Martin Koci: Thinking Faith after Christianity: A Theological Reading of Jan Patočka's Phenomenological Philosophy, 2020, New York: State University of New York Press, 301 pp. ISBN 978-1-4384-7893-7, ISBN 978-1-4384-7892-0

Continental Philosophy Review - Martin Koci’s Thinking Faith after Christianity is a rigorous and nuanced study of Jan Patočka’s philosophy, ineluctable for researchers interested...     

“A Different Starting Point,a Different Metaphysics”: Reading Bergson and Barad Diffractively

This article provides an affirmative feminist reading of the philosophy of Henri Bergson by reading it through the work of Karen Barad. Adopting such a diffractive reading strategy enables feminist philosophy to move beyond discarding Bergson for his apparent phallocentrism. Feminist philosophy finds itself double bound when it critiques a philosophy for being phallocentric, because the setup of a master narrative comes into being with the critique. By negating a gender‐blind or sexist philosophy, feminist philosophy only reaffirms its parameters, and setting up a master narrative costs feminist philosophy its feminism. I thus propose and practice a different methodological starting point, one that capitalizes on “diffraction.” This article experiments with the affirmative phase in feminist philosophy prophesied by Elizabeth Grosz, among others. Working along the lines of the diffractive method, the article at the same time proposes a new reading of Bergson (as well as of Barad), a new, different metaphysics indeed, which can be specified as onto‐epistemological or “new materialist.”     

GILSON AND GOUHIER: FRAMING ‘CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY’

Focusing on their approaches to Nicolas Malebranche, this article compares the contributions of Étienne Gilson and his student and colleague, Henri Gouhier, to the debate around the notion of Christian philosophy during the mid‐1920s into the 1930s. Gilson agreed with Brunschvicg's characterization of Nicolas Malebranche as an important representative of Christian philosophy, and both Gilson and Gouhier had a profound understanding of Malebranche's thought. Following St. Thomas that philosophy should strive to be a ‘perfect use of reason’, Gilson posited Christianity's influence as remaining exterior to philosophy itself. More sympathetic to Malebranche's Augustinian approach, Gouhier allowed for religious experience to operate at the interior of philosophy. These different approaches stemmed from fundamental differences as to how the historical method should be employed in philosophy and what it reveals.     

Kierkegaard's Mirrors: Interest,Self, and Moral Vision

This paper advances the view that the history of philosophy is both a kind of history and a kind of philosophy. Through a discussion of some examples from epistemology, metaphysics, and the historiography of philosophy, it explores the benefit to philosophy of a deep and broad engagement with its history. It comes to the conclusion that doing history of philosophy is a way to think outside the box of the current philosophical orthodoxies. Somewhat paradoxically, far from imprisoning its students in outdated and crystallized views, the history of philosophy trains the mind to think differently and alternatively about the fundamental problems of philosophy. It keeps us alert to the fact that latest is not always best, and that a genuinely new perspective often means embracing and developing an old insight. The upshot is that the study of the history of philosophy has an innovative and subversive potential, and that philosophy has a great deal to gain from a long, broad, and deep conversation with its history.     

Death,medicine & bioethics

The assumptions of philosophy need scrutiny as much the assumptions of medicine do. Scrutiny shows that the philosophical method of bioethics is compromised, for it shares certain fundamental assumptions with medicine itself. To show this requires an unorthodox style of philosophy — a literary one. To show the compromised status of bioethics the paper discusses some seminal utilitarian discussions of the definition of death, of whether it is a bad thing, and of when it ought to occur.     

Feminist philosophy of science: history,contributions, and challenges

Feminist philosophy of science has led to improvements in the practices and products of scientific knowledge-making, and in this way it exemplifies socially relevant philosophy of science. It has also yielded important insights and original research questions for philosophy. Feminist scholarship on science thus presents a worthy thought-model for considering how we might build a more socially relevant philosophy of science—the question posed by the editors of this special issue. In this analysis of the history, contributions, and challenges faced by feminist philosophy of science, I argue that engaged case study work and interdisciplinarity have been central to the success of feminist philosophy of science in producing socially relevant scholarship, and that its future lies in the continued development of robust and dynamic philosophical frameworks for modeling social values in science. Feminist philosophers of science, however, have often encountered marginalization and persistent misunderstandings, challenges that must be addressed within the institutional and intellectual culture of American philosophy.     

