分析哲学

分析哲学的一般性质分析哲学的观点一般地说,分析哲学是把“语言分析”作为一个研究主题的各种现代哲学的总称。但是,它并不是有关语言学的东西。它时常被人认为是方法,而不是综合性的哲学体系。这意味着分析哲学的课题在于探讨以往的思辨哲学或者批判形而上学。在分析哲学看来,以往的思辨哲学或者形而上学的争论和错误的根源都在于语言的误用。因而,“以语言逻辑分析克服形而上学”,就成了分析哲学的主题。维特根斯坦说:“哲学家们的大多数问题和命题的来由是我们不理解我们的语言逻辑。”因此,“哲学的目的是思想的逻辑净化”。也就是说,“一切哲学都是语言的批判”。可以说,他     

哲学问题与生活方式--析叔本华的意志和维特根斯坦的语言游戏

本文通过分析叔本华的意志和维特根斯坦的语言游戏探讨了哲学问题与生活方式之间的关系问题,认为叔本华和维特根斯坦分别提出意志和语言游戏的目的是要通过改变人们的生活方式来消除传统的哲学问题。他们的这一探索对于我们重新认识哲学的性质、意义和功能具有重要意义。     

论《逻辑哲学论》的形而上学性

关于前后期维特根斯坦之间的联系,前人或持断裂说,或持连续说。连续说的根据是认为前后期维特根斯坦在哲学观上并无什么改变。其实,前后期维特根斯坦不仅在语言观上,在哲学观上也有一种根本性的断裂和转向,所谓相似性只是表面上的。本文从三个方面:哲学不是自然科学;哲学是描述与澄清;独一的大问题来展开对前期维特根斯坦哲学观的考察,以期认清《逻辑哲学论》的形而上学性。维特根斯坦从前期到后期的所谓转向,根本上是从形而上学思想方式向非形而上学思想方式的转向。     

维特根斯坦哲学的“二重性”品格

本文通过对“逻辑”、“语言游戏规则”和“世界图式”几个核心概念的分析 ,揭示了批判哲学家维特根斯坦在思想归宿上的保守性 ,意在引发我们对传统反思性哲学的基本特征及其局限性的思考 ,以探索一种更加符合我们这个时代“创造性”精神的新的哲学形态     

青年马克思批判哲学的双重逻辑及其理论意义

青年马克思的批判哲学是沿着双重逻辑展开的,即以政治经济学批判为基础的对现实的市民社会的批判,和以对黑格尔哲学的批判为基础的一般形而上学批判。马克思从宗教批判入手,开启了其批判哲学的双重逻辑,从而完成了对近代西方形而上学和资本主义社会的批判,开创了全新的思想体     

话语实践——哲学研究的新领域、新视角、新方法

如果把 2 0世纪哲学的最伟大成果说成是关于语言在哲学中功能的研究 ,那就大错特错了。维特根斯坦揭示语言与世界同构 ( 1,Ｐ38,“命题是现实的形象”) ,其实只是给逻辑实证主义打了一支强心剂 ,它不仅仅告诉世人可以用逻辑的万能性证明世界的实在性 (这个难题被康德称为人类与哲学的耻辱 ) ,维特根斯坦也因而名声大噪。然而 ,后来哲学的实践完全和维特根斯坦宣言背道而驰 ,世界的实在性不仅和逻辑无缘 ,而且这种实在性甚至和哲学无缘。但是 ,必须看到 ,维特根斯坦开辟的元哲学研究给哲学留下的隐喻的确不可低估 ,人们看到了语言的作用真的…     

生活哲学:当代哲学的一种可能路向

自从维特根斯坦和海德格尔表达了对传统西方思辨哲学的失望态度,消解了传统哲学问题后,20世纪后期西方哲学界弥漫着哲学危机论、终结论之类的悲观情绪,寻找当代哲学的出路成了现实而紧迫的问题,拯救哲学危机的努力使当代哲学走向了多元化的场景。但这是一种哲学的转换、转向,作为一种特殊的思想方式,这种转向表明哲学不仅没有终结,也不会终结,而且在寻找新出路中开拓发展,研究的领域和内容更加丰富多彩了,研究空间也更加开阔更加自由了。实践理性转向和实践哲学的繁荣,便是标志。与此同时出现的生活哲学的复兴,标示了重新回归实践和生活已是当代哲学发展的重要趋势。生活哲学与哲学生活的关系、生活与生活世界的关系和生活哲学的涵义与特征是深入开展生活哲学研究的三个具有前提性基础性的问题。生活哲学必须面向生活世界本身,回归到生活实践之中,关注当下时代的发展。     

