The harm-benefit tradeoff in "bad deal" trials

This paper examines the nature of the harm-benefit tradeoff in early clinical research for interventions that involve remote possibility of direct benefit and likelihood of direct harms to research participants with fatal prognoses, by drawing on the example of gene transfer trials for glioblastoma multiforme. We argue that the appeal made by the component approach to clinical equipoise fails to account fully for the nature of the harm-benefit tradeoff-individual harm for social benefit-that would be required to justify such research. An analysis of what we label "collateral affective benefits," such as the experience of hope or exercise of altruism, shows that the existence of these motivations reinforces rather than mitigates the necessity of justification by reference to social benefit. Evaluations of social benefit must be taken seriously in the research ethics review process to avoid the exploitation of research participants' motivations of hope or altruism and to avoid the possibility of inadvertent exploitation of high-risk research participants and the harms that would associate with such exploitation.     

Modern Families: The Nazi Past and "Fatherlessness"

The author demonstrates, through family therapy case material, a connection between problems of the modern present and the three-generation effects of Nazism.     

Down to cases: the ethical value of "non-scientificity" in dyadic psychoanalysis

The efficacy of the dyadic psychoanalytic method cannot be verified empirically, due to the impossibility of counterfactuals, controls, or double-blind experiments, although inventive psychoanalytic researchers have established validation methodologies for analyzing groups of case studies, outcomes, and even theoretical precepts. The unavailability of complete empirical validation for the most basic method of the discipline of psychoanalysis, or of its fundamental "report of findings"--the case study--means that the field's scientific rationale must be supplemented with public reasoning of another sort. Fortunately, the very conditions of uncertainty that make it impossible to falsify the findings of dyadic psychoanalysis lend it its ethical force by compelling its participants to confront the basic human dilemmas of freedom, meaning, and judgment, the ethical horizon of human affairs. One substantial value of psychoanalysis, then, is its capacity for generating "ethical knowledge" of the sort adumbrated by Aristotle's conception of practical knowledge (phronesis). Case studies written for a lay audience to highlight these basic dilemmas can demonstrate that psychoanalysis produces crucial knowledge, specific to individuals, for living a healthy and satisfying life.     

Jung's views of Nazi Germany: the first year and Jung's transition

This article first considers Jung's response to the coming to power of the Nazis in Germany. It brings forth evidence that, besides wanting to preserve psychotherapy in Germany and maintain the international connection between the German and other communities of psychotherapists, he wanted to advance Jungian psychology – his psychology – in Germany. It also presents evidence that, although he occasionally made some anti‐Semitic statements during this early period, he was not anti‐Semitic in the way the Nazis were. The paper then argues that after Gustav Bally's criticisms in the Neue Zuercher Zeitung in February 1934, Jung entered into a transitional period that spring during which he became warier both of the Nazis and of making any statements that could be construed as being anti‐Semitic. Schoenl and Peck (2012) have shown how Jung's views of Nazi Germany changed from 1933 to March 1936. This present article demonstrates very significant changes in Jung's views during the important early part of this period, that is from January 1933 – when Hitler became Chancellor of Germany – through to the spring of 1934. It draws on evidence from archival and other primary sources.     

Jung's evolving views of Nazi Germany: From 1936 to the end of World War II

This article first shows Jung's evolving views of Nazi Germany from 1936 to the beginning of World War II. In a lecture at the Tavistock Clinic, London, in October 1936, he made his strongest and most negative statements to that date about Nazi Germany. While in Berlin in September 1937 for lectures to the Jung Gesellschaft, his observations of Hitler at a military parade led him to conclude that should the catastrophe of war come it would be far more and bloodier than he had previously supposed. After the Sudetenland Crisis in Fall 1938, Jung in interviews made stronger comments on Hitler and Nazi Germany. The article shows how strongly anti‐Nazi Jung's views were in relation to events during World War II such as Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland, the fall of France, the bombings of Britain, the U.S. entry into the War, and Allied troops advancing into Germany. Schoenl and Peck, ‘An Answer to the Question: Was Jung, for a Time, a “Nazi Sympathizer” or Not?’ (2012) demonstrated how his views of Nazi Germany changed from 1933 to March 1936. The present article shows how his views evolved from 1936 to the War's end in 1945.     

The "subliminal" versus the "subconscious" in the American acceptance of psychoanalysis, 1906-1910.

Insofar as Frederic W. H. Myers' conceptions of the "subliminal" were spread by the Boston-based "Emmanuel movement" for medically supervised religious psychotherapy (fl. 1906-1910), the movement probably did more to help than to hinder American acceptance of Freudian ideas. Certainly, many academic psychologists' conceptions of the "unconscious" and "subconscious" were a hindrance.