Self‐Images and “Perspicuous Representations”: Reflection,Philosophy, and the Glass Mirror

Reflection names the central activity of Western philosophical practice; the mirror and its attendant metaphors of reflection are omnipresent in the self‐image(s) of Western philosophy and in metaphilosophical reflection on reflection. But the physical experiences of being reflected by glass mirrors have been inadequately theorized contributors to those metaphors, and this has implications not only for the self‐image and the self (or selves) of philosophy but also for metaphilosophical practice. This article begins to rethink the metaphor of reflection anew. Paying attention to the history of the glass mirror in Europe reveals and challenges the modern emergence of clear ontological distinctions between disembodied subjects and the objects of their knowledge, and suggests a compelling terrain of metaphilosophical analysis. On the reading offered by the article, the inherent complexity of the relationship between selves and their mirror images, a complexity mediated by social location, historical situation, and particular projects, points to significant spaces of unknowing, of indeterminacy, and of ontological ambiguity.     

Democratizing Technology: Interests, Codes, Rights

This reply to criticism of Questioning Technology by Gerald Doppeltaddresses differences between political philosophy and philosophy oftechnology. While political philosophers such as Doppelt emphasize procedural aspects of democracy and equal rights, many philosophers of technologyimplicitly assume a substantive criterion of the good centered on thedevelopment of human capacities. Questioning Technology alsoemphasizes the diminishing agency of individuals in technologically advanced societies dominated by large scale organizations and themass media. These themes of social critique complement the main focusof political philosophy. Political philosophy must learn to addresstechnical issues as it has learned to address other social issuessuch as race and gender.     

PHILOSOPHY,MYTH, AND THE “SIGNIFICANCE” OF SPECULATIVE THOUGHT

Abstract: A close examination of the relation between philosophy and myth reveals important functional parallels in some of their basic means of operation that helps shed some light on philosophy's overall task. A crucial aspect of the structural similarity between philosophy and myth is the generation of what Hans Blumenberg calls “significance.” I argue that the preservation and enhancement of significance (through a strong affinity to myth) is an essential and overlooked aspect of philosophy's task, one best accomplished through the world‐orienting work of speculative philosophy. By weaving the fragmented insights, criticisms, lessons, and methods of the more “specialized” analytic, pragmatic, critical, postmodern, deconstructivist, and other methods of thought together in a systematic way, speculative philosophy may be able to provide us with the kind of world orientation needed for developing a healthier, richer, more profound understanding of ourselves and our proper place within the world.     

Redefining Ecological Ethics: Science,Policy, and Philosophy at Cape Horn

In the twentieth century, philosophy (especially within the United States) embraced the notion of disciplinary expertise: philosophical research consists of working with and writing for other philosophers. Projects that involve non-philosophers earn the deprecating title of "applied" philosophy. The University of North Texas (UNT) doctoral program in philosophy exemplifies the possibility of a new model for philosophy, where graduate students are trained in academic philosophy and in how to work with scientists, engineers, and policy makers. This "field" (rather than "applied") approach emphasizes the inter- and transdisciplinary nature of the philosophical enterprise where theory and practice dialectically inform one another. UNT's field station in philosophy at Cape Horn, Patagonia, Chile is one site for developing this ongoing experiment in the theory and practice of interdisciplinary philosophic research and education.     

Carnap,Kuhn, and revisionism: on the publication of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Structure</Emphasis> in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Encyclopedia</Emphasis>

In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap’s work. In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap “would have found Structure philosophically congenial”. I claim that Kuhn’s book, from Carnap’s point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather in history of science (in the context of a sharp discovery–justification distinction). It could also explain the fact that, despite his sympathetic letters to Kuhn as editor, Carnap never refers to Kuhn’s book in his work in philosophy of science.     

Review of Mark Siderits, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Buddhism as Philosophy</Emphasis>

Siderits’ book is a welcome contribution to the ongoing dialogue between Buddhism and Western analytic philosophy. It covers the three main areas of philosophical enquiry—metaphysics, ethics and epistemology. Although conceptually quite challenging in places, the information is always presented in a pedagogic, evolutionary and highly readable manner. There are occasional problems with Siderits’ approach of isolating Buddhism as philosophy from Buddhism as religion, particularly in his chapter on ethics, which cannot avoid being somewhat unbalanced, and possibly misrepresentational, as it skirts around the major role that the doctrines of karma and rebirth play in Buddhist ethics. Although Siderits’ approach inevitably leaves some gaps, it manages to fill another important gap left by other books on Buddhism aimed either at the lay practitioner or specialist scholar. For those looking for a serious yet concise presentation of Buddhist philosophy, unencumbered with religious baggage, this is a rewarding resource for both personal and classroom study.     

PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW

Plato's rhetorical gesture invoking a 'quarrel' between philosophy and poetry points to a deep problem in our conception of rational discourse, often obscured or displaced in the history of philosophy's relations with imaginative literature, especially with respect to analytic philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century. Recent developments have helped focus attention on the overlap between philosophy and literature, which the contemporary retreat from philosophy's 'narrative turn' does little to undermine. Further work in the philosophy of language, the logic of the imagination, and the relations between dialectic and rhetoric promise to throw light on that ancient problem.     

