Liminal Space,Sexuality, and the Language of #MeToo

#MeToo has advanced the way that we think and speak of sexual abuses of power by creating a powerful social platform in which victims can function as a group, symbolizing what as psychoanalysts we consider unthinkable, while also striking at the inherent paradox that sexuality poses – how to account for the vagaries of human sexuality and its transgressive nature while holding individual and collective abuses of power accountable? My essay addresses such questions by focusing on the way that language fails to hold and symbolize sexuality due to its affective excess and its driven and enigmatic qualities, and advances the idea that the sexual is metabolized in action with an other and not through words and language. Further, that the boundary between what is permissible and what is not is negotiated on both conscious and unconscious levels of knowing, which I refer to as the liminal area of sexuality. I develop these ideas within a post-Lacanian framework and suggest that psychoanalysis must interface with other disciplines in order to bring depth to our consideration of sexuality at its most transgressive as well as to help stretch the symbolic function of language.     

Imprinted genes, cognition and behaviour

The idea that genes can influence behavioural predispositions and their underlying psychological determinants is becoming increasingly tractable. In this article, recent findings are reviewed on a special type of inheritance, related to the transmission of traits via what have been termed 'imprinted' genes. In imprinted genes one allele is silenced according to its parental origin. This results in the inheritance of traits down the maternal or paternal line, in contrast to the more frequent mode of inheritance that is indifferent to the parental origin of the allele. Drawing on the advances made possible by combining the approaches of cognitive neuropsychology, behavioural neuroscience and contemporary molecular genetics, the detailed evidence for imprinted effects on behavioural and cognitive phenotypes is considered, focusing on findings from mental disorders, Turner's syndrome and experimental work in animal models. As prevailing evolutionary theories stress an essential antagonistic role of imprinted effects, these data might link such apparently diverse issues as neurodevelopment and the vulnerability to mental disease with the 'battle of the sexes', as joined at the level of cognitive and behavioural functioning.     

Anorexia nervosa and oversized experiences

In this paper, I discuss what I call the oversized experiences that anorexic patients suffer from. It has been known for some time that anorexic patients mentally picture their bodies as larger than reality. While this constitutes one kind of oversized experience, I claim there is another, less explored kind. This is an experience of the body as oversized in relation to the affordances of its environment. I discuss recent evidence suggesting anorexic patients exhibit distorted affordance perception. I then discuss how this distorted affordance perception also constitutes an oversized experience of the body. Along with sociocultural influences, I claim oversized experiences ground negative propositional attitudes regarding body size.     

Masculinities, Femininities, Behaviour and Health

Using the notion that gender is performed in daily life and through daily activities, I review some of the health behaviour literature which employs ideas about masculinity and femininity. I argue that recent theorising about both masculinities ( Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005 ) and femininities ( Schippers, 2007 ) can be extremely useful in this field. I consider two specific health behaviours in light of this theorising, namely healthy eating and drinking alcohol, and explore how and which versions of masculinities and femininities are played out, which are problematic, and what they mean for gender hegemony. I argue that across both areas (and across other health behaviours), there are three specific issues that are important and require further conceptual development and empirical work: (1) the relationality of gender; (2) masculinities and femininities as embodied; and (3) the local, contingent and intersectional nature of masculinities and femininities. This conceptual framework and the aspects of relationality, embodiment and intersectionality have important implications not only for understanding health behaviours, but for any social psychological work theorising identities and everyday social practice.     

Working with Norms in Social Work Practice: Introjection,Discipline, and Self-Determination

Since its beginnings, social work has emphasized the ways in which environmental factors and internal dynamics influence individuals. I propose that practitioners continue and strengthen this emphasis by exploring the role that norms play in conflicts and choices. Contemporary and longstanding concepts from sociology and psychoanalysis concerning norms can help us explore what we can change in ourselves, what norms might be outside our capacity to influence, and what change can be undertaken through advocacy or another method. In considering norms, I discuss the introjection process, research in sociology, and the role that discipline and self-determination (including external and internal freedom) play in our choices.     

Wittgenstein and Internal Relations

Abstract: Interpretations of the Tractatus divide into what might be called a metaphysical and an anti‐metaphysical approach to the work. The central issue between the two interpretative approaches has generally been characterised in terms of the question whether the Tractatus is committed to the idea of ‘things’ that cannot be said in language, and thus to the idea of a distinctive kind of nonsense: nonsense that is an attempt to say what can only be shown. In this paper, I look at this dispute from a different perspective, by focusing on the treatment of the concept of internal relations. By reference to the work of Peter Hacker, Hidé Ishiguro and Cora Diamond, I show how this concept is understood quite differently in each of the two interpretative traditions. I focus particularly on how Wittgenstein's idea of the ‘internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world’ (Tractatus 4.014) might be understood within the two interpretative approaches. I offer some reasons in support of the anti‐metaphysical treatment of the concept.     

