The midwife case: Do they “walk the talk”?

Expertise depends on hours and hours of practice within a field before a state of proficiency is achieved. Normally, expert skills involve bodily knowledge associated to the practices of a field. Interactional expertise, i.e. the ability to talk competently about the field, however, is not causally dependent on bodily proficiency. Instead, interactional experts are verbally skilled to an extent that makes them impossible to distinguish from so-called contributory experts, the experienced practitioners. The concept of interactional expertise defines linguistic skills as contingent on bodily knowledge. However, recent neuropsychological findings make it plausible that “first-person”-related neural activations would be relevant with respect to the subjects' verbal output, at least when subjects address concepts that refer to tangible objects. Using imitation games, we explore and expand on the apparently arbitrary relation between bodily experiences and linguistic skills in midwifery. In alignment with several findings within grounded cognition studies, the results presented suggest that somehow personal experiences make a linguistic difference, noticeable to contributory experts.     

Xunzi on Moral Expertise

This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a moral expert, whose moral advice we should adopt even when we cannot appreciate for ourselves the considerations in favor of it. The second is that certain political authorities should be treated as moral experts. I identify three fundamental questions about moral expertise that contemporary philosophy has yet to address in depth, explicate Xunzi??s answers to them, and then give an account of politically authorized moral expertise as Xunzi understands it. The three questions at the heart of this study are these: how should we distinguish between knowing the correct course of action on another??s authority and knowing it for oneself? What exactly are the underlying considerations that the expert grasps and the novice does not? Who are the experts and in what spheres of life can they legitimately claim expertise?     

La portée normative des avis d’expert dans l’élaboration de la décision administrative en matière de sécurité sanitaire

The development of scientific knowledge and the complexity of the issues of health safety have led to increase the use of expertise. The need for transparency following the “scandals” at the end of the last century has led the state to outsource its assessment procedures in health safety, by creating independent agencies. These agencies turn to outside experts because their own staff does not have all the necessary competence. So, the question is: what is the role of these experts in the elaboration of the standards made by the decisions of the agencies? The link between the decision and the expert advice may be almost considered as subordination: the administrative decision becomes stuck by the advice, due to the technical incompetence of the agency. But the circumstances of the administrative decision, especially the situation of scientific uncertainty, can impose a degree of autonomy. If the scope of expert advice seems considerable in certain aspects, it should not hide the full responsibility of policy makers.     

Levels of immersion, tacit knowledge and expertise

This paper elaborates on the link between different types and degrees of experience that can be gone through within a form of life or collectivity—the so-called levels of immersion—and the development of distinct types of tacit knowledge and expertise. The framework is then probed empirically and theoretically. In the first case, its ‘predictions’ are compared with the accounts of novices who have gone through different ‘learning opportunities’ during a pre-operational training programme for running a huge nickel industrial plant in Brazil. These are also analysed vis-à-vis the experience of an expert who has designed and experienced the outcomes of two pre-operational training sessions in the nickel industry before developing and managing the one discussed here. Theoretically, the framework is used to pinpoint exactly what interactional experts who have developed their expertise through linguistic socialisation alone are able to do as well as to analyse the case of technical connoisseurs. The results indicate that the proposed framework is useful. It supports the design and improvement of training programmes for the development of tacit knowledge while at the same time bringing about a refined analysis of claims concerning the abilities of types of experts and expertise.     

Keeping an eye on the violinist: motor experts show superior timing consistency in a visual perception task

Common coding theory states that perception and action may reciprocally induce each other. Consequently, motor expertise should map onto perceptual consistency in specific tasks such as predicting the exact timing of a musical entry. To test this hypothesis, ten string musicians (motor experts), ten non-string musicians (visual experts), and ten non-musicians were asked to watch progressively occluded video recordings of a first violinist indicating entries to fellow members of a string quartet. Participants synchronised with the perceived timing of the musical entries. Results revealed significant effects of motor expertise on perception. Compared to visual experts and non-musicians, string players not only responded more accurately, but also with less timing variability. These findings provide evidence that motor experts’ consistency in movement execution—a key characteristic of expert motor performance—is mirrored in lower variability in perceptual judgements, indicating close links between action competence and perception.     