On the Common Origin of Music and Philosophy: Plato,Nietzsche, and Benjamin

The essay shows the common ground between music and philosophy from the origin of Western philosophy to the crisis of metaphysical thinking, in particular with Nietzsche and Benjamin. At the beginning, the relationship between philosophy and music is marked by the hegemony of the word on the sound. This is the nature of the Platonic idea of music. With Nietzsche and Benjamin this hegemony is denied and a new vision of the relationship becomes possible. The sound is the origin both of language and of music. In thinking about this origin, philosophy shows that “thinking about music” is “thinking in music”, and that this thinking is the origin of philosophy itself.     

Batman in the Classroom: Academic Philosophy and “… and Philosophy”

Though the interaction of philosophy with pop culture has so far mostly taken the form of books for nonphilosophers that use various shows and movies as sources of examples to illustrate “traditional” philosophical issues, this article contends that serious engagement with the informal philosophical discussions expressed in popular entertainments constitutes a kind of “ethnophilosophy” and should be considered an important part of the discipline. Our disciplinary responsibility for maintaining and considering the history of philosophy ought to include even the philosophical conversations that occur outside the academy; however unlike “proper” philosophy this material may be, it nonetheless represents engagement—sometimes substantial engagement—with the same issues that concern those of us who are considered “professional” philosophers, and thus is legitimately of interest to us.     

The Theater of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Metaxu</Emphasis>: Staging the Between

Human life is defined between diverse extremes: birth and death, nothing and infinity. Theater tries to stage something of this between-being and bring it out of its recess in everyday life. What can be called a metaxological philosophy can illuminate this between-condition. “Metaxu” is the Greek word for “between,” while “logos” can mean an accounting, or reasoning, or wording. A metaxological philosophy of the theatre would look on it as staging the between. Can we say that the theatrical stage, as an intermedium of human communication, is a distinctive wording of the between? Can a metaxological philosophy throw light on what is staged on it, in and through it? In light of this philosophy of the metaxu, reflections are offered on essential themes such as: the space of the stage, the intermediation of inter-action, the shaping of plot, the openness of endings, the tragic and the comic, the sacred and the profane.     

Feminist Philosophy,Pragmatism, and the “Turn to Affect”: A Genealogical Critique

Recent years have witnessed a focus on feeling as a topic of reinvigorated scholarly concern, described by theorists in a range of disciplines in terms of a “turn to affect.” Surprisingly little has been said about this most recent shift in critical theorizing by philosophers, including feminist philosophers, despite the fact that affect theorists situate their work within feminist and related, sometimes intersectional, political projects. In this article, I redress the seeming elision of the “turn to affect” in feminist philosophy, and develop a critique of some of the claims made by affect theorists that builds upon concerns regarding the “newness” of affect and emotion in feminist theory, and the risks of erasure this may entail. To support these concerns, I present a brief genealogy of feminist philosophical work on affect and emotion. Identifying a reductive tendency within affect theory to equate affect with bodily immanence, and to preclude cognition, culture, and representation, I argue that contemporary feminist theorists would do well to follow the more holistic models espoused by the canon of feminist work on emotion. Furthermore, I propose that prominent affect theorist Brian Massumi is right to return to pragmatism as a means of redressing philosophical dualisms, such as emotion/cognition and mind/body, but suggest that such a project is better served by John Dewey's philosophy of emotion than by William James's.     

Matters of Demarcation: Philosophy,Biology, and the Evolving Fraternity between Disciplines

The influence that philosophy of science has had on scientific practice is as controversial as it is undeniable, especially in the case of biology. The dynamic between philosophy and biology as disciplines has developed along two different lines that can be characterized as ‘paternal’, on the one hand, and more ‘fraternal’, on the other. The role Popperian principles of demarcation and falsifiability have played in both the systematics community as well as the ongoing evolution–creation debates illustrate these contrasting forms of interdisciplinary engagement, underscoring the influence philosophy of science in shaping our contemporary understanding of biology in the North American context. However, a strict disciplinary distinction between philosophy and science may itself be a false dichotomy that risks hampering future development of the biological sciences. By actively engaging with philosophical considerations as an integral part of their scientific practice, nineteenth‐century biologists offer an interesting counterpoint to current trends of overspecialization and provide a model of scientists who avoided extremes of antagonism with, or subservience to, philosophy.     

Selective appropriation, medical ethics, and health politics: the complementarity of Baker, McCullough, and me

Baker and McCullough (2007) criticize a 1979 article by this author for insufficiently appreciating how physicians have appropriated ideas from moral philosophy. This rejoinder argues that the two articles are complementary. The 1979 article summarized evidence that leading physicians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries appropriated ideas from moral philosophy and related disciplines that reinforced their political goals of self-regulation and dominance of the allocation of resources for health. In retrospect the 1979 article also urged bioethicists to appropriate ideas from other disciplines, including moral philosophy, which would contribute to improving the health of populations.