科技伦理责任观基本内容论析

当今时代,科技伦理失责问题日渐凸显,迫切需要构建科技伦理责任观,科学明晰科技伦理责任观的基本内容。本文认为科技伦理责任观的构建包括责任目标、责任主体、责任对象、责任原则和责任规范等基本内容,并对之作了分析和阐述。     

Designing Games to Teach Ethics

This paper describes a teaching methodology whereby students can gain practical experience of ethical decision-making in the engineering design process. We first argue for the necessity to teach a 'practical' understanding of ethical issues in engineering education along with the usual theoretical or hypothetical approaches. We then show how this practical understanding can be achieved by using a collaborative design game, describing how, for example, the concept of responsibility can be explored from this practical basis. We conclude that the use of games in design education can provide an excellent basis for discussing practical and ethical reasoning during the process of design.     

Student Agency in Literacy: Validation of the Student Agency Profile (StAP)

Abstract

There have been recent calls to support student agency in the field of literacy. Agency, which we define in the context of schooling, is a multidimensional construct where individuals exert influence and create opportunities in the learning context through intentions, decisions, and actions. We propose highlighting agency as an interconnected construct, which includes self-perception as readers and writers, intentionality, choice-making, persistence, and interactiveness. Elementary students (n?=?1,726) completed surveys of their agency along with standardized literacy assessments. Statistical analyses largely aligned with the hypothesized dimensions of agency. Relationships to student literacy achievement were stronger in grades 3^rd–5^th than in 1^st–2^nd grades. Discussion highlights how elementary students have a voice in their agency as it pertains to literacy. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.     

From Neurotic Guilt to Existential Guilt as Grief: The Road to Interiority, Agency, and Compassion Through Mourning. Part II

This study is a continuation of an article that was published in the previous issue of The American Journal of Psychoanalysis (Volume 66, Number 3, September 2006). The case of Helen is illustrated in terms of the analysand’s developmental mourning, countertransference, interiority, antilibidinal ego, and transformation of aggression into self-agency.Susan Kavaler-Adler, Ph.D., ABPP, is Founder and Executive Director, Training Analyst, Faculty Member, and Supervisor at the Object Relations Institute for Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis, New York.     

Traumas With and Without a Sense of Agency

The authors differentiate two types of traumatic experience: trauma with agency and trauma without agency. The types are different despite the fact that the symptoms of both look similar enough to fall within the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The differentiating factor is the sufferer's sense of agency during the circumstances surrounding the trauma. What is traumatizing is that the individual acted in some way that, however adaptive in the moment of threat and crisis, was ultimately loathed simultaneously or subsequently by the person's larger self and seen by this larger self as defining of character. Traumatized clients with a sense of agency require treatment that comes from being cared for and loved despite this hated facet of self.     

The Career Human Agency Theory

The authors propose a constructivist theory of career human agency to integrate and update the existing career theoretical models to better address the current postmodern zeitgeist. The career human agency theory (CHAT) represents a metatheory of career psychology guided by the principles of Bandura’s human agency framework and informs career development practice and counseling interventions. CHAT promotes the enactment of personal, proxy, and collective agency in the face of uncertainty and adversity. This article describes 4 pillar principles of career agency and provides concrete examples for career counseling application.     

Children's Loss of Agency under Extreme Adversity

This study explores the notion of children's agency in situations of extreme adversity. The child participants (n=117) live in the midst of the HIV/AIDS pandemic; extreme poverty; and systemic educational malfunction. Four focus group interviews were conducted with the children to explore their experiences of potential barriers to education. The findings indicated that contextual factors had a profoundly negative impact on the children, with their agentive capacity being severely compromised through their exposure to multiple, complex layers of risk. There was very little evidence to suggest that children retain any sense of their own agency in such adversity. This has implications for their resilience and for the development of policy and intervention strategies that may meet these children's needs.     

The mediating effects of misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts on obsessive-compulsive symptoms

Perfectionism and inflated responsibility have both been identified as risk factors for the development and maintenance of obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms. The aim of the present study was to test whether the relationships between these two variables and OC symptoms are mediated by the misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts (MIT). Three hundred and three university students completed the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory, the Responsibility Attitude Scale, and the Responsibility Interpretations Questionnaire. MIT was found to partially mediate the relationship between responsibility attitudes and OC symptoms. MIT also partially mediated the relationship between concern over mistakes and OC symptoms, even after controlling for responsibility attitudes. Both concern over mistakes and responsibility attitudes were significant predictors of MIT and OC symptoms, but responsibility was the stronger predictor when all of the variables were included in the model. Clinical implications for the treatment of OCD are discussed.     

Agency and Normative Self-Governance

We are agents: we can deliberate about what to do, and then act on the basis of that deliberation. We are also capable of normative self-governance: we can identify and respond to reasons as reasons. Many theorists believe that these two capacities are intimately connected. On the basis of this connection they conclude that practical reasoning must be carried out under the guise of a justification. This paper explores two strategies for avoiding that conclusion. The first, which just denies the connection between agency and normative self-governance, is rejected as too costly, since it leaves the normative significance of agency unexplained. The second, which suggests that we can respond to a consideration as a reason without representing it as a reason, seems more promising, but it requires a reductive account of reasons for action. The upshot is that metaethics and action theory are entwined in ways that few have recognized.     

Technological Resources to Support Adaptive Responding with Persons with Multiple Disabilities

This study assessed technological resources for supporting adaptive responses in 2 men with profound multiple disabilities. The technological resources (an electronic control device connected to optic sensors and pleasant stimuli) ensured the activation of those stimuli contingent on adaptive responses. The responses consisted of putting various objects in a container fitted to a desk. Data showed that both participants reached satisfactory levels of adaptive responses in the intervention and generalization settings. Procedural issues, practical implications of the findings and measures for promoting response maintenance were discussed.     

