Hybrid Probabilistic Logic Programs as Residuated Logic Programs

In this paper we show the embedding of Hybrid Probabilistic Logic Programs into the rather general framework of Residuated Logic Programs, where the main results of (definite) logic programming are validly extrapolated, namely the extension of the immediate consequences operator of van Emden and Kowalski. The importance of this result is that for the first time a framework encompassing several quite distinct logic programming semantics is described, namely Generalized Annotated Logic Programs, Fuzzy Logic Programming, Hybrid Probabilistic Logic Programs, and Possibilistic Logic Programming. Moreover, the embedding provides a more general semantical structure paving the way for defining paraconsistent probabilistic reasoning with a logic programming semantics.     

The Refined Extension Principle for Semantics of Dynamic Logic Programming

Over recent years, various semantics have been proposed for dealing with updates in the setting of logic programs. The availability of different semantics naturally raises the question of which are most adequate to model updates. A systematic approach to face this question is to identify general principles against which such semantics could be evaluated. In this paper we motivate and introduce a new such principle the refined extension principle. Such principle is complied with by the stable model semantics for (single) logic programs. It turns out that none of the existing semantics for logic program updates, even though generalisations of the stable model semantics, comply with this principle. For this reason, we define a refinement of the dynamic stable model semantics for Dynamic Logic Programs that complies with the principle.     

现象学与逻辑学

无论在胡塞尔思想中还是在海德格尔思想中,现象学与逻辑学的关系都构成一个核心问题。本文首先再现了胡塞尔前后期在此问题上的相关研究,并指出他的超越论逻辑学的要点在于对本质的前逻辑直观,也是最有可能为逻辑学提供哲学支撑的因素。其次,在海德格尔方面,根据律概念成为讨论现象学与逻辑学关系的切入点,由此导出他的“存在理解”、“无蔽”和“自由”的概念解释。他们的共同点在于：把形式逻辑看作陈述逻辑,并试图用前谓词判断的哲学逻辑学来为它奠基。     

Second order inductive logic and Wilmers' principle

We extend the framework of Inductive Logic to Second Order languages and introduce Wilmers' Principle, a rational principle for probability functions on Second Order languages. We derive a representation theorem for functions satisfying this principle and investigate its relationship with the first order principles of Regularity and Super Regularity.     

A Translation of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic into Basic Predicate Logic

Basic Predicate Logic, BQC, is a proper subsystem of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic, IQC. For every formula in the language {, , , , , , }, we associate two sequences of formulas 0,1,... and 0,1,... in the same language. We prove that for every sequent , there are natural numbers m, n, such that IQC , iff BQC n m. Some applications of this translation are mentioned.     

Some Aspects of Polyadic Inductive Logic

We give a brief account of some de Finetti style representation theorems for probability functions satisfying Spectrum Exchangeability in Polyadic Inductive Logic, together with applications to Non-splitting, Language Invariance, extensions with Equality and Instantial Relevance.     

试论"真矛盾"及次协调逻辑的哲学价值

二十世纪后期以来,再也没有哪一种逻辑像次协调逻辑那样,在取得丰富研究成果的同时,也领略到了极为尖锐的批判,仿佛其本身就是一种意味深长的“矛盾”。依照次协调逻辑“真矛盾”的观点所构建的次协调逻辑系统,夷非所思地试图要容纳我们所认知的悖论、辩证矛盾、甚至逻辑矛盾。次协调逻辑试图要和悖论永久共存,但我们可以为了暂时的搁置这种矛盾,发展某理论的其他方面而接受这种逻辑技术。次协调逻辑在反映人脑的容错机制上具有重要的描述功能,这对提高计算机的智能化具有十分重要的实践意义。     

Substructural Logics in Natural Deduction

Extensions of Natural Deduction to Substructural Logics of IntuitionisticLogic are shown: Fragments of Intuitionistic Linear, Relevantand BCK Logic. Rules for implication, conjunction, disjunctionand falsum are defined, where conjunction and disjunction respectcontexts of assumptions. So, conjunction and disjunction areadditive in the terminology of linear logic. Explicit contractionand weakening rules are given. It is shown that conversionsand permutations can be adapted to all these rules, and thatweak normalisation and subformula property holds. The resultsgeneralise to quantification.     

Reflecting rules: A note on generalizing the deduction theorem

The purpose of this brief note is to prove a limitative theorem for a generalization of the deduction theorem. I discuss the relationship between the deduction theorem and rules of inference. Often when the deduction theorem is claimed to fail, particularly in the case of normal modal logics, it is the result of a confusion over what the deduction theorem is trying to show. The classic deduction theorem is trying to show that all so-called ‘derivable rules’ can be encoded into the object language using the material conditional. The deduction theorem can be generalized in the sense that one can attempt to encode all types of rules into the object language. When a rule is encoded in this way I say that it is reflected in the object language. What I show, however, is that certain logics which reflect a certain kind of rule must be trivial. Therefore, my generalization of the deduction theorem does fail where the classic deduction theorem didn't.     

