Do people keep believing because they want to? Preexisting attitudes and the continued influence of misinformation

Misinformation—defined as information that is initially assumed to be valid but is later corrected or retracted—often has an ongoing effect on people’s memory and reasoning. We tested the hypotheses that (a) reliance on misinformation is affected by people’s preexisting attitudes and (b) attitudes determine the effectiveness of retractions. In two experiments, participants scoring higher and lower on a racial prejudice scale read a news report regarding a robbery. In one scenario, the suspects were initially presented as being Australian Aboriginals, whereas in a second scenario, a hero preventing the robbery was introduced as an Aboriginal person. Later, these critical, race-related pieces of information were or were not retracted. We measured participants’ reliance on misinformation in response to inferential reasoning questions. The results showed that preexisting attitudes influence people’s use of attitude-related information but not the way in which a retraction of that information is processed.     

Do people use category-learning judgments to regulate their learning of natural categories?

Although research has established that people can accurately judge how well they have learned categories, no research has examined whether people use their category-learning judgments (CLJs) to regulate their restudy of natural categories. Thus, in five experiments we investigated the relationship between people’s CLJs and selections of categories for restudy. Participants first attempted to learn natural categories (bird families; e.g., finches, grosbeaks, and warblers) so that they could categorize new exemplars on a final test. After this initial study phase, participants made a CLJ for each category and then selected a subset of the categories for restudy. Across experiments, we also manipulated several variables (e.g., selecting either three or nine categories, or obtaining 30% vs. 80% performance on the final test) that were expected to influence restudy selections. However, the manipulations typically had minimal impact. More important, in all experiments we found an unexpected outcome: Some participants tended to select the categories they judged to be most well learned for restudy, and others tended to select those judged to be least well learned. We discovered these qualitative differences in the use of CLJs to make restudy selections by using post-hoc analyses in Experiments 1a and 1b, and hence we sought to (a) replicate them in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 and (b) provide preliminary evidence regarding factors that can (vs. cannot) account for them. Most important, evidence across all of the experiments supported the conclusion that people do use their CLJs to select categories for restudy.     

Do mindful people set better goals? Investigating the relation between trait mindfulness,self-concordance,and goal progress

The present research examined the relation between trait mindfulness, self-concordance, and goal progress. We hypothesized that mindfulness would be positively associated with setting self-concordant goals (Studies 1–3), which would in turn predict greater goal progress (Studies 2 and 3). An internal mini meta-analysis (N = 1522) indicates that mindfulness had a small, positive association with self-concordant goal setting, r = 0.14, p < .001. Two longitudinal studies (Studies 2 and 3) found a small indirect effect of mindfulness on goal progress through self-concordance, although this was marginal in Study 2. In addition, Studies 2 and 3 found that mindfulness predicted increases in goal self-concordance over time. These findings provide support for the proposition that mindful people set “better” goals.     

Do people know how they’ve changed? A longitudinal investigation of volitional personality change and participants’ retrospective perceptions thereof

Prior research has found that most people want to change their personalities. Moreover, these change goals predict trait growth. The present study extended this by examining both actual change in self-report traits and people’s perceptions of how they have changed across 16 weeks. Results indicated moderate alignment between trait growth and perceived change (average r = 0.49)—with 39% of responses indicating perceived changes in the opposite direction of trait growth. Moreover, change goals predicted trait growth holding perceptions constant, and both trait growth and perceptions independently predicted well-being. These data elucidate how people perceive the process of volitional change. Moreover, these data suggest people change in desired ways, even if they do not perceive those changes.     

Value seeking and prediction-decision inconsistency: Why don’t people take what they predict they’ll like the most?

In this research, it is proposed that, when making a choice between consumption goods, people do not just think about which option will deliver the highest consumption utility but also think about which choice is most consistent with rationales—beliefs about how they should make decisions. The present article examines a specific rationale, value seeking. The value-seeking rationale refers to the belief that one should choose the option in a choice set that has the highest monetary value. Studies 1 and 2 show that value seeking could lead to a prediction-decision inconsistency, predicting a high consumption utility from one option but choosing another option. Study 3 shows that the prediction-decision inconsistency could be created even by “illusory” (as opposed to truly monetary) values and that the inconsistency could be turned on or off through empirical manipulation.     