Les publications des experts médicaux : l’exemple de l’anesthésie-réanimation

Forensic expertise becomes dominant in our society. Several reports questioned the competence of medical experts. We analysed the scientific competence of the 136 experts in Anaesthesia, Intensive Care and Emergency Medicine from senior courts in France. For that purpose, we made the choice of the H-Index and the number of scientific publications as markers of quality, using Google Scholar and PubMed databases. Thirty-five percent of experts have an H-Index equal to zero and 27 % never published. Out of the 104 experts who published at least one scientific article, 27 (26 %) did not publish for at least 10 years. The present study illustrates the great heterogeneity of the medical expert population regarding our criterions of judgement. This questions the selection and the operating mode of legal experts. There is a major difference with the selection process performed by the French Conciliation and Compensation Commissions. We propose that the official scholarly societies should be consulted during the appointment process.     

Estlund on Epistocracy: A Critique

An influential anti-democratic argument says: ??(1) Answers to political questions are truth-apt. (2) A small elite only??the epistocrats??knows these truths. (3) If answers to political questions are truth-apt, then those with this knowledge about these matters should rule. (4) Thus, epistocrats should rule.?? Many democrats have responded by denying (1), arguing that, say, answers to political questions are a matter of sheer personal preference. Others have rejected (2), contending that knowledge of the true answers to political questions is evenly distributed. David Estlund finds neither of these replies conclusive. Instead, he attacks (3) arguing that there can be no agreement between qualified people as to who the epistocrats are and that people are not subject to being ruled by experts, whose status as such they can reasonably dispute. Critically, I argue that this argument does not block all forms of epistocratic argument and that Estlund fails to consider the full range of plausible epistocratic views. More constructively, I offer a modest argument for why greater expertise does not necessarily warrant greater political authority. Presumably, the set of feasible options might differ, depending on what procedure is used, and a sub-optimal choice by nonepistocrats from a better set might be superior to the optimal choice by epistocrats from a worse set. In such cases, the mere fact of greater expertise does not warrant political authority, i.e., (3) is false.     

Derived embodiment and imaginative capacities in interactional expertise

Interactional expertise is said to be a form of knowledge achieved in a linguistic community and, therefore, obtained entirely outside practice. Supposedly, it is not or only minimally sustained by the so-called embodied knowledge. Here, drawing upon studies in contemporary neuroscience and cognitive psychology, I propose that ‘derived’ embodiment is deeply involved in competent language use and, therefore, also in interactional expertise. My argument consists of two parts. First, I argue for a strong relationship among language acquisition, language use and the real world (i.e. the world accessible to the senses). Biological constraints in very early childhood anchor language to the body. These constraints are by-products of our evolutionary peculiarity that we gain because of our physical and psychological immaturity at birth. Thus, infancy is predominantly concerned with the bodily needs and experiences of the concrete while language acquisition takes place. Particular interest in the concrete furnishes our linguistic world and installs ‘concrete’ language as the principal constituent of competent language use. Second, I argue that well-established concrete language implicitly and explicitly elicits mental representations, namely partial reactivations of sensorimotor states that occur during experience. These are stepping stones by which we subsequently make sense of expressions in new linguistic areas. Like any competent language user, the interactional expert, therefore, prompts multimodal imagination and re-enacts concrete experiences when acquiring linguistic knowledge pertaining to a specialist field. Finally, I outline the characteristics of those imaginative powers to identify mechanisms that improve interactional expertise and discuss the obvious relation between interactional expertise and ordinary knowledge acquisition after the concrete language stage.     

What “Intuitions” are Linguistic Evidence?

In “Intuitions in Linguistics” (2006a) and Ignorance of Language (2006b) I took it to be Chomskian orthodoxy that a speaker’s metalinguistic intuitions are provided by her linguistic competence. I argued against this view in favor of the alternative that the intuitions are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena. The concern about these linguistic intuitions arises from their apparent role as evidence for a grammar. Mark Textor, “Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions” (2009), argues that I have picked the wrong intuitions: I should have picked non-judgmental linguistic “seemings”. These reside between metalinguistic judgments and linguistic performances and have an epistemic authority that the orthodox view may well be able to explain. Textor seems to think that the metalinguistic intuitions are not evidence at all. I argue that he is wrong about that. More importantly, I argue that there are no “in-between” linguistic seemings with epistemic authority.     

On interactional expertise: Pragmatic and ontological considerations

This paper is a critical examination of Harry Collins's investigation into a third form of knowledge, “interactional expertise.” We argue that although Collins makes a genuine contribution to the phenomenological literature on expertise, his account requires further critical evaluation and response due to pragmatic and ontological considerations. We contend that by refining (in some questionable ways) the category of interactional expertise so as to create epistemological equivalence between activists, sociologists, critics, journalists, and some science administrators, Collins potentially undermines the value that a more rigorously construed concept of interactional expertise might have. We further show that Collins misunderstands the nature of embodiment in a way that is exacerbated by the sociological perspective that he adopts.     

