Sick? Or slow? On the origins of intelligence as a psychological object

This paper examines the first moments of the emergence of “psychometrics” as a discipline, using a history of the Binet–Simon test (precursor to the Stanford–Binet) to engage the question of how intelligence became a “psychological object.” To begin to answer this, we used a previously-unexamined set of French texts to highlight the negotiations and collaborations that led Alfred Binet (1857–1911) to identify “mental testing” as a research area worth pursuing. This included a long-standing rivalry with Désiré-Magloire Bourneville (1840–1909), who argued for decades that psychiatrists ought to be the professional arbiters of which children would be removed from the standard curriculum and referred to special education classes in asylums. In contrast, Binet sought to keep children in schools and conceived of a way for psychologists to do this. Supported by the Société libre de l'étude psychologique de l'enfant [Free society for the psychological study of the child], and by a number of collaborators and friends, he thus undertook to create a “metric” scale of intelligence—and the associated testing apparatus—to legitimize the role of psychologists in a to-that-point psychiatric domain: identifying and treating “the abnormal”. The result was a change in the earlier law requiring all healthy French children to attend school, between the ages of 6 and 13, to recognize instead that otherwise normal children sometimes need special help: they are “slow” (arriéré), but not “sick.” This conceptualization of intelligence was then carried forward, through the test's influence on Lewis Terman (1877–1956) and Lightner Witmer (1867–1956), to shape virtually all subsequent thinking about intelligence testing and its role in society.     

On the irreducibility of the will

This paper criticizes the thesis that intending to do something is reducible to some combination of beliefs and desires. Against Audi's recent formulation of such a view I offer as counterexample a case wherein an agent who wants and expects to V has not yet decided whether to V and hence does not yet intend to. I try to show that whereas belief that one will V is not necessary for intending to V, as illustrated in cases of desperate attempts to V, one cannot intend to V without preferring to V (rather than not V) and thus one cannot intend to V without, in some sense, wanting to V (at least wanting it in preference to not V-ing). The connection of one's intentions with one's objectives, attempts, plans, and hopes is briefly treated, and some influential work by Davidson is criticized.     

牟宗三先生以"自律道德"的理论诠释儒学之蠡测

Mou Zongsan uses the highest moral principle “autonomy” to interpret Confucius’ benevolence and Mencius’ “inherent benevolence and righteousness”, focuses on the self-rule of the will. It does not do any harm to Mencius’ learning, on the contrary, it is conducive to the communication between Chinese and Western philosophies. If we stick to Kant’s moral self autonomy and apply it to interpreting Zhu Xi’s moral theory, similarly we will discover the implications of Zhu Xi’s “autonomy” in his moral learning. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Mou Zongsan to say that Zhu Xi’s ethics belongs to the autonomous one. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2005, (6): 33–39     

Conservatives and Racists: Inferential Role Semantics and Pejoratives

According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for any given expression to possess a particular meaning one must be disposed to make or, alternatively, acknowledge as correct certain inferential transitions involving it. As Williamson points out, pejoratives such as ‘Boche’ seem to provide a counter-example to IRS. Many speakers are neither disposed to use such expressions nor consider it proper to do so. But it does not follow, as IRS appears to entail, that such speakers do not understand pejoratives or that they lack meaning. In this paper, I examine recent responses to this problem by Boghossian and Brandom and argue that their proposed construal of the kind of inferential rules governing a pejorative such as ‘Boche’ is to be ruled out on the grounds that it is non-conservative. I defend the appeal to conservatism in this instance against criticism and, in doing so, propose an alternative approach to pejoratives on behalf of IRS that resolves the problem Williamson poses.

On unpredictability as a causal factor in “learned helplessness”

In two replications, two groups of dogs were exposed to a series of uncontrollable, electric shocks. For one group the shocks were preceded by a tone (i.e., Paired). For the other group the shocks were randomly related to the tones and hence unpredictable (i.e., Random). Each replication also included a third group; in the first it was exposed only to the series of tones (CS-only), while in the second, it was exposed only to a series of shocks (Shocks-only). Then, all dogs were required to learn a discriminative choice escape/avoidance task in which the required response was to lift the correct paw in the presence of each of two visual S^Ds to escape or avoid the shocks [($\text{S}{}_1{}^{\mathrm{D}}\text{?R}{}_1\text{)}\text{(S}{}_2{}^{\mathrm{D}}\text{?R}{}_2$)]. Dogs preexposed to random tones and shocks were least successful in learning the task relative to those groups which experienced either predicted shocks, only the tones, or only the shocks, which in turn did not differ from each other. These results permitted the inference that the proactive interference with choice behavior following random tone CSs and shocks was attributable to a learned irrelevance generalized with respect to CSs.     

Mediation analysis of the association between use of NRT for smoking reduction and attempts to stop smoking

Objectives: Use of nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) for smoking reduction (SR) is linked to higher quit attempt rates than SR without NRT. This study aimed to assess the possible mediating roles of confidence in ability to quit, enjoyment of smoking and motivation to quit in this association.

Design: Cross-sectional survey.