Your goals or mine? Women’s personal and vicarious eating regulation goals and their partners’ perceptions of support,well-being,and relationship quality

This research examined the types of eating regulation goals that women have for themselves as well as for their romantic partner, and how these relate to their interpersonal style toward their partner, and to their partner’s psychological and relational well-being. Participants were 131 heterosexual couples. Results show that the eating regulation goals that women have for their partner (health or appearance oriented) reflect the type of goals that they personally pursue. Furthermore, women who have health-focused eating goals for their partner are perceived as more autonomy-supportive, which is associated with the partner’s report of higher relationship quality. Conversely, women who have appearance-focused eating goals for their partner are more likely to be perceived as controlling, which negatively predicts the partner’s psychological and relational well-being. These results attest to the importance of considering women’s personal eating regulation goals for a better understanding of the type of goals they have for their partners and how these relate to their partners’ well-being and relationship quality.     

Leaders’ receptivity to subordinates’ creative input: The role of achievement goals and composition of creative input

We identified leaders’ achievement goals and composition of creative input as important factors that can clarify when and why leaders are receptive to, and supportive of, subordinates’ creative input. As hypothesized, in two experimental studies, we found that relative to mastery goal leaders, performance goal leaders were less receptive to subordinates’ voiced creative input. In Study 1, we further showed that image threat appraisal and learning opportunity appraisal mediated this effect. In Study 2, we demonstrated that when merely creative ideas were expressed by the subordinate, performance goal leaders responded like mastery goal leaders. However, as in Study 1, performance goal leaders were less receptive to, and less supportive of, subordinates’ creative input than mastery goal leaders when the composition of subordinates’ creative input included both problem identifications and creative ideas.     

Do people agree about the causes of behavior? A social relations analysis of behavior ratings and causal attributions

Two studies examined consistency and agreement in behavior ratings and causal attributions. In Study 1, participants (N = 280) engaged in a series of getting-acquainted conversations in one of 3 communication media (face-to-face, telephone, computer mediated); in Study 2, participants (N = 120) engaged in a competitive group task. In both studies, participants rated themselves and their interaction partners on a set of behaviors and then made attributions about the causes of those behaviors. The major findings were that (a) participants consistently favored some causal factors over others in explaining both their own and their partners' behavior, supporting the existence of generalized attributional styles; and (b) participants showed moderate self-partner and partner-partner agreement about behavior but virtually no agreement about the causes of behavior. Thus, in brief interactions people tend to see themselves and others through the lens of their stable patterns of perceiving and interpreting behavior.     

Do older individuals adapt to their traits?: Personality–emotion relations among younger and older adults

Prominent lifespan theories posit that older adults are motivated to engage in emotion-regulation more frequently than younger adults. The present study follows from such theories and makes a novel prediction hitherto unexamined in the aging–emotion literature. Based on the idea that older adults more frequently regulate their emotions, it was predicted that traits, reflective of temperament or habit, would be less predictive of emotions among older adults (N = 60; M age = 74.9 years) than younger adults (N = 44; M age = 19.5 years). This hypothesis was confirmed across four of the Big 5 traits and, consistent with predictions, the moderating effects of age were particularly strong for negative emotions. The discussion focuses on the implications of the present findings for understanding age differences in personality, emotion, and emotion-regulation.     

Can you make my goals easier to achieve? Effects of partner instrumentality on goal pursuit and relationship satisfaction

Goal pursuits are strongly influenced by romantic partners, and a partner's instrumentality to goals may be particularly important for goal pursuit. This study examined the effects of partner instrumentality on goal‐related effort, goal progress, goal commitment, and relationship satisfaction over time. It also examined whether relationship satisfaction moderated the effects of partner instrumentality on goal pursuit processes. Newly dating romantic partners (N = 59 couples) reported on their goals and relationship satisfaction at two assessments 3 months apart. Multilevel models indicated that partner instrumentality predicted increases in progress over time but only for those high in relationship satisfaction. Partner instrumentality also predicted increases in one's own relationship satisfaction but was unrelated to changes in the partner's satisfaction. These findings suggest that partner instrumentality benefits increased goal progress, particularly for those with satisfying relationships, and further increases relationship satisfaction.     