Modal Deduction in Second-Order Logic and Set Theory - II

In this paper, we generalize the set-theoretic translation method for poly-modal logic introduced in [11] to extended modal logics. Instead of devising an ad-hoc translation for each logic, we develop a general framework within which a number of extended modal logics can be dealt with. We first extend the basic set-theoretic translation method to weak monadic second-order logic through a suitable change in the underlying set theory that connects up in interesting ways with constructibility; then, we show how to tailor such a translation to work with specific cases of extended modal logics.     

Mass Nouns in a Logic of Classes as Many

A semantic analysis of mass nouns is given in terms of a logic of classes as many. In previous work it was shown that plural reference and predication for count nouns can be interpreted within this logic of classes as many in terms of the subclasses of the classes that are the extensions of those count nouns. A brief review of that account of plurals is given here and it is then shown how the same kind of interpretation can also be given for mass nouns.     

A logic of intention and attempt

We present a modal logic called (logic of intention and attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of , we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.     

Propositional Plausible Logic: Introduction and Implementation

Plausible Logic allows defeasible deduction with arbitrary propositions, and yet when sufficiently simplified it is very similar to the Defeasible Logics of Billington and Nute. This paper presents Plausible Logic, explains some of the ideas behind the definitions, applies Plausible Logic to an example, and proves a coherence result which indicates that Plausible Logic is well behaved. We also report the first complete implementation of propositional Plausible Logic. The implementation has a web interface which makes it available to researchers and students everywhere. The implementation is evaluated experimentally, and is shown to be capable of handling tens of thousands of rules and sufficiently many disjunctions for realistic problems.     

From a Continental Point of View: The Role of Logic in the Analytic-Continental Divide

My discussion addresses the differences between analytic and continental philosophy concerning the use of logic and exact reasoning in philosophical practice. These differences are mainly examined in the light of the controversial dominance of Hegel's concept of logic (and theory of concept) in twentieth-century continental philosophy. The inquiry is developed in two parts. In the first (Sections 1-2), I indicate some aspects of the analytic-continental divide, pointing to the role that the topic 'logic and philosophy' plays in it. In the second part (Sections 3-6), I give a short account of the views of logic which are typical of the three main trends of continental philosophy (see Table 1). I also suggest how, with the aid of some typical analytical devices, some continental 'anti-logical' attitudes may be corrected, on their own terms.     

Towards the logic of projective identification

This paper is devoted to the ‘logic of the unconscious’ and its application to the analysis of projective intentionality in psychoanalysis.Subjective assumptions concerning the existence and identity of intentional objects are often unconscious. They result from personal experience through its assimilation and transformation in further psychological (e.g. defensive) processes. Formal aspects of these subjective assumptions and their influence on our judgment and action have been studied by a number of psychoanalytic authors, in particular by Silvano Arieti, Ignacio Matte-Blanco and their followers who tried to develop ‘logic of the unconscious’. My project consists in the reformulation, clarification and elaboration of the logic of the unconscious using contemporary modal and relevant logics, in particular Graham Priest's logic of intentionality. An important advantage of this logic is that it allows for truth indeterminacy and paraconsistency of the propositional content of intentional states. In this article I explore the logic of projective identification, which I assume plays the central role in the logic of the unconscious.Special attention is given to the logical analysis of the notion of an internal object, and to a logical reconstruction of the fantasy of projective identification.     

A Dynamic-Logical Perspective on Quantum Behavior

In this paper we show how recent concepts from Dynamic Logic, and in particular from Dynamic Epistemic logic, can be used to model and interpret quantum behavior. Our main thesis is that all the non-classical properties of quantum systems are explainable in terms of the non-classical flow of quantum information. We give a logical analysis of quantum measurements (formalized using modal operators) as triggers for quantum information flow, and we compare them with other logical operators previously used to model various forms of classical information flow: the “test” operator from Dynamic Logic, the “announcement” operator from Dynamic Epistemic Logic and the “revision” operator from Belief Revision theory. The main points stressed in our investigation are the following: (1) The perspective and the techniques of “logical dynamics” are useful for understanding quantum information flow. (2) Quantum mechanics does not require any modification of the classical laws of “static” propositional logic, but only a non-classical dynamics of information. (3) The main such non-classical feature is that, in a quantum world, all information-gathering actions have some ontic side-effects. (4) This ontic impact can affect in its turn the flow of information, leading to non-classical epistemic side-effects (e.g. a type of non-monotonicity) and to states of “objectively imperfect information”. (5) Moreover, the ontic impact is non-local: an information-gathering action on one part of a quantum system can have ontic side-effects on other, far-away parts of the system.