Main outcome measures: Smokers were asked if they were currently attempting SR, and if they were, whether they were using NRT. Motivation to stop, enjoyment of smoking, confidence in ability to stop, and previous quit attempts, were also assessed.

Results: There was no evidence that confidence in ability to quit or enjoyment of smoking mediated the association between the use of NRT for SR and attempts to quit. Only motivation to stop partially mediated between the use of NRT for SR and attempts to stop (indirect effect: odds ratio 1.08, p?<?0.001).

Conclusion: Although this study is limited by its cross-sectional design, the findings point towards the possibility that the use of NRT to aid SR may promote attempts to stop through increasing motivation to quit but not by increasing confidence or by reducing enjoyment of smoking. Longitudinal studies are required to draw firmer conclusions about the possible mediating effects of motivation to quit.     

‘At home in the uncanny’: Freud's account of das Unheimliche in the context of his theory of religious belief

This paper serves as an exploration of Freud's comment that one of the functions of religious belief is to make humanity feel ‘at home in the uncanny’ (heimisch im Unheimlichen). The first section examines the context of Freud's comment within The Future of an Illusion. Attention is then shifted to Freud's essay on ‘The “Uncanny”’, and to his conclusion that the ‘uncanny’ is the name for everything that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light. A number of interpretations of the ‘at home’ remark are discussed, and it is suggested that religion might fruitfully be viewed as an attempt to come to terms with humanity's ‘transcendental homelessness’.     

Noticing and responding in a discrimination based on a distinguishing element

In learning a successive go/no-go discrimination between a positive display consisting of the elements A and B, and negative display consisting of A-alone, pigeons first trained to peck A shift to pecking the distinguishing B element. In order to learn whether or not the shift to B is facilitated by B's function as a signal of the reinforcer, apart from the direct reinforcement of B responses, six arrangements of the elements with respect to the food reinforcer were used. Discrete trials were terminated by a single peck or after 4 sec. The A and B elements were dots of different color. The most critical comparison was between two groups, both of which received no reinforcement for a response directed to B. In one case, B signaled the reinforcer: An A response was reinforced when B was present but not when A appeared alone. In the other, B signaled the absence of a reinforcer: An A response was nonreinforced when B was present, while the response to A-alone was reinforced. During training and in extinction many more reponses were made to B when it signaled the reinforcer than when it signaled its absence. It is concluded that in a discrimination between AB positive and A negative the shift from pecking A to pecking B is facilitated by B's role as a signal for the reinforcer even on trials in which the peck is not made to B. Results from certain other groups showed that, unless pecks shifted to B within the positive display, pecks to A continued on the negative, A-alone trials as well as on the positive AB trials.     

Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality

The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.

Development and initial validity of the Exercise-Related Cognitive Errors Questionnaire

ObjectiveCognitive errors (CEs) reflect individuals' biased evaluations of context-relevant information. In the exercise domain, a valid form of exercise CE assessment is needed. The Exercise-related Cognitive Errors Questionnaire (E-CEQ) was developed to determine to what extent adults make cognitive errors regarding exercise decisions. The purpose of this study was to develop and provide initial validity evidence for the E-CEQ.DesignThe current study used an online self-report survey.MethodFirst, 24 initial vignettes representing 6 CEs were created and content validated. Second, data from 364 adults (M_age = 29.1, SD_age = 11.6; 81.3% female) was gathered to examine the E-CEQ's factor structure. Finally, data from the 364 participants was used to examine aspects of criterion-related validity.ResultsA 16-item, three-factor model was retained as the final E-CEQ factor structure and had good psychometric properties (χ² = 164.35, df = 75, p < .001; RMSEA = .057; CFI = .947; TLI = .915). Evidence of the questionnaire's predictive utility is provided. For example, exercise CEs were negatively related to exercise and accounted for 4.9% of additional variance beyond the contribution of past exercise in predicting exercise intention.ConclusionsThe steps taken to examine different forms of validity helped provide a platform from which to continue (a) to study biases linked to cognitive errors and (b) the E-CEQ validation process through ongoing investigation.     

Triangulation,Untranslatability, and Reconciliation

Donald Davidson used triangulation to do everything from explicate psychological and semantic externalism, to attack relativism and skepticism, to propose conditions necessary for thought and talk. At one point Davidson tried to bring order to these remarks by identifying three kinds of triangulation, each operative in a different situation. Here I take seriously Davidson’s talk of triangular situations and extend it. I start by describing Davidson’s situations. Next I establish the surprising result that considerations from one situation entail the possibility that at any one time one language is partially untranslatable into another. Because the possibility is time-indexed, it need not conflict with Davidson’s own argument against the possibility of untranslatability. I derive the result, not to indict Davidson, but to propose a new kind of triangulation, the reconciliation of untranslatability, which I investigate. Insofar as triangulation is central to Davidson’s views, getting a handle on his various triangular situations is key to getting a handle on his contributions to philosophy. Insofar as those contributions have enriched our understanding of how language, thought, and reality interrelate, extending Davidson’s model promises to extend our understanding too.

