Clinical Commentary

Abstract

This paper is the narrative of a first-time father with a son born seven weeks early by Caesarean section. Against the anxiety and trauma of his infant's birth and his wife's illness, another inner darker drama is being relived. Michael shows all the wounds of a battered child. He asks two awesome questions - Will I be to my son as my father was to me? Will my son be to me as I was to my father? Fearful and at first unvoiced questions, the developing interviews gave them a voice. We respected Michael's sharing of the early and fearful days and nights when his infant first came home. We sometimes found it hard to empathize with his running away to hide in work, until we understood what he was hiding from. Most poignant was his struggle with his anger and hurt with his father and his desire to understand, ‘Why?’, so that he would not be like this to his son. We saw a sensitive revelation of life being born inside him anew, as he made contact with his real infant and his psychic infant within. Of particular interest was the therapeutic use of the research interview space and the interviewer.     

Kierkegaard on Imitation and Ethics: Toward a Secular Project?

This essay demonstrates the prominence of imitation in Kierkegaard’s ethics. I move beyond his idea of authentic existence modeled on Christ and explore the secular dimension of Kierkegaard’s insights about human nature and imitation. I start with presenting imitation as key to understanding the ethical dimension of the relationship between the universal and individual aspects of the human self in Kierkegaard. I then show that Kierkegaard’s moral concepts of “primitivity” and “comparison” are a response to his sociological and psychological observations about imitation from an ethical point of view. In the final section of this paper, I briefly engage Friedrich Schleiermacher’s “ethics of individuality” and Gabriel Tarde’s “laws of imitation” to explore Kierkegaard’s consideration of ethics and imitation as situated within the context of a broader conversation on imitation.     

DECONSTRUCTING THE SECULAR MAGISTERIUM: VOICES PAST AND PRESENT FOR CONVERSATIONS OF THE FUTURE

In this paper I offer a possible approach to accomplishing Benedict's goal proposed in his Regensburg address. 1 I take his goal to be twofold. First, we must expand our concept of reason beyond the privileged position of scientific empiricism and philosophical reasoning, both of which form what I have called the Secular Magisterium, put in place as the dominant intellectual force by the Enlightenment. Second, the motivation for expanding our concept of reason is for the purpose of greater dialogue across cultures, across religions and across academic disciplines. Since I take Benedict's goal to be twofold, my paper will address these issues in two parts, the second building from the first. In the first section, I will revisit the counter‐Enlightenment thinking of some well known, yet significantly marginalized voices, with the goal of hearing them again and reviving their critique to inform our own. By the end of this section, I will offer what I take to be a counter‐Enlightenment approach to knowing our world by means of an expanded concept of reason. In the second section, I will address what I take to be some of the more intellectual challenges to the possibilities for conversation across cultures, religions, and disciplines. It is my goal to show how an embodied version of the counter‐Enlightenment approach I offer in the first section can allow for genuine conversation that not only provides opportunities to better know our conversation partners, but also offers the possibility of honest persuasion in which the other sees reality differently and considers this way better.     

Moral Imagination,Perception, and Judgment

This paper develops an account of moral imagination that identifies the ways in which imaginative capacities contribute to our ability to make reason practical in the world, beyond their roles in moral perception and moral judgment. In section 1, I explain my understanding of what it means to qualify imagination as ‘moral,’ and go on in section 2 to identify four main conceptions of moral imagination as an aspect of practical reason in philosophical ethics. I briefly situate these alternative ideas in relation to standard accounts of moral perception and judgment with reference to some guiding examples. In section 3, I argue that the fourth conception of moral imagination, moral imagination understood as the capacity to generate new possibilities for morally good action, is not well accounted for within the standard categories of practical reason. Section 4 clarifies the scope and importance of this capacity and defends its claim to increased theoretical attention.     

Moving on From the Suburbs

This is an account of my development as a psychoanalyst beginning in a safe but very unquestioning culture of a London suburb. Some unusual features of my childhood, as well as a natural curiosity, made me need to question the apparent certainties of my surroundings. I describe how a number of events—the death of my father, my illness as an adolescent, and an unlikely encounter with psychoanalysis shortly after, set me onto a rather slow road toward becoming a psychoanalyst several years later. I describe the influences that were important to me. I have always been most inspired by those who could explain complex ideas in a simple and straightforward way, and this has become important objective for me.     

On Being Wholeheartedly Ambivalent: Indecisive Will,Unity of the Self,and Integration by Narration

In this paper, I want to discuss the relation between ambivalence and the unity of the self. I will raise the question whether a person can be both ambivalent about his own will and nevertheless be wholehearted. Since Harry Frankfurt’s theory is my main point of reference, I briefly introduce his account of the will and the reasons for his opposition towards ambivalence in the first section. In the second section, I analyse different interpretations of ambivalence. In the third section, I provide a narrative account of a diachronic integration of the self that allows for the integration of volitional ambivalence. Finally, I scrutinise different meanings of the unity of the self, since disintegration, not ambivalence, seems to be bad for us. I conclude that persons can indeed be wholeheartedly ambivalent.     

