Right-left confusion in the adult: A verbal labeling effect

Directional judgments are typically slower when relative location is described by the words “east” and “west” or “right” and “left” than when described by the words “north” and “south” or “up” and “down.” A series of experiments are reported that disentangle verbal from perceptual encoding explanations for right-left difficulty. Overall, our results support a verbal encoding explanation for right-left confusion in the adult. Experiments 1-3 demonstrate that in a response-differentiation task, it is response to the labels “north,” “east,” “south,” and “west” that is responsible for right-left confusion. In addition, Experiments 4-6 demonstrate that right-left difficulty in a mirror image discrimination task is contingent on the use of directional labels. (The data also suggest that it may be more difficult to deal with “up,” “down,” “left,” and “right” than with “north,” “south,” “east,” and “west”) The data are interpreted as inconsistent with a bilateral symmetry explanation for right-left confusion.     

Reaction times in a task analogous to “same”-“different” judgment

Subjects responded “yes” if two equal-length strings of letters contained a common letter in a common position; otherwise they responded “no.” Thus, the task was to judge whether all or not all of the letters in one string differed from the letter occupying the corresponding position in the other string. Conversely, in “same”-“different” judgment, the task is to judge whether all or not all of the letters in one string match the corresponding letter in the other string. Thus, common-letter judgment and “same”-“different” judgment are symmetrically related with “no” analogous to “same” and “yes” analogous to “different.” The response “same” is often faster than the response “different.” However, in the common-letter task, “no” was slower than “yes.” More specifically, both the “yes” and “no” reaction times were consistent with a serial self-terminating search. This is precisely what would be expected from Bamber’s (1969) two-process model.     

Reaction times and error rates for judging nominal identity of letter strings

Most theories of “same”-“different” judgments predict that “same” responses should be at least as slow as “different” responses. However, the contrary has often been found. To explain this, a two-processor model has been proposed. In this model, a fast processor and a slow processor operate simultaneously. “Same” responses are initiated by whichever processor first indicates that the stimuli are “same,” whereas “different” responses are initiated only by the slow processor. In the experiment reported here, Ss judged whether two successively presented letter strings were nominally “same” or “different.” It was expected that the fast processor would be incapable of making nominal identity judgments. Thus, both “same” and “different” responses would be initiated by the slow processor. Consequently, “same” responses should have been slower than “different” responses. However, this did not occur. This finding casts doubt upon, but does not disprove, the two-processor model.     

“Ratios” and “differences” in perceived sweetness intensity

For a number of perceptual continua, it has been shown in previous studies that subjects use only one quantitative comparison between two sensory impressions of a pair of stimuli, irrespective of whether they are instructed to judge “ratios” or “differences”. This comparison can be described by algebraic subtraction. The present study was designed to investigate whether this one-operation theory for psychophysical judgment also applied to the sensory continuum of sweetness. Subjects were presented with pairs of fructose solutions, and judged “ratios” of, or “differences" in, perceived sweetness intensities. The pairs were constructed on the basis of a factorial judgment design. The results showed that the reported “differences” could be adequately described by a difference response model, and that the reported “ratios” could be adequately described by a ratio response model. However, the reported “ratios” and reported “differences” were monotonically related, and the marginal means of the log-transformed response matrix of “ratios” were a linear function of the marginal means of the response matrix of “differences”. These results are incompatible with the notion that subjects judged differences when instructed to judge “differences”, but ratios when instructed to judge “ratios”. The consistency of the ratio response model with “ratio” judgments is probably caused by a comparative operation based on “differences” in combination with an exponential response output function. It may be concluded that subjects judge only “differences”, and not “ratios”, between perceived sweetness intensities.     

