The nature of expertise in fingerprint examiners

Latent print examinations involve a complex set of psychological and cognitive processes. This article summarizes existing work that has addressed how training and experience creates changes in latent print examiners. Experience appears to improve overall accuracy, increase visual working memory, and lead to configural processing of upright fingerprints. Experts also demonstrate a narrower visual filter and, as a group, tend to show greater consistency when viewing ink prints. These findings address recent criticisms of latent print evidence, but many open questions still exist. Cognitive scientists are well positioned to conduct studies that will improve the training and practices of latent print examiners, and suggestions for becoming involved in fingerprint research are provided.     

The experience machine and the expertise defense

Recent evidence suggests that participants without extensive training in philosophy (so-called lay people) have difficulties responding consistently when confronted with Robert Nozick’s Experience Machine thought experiment. For example, some of the participants who reject the experience machine for themselves would still advise a stranger to enter the machine permanently. This and similar findings have been interpreted as evidence for implicit biases that prevent lay people from making rational decisions about whether the experience machine is preferable to real life, which might have consequences for one of the strongest objections to philosophical hedonism (the view that pleasure is the only intrinsic value). Against this consequence, it has been argued that expert philosophers are immune to such biases (the so-called expertise defense). In this paper, I report empirical evidence against this expertise defense.     

The influence of expertise on X-ray image processing

Observers with four different levels of radiological experience performed a recognition memory task on slides of faces and chest X-ray films. Half of the X-ray films revealed clinically significant abnormalities and half did not. Recognition memory for faces was uniformly high across all levels of radiological experience. Memory for abnormal X-ray films increased with radiological experience and, for the most experienced radiologists, was equivalent to memory for faces. Surprisingly, recognition memory for normal films actually decreased with radiological experience from above chance to a chance level. These results indicate that radiological expertise is associated with selective processing of clinically relevant abnormalities in X-ray images. Expert radiologists appear to process X-ray images the way that we all process faces, by quickly detecting and devoting processing resources to features that distinguish one stimulus from another. However, the selective processing of X-ray films appears to be restricted to clinically relevant abnormalities. As they develop the ability to detect these abnormalities, radiologists appear to lose the ability to detect variations in normal features.     

The training and transfer of real-world perceptual expertise

A hallmark of perceptual expertise is that experts classify objects at a more specific, subordinate level of abstraction than novices. To what extent does subordinate-level learning contribute to the transfer of perceptual expertise to novel exemplars and novel categories? In this study, participants learned to classify 10 varieties of wading birds and 10 varieties of owls at either the subordinate, species (e.g., "great blue crown heron,"eastern screech owl") or the family ("wading bird,"owl") level of abstraction. During training, the amount of visual exposure was equated such that participants received an equal number of learning trials for wading birds and owls. Pre- and posttraining performance was measured in a same/different discrimination task in which participants judged whether pairs of bird stimuli belonged to the same or different species. Participants trained in species-level discrimination demonstrated greater transfer to novel exemplars and novel species categories than participants trained in family-level discrimination. These findings suggest that perceptual categorization, not perceptual exposure per se, is important for the development and generalization of visual expertise.     

Moral expertise

We offer a theory of moral expertise based on an updated version of the Thomistic concept of habitus. We maintain that mature moral control arises from internalized standards of belief married to corresponding actions; the result is moral expertise. Beliefs and actions (conceptualized as habitus) coalesce in a moral identity, which is then sustained by the beliefs and actions that comprise the habitus; what we do affects who we are and what we believe, just as what we believe guides what we do. In support of these claims, we examine recent research on moral judgment, moral identity, and moral emotions.     

The effect of expertise on collaborative problem solving

Why do some groups succeed where others fail? We hypothesise that collaborative success is achieved when the relationship between the dyad's prior expertise and the complexity of the task creates a situation that affords constructive and interactive processes between group members. We call this state the zone of proximal facilitation in which the dyad's prior knowledge and experience enables them to benefit from both knowledge-based problem-solving processes (e.g., elaboration, explanation, and error correction) andcollaborative skills (e.g., creating common ground, maintaining joint attention to the task). To test this hypothesis we conducted an experiment in which participants with different levels of aviation expertise, experts (flight instructors), novices (student pilots), and non-pilots, read flight problem scenarios of varying complexity and had to identify the problem and generate a solution with either another participant of the same level of expertise or alone. The non-pilots showed collaborative inhibition on problem identification in which dyads performed worse than their predicted potential for both simple and complex scenarios, whereas the novices and experts did not. On solution generation the non-pilot and novice dyads performed at their predicted potential with no collaborative inhibition on either simple or complex scenarios. In contrast, expert dyads showed collaborative gains, withdyads performing above their predicted potential, but only for the complex scenarios. On simple scenarios the expert dyads showed collaborative inhibition and performed worse than their predicted potential. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of collaborative problem solving.     

The role of lexical expertise in reading homophones

In Experiment 1, university students classified on lexical expertise on the basis of spelling plus nonword pronunciation accuracy made lexical decisions to homophones and control words. Homophones were accepted as words more slowly than control words, but lexical experts showed a smaller homophone cost than the less skilled group. In Experiment 2, similarly classified groups showed a large difference in their ability to detect homophones, with the low-expertise group showing a yes bias to high-frequency words, and having difficulty detecting homophones when mate-frequency was low. The results suggest superior use of orthography in the lexical experts and more reliance on semantic information in nonexperts, and support the importance of facility with orthography–phonology mappings in lexical expertise.     