中国首次大规模影印英文原版书西学基本经典

季羡林、费孝通等29位中国一流西学专家分类选目,定为10类100种。全部影印权威出版社的英文善本。中国社会科学出版社出版西学基本经典　总目哲　学　理想国柏拉图形而上学亚里士多德诗学亚里士多德诗艺贺拉斯论崇高朗吉奴斯第一哲学沉思录笛卡尔思想录帕斯卡尔人性论休谟纯粹理性批判康德判断力批判康德精神现象学黑格尔小逻辑黑格尔作为意志和表象的世界叔本华查拉图斯特拉如是说尼采非此即彼克尔凯郭尔普通语言学教程索绪尔纯粹现象学导论胡塞尔逻辑哲学论(德英对照)维特根斯坦哲学研究(德英对照)维特根斯坦存在与时间海德格尔诗·语言·…     

布宁:"当代中国哲学和哲学分析"

哲学分析可被追溯至芝诺的悖论、苏格拉底与柏拉图的辩证法以及亚里士多德"拯救现象"的方法.现代分析哲学运动始于弗雷格对关涉世界的语言的探究,用命题演算和谓词演算取代古典三段论.同时皮尔士在美国也为哲学分析奠立基础.从罗素、前期维特根斯坦到逻辑实证主义以及希尔伯特、哥德尔等,都将理想(人工)语言的分析置于哲学的中心地位,但它和还原论的"证实"原则都引起争议.     

从世界到生活形式--维特根斯坦前后期哲学转变原因探析

一般认为,维特根斯坦前后期哲学转变的原因是语言观的变化。本文结合维特根斯坦跨越两种哲学传统的背景,认为哲学转变的根本原因是由于前期本体论的内在缺陷而导致的本体论变化,维特根斯坦前期哲学本体论只局限于可说的“世界”,而不可说的神秘之物则被排除在世界之外,这与维特根斯坦珍视神秘之物的初衷相悖,这种内在矛盾促成了前期本体论向后期本体论的转变,这一转变的重大意义在于后期本体论消泯了可说与不可说的界限,是人类社会实践的坚实基础。     

Overcoming Philosophy: Heidegger, Metaphysics, and the Transformation to Thinking

Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics is central to his attempt to re-instantiate the question of being. This paper examines Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics by looking at the relationship between metaphysics and thought. This entails an identification of the intimate relationship Heidegger maintains exists between philosophy and metaphysics, an analysis of Heidegger’s critique of this association, and a discussion of his proposal that philosophy has been so damaged by its association with metaphysics that it must be replaced with meditative thinking. It is not quite clear, however, how the overcoming of metaphysical thinking is to occur especially given Heidegger’s insistence that relying on human will to effect an alteration in thinking simply re-instantiates the metaphysical perspective to be overcome. While several critics have argued Heidegger has no solution to this issue, instead holding that thought must simply be open to being’s ‘self’-transformation if and when it occurs, I turn to Heidegger’s notion of trace and a number of scattered comments on the relationship between meditative thinking and willing as non-willing to show Heidegger: (a) was aware of this issue; and (b) tried to resolve it by recognising a reconceptualised notion of willing not based on or emanating from the aggressive willing of metaphysics.     

实践的逻辑与哲学终结论的困境

以实践是一种具体、历史的现实生活为基础,把马克思意义上的哲学终结论解释为以具体、历史的分析取代抽象、超历史的形而上分析这种愈来愈被认可的说法,由于马克思仍然把需要、经济、理性、发展视为一般性、永恒性的东西,而需要重思。实际上,马克思在反旧形而上学之路上前进的距离不能过高估计。对实践的自悖性估计过低是马克思未能继续前进的根源。同时,在马克思主义理论中反对过分的专门化富有意义,但把哲学终结于社会批判理论中的马尔库塞式见解也会造成某种漠视。     

Philosophy of Science A Personal Peek into the Future

In this opinion piece, the authors offer their personal and idiosyncratic views of the future of the philosophy of science, focusing on its relationship with the history of science and metaphysics, respectively. With regard to the former, they suggest that the Kantian tradition might be drawn upon both to render the history and philosophy of science more relevant to philosophy as a whole and to overcome the challenges posed by naturalism. When it comes to the latter, they suggest both that metaphysics has much to learn from the philosophy of science and that it offers an array of tools that philosophers of science can themselves appropriate.     

Critical Notice of Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide: Pluralist Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century. Edited by Jeffrey A. Bell,Andrew Cutrofello,and Paul M. Livingston (New York: Routledge, 2016. 334 + viii pp)

This collection maintains a dialogue between the analytic and continental traditions, while aspiring to situate itself beyond the analytic-continental divide. It divides into four parts, (1) Methodologies, (2) Truth and Meaning, (3) Metaphysics and Ontology, and (4) Values, Personhood and Agency, though there is considerable overlap among the categories. History and temporality are recurrent themes, but there is a lot of metaphysics generally, with some philosophy of language, philosophy of social science, ethics, political philosophy and epistemology. Less prominent is a pragmatic, deflationary attitude, and at a number of points I argue for the virtues of such an approach.     

