. This translation effect was attributable to the subjective experience of remembering rather than knowing. The present research therefore demonstrates the beneficial effect of translation in both recall and recognition, with the effect of vocalisation in recognition being based on rich episodic remembering.     

Impact of encoding depth on awareness of perceptual effects in recognition memory

Pictorial stimuli are more likely to be recognized if they are the same size, rather than a different size, at study and at test. This size congruency effect was replicated in two experiments in which the encoding variables were respectively undivided versus divided attention and level of processing. In terms of performance, these variables influenced recognition and did not influence size congruency effects. But in terms of awareness, measured by remember and know responses, these variables did influence size congruency effects. With undivided attention and with a deep level of processing, size congruency effects occurred only in remembering. With divided attention and with a shallow level of processing, size congruency effects occurred only in knowing. The results show that effects that occur in remembering may also occur independently in knowing. They support theories in which remembering and knowing reflect different memory processes or systems. They do not support the theory that remembering and knowing reflect differences in trace strength.     

Recognition memory and awareness: An experiential approach

Abstract

This article reviews recent studies that have adopted an experiential approach to recognition memory and awareness. This approach measures two subjective states of awareness in recognition memory, remembering (or conscious recollection) and knowing (or familiarity). There is now evidence of quite a few experimental dissociations between these two states of awareness. These dissociations impose additional constraints on theories about relations between awareness and memory systems or processes.     

PTSD psychiatric patients exhibit a deficit in remembering

This study investigated the effects of PTSD on levels of awareness in a recognition memory task. A group of PTSD psychiatric patients and a control group without any traumatic experience were compared in remembering (R) versus knowing (K) recognition using non-trauma-related words. Results showed that overall recognition did not differ between the two groups, but in the PTSD group a significantly different pattern of Remember and Know responses was produced, indicating a shift from remembering to knowing. However, this shift from remembering to knowing in individuals with PTSD is associated with modifications in the trait anxiety level. These results are interpreted within theoretical frameworks in which R responses could be associated with distinctiveness (Rajaram, 1996) and conceptual processing (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). These collective findings would suggest the possibility that a poor general ability in the formation of source memory may eventually be a common characteristic across different types of PTSD.     

Effects of repetition and response deadline on associative recognition in young and older adults

The present study examined the joint effects of repetition and response deadline on associative recognition in older adults. Young and older adults studied lists of unrelated word pairs, half presented once (weak pairs) and half presented four times (strong pairs). Test lists contained old (intact) pairs, pairs consisting of old words that had been studied with other partners (rearranged lures), and unstudied pairs (new lures), and participants were asked to respond "old" only to intact pairs. In Experiment 1, participants were tested with both short and long deadlines. In Experiment 2, the tests were unpaced. In both experiments, repetition increased hit rates for young and older adults. Young adults tested with a long deadline showed reduced (Experiment 1) or invariant (Experiment 2) false alarms to rearranged lures when word pairs were studied more often. Young adults tested with a short deadline and older adults tested under all conditions had increased false alarm rates forstrong rearranged pairs. Implications of these results for theories of associative recognition and cognitive aging are explored.     

Defeating the potentially deleterious effects of externally imposed deadlines: practitioners' rules-of-thumb

The authors interviewed people to determine whether they devise strategies to offset the damaging effect that externally imposed deadlines have on intrinsic motivation. Interviewees' "practitioners' rules-of-thumb" strategies were consistent with the tenets of self-determination theory and were tested empirically in three experiments. In each of the experiments, complete or partial self-determination of initially externally imposed time limits negated the otherwise deleterious effects of deadlines on intrinsic motivation. Participants who actively co-opted a deadline as their own (Experiment 1), who self-imposed sub deadlines within an overall externally imposed deadline (Experiment 2), and who self-imposed more stringent deadlines than those imposed externally (Experiment 3) spent significantly more free-choice time engaged in target tasks than did their counterparts in externally imposed deadline conditions where no self-determination was permitted. Given the ubiquity of deadlines, the results can directly be implemented by both deadline setters and deadline recipients to protect people's interest in their work.     