Children and chess expertise: The role of calibration

Summary Three studies of calibration are reported. Calibration refers to the accuracy with which one can predict one's own performance. In the first study child chess players, non-chess playing parents, and statistics students were asked to predict chances of winning chess games against hypothetical opponents. These subjective probabilities were compared to the actual probabilities, based on the Elo rating system. Better players' predictions were better calibrated. Confidence and ratings are negatively correlated, indicating that with lower ratings, players are overconfident. Skilled child players' predictions were better calibrated than any of the adults'. In the second study subjects were asked to estimate chances of winning in conjunctive situations, e. g., winning all the rounds in a tournament. Again, better child players were more accurate in their predictions and more accurate than adults. In the third study, child players were asked to predict their chances of winning in a non-chess domain after hearing a hypothetical win/loss history. Higher-rated players' predictions were again better calibrated, even though the domain was outside their expertise. The motivational and cognitive implications of calibration are discussed.     

The culture of perceptual expertise and the other-race effect

In our commentary, we propose that the ORE can be viewed as a form of perceptual expertise. Like experts, we recognize own-race faces at the subordinate level as individuals and novices when recognize other-race faces at the basic level of race. Applying a perceptual expertise account, we explain the ORE in terms of its cognitive, neural, and motivational factors. We suggest that by creating a culture of “other-race” expertise, improvements in other-race face recognition can be achieved.     

The attentional blink is attenuated for objects of expertise

Perceptual expertise with a specific domain of stimuli has been shown to afford numerous benefits to information processing performance. Previous work has suggested that face perception, a domain of perceptual expertise for many, is less susceptible to one of the most robust examples of information processing limits, namely the attentional blink. Here we extend this finding to non-face objects of expertise, supporting an expertise-related account of this benefit. Further, the attenuation of the attentional blink phenomenon was correlated with expertise at an individual level, whereby greater expertise with cars yielded a smaller attentional blink for these stimuli. These results support previous work suggesting that extensive experience with a class of objects, such as in the case of perceptual experts, can reduce the consequence of inherent limitations in human information processing. Possible mechanistic accounts of how experience may circumvent processing limitations are discussed.     

Three dimensions of expertise

Psychologists and philosophers tend to treat expertise as a property of special individuals. These are individuals who have devoted much more time than the general population to the acquisition of their specific expertises. They are often said to pass through stages as they move toward becoming experts, for example, passing from an early stage, in which they follow self-conscious rules, to an expert stage in which skills are executed unconsciously. This approach is ‘one-dimensional’. Here, two extra dimensions are added. They are drawn from the programme known as Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE) and its ‘Periodic Table of Expertises’. SEE, which is sociological, and/or Wittgensteinian, in inspiration, takes expertise to be the property of groups; there are ‘domains’ of expertise. Under SEE, level of expertise grows with embedding in the society of domain experts; the key is the transmission of domain-specific tacit knowledge. Thus, one extra dimension is degree of exposure to tacit knowledge. Under SEE, domains can be big or small so there can be ‘ubiquitous tacit knowledge’, such as natural-language-speaking or other elements of general social behaviour, which belong to every member of a society. The second extra dimension is, therefore, ‘esotericity’. The resulting three-dimensional ‘expertise-space’ can be explored in a number of ways which reveal the narrowness of the analysis and the mistakes that have been made under the one-dimensional model.     

Debating ethical expertise

This paper explores the relevance of the debate about ethical expertise for the practice of clinical ethics. We present definitions, explain three theories of ethical expertise, and identify arguments that have been brought up to either support the concept of ethical expertise or call it into question. Finally, we discuss four theses: the debate is relevant for the practice of clinical ethics in that it (1) improves and specifies clinical ethicists' perception of their expertise; (2) contributes to improving the perception of moral competence of non-ethicists; (3) gives insight into complementary styles of argumentation of ethicists and non-ethicists; and (4) contributes to the awareness of the problem of profession-building of (clinical) ethicists.     

The relationship between visual attention and expertise in sports

ObjectivesGiven the prevalence of misperception and failed perception, particularly in attention-demanding team sports, surprisingly few studies have explored whether experts in team sports differ from other athletes and from non-athletes in their basic attention abilities.MethodIn this study, we examined group differences between experts in team handball (n = 40), athletes from non-team sports (n = 40), and novice athletes (n = 40) using a battery of three attention tasks: a functional field of view task, a multiple-object tracking task, and an inattentional blindness task.ResultsPerformance on the three attention tasks was largely independent, with no significant correlations among the tasks. Team sports experts showed no better performance on the basic attention tasks than did athletes from non-teams sports or novice athletes.ConclusionsThe finding that all basic attention tasks are largely independent provides preliminary support for the idea that attentional breadth, tracking performance, and inattentional blindness are distinct attentional processes. Our results demonstrate that sports expertise effects are unrelated to basic differences in attention—expertise does not appear to produce differences in basic attention and basic differences in attention do not appear to predict eventual expertise. Further experiments could focus on the ways in which more specific attentional strategies and processes contribute to sports performance.     

The nature and nurture of expertise: a fourth dimension

One formative idea behind the workshop on expertise in Berkeley in August of 2010 was to develop a viable “trading zone” of ideas, which is defined as a location “in which communities with a deep problem of communication manage to communicate” (Collins et al. 2010, p. 8). In the current case, the goal is to have a trading zone between philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists who communicate their ideas on expertise such that productive interdisciplinary collaboration results. In this paper, I review Harry Collins' three-dimensional model of expertise and provide a very brief and non-inclusive overview of a psychological response. In addition, I propose an addendum to the model by adding a fourth—natural talent—dimension.