Is there a problem with enhancement?

This article examines arguments concerning enhancement of human persons recently presented by Michael Sandel (2004). In the first section, I briefly describe some of his arguments. In section two, I consider whether, as Sandel claims, the desire for mastery motivates enhancement and whether such a desire could be grounds for its impermissibility. Section three considers how Sandel draws the distinction between treatment and enhancement, and the relation to nature that he thinks each expresses. The fourth section examines Sandel's views about parent/child relations and also how enhancement would affect distributive justice and the duty to aid. In conclusion, I briefly offer an alternative suggestion as to why enhancement may be troubling and consider what we could safely enhance.     

They Call Us Problem Child: Delinquency,Medicalization, and Social Class in Primary Education

This article recounts my seven-year struggle with my son in his high-performing school district, and his immediate shift in identity from delinquent to honor student when we changed districts. I argue that social class is encoded in setting and family form. Factors like context, class and family form discrimination, diagnosis in schools, and access to resources, all shaped Coby’s social experiences.     

Caring for the Care-Giver: The Benefit of a Peer Supervision Group

I presented the following case to my leader-led peer supervisiongroup twice as the case evolved over the course of one year. During my firstmeetings with Mr. and Mrs. M we discussed a prenatal diagnosis of a skeletaldysplasia at thirty-three weeks of pregnancy and the option of a third trimesterpregnancy termination. One year later I presented follow-up on the outcome ofthe affected pregnancy, a new pregnancy, and Mrs. M's suicide. Although bothsegments of the case were completed by the time I presented, my peersupervision group was invaluable. With the encouragement and support of groupmembers, I could openly express and process my sadness and grief for the M'ssituation and the loss of Mrs. M's life.     

Comparative Evaluations

My response to Engelmann (2008) will be based on several questions that will allow both its author and the general reader to determine whether the assumptions I make as an interpreter of this complex paper are congruent or incongruent with their own interpretations of the text. The interpretations by the writer, by any commentator, and the diverse interpretations of a general audience together with my own interpretations will, I hope, facilitate some fruitful ‘comparative evaluations.’ I articulate my inferences of the most dense part of the paper, namely the ‘concrete immediate Consciousness and the developing absent outside.’ My hope is to address Engelmann’s question: “Am I in a better disposition to judge modern theories of consciousness?” The last section of my response spells out more personal comments to my all too brief and single encounter with Arno Engelmann. It is there that Arno Engelmann’s fascinating statement “I am a citizen of the world” is addressed through its counterparts in my life.     

Being bored: Heidegger on patience and melancholy

In his reflections on ethics, Descartes distances himself from the eudaimonistic tradition in moral philosophy by introducing a distinction between happiness and the highest good. While happiness, in Descartes’s view, consists in an inner state of complete harmony and satisfaction, the highest good instead consists in virtue, i.e. in ‘a firm and constant resolution' (e.g. CSMK: 325/AT 5: 83) to always use our free will well or correctly. In Section 1 of this paper, I pursue the Cartesian distinction between happiness and the highest good in some detail. In Section 2, I discuss the question of how the motivation to virtue should be accounted for within Descartes’s ethical framework. In Section 3, I turn to Descartes’s defence of the view that virtue, while fundamentally distinct from happiness, is nevertheless sufficient for obtaining it. In the final section of the paper (Section 4), my concern is instead with a second and sometimes neglected distinction that Descartes makes between two different senses of the highest good. I show that this distinction does not remove the non-eudaimonistic character of Descartes’s ethics suggested in Section 1, and present two reasons for why the distinction is important for Descartes’s purposes.     

Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions

It is always great good fortune for an author to have his writings meet with a receptive circle of readers who take them up in their own work and clarify them further. Indeed, it may even be the secret of all theoretical productivity that one reaches an opportune point in one's own creative process when others' queries, suggestions, and criticisms give one no peace, until one has been forced to come up with new answers and solutions. The four essays collected here, in any event, jointly represent an ideal form of such a challenge: I am now compelled to make further theoretical developments and clarifications that lead me to a whole new stage of my own endeavours, well beyond what I initially had in mind in The Struggle for Recognition . For this reason, I will not concentrate here on interpretative issues regarding my earlier work but will instead take up the problems and challenges that have occasioned several revisions on my part. For this reason, it makes sense to begin (in section I) with the points that Carl-Göran Heidegren makes, in terms of a history of social theory, regarding my proposed theory of recognition. The issues that still motivate me today can best be expressed via an engagement with the conscientious interpretations he offers. The core of this rejoinder is based on Heikki Ikäheimo's and Arto Laitinen's suggestions and corrections, which they have used to develop my initial approach further, to the point where the theoretical outlines of a precise and general concept of recognition come into view. It is primarily these two contributions that helped me develop a productive elaboration of my originally vague intuitions (section II). By way of conclusion (in section III), I take up the penetrating questions raised by Antti Kauppinen regarding the use of the concept of recognition in the broader context of social criticism; he has compelled me to take on several extremely helpful clarifications, and they give me the opportunity, in conclusion, to summarize my overarching intentions.     