Inherent directionality of “even if” counterfactual conditionals

In this research, we investigate whether semifactual conditionals such as “even if there had been an A, there would have been a B” are understood by thinking initially of the antecedent “A”, as was found with factual conditionals. The “inherent directionality” hypothesis assumes that for the comprehension of most relational statements, a presuppositional element (i.e. the “relatum”) is initially established. For “even if”, both terms could work as “relatum”. This is because on the one hand, people tend to infer “B” from “A” and “not-A” and, on the other hand, “B” could work as a pragmatic presupposition. In the present experiment, semifactual and factual conditionals were tested with a sentence-picture verification task. Results were consistent with the “inherent directionality” hypothesis: only “if then” factual conditionals, but not semifactuals, showed a preference for reasoning from the antecedent, with faster verifications.     

Creating a Self-Plagiarism Research Topic Typology through Bibliometric Visualisation

Self-plagiarism, textual recycling and redundancy seemed to be controversial and unethical; however some questions about its definition are still open. The objective in this paper presented study was to use bibliometric analysis to synthesise and visualize the research literature production and derive a typology of self-plagiarism research. Five topics emerged: Self-plagiarism, Institutional self-plagiarism, Self-plagiarism and ICT, Self-plagiarism in academic writing, Self-plagiarism in science. The state of the art topics seem to be “social medium”, “virtual world”, “face book”, “sociomateriality”, “knowledge sharing”, “open access”, “institutional repository”, “retraction” and “responsible conduct”.     

The phenomenological ontology of literature

Literary ontology is essentially a phenomenological issue rather than one of epistemology, sociology, or psychology. It is a theory of the phenomenological essence intuited from a sense of beauty, based on the phenomenological ontology of beauty, which puts into “brackets” the sociohistorical premises and material conditions of aesthetic phenomena. Beauty is the “objectified” emotion. This is the phenomenological definition of the essence of beauty, which manifests itself on three levels, namely “emotion qua selfconsciousness,” “sense of beauty qua emotion,” and “sentiment qua sense of beauty.” Art on the other hand is the “objectification of emotion” whose most general and closest manner to “humanity” is literature and poetry. Poetry is the origin of language and the linguistic essence is a metaphor. Language as “the house of being” is both “thinking” and “poetry.” Literature expresses the essence of art in the most direct way and, in traditional Chinese aesthetic terminology, literature is the “language of emotion” conveyed by the writer based on his own emotion towards the “language of scene.”     

＂I Effaced Myself＂ and ＂The Disappearance of the Subject＂： A Comparison between Zhuangzi and Jean Baudrillard＇s Anti-Subjectivism

In the chapter ＂The Adjustment of Controversies＂ in his eponymous work, Zhuangzi has the character Nanguo Ziqi declare ＂I effaced myself,＂ thereby holding that one can return to the state of naturalness only after breaking with the ＂self＂ that is in opposition to ＂objects,＂ abandoning his subject-object standpoint and entering a state of ＂effacement＂ wherein one fuses with the Dao. Coincidently, the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard also repeatedly stresses the ＂disappearance of the subject＂ in his later philosophy, trying to dissolve subject-centrism by means of a counterattack by the object wherein its logic would entrap the subject. Although they lived in different times, both Zhuangzi and Baudrillard note the same human predicament--the situation wherein the ＂I as subject＂ constantly obscures the ＂real I.＂ Their resolutions of the predicament are similar： both put their hopes in the dissolution of the ＂I＂ or self in subject-object relations, with Zhuangzi declaring ＂I effaced myself＇ and Baudrillard mooting the ＂disappearance of the subject.＂ They differ, however, on how to dissolve the ＂I＂ （myself）. Briefly, Zhuangzi advocates ＂effacing myself through the Dao,＂ that is, quitting one＇s ＂fixed mindset＂ and ＂egoism＂ and returning to the Dao by means of ＂forgetting＂ or ＂effacing＂; Baudrillard, on the other hand, proposes to ＂efface oneself through the object,＂ i.e., replace the supremacy of the subject with that of the object. Baudrillard＇s theory has often been criticized as pataphysics because of its nihilism without transcendence; in contrast, Zhuangzi＇s view, which construes the whole world as the unfolding of the Dao, seems more thought-provoking.     