Moral Agency in Other Animals

Some philosophers have argued that moral agency is characteristic of humans alone and that its absence from other animals justifies granting higher moral status to humans. However, human beings do not have a monopoly on moral agency, which admits of varying degrees and does not require mastery of moral principles. The view that all and only humans possess moral agency indicates our underestimation of the mental lives of other animals. Since many other animals are moral agents (to varying degrees), they are also subject to (limited) moral obligations, examples of which are provided in this paper. But, while moral agency is sufficient for significant moral status, it is by no means necessary.     

The Nature of Client Agency Prior to Therapy: A Qualitative Study on Clients’ Narratives

Client agency is considered a crucial contributor to good treatment outcome. Recent studies, however, differ strongly in how they conceptualise and investigate agency. The current study explores the nature of client agency in ten clients’ pre-treatment interviews. Applying Consensual Qualitative Research, we constructed three overarching categories, subdivided into 14 sub-categories capturing both between- and within-person differences in agency before therapy. We found that all participants oscillated between the experience of a lack of grip on problems on the one hand and noticing their involvement in the problem and taking action on the other. These results present a dynamic conceptualisation of client agency. This allows us to ask pertinent questions for both future research and clinical practice.     

Impure Agency and the Just War

Feminist critiques of intention challenge some aspects of traditional just war reasoning, including the criteria of right intention and discrimination (particularly as interpreted using the doctrine of double effect). I take note of these challenges and propose some directions just war reasoners might take in response. First, right intention can be evaluated more accurately by judging what actors in war actually do than by attempting to uncover inward dispositions. Assessing whether agents in war have taken due care to minimize foreseeable collateral damage, avoided intentional targeting of noncombatants, corrected previous mistakes in their later actions, and taken responsibility to repair unintended damage they cause are examples of ways in which just war reasoners can evaluate intention by looking at actions.     

Agency and Communion Related to Mental Health in Japanese Young Adults

Based on Bakan’s (1966) theory, Helgeson (1994) presented a conceptual model of the relationships of biological sex, agency, and communion with psychological and physical well-being. This study was designed to examine the relationships of mitigated and unmitigated agency (M, M-) /communion (F, F-) with mental health in Japanese young adults. Participants were 602 (247 men, 355 women) undergraduate students and vocational school students in Japan. The average age of the participants was 20.0 years (SD=4.1). The results showed that communion (F) was positively associated with social support, unmitigated communion (F-) was strongly and positively associated with dysphoria for both men and women, unmitigated agency (M-) was also positively associated with dysphoria for women, and agency (M) was negatively associated with dysphoria for women. Both M and F were positively associated and F- was negatively associated with self-esteem for both men and women. M may moderate F-, and social support may moderate M-, for women. Thus our findings partially supported Helgeson’s model.     

From the casino to the jungle

Clear-cut cases of decision-making under risk (known probabilities) are unusual in real life. The gambler’s decisions at the roulette table are as close as we can get to this type of decision-making. In contrast, decision-making under uncertainty (unknown probabilities) can be exemplified by a decision whether to enter a jungle that may contain unknown dangers. Life is usually more like an expedition into an unknown jungle than a visit to the casino. Nevertheless, it is common in decision-supporting disciplines to proceed as if reasonably reliable probability estimates were available for all possible outcomes, i.e. as if the prevailing epistemic conditions were analogous to those of gambling at the roulette table. This mistake can be called the tuxedo fallacy. It is argued that traditional engineering practices such as safety factors and multiple safety barriers avoid this fallacy and that they therefore manage uncertainty better than probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). PRA is a useful tool, but it must be supplemented with other methods in order not to limit the analysis to dangers that can be assigned meaningful probability estimates.     

Agency and pain: An exploration

The notion of agency has become particularly prominent in social‐science writing. This article identifies some of the weaknesses in the ways it has been employed in contemporary anthropology. It criticises the assumptions of self‐empowerment, responsibility, and constructivism that are held to be essential to moral agency in much of that usage. Present‐day conceptions of agency in this literature introduce—whether intentionally or not—a triumphalist vision of history. Drawing on recent neuro‐physiological research, religious history and ethnography, it focuses on pain in order to think about agency in other than triumphalist terms. Triumphalist versions of agency, the article argues, are not only inherently questionable, they also distract our attention away from the need to understand how different traditions articulate the idea of living sanely in a world that is inevitably painful.     

Re‐embedding Moral Agency

The connection between ethics and theological vision has become increasingly important for ethics as we better appreciate how the moral agent is embedded in a framework that affectively and intellectually shapes her moral reasoning. Moral reasoning is always reasoning within (that is, within a moral framework, a religious worldview, and/or a set of ideological commitments). A similar framing occurs in literature, which I refer to as its “horizon.” A literary text's horizon comprises the theological and metaphysical commitments that are implied by the text and that the reader relies on to make sense of it. I suggest that there is a parallel between how moral frameworks and literary horizons operate in that both shape moral judgment. I argue that in using literature as a resource for ethics, the same contemporary currents that have led us to appreciate the embeddedness of moral reasoning should also encourage us to give more careful attention to the theological or metaphysical vision implied by a text. Such a “theo‐ethical” reading of literature provides a richer understanding of particular moral goods and the interplay between those goods and ethical themes like agency, hope, and redemption. I substantiate this claim with a reading of William Blake's Jerusalem: The Emanation of the Giant Albion.