From Knowing to Discovering: Some Suggestions for Work with Anorexic Patients

ABSTRACT

In this article I offer some technical suggestions for psychoanalytic work with anorexic patients. Although focused on an outpatient setting, certain parts of the article will also have utility for inpatient work. As an outpatient therapist working with an anorexic patient, especially in the acute stages of the illness, there are case management demands that need immediate attention. The setting up the particular frame is required to augment the therapeutic work. The most urgent pressure felt by the clinician is the precariousness of the patient’s physical health. This can be experienced as if there is a gun to the head of the therapist. This deathly force must be carefully and constantly grappled with, and particularly so in the most symptomatic stages of the illness. The clinician must work with a patient who might die at any time, yet an anorexic patient cannot be managed the way a suicidal patient would be. The question of technique in this situation is a complex one. Above all, the patient must be met where s/he is. Notwithstanding the uniqueness of each patient there are some specific themes that often arise in the acute stage of the illness. Certain technical suggestions are offered.     

Causal discovery and the problem of psychological interventions

Finding causes is a central goal in psychological research. In this paper, I argue based on the interventionist approach to causal discovery that the search for psychological causes faces great obstacles. Psychological interventions are likely to be fat-handed: they change several variables simultaneously, and it is not known to what extent such interventions give leverage for causal inference. Moreover, due to problems of measurement, the degree to which an intervention was fat-handed, or more generally, what the intervention in fact did, is difficult to reliably estimate. A further complication is that the causal findings in psychology are typically made at the population level, and such findings do not allow inferences to individual-level causal relationships. I also discuss the implications of these problems for research, as well as various ways of addressing them, such as focusing more on the discovery of robust but non-causal patterns.     

Ineffability,Signification and the Meaning of Life

Abstract

There is an apparent tension between two familiar platitudes about the meaning of life: (i) that ‘meaning’ in this context means ‘value’, and (ii) that such meaning might be ineffable. I suggest a way of trying to bring these two claims together by focusing on an ideal of a meaningful life that fuses both the axiological and semantic senses of ‘significant’. This in turn allows for the possibility that the full significance of a life might be ineffable not because its axiological significance is ineffable, but because its semantic significance is ineffable in virtue of the signification relation itself being unsignifiable. I then explore to what degree this claim about signification can be adequately defended.     

The multiple realization book

In this review of Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book I look at the positive account, Modest Identity Theory, that Polger and Shapiro advance. In §2 of this review, I outline P&S’s arguments against multiple realization and summarize the view they defend, Modest Identity Theory. In §3, I consider what consequences the adoption of Modest Identity Theory might have on the ontology of psychological or mental kinds. In particular, I highlight the ontological pluralism and anti-reductionism that Polger and Shapiro endorse. Modest Identity Theory tolerates multiple taxonomies of psychological kinds, which represents an important departure from earlier versions of Identity Theory. I conclude in §4 by arguing that the way Modest Identity Theory individuates psychological kinds very closely resembles the way that those kinds are individuated by functionalism. I argue that the causal properties individuative of psychological kinds can be used to group together distinct neuroanatomical characteristics. I illustrate this by describing research into the functional connectivity of the reading network. I conclude by emphasizing the value of using empirical evidence from neuroscience and cognitive science to inform the new pluralistic ontology of psychological and mental kinds with which Modest Identity Theory is compatible.     

Ethics and the sexual countertransference

In this paper I shall suggest that, in addition to 'conscience', the archetype of Eros plays an important part in 'benign relatedness' and that this is what constitutes an ethical attitude. I also propose that the idea of 'benign relatedness' can provide us with a workable concept for those serving on Ethics Committees especially when our Code of Ethics is unclear or limited. I attempt to show that the analytic attitude is essentially ethical and define what I see as the analytic attitude as a way of demonstrating this. By discussing the neurotic sexual countertransference and unconscious identity I hope to clarify the main reasons for unethical enactments. I use examples of ethical problems, including a personal experience, to illustrate the kinds that occur and lastly I discuss how mourning plays an important part in the resolution and avoidance of these problems.     

Skill theory v2.0: dispositions,emulation, and spatial perception

An attempt is made to defend a general approach to the spatial content of perception, an approach according to which perception is imbued with spatial content in virtue of certain kinds of connections between perceiving organism’s sensory input and its behavioral output. The most important aspect of the defense involves clearly distinguishing two kinds of perceptuo-behavioral skills—the formation of dispositions, and a capacity for emulation. The former, the formation of dispositions, is argued to by the central pivot of spatial content. I provide a neural information processing interpretation of what these dispositions amount to, and describe how dispositions, so understood, are an obvious implementation of Gareth Evans’ proposal on the topic. Furthermore, I describe what sorts of contribution are made by emulation mechanisms, and I also describe exactly how the emulation framework differs from similar but distinct notions with which it is often unhelpfully confused, such as sensorimotor contingencies and forward models.     

