Role Asymmetry and Code Transmission in Signaling Games: An Experimental and Computational Investigation

In signaling games, a sender has private access to a state of affairs and uses a signal to inform a receiver about that state. If no common association of signals and states is initially available, sender and receiver must coordinate to develop one. How do players divide coordination labor? We show experimentally that, if players switch roles at each communication round, coordination labor is shared. However, in games with fixed roles, coordination labor is divided: Receivers adjust their mappings more frequently, whereas senders maintain the initial code, which is transmitted to receivers and becomes the common code. In a series of computer simulations, player and role asymmetry as observed experimentally were accounted for by a model in which the receiver in the first signaling round has a higher chance of adjusting its code than its partner. From this basic division of labor among players, certain properties of role asymmetry, in particular correlations with game complexity, are seen to follow.     

The development of a simple form of communication

This paper is concerned with situations in which one of two possible stimuli is presented to one subject, the sender, while a second subject is required to make one of two responses. The stimuli are not available to the receiver, but the latter can perceive the sender. Successful performance depends on the sender indicating what stimulus is present to the receiver. It is proposed that the development of this form of communication, initially observed with dolphins, can be understood in the light of recent autoshaping research. An experiment demonstrated that pairs of pigeons can learn to perform appropriately in such a situation and provided evidence supporting an autoshaping analysis.     

Self-disclosure and liking: Effects for senders and receivers1

This experiment tested the social reward potential of self-disclosure and its impact on a receiver's attraction towards the sender. Further, a sender self-perception effect was tested. Just as a receiver is speculated to use the intimacy level of a disclosure as an indication of sender regard and trust, the self-perception hypothesis maintains that the sender also uses intimacy level to self-attribute liking and trust for the receiver. A forced-compliance procedure with college males was used to have a sender subject send either a high or low intimacy self-disclosure essay. Consistent with the social reward and self-perception hypotheses were measures of sender's behavior as trusting and measures of feelings during the disclosure process. General measures of liking and trust were not successful, however.     

The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism,Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism

Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goal here is not to evaluate their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism, recruit recent philosophical work on mechanisms and computation to shed light on them, and clarify how functionalism and computationalism may or may not legitimately come together.     

Extended cognition and the metaphysics of mind

This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional relations rather than by their physical constituents. Furthermore, it has been claimed that functionalism entails a version of extended cognition which is sufficiently radical as to be obviously false. I survey the debate and propose several ways of avoiding this conclusion, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing the hypothesis of extended cognition from the related notion of the extended mind.     

Composition and the cases

Some strange cases have gripped philosophers of mind. They have been deployed against materialism about human persons, functionalism about mentality, the possibility of artificial intelligence, and more. In this paper, I cry “foul”. It’s not hard to think that there’s something wrong with the cases. But what? My proposal: their proponents ignore questions about composition (questions about when some things make up another). And ignoring composition is a mistake. Indeed, materialists about human persons, functionalists about mentality, and believers in the possibility of artificial intelligence can plausibly deploy moderate theories of composition in defense of their views. And as it turns out, these strange cases are an interesting source of evidence for moderate theories of composition.     

The Annual Survey of Psychoanalysis,Volume I Edited by John Frosch,in collaboration with Jacob A. Arlow,Nathaniel Ross,and Sidney Tarachow

Interaction analysis has become a standard tool for process-oriented research. Although now a researcher has a choice of instruments, the majority of these are based on the same concept of communication: the sender–receiver model. Communication is treated as a discrete and encoded process that progresses uniformly in time. We critically discuss these assumptions and the limits they put on communication research. It is asserted that instruments for interaction analysis based on the sender–receiver model restrict themselves to the more superficial levels of interaction and are unable to register the more significant events. Therefore they cannot account for a very essential feature of the communication process, namely the creation of meaning. Alternative options are discussed.     

Mind and Anti-Mind: Why Thinking Has No Functional Definition

Functionalism is perhaps the most prominent theory of mind today. The central thesis of functionalism is that the standard mental relations (or properties or states) are uniquely determined by their causal roles in functioning organisms. That is, the principles of psychology specify the characteristic way that (behavioral or physiological) input, the standard mental relations such as belief and desire, and (behavioral or physiological) output are causally arranged; and the central idea of functionalism is that, e.g., belief's characteristic causal role can be fulfilled by exactly one relation-namely, belief itself. Clearly, then, the most direct way to refute functionalism would be to show that there are relations that demonstrably differ from the standard mental relations and that, nevertheless, could fulfill the same causal role as those mental relations.     

Do We Feel the Same Way If We Think the Same Way? Shared Attitudes and the Social Induction of Affect

Drawing on the literature on emotional mimicry, we argue that attitude similarity between a sender and a receiver influences the social induction of affect. Studies 1, 2, and 3 supported this reasoning by showing that similarity fostered, whereas dissimilarity blocked concordant reactions to a happy sender (but not to a sad sender). We also examined the mechanism behind these effects and found that similarity influenced liking of the happy sender but did not affect liking of the sad sender. Study 4 provided causal evidence for this idea by showing that similarity influenced the induction of positive affect through liking.     

Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism

The type-type reductive identity of the mental to the physical was once the dominant position in the mental causation debate. In time this consensus was overturned, largely due to its inability to handle the problem of multiple realizability. In its place a nonreductive position emerged which often included an adherence to functionalism. Functionalism construes mental properties as functional states of an organism, which in turn have specific physical realizers. This nonreductive form of functionalism, henceforth called role functionalism, has faced a number of criticisms itself. Chief among these is the concern that the realizer of the functional role is causally sufficient, so the role property does not make a contribution of its own. In this paper I argue that there is a way for unreduced functional properties to play a role after all. This is done by conceiving of functional properties as higher level functional properties of a macro system which determine that its realizers will play the roles that they play.     