Concepts of Creativity: Similarities and Differences among Mainland,Hong Kong and Taiwanese Chinese

Aspects of creativity concepts across different Chinese populations were examined. A Likert style questionnaire consisting of 60 adjectives was administered to 451 undergraduates from Beijing, Guangzhou, Taipei and Hong Kong. The results show that: (a) the core characteristics of creativity identical in all the samples are: “originality”, “innovativeness”, “thinking” and “observational skills”, “flexibility”, “willingness to try”, “self confidence”, and “imagination”; (b) the Taipei sample, unlike the other three samples, does not associate “wisdom”, “assertiveness”, and “individualism” with creativity; (c) in all Chinese populations the three factors labeled innovative, dynamic, and intellectual were distinguishable in the concept of creativity; (d) “artistic” and “humorous” were missing in the Chinese perception of creativity; (e) creativity characteristics received relatively low ratings on the desirability scale.     

Response probabilities and “same-different” reaction times

A “same-different” reaction-time (RT) task with multidimensional stimuli was used with a 50:50 and a 75:25 proportion of “different” to “same” response. The “different” RTs to each dimension were similar for the two proportions. However, the “same” RT in the 50:50 condition was faster than the “same” for the 75:25 condition and faster than the slowest “different” RT. Interpretations of the results in terms of response bias and processing criteria are offered.     

Priming effect in affirmative complex conditional connectives

We report the results of an experiment that examined the mental representations underlying the comprehension of complex conditional connectives (such as “A, on condition that B”) and the conditional if (such as “A, if B”). The mental representations during the comprehension stage were analysed using a “priming methodology”. The experiment showed that participants read the possibility “A and not-B” faster when it was primed by “A, if B” than when it was primed by “A, on condition that B”. The finding suggests that people understand the sentence “A, on condition that B” as biconditional; other possibilities (“A and B”, “not-A and B”, “not-A and not-B”) were primed equally by both connectives. We discuss the implications of this for current theories of reasoning.     

Response to Ranganathan

This essay responds to Bharat Ranganathan's “Comment” on my essay, “The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2011). Addressing key criticisms in this “Comment,” I make the following points. First, neither the idea of inherent dignity being “imparted” to humans, nor the Universal Declaration's implication—through its use of terms such as “inherent” and “inalienable”—that humans participate in transcendent reality, necessarily presuppose a Christian metaphysics. Second, a concept such as “inherent dignity” must be affirmed to be intrinsically heuristic unless we are to assume that its meaning can be completely known within the conditions of existence; but this affirmation does not render such concepts “indeterminate of sense.” Finally, Ranganathan's distinction between“weak” and “strong” senses of transcendence is untenable. If human truths beyond all contingencies are knowable (“weak” transcendence), then there must be a real dimension of meaning that transcends all contingencies (“strong” transcendence).     

Towards a literary account of mental health from James' Principles of Psychology

The field of mental health tends to treat its literary metaphors as literal realities with the concomitant loss of vague “feelings of tendency” in “unusual experiences”. I develop this argument through the prism of William James’ (1890) “The Principles of Psychology”. In the first part of the paper, I reflect upon the relevance of James' “The Psychologist's Fallacy” to a literary account of mental health. In the second part of the paper, I develop the argument that “connotations” and “feelings of tendency” are central to resolving some of the more difficult challenges of this fallacy. I proceed to do this in James' spirit of generating imaginative metaphors to understand experience. Curiously, however, mental health presents a strange paradox in William James’ (1890) Principles of Psychology. He constructs an elaborate conception of the “empirical self” and “stream of thought” but chooses not to use these to understand unusual experiences – largely relying instead on the concept of a “secondary self.” In this article, I attempt to make more use of James' central division between the “stream of thought” and the “empirical self” to understand unusual experiences. I suggest that they can be usefully understood using the loose metaphor of a “binary star” where the “secondary self” can be seen as an “accretion disk” around one of the stars. Understood as literary rather the literal, this metaphor is quite different to more unitary models of self-breakdown in mental health, particularly in its separation of “self” from “the stream of thought” and I suggest it has the potential to start a re-imagination of the academic discourse around mental health.     