Trust,expertise, and the philosophy of science

Trust is a central concept in the philosophy of science. We highlight how trust is important in the wide variety of interactions between science and society. We claim that examining and clarifying the nature and role of trust (and distrust) in relations between science and society is one principal way in which the philosophy of science is socially relevant. We argue that philosophers of science should extend their efforts to develop normative conceptions of trust that can serve to facilitate trust between scientific experts and ordinary citizens. The first project is the development of a rich normative theory of expertise and experience that can explain why the various epistemic insights of diverse actors should be trusted in certain contexts and how credibility deficits can be bridged. The second project is the development of concepts that explain why, in certain cases, ordinary citizens may distrust science, which should inform how philosophers of science conceive of the formulation of science policy when conditions of distrust prevail. The third project is the analysis of cases of successful relations of trust between scientists and non-scientists that leads to understanding better how ‘postnormal’ science interactions are possible using trust.     

When experts are influential: Comparisons with respect to success and consistency in judgment tasks

The effects of experts' judgment behavior on the utilization of expert guidance were investigated in four experiments. In all experiments the subjects received written information about the judgments performed by two independent experts concerning a fictitious medical task. The experts' judgment behavior varied with respect to success (i.e. competency), complexity of judgment rule and consistency. The tasks varied with respect to task predictability and complexity of judgment rule. The results indicated that consistent judgment behavior on part of experts is an important premise for proper utilization of expert guidance. Inconsistency on part of experts may induce underestimation of the judgmental competence expressed by the judge, i.e. influence tended to be inappropriately low.     

Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning

Can there be rules of language which serve both to determine meaning and to guide speakers in ordinary linguistic usage, i.e., in the production of speech acts? We argue that the answer is no. We take the guiding function of rules to be the function of serving as reasons for actions, and the question of guidance is then considered within the framework of practical reasoning. It turns out that those rules that can serve as reasons for linguistic utterances cannot be considered as normative or meaning determining. Acceptance of such a rule is simply equivalent to a belief about meaning, and does not even presuppose that meaning is determined by rules. Rules that can determine meaning, on the other hand, i.e., rules that can be regarded as constitutive of meaning, are not capable of guiding speakers in the ordinary performance of speech acts.     

Source expertise and persuasion: the effects of perceived opposition or support on message scrutiny

Compared to nonexperts, expert sources have been considered to elicit more processing of persuasive messages because of expectations that the information is likely to be valid or accurate. However, depending on the position of an advocacy, source expertise could activate other motives that may produce a very different relation from that found in past research. When messages are counterattitudinal (disagreeable), experts should motivate greater processing than nonexpert sources because of expectations that they will likely provide robust opposition to one's existing views. In contrast, when advocacies are proattitudinal (agreeable), nonexpert rather than expert sources should elicit more scrutiny because of perceptions that they will likely provide inadequate support to recipients' current views. Two studies offer evidence consistent with these predictions. Manipulations of source expertise created different expectations regarding the strength of opposition or support, and these perceptions accounted for effects of source expertise on the amount of message scrutiny.     

The expertise reversal effect: cognitive load and motivational explanations

The expertise reversal effect occurs when a learner's expertise moderates design principles such as the redundancy principle (i.e., redundant information should be excluded rather than included) derived from the cognitive load theory. Although this effect is supported by numerous experiments, indicating an overall large effect size, a variety of explanations have been proposed. The present experiment tested a cognitive load and a motivational explanation with 104 students, who reported a lack of experience in the presented instructional contents. They spent about 30 min with the instructional material to learn fundamental concepts about the gradient descent (a mathematical optimization algorithm), and with a retention and transfer test used as dependent measures. Each learner was randomly assigned to one cell of a 2 (either novices or experts introduced to through the instructional design presented previously) × 2 (either with or without additional text explaining the animations) between-subjects factorial design. The expertise reversal effect concerning the redundancy principle was replicated. Novices receiving additional text scored higher on retention and transfer than did novices without additional text, while this result was reversed for experts. Results suggest that this effect can be explained by the learner's cognitive load differences rather than overall motivation differences. Furthermore, a partial overlap was found between the motivational subdimension, "probability of success," and a cognitive load measure. On the practical side, instructional designers should consider the learner's level of expertise and their cognitive load when applying design principles. Further implications for adaptive learning environments are discussed.     