The perception of eye contact

Ss made judgments of whether or not they were being looked in the eye as an E fixated several points on and off their faces.Distance between sender and receiver, sex, and whether the sender made a sequence of fixation sprior to the terminal fixation were variables of interest. The sender-receiver distance produced less effect than predicted from the hypothesis that receiver judgments were determined solely by the discrepancy between the sender’s iris/sclera configuration (ISC) during true eye contact and the current fixation point. There was no stable differencein accuracy as a function of whether the sender’s terminal fixation was preceded by other fixations or not. These findings cast doubt on the belief expressed in recent studies that the ISC can be used to accurately discriminate eye gazes from other gazes. The results also suggest that fixations on some portions of the face yield a judgment of eye contact which might be predicted on the basis of social experience.     

Functional analysis and the problem of rationality

Functional analysis rescued religion from the oblivion to which positiviste would have consigned it, by taking ‘society’ rather than the individual act as the unit of analysis. The history of functionalism has been a record of increasing concern with such holistic units as societies and social systems. One consequence of this shift away from social action (in the Weberian sense) is that the issue of rationality has become largely redundant. Yet the problem remains: How do we account for ‘contributions’ to the social system in terms that make sense of the perspectives of social actors? An examination of unit actions as they are understood by social actors suggests that functionalism in fact incorporated many of the tenets held by positivists, and that it makes untenable (and implicit) assumptions concerning the ‘objectivity’ of the scientific observer.     

Social class difference in response to Christmas cards

In a total of 590 Christmas cards sent perception of status was important for both the sender and the receiver. High status of the sender increased the response rate significantly, especially among the "blue-collar" receivers.     

The psycho‐physical laws of intentionality

Intentional mental states have causes and effects. Davidson has shown that this fact alone does not entail the existence of psycho‐physical laws, but his anomalism makes the connection between the content and causation of intentional states utterly mysterious. By defining intentional states in terms of their causes and effects, functionalism promises to explain this connection. If intentional states have their causes and effects in virtue of their contents, then there must be intrinsic states (of the people who have them) which are ‘local causal surrogates’ for the propositions believed, desired, or whatever. We can define these intrinsic states in terms of the laws that govern them, but these laws alone are not sufficient to account for intentional content. To do that we need to invoke laws which link these intrinsic states with their contents. Such a ‘wide’ functional account is sketched; it combines a suggestion of Ramsey's about truth conditions with a ‘feedback’ account of the content of desires.     

Intentional communication in the chimpanzee: The development of deception

Communication about the location of a hidden incentive was studied in chimpanzee-human dyads, in which each member of a pair served alternately as “sender” and “recipient” of information. When the human cooperated with the chimpanzee in finding the goal, from the very beginning the chimpanzees were able to produce and comprehend behavioral cues which conveyed accurate locational information. When the human and chimpanzee competed for the goal, the chimpanzees learned both to withhold information or mislead the recipient, and to discount or controvert the sender's own misleading cues. The chimpanzee's ability to convey and utilize both accurate and misleading information, by taking into account the nature of the sender or recipient, provides evidence of a capacity for intentional communication in this nonhuman primate species.     

What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: a defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists

A wave of recent work in metaphysics seeks to undermine the anti-reductionist, functionalist consensus of the past few decades in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. That consensus apparently legitimated a focus on what systems do, without necessarily and always requiring attention to the details of how systems are constituted. The new metaphysical challenge contends that many states and processes referred to by functionalist cognitive scientists are epiphenomenal. It further contends that the problem lies in functionalism itself, and that, to save the causal significance of mind, it is necessary to re-embrace reductionism. We argue that the prescribed return to reductionism would be disastrous for the cognitive and behavioral sciences, requiring the dismantling of most existing achievements and placing intolerable restrictions on further work. However, this argument fails to answer the metaphysical challenge on its own terms. We meet that challenge by going on to argue that the new metaphysical skepticism about functionalist cognitive science depends on reifying two distinct notions of causality (one primarily scientific, the other metaphysical), then equivocating between them. When the different notions of causality are properly distinguished, it is clear that functionalism is in no serious philosophical trouble, and that we need not choose between reducing minds or finding them causally impotent. The metaphysical challenge to functionalism relies, in particular, on a na?ve and inaccurate conception of the practice of physics, and the relationship between physics and metaphysics.     

Functionalism and inverted spectra

Functionalism, a philosophical theory, has empirical consequences. Functionalism predicts that where systematic transformations of sensory input occur and are followed by behavioral accommodation in which normal function of the organism is restored such that the causes and effects of the subject's psychological states return to those of the period prior to the transformation, there will be a return of qualia or subjective experiences to those present prior to the transform. A transformation of this type that has long been of philosophical interest is the possibility of an inverted spectrum. Hilary Putnam argues that the physical possibilty of acquired spectrum inversion refutes functionalism. I argue, however, that in the absence of empirical results no a priori arguments against functionalism, such as Putnam's, can be cogent. I sketch an experimental situation which would produce acquired spectrum inversion. The mere existence of qualia inversion would constitute no refutation of functionalism; only its persistence after behavioral accommodation to the inversion would properly count against functionalism. The cumulative empirical evidence from experiments on image inversion suggests that the results of actual spectrum inversion would confirm rather than refute functionalism.     

Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist

According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence that at least some mental state types consist not merely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states, but also in nonrelational properties that play a role in explaining functional relations. Consequently, a scientific realist of the sort I describe must reject functionalism.