On the primacy of the brain

It is well established that emotion is a product of complex interactions among the biological subsystems of the organism. The human nervous system must play a fundamental role in organizing and controlling the manifestation of these interactions. Since emotional disturbance is one of the major phenomena underlying maladaptive behavior, a solid understanding of its nature and mechanisms is essential for enhancing therapeutic practices. Although an increasing number of scholars now advocate the notion of the dependence of emotion on antecedent cognitive processes (e.g., Lazarus, 1982, 1984), and the relevance of both central and peripheral processes of the nervous system to emotional behavior (e.g., Panksepp, 1988; Pribram, 1984), Zajonc (1984) views emotion as independent of cognitive processes. This paper provides a critical evaluation of the basis of Zajonc’s (1984) argument from a neurobiological and psychotherapeutic point of view.     

On the primacy of the brain

It is well established that emotion is a product of complex interactions among the biological subsystems of the organism. The human nervous system must play a fundamental role in organizing and controlling the manifestation of these interactions. Since emotional disturbance is one of the major phenomena underlying maladaptive behavior, a solid understanding of its nature and mechanisms is essential for enhancing therapeutic practices. Although an increasing number of scholars now advocate the notion of the dependence of emotion on antecedent cognitive processes (e.g., Lazarus, 1982, 1984), and the relevance of both central and peripheral processes of the nervous system to emotional behavior (e.g., Panksepp, 1988; Pribram, 1984), Zajonc (1984) views emotion as independent of cognitive processes. This paper provides a critical evaluation of the basis of Zajonc’s (1984) argument from a neurobiological and psychotherapeutic point of view.     

On the naturalising of phenomenology

In the attempt to construct a scientific approach to consciousness, it has been proposed that transcendental phenomenology or phenomenological psychology be introduced into the framework of cognitive neuroscience. In this article, the consequences of such an approach in terms of basic assumptions, methods for the collection of data, and evaluation of the collected data are discussed. Especially, the proposed notions of mutual constraint and the second perso are discussed. It is concluded that even though naturalising of phenomenology might not prove impossible, the projec has not yet found a coherent basic ground.     

On the limits of sexual ethics: The phenomenology of autassassinophilia

Contemporary liberal discourse advocates tolerance of a diversity of sexual orientations and behaviors, provided that the principle of informed consent can be shown to have been respected. Borrowing an extreme test case used by the sexologist John Money—the reciprocally chosen lust murder pact—this theoretical article examines the limits of liberal ideology for sexual ethics. Using as its illustrative material the case of Sharon Lopatka, a Maryland woman who instigated her own sexual murder in 1996, it demonstrates that the phenomenon of being murdered for pleasure problematizes commonplace assumptions about the legitimacy to consent. The discussion recalls and refreshes existing debates in feminism and the politics of sadomasochism and reads them alongside the rhetoric surrounding the ethics of medically assisted suicide. Consenting to murder for pleasure is revealed as a formulation that exceeds the terms of informed consent as it is currently understood and thereby constitutes an ethical and logical aporia. In a final section, the phenomenology of consensual murder is explored via a reading of the dynamics of sexual activity and passivity in philosophical accounts by Jean-Paul Sartre and Martha Nussbaum, and a fictional text by Muriel Spark.     

Longing for tomorrow: phenomenology,cognitive psychology,and the methodological bases of exploring time experience in depression

The subjective experience of time in depression has been described to be altered in complex ways, with sensations of particular slowness, delay or stillness being the most often named articulations. However, the attempts to provide empirical evidence to the phenomenon of “time slowing down in depression” have resulted in inconsistent findings. In consequence, the overall claim that depressive time somehow differs from ordinary time has often been discarded as unfounded. The article argues against such conclusion, contending that the described ambiguity might be caused by the methods employed to assess the phenomenon under observation. In the first part of the article, a reconceptualization of the experience of time in depression is proposed on the grounds of classic and contemporary phenomenological psychiatry. This leads to identify the essential features of depressive time as described both in clinical and philosophical contexts. In the second part, a critique of the existing methods of time perception assessment is conducted, with a specific focus on duration estimation and time passage perception tasks. The above-mentioned core features serve as guidelines in discussing to what degree such methods fit the phenomenon at stake. Finally, an alternative and innovative method is put forward, that might not only help to explore the scope of existing methods but might itself present an alternative to such: the micro-phenomenological interview.     