Effects of repetition and response deadline on item recognition in young and older adults

In the present study, we examined the joint effects of aging, repetition, and response deadline in a plurality discrimination task. Young and older adults studied lists of unrelated singular and plural nouns, with half presented once (weak items) and half presented five times (strong items). Test lists contained old (same) nouns, plurality-reversed nouns (changed lures), and unstudied nouns (new lures), and the participants were asked to respond old only to same items. In Experiment 1, the participants were tested with both short and long deadlines. In Experiment 2, the tests were unpaced. In both experiments, repetition increased hit rates for young and older adults. Young adults tested with a long deadline or no deadline showed invariant (Experiment 1) or reduced (Experiment 2) false alarms to changed lures when the nouns were studied more often. Young adults tested with a short deadline and older adults tested with both long and short deadlines had increased false alarm rates for strong changed lures; without time pressure to respond, older adults did not have a significant increase in false alarms for changed lures. Implications of these results for theories of cognitive aging are explored.     

A test of the deadline model for speed-accuracy tradeoffs

Two experiments were conducted to evaluate the deadline model for speed-accuracy tradeoffs. According to the deadline model, participants in speeded-response tasks terminate stimulus discrimination as soon as it has run to completion or as soon as a predetermined time deadline has arrived, whichever comes first. Speed is traded for accuracy by varying the time deadlines; short deadlines yield fast but sometimes inaccurate responses, whereas long deadlines allow for slow, accurate responses. A new prediction of this model, based on a comparison of reaction time distributions, was derived and tested in experiments involving the joint manipulation of speed stress and stimulus discriminability. Clear violations of this prediction were observed when participants made relative brightness judgments (Experiment 1) and when they made lexical decisions (Experiment 2), rejecting both the deadline model and the fast-guess model. Several alternative models for speed-accuracy tradeoffs, including random-walk and accumulator models, are compatible with the results.     

No-loss gambling shows the speed of the unconscious

This paper investigates the time it takes unconscious vs. conscious knowledge to form by using an improved "no-loss gambling" method to measure awareness of knowing. Subjects could either bet on a transparently random process or on their grammaticality judgment in an artificial grammar learning task. A conflict in the literature is resolved concerning whether unconscious rather than conscious knowledge is especially fast or slow to form. When guessing (betting on a random process), accuracy was above chance and RTs were longer than when feeling confident (betting on the grammaticality decision). In a second experiment, short response deadlines only interfered with the quality of confident decisions (betting on grammaticality). When people are unaware of their knowledge, externally enforced decisions can be made rapidly with little decline in quality; but if given ample time, they await a metacognitive process to complete. The dissociation validates no-loss gambling as a measure of conscious awareness.     

The role of decision processes in remembering and knowing

Participants in recognition memory studies are now often asked to partition recognized items into ones that are accompanied by some recollective experience (those they remember) and ones that are not so accompanied (but which they know were previously encountered). Rather than detecting separate memory systems, such attempts to distinguish between remembering and knowing are better understood as a division of positive recognition responses into those that lie above a second decision criterion (remember) and those that do not (know). As such, the amount of memory associated with knowing is strongly dependent on the placement of the decision criteria. A meta-analysis of published data and a simple experiment tested predictions from the decision process analysis of remember/know responses.     

Recollection-based prospective metamemory judgments are more accurate than those based on confidence: judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKS)

Five experiments were conducted to examine whether the nature of the information that is monitored during prospective metamemory judgments affected the relative accuracy of those judgments. We compared item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs), which involved participants determining how confident they were that they would remember studied items, with judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs), which involved participants determining whether studied items would later be accompanied by contextual details (i.e., remembering) or would not (i.e., knowing). JORKs were more accurate than JOLs when remember-know or confidence judgments were made at test and when cued recall was the outcome measure, but not for yes-no recognition. We conclude that the accuracy of metamemory judgments depends on the nature of the information monitored during study and test and that metamemory monitoring can be improved if participants are asked to base their judgments on contextual details rather than on confidence. These data support the contention that metamemory decisions can be based on qualitatively distinct cues, rather than an overall memory strength signal.