Goodbye and farewell: Siegel vs. Feyerabend∗

The discussion between Searle and the Churchlands over whether or not symbolmanipulating computers generate semantics will be confronted both with the rulesceptical considerations of Kripke/Wittgenstein and with Wittgenstein's privatelanguage argument in order to show that the discussion focuses on the wrong place: meaning does not emerge in the brain. That a symbol means something should rather be conceived as a social fact, depending on a mutual imputation of linguistic competence of the participants of a linguistic practice to one another. The alternative picture will finally be applied to small children, animals, and computers as well.     

Expert Trespassing Testimony and the Ethics of Science Communication

Scientific expert testimony is crucial to public deliberation, but it is associated with many pitfalls. This article identifies one—namely, expert trespassing testimony—which may be characterized, crudely, as the phenomenon of experts testifying outside their domain of expertise. My agenda is to provide a more precise characterization of this phenomenon and consider its ramifications for the role of science in society. I argue that expert trespassing testimony is both epistemically problematic and morally problematic. Specifically, I will argue that scientific experts are subject to a particular obligation. Roughly, this is the obligation to qualify their assertions when speaking outside their domain of scientific expertise in certain contexts. Thus, I argue that scientists who possess expert knowledge are confronted with hard questions about when and how to testify and, therefore, that being a scientific expert comes with great responsibility. Consequently, I provide a concrete “expert guideline” according to which scientific experts, in certain contexts, face an obligation to qualify their assertions when speaking outside their domain of expertise. Furthermore, I consider a number of the conditions in which the guideline is waived or overridden. On this basis, I consider the broader aspects of the roles of scientific experts in a society with a high division of cognitive labor that calls for trust in scientific expert testimony.     

The ethics of truth-telling and the problem of risk

Risk communication poses a challenge to ordinary norms of truth-telling because it can easily mislead. Analyzing this challenge in terms of a systematic divergence between expertise and public attitudes fails to recognize how two specific features of the concept of risk play a role in managing daily affairs. First, evaluating risk always incorporates an estimate of the reliability of information. Since risk communication is an effort at providing information, audiences will naturally and appropriately incorporate their assessment of the reliability of the risk communicator into their assessment of the risk as such. Second, one conceptual and grammatical feature of the concept of risk is to categorize experience as non-routine and demanding further deliberation. That is, the whole point of calling something a risk can be to distinguish it from activities or phenomena that need no further attention. Risk communications that stress relative comparisons of measured probabilities and expected utilities can be inconsistent with both features of our concept of risk. At best they mislead; at worst they undermine our society’s capacity to cope with risk. While there are no simple answers to these two conundrums, technical experts should bear them in mind when communicating with the broader public.     

Analogical transfer and expertise in legal reasoning

Analogical transfer and its relation to expertise is examined in a legal context. Three experiments were conducted comparing the performance of novices (introductory tax students) and of experts (experienced tax practitioners from multinational public accounting firms) on tasks involving the application of tax laws. In Experiment 1 subjects completed a target problem after reading a decided case that was either analogous or not analogous to a target problem. A limited amount of transfer was observed, with no differential rate of transfer across experience levels. In Experiments 2 and 3 attempts were made to facilitate transfer of knowledge by inducing transfer-appropriate processing of the source analog and by providing multiple source analogs. The results of both experiments indicate an interaction between treatment and expertise. Unexpectedly, the facilitating treatments reduced the transfer of knowledge for experts while increasing the transfer for novices. Subsequent analysis of the responses of the expert subjects indicates that for the more experienced expert subjects a highly proceduralized rule interfered with the knowledge transfer when that rule was made salient by the facilitating treatments. The less experienced expert subjects behaved in a manner consistent with the hypotheses. This poor performance of the more experienced experts results from the inflexibility in expert problem solving due to the proceduralization of information processing. Frensch and Sternberg (1989) demonstrate that this type of inflexibility is one of the costs of expertise and results from the development of a large and highly complex knowledge base containing numerous well developed strategies.     

Expertise, Democracy, and Applied Ethics

Is expertise in applied ethics compatible with individual autonomy and democratic self-governance? This depends on whether a ‘tracking condition’ is satisfied for expert claims about issues in applied ethics. This condition requires that, when expert deliberations are properly conducted they ‘track’ the courses of reasoning that the experts’ clients would themselves have undertaken if they had (perhaps subject to certain conditions) considered the matters for themselves. Pluralism of the kind thematised by Isaiah Berlin and Stuart Hampshire suggests that the tracking condition typically will not be satisfied and, hence, that whatever experts are praticising in applied ethics they are doing it contrary to democratic principles of autonomy and self-government. The implications of this result are sketched and some standard objections briefly considered.