The primacy of cognition in schizophrenia

Cognitive tasks and concepts are used increasingly in schizophrenia science and treatment. Recent meta-analyses show that across a spectrum of research domains only cognitive measures distinguish a majority of schizophrenia patients from healthy people. Average effect sizes derived from common clinical tests of attention, memory, language, and reasoning are twice as large as those obtained in structural magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography studies. Chronic stress, genes, brain disturbances, task structure, gender, and sociocultural background may all enhance the sensitivity of cognitive performance to schizophrenia. At the same time, disease heterogeneity and the presence of endophenotypes and subtypes within the patient population may place upper limits on the strength of any specific cognitive finding. Schizophrenia is a complex biobehavioral disorder that manifests itself primarily in cognition.     

Racism: On the phenomenology of embodied desocialization

This paper addresses racism from a phenomenological viewpoint. Its main task is, ultimately, to show that racism as a process of “negative socialization” does not amount to a contingent deficiency that simply disappears under the conditions of a fully integrated society. In other words, I suspect that racism does not only indicate a lack of integration, solidarity, responsibility, recognition, etc.; rather, that it is, in its extraordinary negativity, a socially constitutive phenomenon per se. After suggesting phenomenology’s potential to tackle the question of racism, I will focus on the experiential oppressiveness of racism, i.e., the ways in which it affects its victims’ lived experiences, in transforming their habitual ways of life and, finally, their subjectivities. My major thesis is that racism works via both inter-kinaesthetically as well as symbolically inflicted distortions of the victim’s body schema. As such a process of “negative socialization,” racism, however, influences the embodied self-conception of the oppressor, who finds himself compelled to adhere to some kind of invisible norm such as, e.g., “whiteness.”     

The Cartesianism of phenomenology

Continental Philosophy Review -     

The phenomenology of virtue

What is it like to be a good person? I examine and reject suggestions that this will involve having thoughts which have virtue or being a good person as part of their content, as well as suggestions that it might be the presence of feelings distinct from the virtuous person’s thoughts. Is there, then, anything after all to the phenomenology of virtue? I suggest that an answer is to be found in looking to Aristotle’s suggestion that virtuous activity is pleasant to the virtuous person. I try to do this, using the work of the contemporary social psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and his work on the ‘flow experience’. Crucial here is the point that I consider accounts of virtue which take it to have the structure of a practical expertise or skill. It is when we are most engaged in skilful complex activity that the activity is experienced as ‘unimpeded’, in Aristotle’s terms, or as ‘flow’. This experience does not, as might at first appear, preclude thoughtful involvement and reflection. Although we can say what in general the phenomenology of virtue is like, each of us only has some more or less dim idea of it from the extent to which we are virtuous—that is, for most of us, not very much.     

The phenomenology of negation

Negation is a fundamental component of communication (no-answers), cognition (logical negation), perception (different color), attitude (dislike), emotion (hatred), and volition (disagreement). Its many uses make it difficult to provide an integrated definition of the concept. The aim of this paper is to show that an integrated definition of the concept can be arrived at by means of a phenomenological method structuring it into three general essences labelled lack, otherness and obstruction.

The phenomenology of being a target of prejudice.

The effects of preceived prejudice upon affect and self-evaluation were explored by experimentally investigating the reactions of Jews to failure in an interpersonal situation. Subjects attributing their failure to religious discrimination by gentiles reported feeling more aggression, sadness, anxiety, and egotism on the Mood Adjective Check List than those who could not invoke anti-Semitism as an explanation for their failure. Moreover, they indicated less "social affection," particularly when one of the prejudiced opponents constituted the audience for their self-presentation. Finally, in response in perceived prejudice, subjects also evaluated themselves more favorably on positive traits underlying the Jewish stereotype. These findings were explained in terms of a stress interpretation.