The CEO Selection Decision Process: Bounded Rationality and Decision Component Ordering

This paper presents a model of the basic components of the CEO selection decision process used by corporate boards of directors. It describes selection as a purposeful and boundedly rational process characterized by three key components: aspiration, judgment and justification. Each of these components is described in detail. In addition, the ordering of these elements is examined. Specifically, it is suggested that the exact ordering varies depending on a number of factors. Among the most important are (1) the performance of the organization, (2) the availability of qualified candidates and (3) the standardization of the CEO's office within the organization at the time of the succession decision. Examples are provided to help illustrate various order effects. Following this, sample research propositions are presented to assist researchers in future studies devoted to this topic.     

基于信号检测论的新业务投资决策有限理性实验

采用情境模拟实验,以60名MBA/EMBA学员为被试,对新业务投资决策的4个主要因素、36个处理、12个信号检测单元进行了观察分析.研究发现:①辨别力最强的决策信息组合、判断标准最高的决策信息组合,以及辨别力和判断标准 "双低"的决策信息组合;②影响决策者的有限理性存在程度差别,强弱依次是投资情境、面对机会、投资模式和以往机会.     

信息模糊：消费决策领域中的有限理性

信息模糊（obfuscation）是行为经济学研究的重要领域,主要解释了在商品买卖过程中,销售商通过把商品信息复杂化等手段,让人们的消费过程变得更加复杂和困难,从而使消费者在购买商品时面对信息模糊做出种种不明智的选择的现象问题。本文从以往的研究成果出发,就信息模糊、有限理性和销售者的决策行为的关系进行了探讨,以期为信息模糊的跨学科研究提供可借鉴的思路和方法。     

罗尔斯的公共理性理论及其与正义理论的关系

公共理性是罗尔斯在完善其正义理论的过程中提出的重要理念,但它并不是一个前后一致的理论,它只是在本初意图上是罗尔斯正义理论的组成部分,后来逐渐演变成具有相对独立性的理论形态。罗尔斯之所以将公共理性理论脱离原有的正义理论,在于其正义理论的失败。     

Game Theory and Rational Decision

In its classical conception, game theory aspires to be a determinate decision theory for games, understood as elements of a structurally specified domain. Its aim is to determine for each game in the domain a complete solution to each player's decision problem, a solution valid for all real-world instantiations, regardless of context. “Permissiveness” would constrain the theory to designate as admissible for a player any conjecture consistent with the function's designation of admissible strategies for the other players. Given permissiveness and other appropriate constraints, solution sets must contain only Nash equilibria and at least one pure-strategy equilibrium, and there is no solution to games in which no symmetry invariant set of pure-strategy equilibria forms a Cartesian product. These results imply that the classical program is unrealizable. Moreover, the program is implicitly committed to permissiveness, through its common-knowledge assumptions and its commitment to equilibrium. The resulting incoherence deeply undermines the classical conception in a way that consolidates a long series of contextualist criticisms. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

"Leaky" Rationality: How Research on Behavioral Decision Making Challenges Normative Standards of Rationality

ABSTRACT— For more than 30 years, decision-making research has documented that people often violate various principles of rationality, some of which are so fundamental that theorists of rationality rarely bother to state them. We take these characteristics of decision making as a given but argue that it is problematic to conclude that they typically represent departures from rationality. The very psychological processes that lead to "irrational" decisions (e.g., framing, mental accounting) continue to exert their influence when one experiences the results of the decisions. That is, psychological processes that affect decisions may be said also to "leak" into one's experience. The implication is that formal principles of rationality do not provide a good enough normative standard against which to assess decision making. Instead, what is needed is a substantive theory of rationality—one that takes subjective experience seriously, considers both direct and indirect consequences of particular decisions, considers how particular decisions fit into life as a whole, and considers the effects of decisions on others. Formal principles may play a role as approximations of the substantive theory that can be used by theorists and decision makers in cases in which the formal principles can capture most of the relevant considerations and leakage into experience is negligible.     

The Newtonian Limit of Relativity Theory and the Rationality of Theory Change

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the question of whether Newtonian mechanics can be derived from relativity theory. Physicists agree that classical mechanics constitutes a limiting case of relativity theory. By contrast, philosophers of science like Kuhn and Feyerabend affirm that classical mechanics cannot be deduced from relativity theory because of the incommensurability between both theories; thus what we obtain when we take the limit c in relativistic mechanics cannot be Newtonian mechanics sensu stricto. In this paper I focus on the alleged change of reference of the term mass in the transition from one theory to the other. Contradicting Kuhn and Feyerabend, special relativity theory supports the view that the mass of an object is a characteristic property of the object, that it has the same value in whatever frame of reference it is measured, and that it does not depend on whether the object is in motion or at rest. Thus mass preserves the reference through the change of theory, and the existence of a Newtonian limit of relativity theory provides a good example of the rationality of theory change in mathematical physics.     