Do people aggress to improve their mood? Catharsis beliefs, affect regulation opportunity, and aggressive responding

Do people aggress to make themselves feel better? We adapted a procedure used by G. K. Manucia, D. J. Baumann, and R. B. Cialdini (1984), in which some participants are given a bogus mood-freezing pill that makes affect regulation efforts ineffective. In Study 1, people who had been induced to believe in the value of catharsis and venting anger responded more aggressively than did control participants to insulting criticism, but this aggression was eliminated by the mood-freezing pill. Study 2 showed similar results among people with high anger-out (i.e., expressing and venting anger) tendencies. Studies 3 and 4 provided questionnaire data consistent with these interpretations, and Study 5 replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 using measures more directly concerned with affect regulation. Taken together, these results suggest that many people may engage in aggression to regulate (improve) their own affective states.     

Optimistic and pessimistic biases and comparative judgmental processes in Japan: Do people really compare themselves to their peers?

Studies on above-average and unrealistic-optimism effects have recently claimed that they are the consequence of an over-utilization of self-relevant and under-utilization of peer-relevant information, despite the assumption that people would refer to both themselves and their average peer to make a comparative judgment. However, there is a possibility that these tendencies are prevalent only in Western cultures. The present paper reports on three studies of comparative self-other judgments conducted with Japanese university students. The results consistently showed that participants tended to focus simply on their own abilities, traits, or the likelihood of experiencing future life events, without paying much attention to their peers. These findings suggest first that there is a consistent tendency for people to place a greater weight on the self than normative standards when considering their comparative position in a group, and that this tendency is independent of the size or direction of comparative biases.     

Do birds (pigeons and bantams) know how confident they are of their perceptual decisions?

Rhesus monkeys are known to recognize confidence about their immediate perceptual and cognitive decisions by using a betting procedure (Son and Kornell in The missing link in cognition: origins of self-reflective consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 296–320, 2005; Kornell et al. in Psychol Sci 18:64–71, 2007). In this report, we examined whether this ability is shared in two avian species (pigeons and bantams) in order to know how widespread this metacognitive ability is among animals. We trained pigeons and bantams to search for a differently colored disk (target) among others (distracters) displayed on a touch-sensitive monitor. In test, the subjects were required to choose one of two confidence icons, “risk” and “safe”, after the visual search. A peck at the “risk” icon after a correct response in the visual search (i.e., a peck at the target) was reinforced by food and light, while that after an incorrect response (i.e., a peck at a distracter) resulted in a timeout. A peck at the “safe” icon was always reinforced by food and light, or by light only, regardless of the visual search result. The percentages of “safe” choices after incorrect responses were higher than after correct responses in all six pigeons and two of three bantams. This behavior generalized to novel stimuli in some subjects, and even to a novel line-classification task in a pigeon. These results suggest that these two distantly related avian species have in common a metacognitive ability that allows them to recognize confidence about their immediate perceptual decisions.     

Do women sometimes say no when they mean yes? The prevalence and correlates of women's token resistance to sex

We investigated whether women ever engage in token resistance to sex--saying no but meaning yes--and, if they do, what their reasons are for doing so. A questionnaire administered to 610 undergraduate women asked whether they had ever engaged in token resistance and, if so, asked them to rate the importance of 26 possible reasons. We found that 39.3% of the women had engaged in token resistance at least once. Their reasons fell into three categories: practical, inhibition-related, and manipulative reasons. Women's gender role attitudes, erotophobia-erotophilia, and other attitudes and beliefs varied as a function of their experience with token resistance and their sexual experience. We argue that, given society's sexual double standard, token resistance may be a rational behavior. It could, however, have negative consequences, including discouraging honest communication, perpetuating restrictive gender stereotypes, and--if men learn to disregard women's refusals--increasing the incidence of rape.     

Self-focused attention,performance expectancies,and the intensity of effort: Do people try harder for harder goals?

Many theories argue that goal striving is more intense when people have optimistic expectancies for achieving the goal and when attention is self-focused. Brehm’s motivational intensity theory, however, predicts that the intensity of motivation is only as high as necessary, so people will try harder for difficult tasks than for easy tasks, all else equal. The present experiment compared these two approaches by manipulating two levels of self-focused attention (low and high self-awareness, via a mirror) and two levels of task difficulty (easy and difficult). Effort was assessed as cardiovascular reactivity, particularly change in systolic blood pressure. Neither high self-focus nor an easy task per se caused increased effort; instead, high self-focus significantly increased systolic reactivity when the task was difficult. Effort was thus higher despite less optimistic goal expectancies, a finding that is predicted by Brehm’s motivational intensity theory but not by traditional self-regulation models.     

How are children’s perceptions of the malleability of their academic competencies related to their teachers’ and parents’ views?

