Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that Book II, Chapter viii of Locke' Essay is a unified, self-consistent whole, and that the appearance of inconsistency is due largely to anachronistic misreadings and misunderstandings. The key to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that the former are, while the latter are not, real properties, i.e., properties that exist in bodies independently of being perceived. Once the distinction is properly understood, it becomes clear that Locke's arguments for it are simple, valid and (in one case) persuasive as well.     

Secondary and Tertiary Qualities: Semantics and Response-Dependence

Abstract: Secondary and tertiary qualities are plausibly explained along dispositionalist lines. Concepts of such qualities are response-dependent, denoting properties that are partly mind/brain-dependent. Unfortunately, dispositionalism is hard to square with extant versions of naturalistic theories of representation. In particular the standard naturalistic (indicational) semantics of representational content cannot handle the question from either the subjectivist or the dispositional viewpoint. The paper proposes a remedy: the problem can be solved in a smooth and natural way, provided that we revise and supplement the standard semantics in a rather obvious fashion, by allowing the mind/brain-involving properties to figure within it.     

Secondary Qualities and Self‐Location1

There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer‐independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less‐than‐fully‐real, subjective, observer‐dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in any kind of satisfying and sensible way. I attempt such a spelling‐out after first trying to pin down in more detail what we want from the primary/secondary quality distinction, and saying a bit about why that is such a hard thing to get.     

Paradise Regained: A Non-Reductive Realist Account of the Sensible Qualities

This paper defends a non-reductive realist view of the sensible qualities—roughly, the view that the sensible qualities are (i) really instantiated by the external objects of perception, and (ii) not reducible to response-independent physical properties or response-dependent relational properties. I begin by clarifying and motivating the non-reductive realist view. I then consider some familiar difficulties for the view. Addressing these difficulties leads to the development and defence of a general theory, inspired by Russellian Monist theories of consciousness, of how the sensible qualities (especially the so-called ‘secondary qualities’) relate to physical reality. I conclude by showing how this theory, which I call ‘Secondary Quality Russellian Monism’, resolves the most significant difficulties for the non-reductive realist view of the sensible qualities.     

教师心理素质的隐含研究

本研究旨在运用隐含研究方法揭示教帅应具备的心理素质及其结构。为此,本研究进行了一个预备测试与3个正式测试。研究结果表明：①创造性,责任感,教育效能感等21项特性是教师重要的心理品质;②在这些心理品质中,客观公正性、移情性、角色认同、有恒性、监控陛、责任感、非权势等11项心理品质被教师、家长、学生共同认定为最重要最基本的心理品质;③人们心目中教师心理品质由工作动因,工作行为、行为调控三个维度构成的;④综合三项测试结果,本研究认为教师心理素质是由3个维度、10项基本特性构成的。此外,文章还分析了这一结论与以前研究结果的关系及隐含研究方法对于该项研究的适用性。     

大学生心理素质的隐含研究

运用隐含研究方法揭示大学生应具备的心理素质及结构。结果显示：坚强、自信乐观等20项特征是大学生重要的心理品质;教师与大学生对心理素质的提名存在差异;人们心目中的大学生心理素质主要有发展动因、行为方式和自我管理三个维度组成。     

Virtues as Qualities of Character

Over the last two decades, a growing philosophical literature has subjected virtue ethics to empirical evaluation. Drawing on results in social psychology, a number of critics have argued that virtue ethics depends upon false presuppositions about the cross-situational consistency of psychological traits. Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue has been a prime target for the situationist critics. This essay assesses the situationist critique of MacIntyre’s account of virtue. It argues that MacIntyre’s social teleological account of virtue is not what his situationist critics take it to be. Virtues, for MacIntyre, are not reducible to psychological traits. They are qualities of one’s socially constituted character, and their intelligibility as virtues derives from their role in the narrative of one’s life. Recognizing this both clarifies and complicates debates about the implication of situationist social psychology for virtue ethics. It also grants a new significance to MacIntyre’s attention to the socio-historical context of virtue, a significance that should be especially interesting to religious ethicists.     

The Four Qualities of Life

The terms 'quality-of-life', 'well-being' and 'happiness' denote different meanings; sometimes they are used as an umbrella term for all of value, and at other times to denote special merits. This paper is about the specific meanings of the terms. It proposes a classification based on two bi-partitions; between life 'chances' and life 'results', and between 'outer' and 'inner' qualities. Together these dichotomies imply four qualities of life: 1) livability of the environment, 2) life-ability of the individual, 3) external utility of life and 4) inner appreciation of life.This fourfold matrix is applied in three ways: firstly to place related notions and alternative classifications, secondly to explore substantive meanings in various measures for quality of life and thirdly to find out whether quality-of-life can be measured comprehensively. This last question is answered in the negative. Current sum-scores make little sense. The most inclusive measure is still how long and happily people live.     

Matching Sensible Qualities: A Skeleton in the Closet for Representationalism

The intransitivity of matching sensible qualities of color isa threat not only to the sense-data theory, but to allrealist theories of sensible qualities, including thecurrent leading realist theory: representationalism.I save representationalism from this threat by way ofa novel yet empirically plausible hypothesis about theintrospective classification of sensible qualities of color.I argue that due to limitations of the visual system's abilityto extract fine-grained information about color fromthe environment, introspective classification of sensiblequalities of color is sensitive to features of context.I finish by arguing for the superiority of mysolution over two alternative solutions: one by NelsonGoodman, the other by C.L. Hardin.     

A Theory of Blame

We introduce a theory of blame in five parts. Part 1 addresses what blame is: a unique moral judgment that is both cognitive and social, regulates social behavior, fundamentally relies on social cognition, and requires warrant. Using these properties, we distinguish blame from such phenomena as anger, event evaluation, and wrongness judgments. Part 2 offers the heart of the theory: the Path Model of Blame, which identifies the conceptual structure in which blame judgments are embedded and the information processing that generates such judgments. After reviewing evidence for the Path Model, we contrast it with alternative models of blame and moral judgment (Part 3) and use it to account for a number of challenging findings in the literature (Part 4). Part 5 moves from blame as a cognitive judgment to blame as a social act. We situate social blame in the larger family of moral criticism, highlight its communicative nature, and discuss the darker sides of moral criticism. Finally, we show how the Path Model of Blame can bring order to numerous tools of blame management, including denial, justification, and excuse.     

A Theory of Art

Book Information A Theory of Art. A Theory of Art Berger Karol Oxford Oxford University Press 2000 287 Hardback By Berger Karol. Oxford University Press. Oxford. Pp. 287. Hardback:,     

A Theory of Necessities

Journal of Philosophical Logic - We develop a theory of necessity operators within a version of higher-order logic that is neutral about how fine-grained reality is. The theory is axiomatized in...