Mental imagery increases self-determined motivation to exercise with university enrolled women: A randomized controlled trial using a peer-based intervention

ObjectivesThe purpose of this study was to examine the effects of a peer-based mental imagery intervention on the self-determined motivation and cardio-respiratory fitness of university enrolled women.DesignRandomized controlled trial.Method43 University enrolled women were randomized to peer-mentored or peer-mentored plus mental imagery conditions while 32 completed three meetings with peer-mentors and post-testing (M^age = 19.91; SD = 1.70).ResultsSignificant improvements in cardio-respiratory endurance, ratings of perceived endurance, and self-determined motivation to exercise were observed across both study conditions. Participants assigned to the peer mentored plus mental imagery condition reported significantly greater increases in self-determined motivation to exercise at post-test compared to those in the peer-mentored condition.ConclusionsPeer-based interventions are a viable way to improve fitness and health outcomes while mental imagery appears to be associated with increases in autonomous forms of exercise motivation.     

The (near) necessity of alternate possibilities for moral responsibility

Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.

Why modal fictionalism is not self-defeating

Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of a plurality of worlds. In this paper, I develop a new strategy for the fictionalist to pursue in response to the Brock–Rosen objection. I begin by arguing that modal fictionalism is best understood as a paraphrase strategy that concerns the propositions that are expressed, in a given context, by modal sentences. I go on to argue that what is interesting about paraphrastic fictionalism is that it allows the fictionalist to accept that the sentence ‘there is a plurality of worlds’ is true without thereby committing her to the existence of a plurality of worlds. I then argue that the paraphrastic fictionalist can appeal to a form of semantic contextualism in order to communicate her status as an anti-realist. Finally, I generalise my conception of fictionalism and argue that Daniel Nolan and John O’Leary-Hawthorne [1996 Reflexive fictionalisms. Analysis, 56, 26–32] are wrong to suggest that the Brock-Rosen objection reveals a structural flaw with all species of fictionalism.

Quitting smoking: The importance of non-smoker identity in predicting smoking behaviour and responses to a smoking ban

Objective: We examined how ‘smoker’ and ‘non-smoker’ self- and group-identities and socio-economic status (SES) may predict smoking behaviour and responses to antismoking measures (i.e. the Dutch smoking ban in hospitality venues). We validated a measure of responses to the smoking ban.

Design: Longitudinal online survey study with one-year follow-up (N = 623 at T1 in 2011; N = 188 at T2 in 2012) among daily smokers.

Main outcome measures: Intention to quit, quit attempts and ‘rejecting’, ‘victimizing’, ‘socially conscious smoking’ and ‘active quitting’ responses to the smoking ban.

Results: Non-smoker identities are more important than smoker identities in predicting intention to quit, quit attempts and responses to the smoking ban, even when controlling for other important predictors such as nicotine dependence. Smokers with stronger non-smoker identities had stronger intentions to quit, were more likely to attempt to quit between measurements, and showed less negative and more positive responses to the smoking ban. The association between non-smoker self-identity and intention to quit was stronger among smokers with lower than higher SES.

Conclusion: Antismoking measures might be more effective if they would focus also on the identity of smokers, and help smokers to increase identification with non-smoking and non-smokers.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">My Way</Emphasis> and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward,Smilansky, and Perry

I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned (even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own account.

The conjunction fallacy: a misunderstanding about conjunction?

It is easy to construct pairs of sentences X, Y that lead many people to ascribe higher probability to the conjunction X-and-Y than to the conjuncts X, Y. Whether an error is thereby committed depends on reasoners’ interpretation of the expressions “probability” and “and.” We report two experiments designed to clarify the normative status of typical responses to conjunction problems.     

Outcome predictors in the behavioral treatment of stuttering

The MMPI and subscales of the Stuttering Severity scale were utilized to predict motivation and success in the behavioral treatment of 32 stutterers. Subjects spent a mean of 10 individual sessions in criterion-oriented learning of fluent speech based on speech-muscle relaxation aided by EMG visual biofeedback. Judged motivation and judged success were strongly related to each other and significantly related to MMPI K and Es scores and negatively to F and Sc. Actual success was negatively related to Sc and Pd, completely unrelated to Es, and (if anything) negatively related to K. Results are consistent with previous studies, and show that global judgements of progress were only minimally related to a measure of actual progress.     

Correct Responses and the Priority of the Normative

The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, trying, or intending to have that response. In support of this, it is pointed out that awareness of pragmatic or strategic considerations, unlike awareness of reasons of the ‘right kind’, are never sufficient by themselves to produce the responses for which they are reasons. I argue that this phenomenon cannot be used as a criterion for distinguishing reasons-for-a-response from reasons-for-wanting-to-have-a-response. I subsequently investigate the possibility of basing this distinction on a claim that the responses in question (e.g. admiration or desire) are themselves inherently normative; I conclude that this approach is also unsuccessful. Hence, the ‘direct response’ phenomenon cannot be used to rule out the possibility of pragmatic or strategic reasons for responses; and the rejection of such reasons therefore cannot be used to circumvent the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.