Right and Righteous: Children's Incipient Understanding and Evaluation of True and False Statements

Two studies examined young children's early understanding and evaluation of truth telling and lying and the role that factuality plays in their judgments. Study 1 (one hundred four 2- to 5-year-olds) found that even the youngest children reliably accepted true statements and rejected false statements and that older children's ability to label true and false (T/F) statements as “truth” and “lie” emerged in tandem with their positive evaluation of true statements and “truth” and their negative evaluation of false statements and “lie.” The findings suggest that children's early preference for factuality develops into a conception of “truth” and “lie” that is linked both to factuality and moral evaluation. Study 2 (one hundred twenty-eight 3- to 5-year-olds) revealed that whereas young children exhibited good understanding of the association of T/F statements with “truth,” “lie,” “mistake,” “right,” and “wrong,” they showed little awareness of assumptions about speaker knowledge underlying “lie” and “mistake.” The results further support the primacy of factuality in children's early understanding and evaluation of truth and lies.     

Children's understanding of sentences with contingent relations: Why are temporal and conditional connectives so difficult?

Children aged 5-, 7-, and 9 were tested on two different tasks to assess their understanding of sentences containing the connectives “when,” “as soon as,” “before,” “after,” “if,” “if-not,” “unless,” and “unless-not.” The results revealed significant improvement between the ages of 5 and 7. This improvement was attributed, in part, to an increased ability to retain information expressed in subordinate clauses. At all age levels, however, the connectives “unless” and “unless-not” were consistently misinterpreted; “unless” was treated as its polar opposite “if,” and “unless-not” was treated as its polar opposite “if-not.”     

That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”     

The measurement of simulated stealing behaviour and moral judgement — a technique

A technique is described which attempts to measure the responses of children in hypothetical stealing dilemmas. A technique embodying two forms, a so-called “did do” version and a “should do” version, was constructed. The “did do” version was an attempt to represent the child in an “actual” though hypothetical stealing dilemma and through the use of the first person pronoun “I”, contrast this with a situation in which the child could respond in terms of how he or she thought he or she should. A series of highly significant differences within the groups on the “did do” and “should do” versions was noted, together with significant differences between the “delinquent” and “normal” populations. It was argued that such differences indicated that the procedure had good validity as well as acceptable reliability.     

Understanding the “cognitive revolution” in psychology

In this paper it is argued that the “cognitive revolution” in psychology is not best represented either as a Kuhnian “paradigm shift,” or as a movement from an instrumentalist to a realist conception of psychological theory, or as a continuous evolution out of more “liberalized” forms of behaviorism, or as a return to the form of “structuralist” psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener. It is suggested that the move from behaviorism to cognitivism is best represented in terms of the replacement of (operationally defined) “intervening variables” by genuine “hypothetical constructs” possessing cognitive “surplus meaning,” and that the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s continued a cognitive tradition that can be traced back to the 1920s. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Stuck in the Middle: The Use and Interpretation of Mid-Points in Items on Questionnaires

Likert-type scales are commonly used when assessing attitudes, personality characteristics, and other psychological variables. This study examined the effect of varying the number of response options on the same set of 28 attitudinal items. Participants answered items using either a 4-point scale (forced choice), a 5-point scale that included a “neither” mid-point, or a 4-point scale with an option of “no opinion” presented after the item. The questionnaire also included an item asking participants what they believe the midpoint in a scale indicated. As predicted, participants’ interpretations of the midpoint varied widely with the most common responses being: “no opinion,” “don't care,” “unsure,” “neutral,” “equal/both,” and “neither.” The quantitative results showed that participants’ levels of item endorsement varied based on the response options offered. For example, “neither” was chosen more often than “no opinion” on all of the items.