Causal explanation and scientific realism

It is widely believed that many of the competing accounts of scientific explanation have ramifications which are relevant to the scientific realism debate. I claim that the two issues are orthogonal. For definiteness, I consider Cartwright's argument that causal explanations secure belief in theoretical entities. In Section I, van Fraassen's anti-realism is reviewed; I argue that this anti-realism is, prima facie, consistent with a causal account of explanation. Section II reviews Cartwright's arguments. In Section III, it is argued that causal explanations do not license the sort of inferences to theoretical entities that would embarass the anti-realist. Section IV examines the epistemic commitments involved in accepting a causal explanation. Section V presents my conclusions: contra Cartwright, the anti-realist may incorporate a causal account of explanation into his vision of science in an entirely natural way.     

On choosing between movement sequences: comments on Rose (1988)

One method of investigating human motor programming is to determine how the choice reaction time for a memorized response sequence depends on the composition of that sequence as well as the other sequence that may be required. Using this method, Rose (1988) found that the total number of responses in the two possible response sequences predicts the choice reaction time to initiate either one. On the basis of this result, Rose claimed that the hierarchical editor (HED) model of motor programming, developed by Rosenbaum, Inhoff, and Gordon (1984), may have to be reevaluated. In this commentary I argue that Rose's results are inconsistent with a precursor of the HED model, not with the HED model itself, that the HED model actually provides a better fit to Rose's data than her total-number-of-responses model, that in general, choice reaction time does not increase with the total number of possible responses, and that structural relations between alternative movement sequences are the main determinants of choice reaction time. Taken as a whole, the results suggest that possible responses are not held in completely readied form before being selected for execution. A further implication is that the storage capacity of the motor output buffer (the MOB) is extremely limited.     

Redemption Revisited: Doing Theology at Shawshank

This article examines recent scholarly attempts to revisit the Christian theme of redemption by making various uses of Frank Darabont's 1994 film The Shawshank Redemption. While the appropriation of this film has generated much insightful theology, there has been an insufficient regard for the extent to which ‘redemption’ is a diverse and heterogeneous term which is not intrinsically transferable beyond the specific contours of the Christian faith. I suggest that a new way of doing theology through film is needed. As an alternative to hijacking the film for theological purposes, my premise is that the most judicious way of entering into conversation with the film is to pay particular attention to what actual audiences are saying about it and from that point seeing what sort of theological encounter—if any—can be facilitated.     

‘Adolescent fantasies and the horror-film genre‘: The freud museum 1995 spring conference

Abstract

As I walked towards home across Waterloo Bridge, having left this conference in its apt setting of the National Film Theatre, I realized I had attended the day from two points of interest: firstly, from my professional position of working in a university counselling service where I encounter adolescents and their ‘phantasies’ regularly. Only the other day a young student I had been seeing started the session by telling me she had seen the film Interview with the Vampire the night before, had been sick at the end, and then casually ‘threw up’ to me that she did not think she would need to go on seeing me.     

Substantive thoughts about substantive thoughts: a reply to Galin

In his commentary, David Galin raises several important issues that deserve to be addressed. In this response, I do three things. First, I briefly discuss the relation between the present work and the metaphoric theories of thought developed by cognitive lin- guists such as Lakoff and Johnson (1998). Second, I address some of the confusions that seem to have arisen about my use of the terms "substantive thought" and "nucleus." Third, I briefly discuss some of the directions that Galin suggests for further research.     

Hegel,grandfather of disjunctivism

In this paper, I shall investigate whether Hegel can be considered as a sort of ancestor of McDowell’s disjunctivism. If this hypothesis turns out to be plausible, then the paper offers two gains. On the one hand, it offers an innovative interpretation of the way in which Hegel conceives of our sensible epistemic access to the world. On the other hand, McDowell's own claim that his own theoretical proposal has a Hegelian sound is supported by a previously unexplored argument. I organize my analysis into three parts: I sketch McDowell’s version of disjunctivism (Section 2); I analyze some passages from Hegel that I believe are important for showing some similarities between his and McDowell’s argumentative strategy (Section 3); in the conclusion (Section 4), I highlight a number of core features that Hegel seems to share with McDowell’s disjunctivism and I submit that they are sufficient to label Hegel the “grandfather” of McDowell's disjunctivism.     

What I Talk About When I Talk About Teaching and Learning

In this text I discuss two events in which I learned something important about life and about education in order to formulate in a precise manner two propositions for my pedagogical creed. In focus for both are the interrelatedness of theory and life. The stories are told through the lenses of Emmanuel Levinas’s and Jacques Rancière’s thinking, but the stories also are shown to be essential in my understanding of their thinking. The first story is about learning ethics as a consequence of meeting an old man on a remote island and the second story is about teaching, when a young girl in a situation of war taught me something important about political life. In a final section I discuss briefly what those theoretical/practical experiences and memories bring to my understanding of education.