Estrangement,Nature and ‘the Flesh’

In this paper I address the question of what it is to be alienated from nature. The focus is alienation in the sense of estrangement, a ‘being cut off from’ a wider world. That we are so estranged is a claim associated with ecological critique of contemporary society. But what is it to be estranged from nature given that everything we are, do and produce, always remains within a wider nature? I explore the possibility that this might be understood with reference to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘flesh’. I set the scene for this with some discussion of Honneth’s recent account of reification as a ‘distorted praxis’ and then, drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and especially his later ontology of flesh, develop the idea of estrangement from the natural world as an inadequate participation in a ‘primordial’ perceptual relation. This idea of estrangement brings together various elements of ecological critique. However, I argue that although this idea of estrangement might inform and help to articulate such a critique, it cannot be the sole concern of an environmental political philosophy: other kinds of alienation within the humanised environmental context need to be considered too.     

Metacognition,rumination and road rage: An examination of driver anger progression and expression in Australia

Road rage is a serious issue impacting road safety on Australian roads. This study investigated the psychological antecedents involved in aggressive driver behaviours. Specifically, the study investigated the relationships between metacognitive beliefs, anger rumination, trait driver anger, and driver aggression; and examined the extent of aggressive behaviours in a sample of Australian drivers (N = 246). An inspection of cross-tabulations indicated that nearly all drivers engaged in verbal driver aggression (94%), approximately half of the drivers engaged in vehicle aggression (53%), and approximately a quarter of the drivers engaged in physical aggression (27%). Driver aggression was more commonly reported from males, open licensed, and middle-aged drivers. Structural path analysis indicated that there was a hierarchical series of relationships present, in that metacognitive beliefs influenced cognitive constructs such as anger rumination and constructive expression. Additionally, such factors were shown to more prominently influence trait driver anger, and the degree to which it was expressed. Bivariate correlations also demonstrated that the relationships carried forward to more specific dimensions of anger rumination and driver aggression styles. The findings of this study may assist to identify the origins of psychological mechanisms involved with anger progression and expression and inform potential interventions for aggressive driving behaviours.     

Self‐Control as a Normative Capacity

Recently, two apparent truisms about self‐control have been questioned in both the philosophical and the psychological literature: the idea that exercising self‐control involves an agent doing something, and the idea that self‐control is a good thing. Both assumptions have come under threat because self‐control is increasingly understood as a mental mechanism, and mechanisms cannot possibly be good or active in the required sense. However, I will argue that it is not evident that self‐control should be understood as a mechanism, suggesting that we might also argue the other way around: if we have independent reason to hold onto the idea that self‐control is inherently good and active, the conclusion might be that self‐control cannot be a mechanism. I will show that Aristotle's original analysis of self‐control actually offers grounds for both assumptions: he took there to be conceptual connections between self‐control and goodness/activity. By examining these connections, I argue that an Aristotelian approach could offer promising leads for a contemporary non‐mechanistic understanding of self‐control as a normative capacity.     

Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single,Objective World

Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests (focusing, in particular, on work by John Haugeland), and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of Bernard Williams and Adrian Moore), I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject‐matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like.     

Is Folk Psychology Different?

In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the very notion of such a different kind of explanation. I argue first that the in some sense a priori and conceptual nature of folk psychological principles does not support the idea that these are other than empirical generalisations, by appeal to recent nativist ideas in cognitive science and to Lewis's conception of the meaning of theoretical terms. Second, I argue that there is no coherent sense in which folk psychological explanations can be seen as normative. Thirdly, I examine the putatively holistic character of the mental and conclude that that too fails to provide any cogent reasons for viewing folk psychological explanations as different from other kinds of explanation.     

I Working with dissociative dynamics and the longing for excess in binge eating disorders

In this paper the author describes her work with a woman who, in her mid 20s, sought analysis for her non‐vomiting binge eating disorder. The paper explores how two aspects of Jung's view of the psyche as healthily dissociable were used to think about the potential for change contained within the explosive, aggressive energies in this patient's bingeing. The resultant approach takes the patient's splitting defences, dissociations and self‐destructive behaviour as a point of access to her unconscious. Seen in this way, these behaviours contain the seeds of recovery and are the starting point for analysis rather than defences against it. The paper also brings a number of Jungian and post‐Jungian ideas into conversation with aspects of contemporary thinking about subjectivity, identity and the longing for excess developed by Leo Bersani and Judith Butler.     

Basic desert of reactive emotions

In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.