Knowledge and True Belief in Early Analytic Philosophy1

Abstract

I argue that the sufficiency of true belief for knowledge was accepted by some principal figures in the early history of analytic philosophy, including Russell, Schlick, McTaggart, and Moore, among others.     

Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy

This paper begins with a critique of the uses of the term "bentilun 體論 (ontology)" in modem Chinese scholarship by tracing their claim to being theoretical paradigms for understanding Chinese philosophy as a philosophical tradition.It is supplemented by a contrastive discussion of bentilun and its original ancient Greek counterpart,i.e.ontology,to show that the object of discourse in bentilun does not match up with that of ontology,namely "being qua being." This comparative study also demonstrates that bentilun finds its philosophical significance in connection with the theory of xinxing心性(heart-mind).In the second section of this paper,a comparative study of "xingershangxue形而上學 (metaphysics)" and "metaphysics" highlights the central tenet that the dao essentially transcends language.Daoist philosophy is used as an example that identifies a unique predilection toward philosophical concepts that transcend the realm of nameable thoughts and objects in Chinese philosophy.Textual evidence is provided to show that the conceptual possibility of xingershangxue is based upon a fundamental difference between you (being) and wu無 (not-being),in a way that is similar to philosophical developments in other early civilizations.Nonetheless,in addition to a philosophical interest in principles and values that transcend the material world,Daoist xingershangxue exhibits an idiosyncratic attention to notions and theories whose object of discourse is essentially unnameable.This characteristic philosophical interest is identified with the aim of locating essential disciplines within Chinese philosophy,including the theory of xinxing,practical wisdom,and the theory of jingjie境界 (state-of-attainment) in a wider framework of east and west philosophical traditions.     

Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”     

BETWEEN THE OLD METAPHYSICS AND THE NEW EMPIRICISM: COLLINGWOOD'S DEFENCE OF THE AUTONOMY OF PHILOSOPHY

Collingwood has failed to make a significant impact in the history of twentieth century philosophy either because he has been dismissed as a dusty old idealist committed to the very metaphysics the analytical school was trying to leave behind, or because his later work has been interpreted as advocating the dissolution of philosophy into history. I argue that Collingwood's key philosophical works are a sustained attempt to defend the view that philosophy is an autonomous discipline with a distinctive domain of inquiry and that Collingwood's attempt to defend the autonomy of philosophy is intimately connected to his defence of intensional notions against the kind of meaning scepticism which came to prevail from the 1920s. I defend the philosophical claim that there is a third way between the idealist metaphysics with which Collingwood is often associated and the neo‐empiricist agenda which characterised analytic philosophy in mid‐century by defending the hermeneutic thesis that Collingwood's work is a sustained attempt to articulate a conception of philosophy as an epistemologically first science. Since there is a via media between the old metaphysics and the new empiricism there is no need to choose between a certain kind of armchair metaphysics and a scientifically informed ontology.     

The Substantive Impact of Computers on Philosophy Prolegomena to a Computational and Information-Theoretic Metaphysics

I survey in this article the practical uses of computers in philosophy: except for logic, computers have not yet noticeably improved the quality of philosophizing, research, or pedagogy. They have made work easier. My main interest, however, is in the "substantive" impact that computers may have on philosophical problems, especially in metaphysics. I argue that logic, the notion of decidability, and the theory of computation all predated and did not require modern digital computers. In the philosophy of mind, there has been a persistent conflation of computationalism and physicalism. The two theses can and should be separated. Finally, I suggest that we see glimpses of a new metaphysics based on information and information transformations that goes far beyond the well-trodden mind-brain debates.     

Between Pragmatism and Critical Theory: Social Philosophy Today

This paper aims at renovating the prospects for social philosophy through a confrontation between pragmatism and critical theory. In particular, it contends that the resources of pragmatism for advancing a project of emancipatory social philosophy have so far been neglected. After contrasting the two major traditions in social philosophy—the analytical and the critical—I proceed to outline the main traits of a pragmatist social philosophy. By inscribing pragmatism within the tradition of social philosophy, my aim is to promote a new understanding of pragmatism as one of the central Euro-American traditions in social and political philosophy, deserving to be on an equal footing with critical theory and political liberalism. And, furthermore, one whose critical and radical force may be of great help in the wake of the dismissal of the metaphysical certainties upon which the critical program of social philosophy had once set its hopes of social emancipation.