Standard Decision Theory Corrected

Where there are infinitely many possible basic states of the world, a standard probability function must assign zero probability to each state – since any finite probability would sum to over one. This generates problems for any decision theory that appeals to expected utility or related notions. For it leads to the view that a situation in which one wins a million dollars if any of a thousand of the equally probable states is realized has an expected value of zero (since each such state has probability zero). But such a situation dominates the situation in which one wins nothing no matter what (which also has an expected value of zero), and so surely is more desirable. I formulate and defend some principles for evaluating options where standard probability functions cannot strictly represent probability – and in particular for where there is an infinitely spread, uniform distribution of probability. The principles appeal to standard probability functions, but overcome at least some of their limitations in such cases.     

Causal Decision Theory and EPR correlations

The paper argues that on three out of eight possible hypotheses about the EPR experiment we can construct novel and realistic decision problems on which (a) Causal Decision Theory and Evidential Decision Theory conflict (b) Causal Decision Theory and the EPR statistics conflict. We infer that anyone who fully accepts any of these three hypotheses has strong reasons to reject Causal Decision Theory. Finally, we extend the original construction to show that anyone who gives any of the three hypotheses any non-zero credence has strong reasons to reject Causal Decision Theory. However, we concede that no version of the Many Worlds Interpretation (Vaidman, in Zalta, E.N. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 2014) gives rise to the conflicts that we point out.     

The Relevance of Decision Theory to Ethical Theory

Morality for the purposes of this paper consists of sets of rules or principles intended for the general regulation of conduct for all. Intuitionist accounts of morality are rejected as making reasoned analysis of morals impossible. In many interactions, there is partial conflict and partial cooperation. From the general social point of view, the rational thing to propose is that we steer clear of conflict and promote cooperation. This is what it is rational to propose to reinforce, and to assist in reinforcing in society; it is not necessarily what it is individually rational to do. Even so, given the general situation, the rationality of its reinforcement will typically support the rationality of individual action as well. Game theory makes it possible to clarify these interactions, and these proposals for social solutions.     

A Peircean Theory of Decision

It is sometimes argued that the fact that possession of perfect knowledge about the future is impossible, means that it is impossible for decisions to be rational. This reasoning is fallacious. If rationality is given a new interpretation, then decisions can be considered rational. A theory of decision that has as its basis Peirce’s theory of abduction can provide a new way of understanding decisions as rational processes. The Peircean theory of decision (i) considers decisions as part of a complete strategy, and (ii) shows that decision making is governed by the same rules as scientific abduction. These rules are neither permissive rules like rules of deductive inference nor predictive like laws of nature, but rather genuine laws of conduct that determine what step should be made, if a given end is to be reached. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory

This paper argues against evidential decision-theory, by showing that the newest responses to its biggest current problem – the medical Newcomb problems – don’t work. The latest approach is described, and the arguments of two main proponents of it – Huw Price and CR Hitchcock – clearly distinguished and examined. It is argued that since neither new defence is successful, causation remains essential to understanding means-end agency.     

Odd Choices: On the Rationality of Some Alleged Anomalies of Decision and Inference

This paper presents a number of apparent anomalies in rational choice scenarios, and their translation into the logic of everyday reasoning. Three classes of examples that have been discussed in the context of probabilistic choice since the 1960s (by Debreu, Tversky and others) are analyzed in a non-probabilistic setting. It is shown how they can at the same time be regarded as logical problems that concern the drawing of defeasible inferences from a given information base. I argue that initial appearances notwithstanding, these cases should not be classed as instances of irrationality in choice or reasoning. One way of explaining away their apparent oddity is to view certain aspects of these examples as making particular options salient. The decision problems in point can then be solved by ‘picking’ these options, although they could not have been ‘chosen’ in a principled way, due to ties or incomparabilities with alternative options.     

Decision Theory and the Sale of Alcohol1

Two studies examined the role of representativeness in determining the legal age of customers seeking to purchase alcohol. In Study 1, subjects were presented with a series of common grocery products along with an alcoholic beverage and a shopper. Results indicated that products which cued an older consumer produced higher age estimates of the shopper and decreased the likelihood that they would be asked to provide proof of legal age. Study 2 extended these findings in two important ways: (a) The target was presented as either a college student or parent and (b) individual differences in self-consciousness were related to susceptibility to manipulations of representativeness. Results indicated that the parent/student manipulation affected both the decision to request identification and age estimates of the target. Age estimations were positively related to individual differences in public self-consciousness, whereas the decision to request identification depended upon individual levels of social anxiety and private self-consciousness. Implications of these data for restricting access to alcohol among minors are considered.     

Decision Making in Vocational Theory: Evolution and Implications

This article examines the evolution of decision making from a position of minor significance to one of primary importance in vocational theory.