THE NATURE OF HOPE

Both traditional accounts of hope and some of their recent critics analyze hope exclusively in terms of attitudes that a hoper bears towards a hoped-for prospect, such as desire and probability assignment. I argue that all of these accounts misidentify cases of despair as cases of hope, and so misconstrue the nature of hope. I show that a more satisfactory view is arrived at by noticing that in addition to the aforementioned attitudes, hope involves a characteristic attitude towards an external factor, on whose operation the hoper takes the prospect's realization to depend causally.     

SARS:希望与挑战

经过全球各方面不懈努力,对SARS的研究、防控现巳取得阶段性进展：新型冠状病毒巳被确定为致病原,病毒基因组巳解析、诊断技术巳用于临床、疾病的流行规律正在描述、有效防控措施巳采用等,所有的一切有赖于全球的协作、科学的力量。但是,人类在彻底控制SARS之前还需要大量工作,目前还存在许多亟待解决的问题。     

THE DILEMMA OF THE GIFTED WOMAN

The abilities of highly capable women have rarely received serious recognition, support, or guidance. Although there is increasing interest in attracting women to positions of social, political, educational, and scientific leadership, many obstacles inhibit women from realizing their potential in these areas. These obstacles include: confusion about the meaning and nature of giftedness; psychological and cultural barriers to owning and displaying one's abilities; and ambivalent attitudes of peers, parents, and significant others toward exceptional ability in women. This paper encourages feminist psychologists to respond to this population's unique affective needs, and focuses on recognizing, understanding, and furthering exceptional ability in women in the face of gender-role stereotyping and cultural pressures.     

A METAPHILOSOPHICAL DILEMMA FOR EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM

Abstract: In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it's implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief.     

A DILEMMA FOR SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG'S MODERATE PYRRHONIAN MORAL SCEPTICISM

In order for us to have epistemic justification, Sinnott-Armstrong believes we do not have to be able to rule out all sceptical hypotheses. He suggests that it is sufficient if we have 'modestly justified beliefs', i.e., if our evidence rules out all non-sceptical alternatives. I argue that modest justification is not sufficient for epistemic justification. Either modest justification is independent of our ability to rule out sceptical hypotheses, but is not a kind of epistemic justification, or else modest justification is a kind of epistemic justification, but is not truly independent of our ability to rule out sceptical hypotheses.