The study examined children’s and their parents’ and teachers’ perceptions of the malleability of the child’s academic competencies. A total of 103 third- and sixth-graders and their parents and teachers were asked to rate how much the child could improve her/his competencies in mathematics and Finnish. The participants were asked to use intrapersonal and interpersonal criteria in their ratings, i.e., to rate the child’s potential for improvement in comparison with his/her own current competencies and in relation to her/his peers’ competencies. The results showed a tendency that older children’s perceptions were closer to their parents’ and teachers’ views than those of younger children. Children of academically educated parents showed a stronger correlation with their teachers’ and parents’ intrapersonal perceptions than children of vocationally educated parents. The results also suggested that the teachers and parents trusted in boys’ intrapersonal potential in Finnish more than in girls’ but there were no gender-differences in their perceptions concerning mathematics. In all, the children’s intrapersonal perceptions of their improvement potential were the most optimistic, followed by their parents’ and lastly by their teachers’ perceptions.     

“I’ve said I’m sorry,haven’t I?” A study of the identity implications and constraints that apologies create for their recipients

In contrast to previous research on apologies, which has examined their role in enhancing impressions of those issuing them (e.g., Darby and Schlenker, 1989), the research reported here draws upon Goffman’s (1955) analysis of the “corrective cycle” and is concerned with constraints associated with the receipt of apologies. Study 1 examines the implications for the actor of accepting, not accepting, or rejecting apologies. It is demonstrated that across a variety of judgments, most positive views of the actor result when apologies are accepted; least positive views are associated with their rejection. A follow-up study sought to establish whether this effect would occur under circumstances in which unconvincing apologies are rejected. Results indicate that the apology’s status (convincing versus unconvincing) has no bearing on perceptions of actors. Based on a hypothetical role-play format, Study 2 addresses the matter of whether actors experience a subjective sense of constraint upon receipt of unsatisfactory apologies. The data suggest that there exists a pronounced tendency to accept such apologies, though typically with conditions that would be specified to the offender. More general implications of the data are discussed.     

What to do? The effects of discrepancies, incentives, and time on dynamic goal prioritization

This study examined factors that influence the dynamic pursuit of multiple goals over time. As hypothesized, goal-performance discrepancies were significantly related to subsequent time allocation. Greater distance from a given goal resulted in greater time subsequently allocated to that goal. In addition, the incentives offered for goal attainment determined the relative influence of discrepancies for each goal. When the incentives for each goal were equivalent, progress toward each goal exhibited equal influence, with greater time allocated to whichever goal was furthest from completion at the time. However, with an incentive available for only 1 of the 2 goals, time allocation was largely determined by progress toward the rewarded goal. Likewise, when incentives for each task differed in their approach-avoidance framing, progress toward the avoidance-framed goal was a stronger predictor of subsequent allocation than was progress toward the approach-framed goal. Finally, the influence of goal-performance discrepancies differed as a function of the time remaining for goal pursuit. The implications for future work on dynamic goal prioritization and the provision of performance incentives are discussed.     

Do we listen to advice just because we paid for it? The impact of advice cost on its use

When facing a decision, people often rely on advice received from others. Previous studies have shown that people tend to discount others’ opinions. Yet, such discounting varies according to several factors. This paper isolates one of these factors: the cost of advice. Specifically, three experiments investigate whether the cost of advice, independent of its quality, affects how people use advice. The studies use the Judge–Advisor System (JAS) to investigate whether people value advice from others more when it costs money than when it is free, and examine the psychological processes that could account for this effect. The results show that people use paid advice significantly more than free advice and suggest that this effect is due to the same forces that have been documented in the literature to explain the sunk costs fallacy. Implications for circumstances under which people value others’ opinions are discussed.     

Do today's young people really think they are so extraordinary? An examination of secular trends in narcissism and self-enhancement

The present research investigated secular trends in narcissism and self-enhancement over the past three decades. Despite recent claims about the impact of the "self-esteem movement" on the current generation of young people, we found no evidence that college students' scores on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory increased from the 1980s through 2007 (N= 26,867), although we did find small changes in specific facets of narcissism. Similarly, we found no evidence that high school students' level of self-enhancement, defined by the discrepancy between their perceived intelligence and their actual academic achievements, increased from 1976 to 2006 (N= 410,527). These results cast doubt on the belief that today's young people have increasingly inflated impressions of themselves compared with previous generations.