On the automatic evaluation of end-states

The author's research examined automatically activated attitudes toward desired end-states. Across 4 studies, participants' automatic attitudes toward goals (i.e., thinness, egalitarianism) significantly predicted their goal pursuit, including behaviors, intentions, and judgments. Such attitudes predicted behavior and judgments that are difficult to monitor and control (i.e., restrained eating, subtle prejudice), but not judgments that are easy to monitor and control (i.e., blatant prejudice). Automatic attitudes toward goals also possessed unique predictive validity compared with explicit measures of motivation and with automatic attitudes toward more physical, "graspable" objects. The findings are discussed with regard to the predictive validity of automatic attitudes, the use of automatic attitudes toward goals as an implicit measure of motivation, and the role of automatic evaluative processes in goal-pursuit and self-regulation.     

Affect in the aftermath: how goal pursuit influences implicit evaluations

Previous research has shown that the activation of a goal leads to more implicit positivity toward goal-relevant stimuli. We examined how the actual pursuit of a goal influences subsequent implicit positivity toward such stimuli. Participants were consciously or non-consciously primed with a goal, or not, and then completed a goal-relevant task on which they succeeded or failed. We then measured their goal-relevant implicit attitudes. Those who were primed with the goal (consciously or non-consciously) and experienced success exhibited more implicit positivity toward the goal, compared with the no-goal condition. Experiencing failure in the goal priming conditions reduced implicit positivity toward the goal, indicating disengagement from the goal. We discuss the theoretical implications for understanding the role of implicit attitudes in self-regulation.     

Mental contrasting and the self-regulation of responding to negative feedback

Mentally contrasting a desired future with impeding reality promotes goal pursuit when expectations of success are high and curbs goal pursuit when expectations of success are low. Four studies tested whether mental contrasting affects responses to goal-relevant negative feedback. Mental contrasting promoted the processing of negative feedback (Studies 1 and 2), which in turn helped participants to form plans beneficial for goal pursuit (Study 2). Mental contrasting also protected the self-view of competence against negative feedback (Study 3) and facilitated beneficial attributions for negative feedback (Study 4). All effects occurred in line with expectations of success. These results suggest that mental contrasting regulates effective responses to negative feedback by bringing goal pursuit in line with expectations of success.     

The "Instrumentality" Heuristic: Why Metacognitive Difficulty Is Desirable During Goal Pursuit

ABSTRACT— The literature overwhelmingly demonstrates that feelings of ease are good and that objects that are easy to process are much liked. We propose, and demonstrate across three experiments, that this is not the case when people are pursuing a goal. This is because people pursuing a goal (e.g., "become kinder") usually invest efforts in whichever means (e.g., donate to a particular charity) they perceive as most instrumental for attaining their goal. Consequently, in their minds there is a correspondence between instrumentality of a means and feelings of effort. This correspondence becomes reversed in people's minds during goal pursuit, and they also come to view an object that is associated with feelings of effort rather than ease as more instrumental for goal attainment and consequently more desirable. When an object is not a means to fulfill an accessible goal, or when goals relating to the means are not accessible, subjective feelings of ease improve evaluation, as found in previous research on ease of processing.     

Real Objects Can Impede Conditional Reasoning but Augmented Objects Do Not

In this study, Knauff and Johnson‐Laird's (2002) visual impedance hypothesis (i.e., mental representations with irrelevant visual detail can impede reasoning) is applied to the domain of external representations and diagrammatic reasoning. We show that the use of real objects and augmented real (AR) objects can control human interpretation and reasoning about conditionals. As participants made inferences (e.g., an invalid one from "if P then Q" to "P"), they also moved objects corresponding to premises. Participants who moved real objects made more invalid inferences than those who moved AR objects and those who did not manipulate objects (there was no significant difference between the last two groups). Our results showed that real objects impeded conditional reasoning, but AR objects did not. These findings are explained by the fact that real objects may over‐specify a single state that exists, while AR objects suggest multiple possibilities.     

The effect of developmental regulation on visual attention: The example of the "biological clock"

The current study investigated the attentional mechanisms associated with goal engagement and disengagement in a lifespan context. Women approaching the end of their childbearing years (N = 29) were compared with women who had passed that deadline (N = 28). Participants' goal engagement was measured with a goal nomination task, an incidental recall task of goal-relevant sentences, visual attention to goal-relevant vs. goal-irrelevant images, and a memory task of goal-relevant images. The attention data indicated that women approaching the deadline had a longer first fixation on baby images than women who had passed the deadline. This novel finding was supported by a replication of the previous finding that women approaching the deadline were more engaged with the goal of childbearing than women who had passed the deadline. The connection between attention and memory of goal-relevant information is explored as evidence of cognition working in the service of motivation and developmental regulation.     

Preconscious effects of temporary goals on attention

Two experiments examined whether accessible goals preconsciously direct selective attention. Goal activation was manipulated by one's goal pursuit being either undermined or affirmed (resulting in an experienced state of either incompleteness or completeness). Attention responses were assessed through a Stroop-like task (Experiment 1) and a response-time task in which participants indicated a stimulus' direction of motion (Experiment 2). Results showed that when goals were accessible, attention was drawn toward goal-relevant items—even when these items were to be ignored and when responses occurred too fast for conscious control. Accessible goals directed implicit cognition (i.e., attention toward stimuli associated with the goal), despite the fact that these goals were not chronically held, but manipulated in the lab.     

Subliminal priming and persuasion: Striking while the iron is hot

Three studies demonstrated that subliminally priming a goal-relevant cognition (thirst in Studies 1 and 2; sadness in Study 3) influenced behavior (in Study 1) and enhanced the persuasiveness of an ad targeting the goal (in Studies 2 and 3) when people were motivated to pursue the goal (when they were thirsty in Studies 1 and 2; when they expected to interact with another person in Study 3). These results suggest that subliminal priming can be used to enhance persuasion, but only when certain conditions are met. Both the priming of goal-relevant cognitions and the motive to pursue the goal were necessary for ads targeting the goal to be more persuasive. The implications of these results for the role of functionality in subliminal priming and for the use and abuse of subliminal priming in persuasion are discussed.     

How to work out and avoid procrastination: The role of goal focus

This 8-week longitudinal experience sampling study with N = 346 participants (n = 242 completers) of a high-intensity interval training program explored how goal focus (i.e., a focus on the process vs. outcome of goal pursuit) is related to procrastination and successful goal pursuit. Specifically, the study investigated the association between goal focus and participants' adherence to their workout plans (i.e., procrastination), their immediate experience during the workout (e.g., pleasantness), and their intentions to work out when they were procrastinating. Moreover, the study examined how process and outcome focus are linked to overall goal achievement, workout satisfaction, and objective fitness gains. Converging with previous research, results suggest that adopting a process focus is adaptive. In addition, the analyses revealed some positive relationships between outcome focus and immediate indicators of successful goal pursuit. However, in contrast to process focus, outcome focus was not related to the overall measures and even seemed maladaptive once people were procrastinating.     

Forcing your luck: Goal-striving behavior in chance situations

Previous research suggests that desired end-states (i.e., goals) initiate a set of motivational processes supporting goal-attainment. For example, motivational intensity (e.g., effort investment) increases as distance to the goal decreases. The present studies investigate whether this goal-gradient can also be observed in chance determined situations, situations in which there is a desired end-state (i.e., winning) but in which increased effort investment does not support goal-attainment. Three studies provide consistent evidence for the goal-gradient in chance determined situations. We show that participants (in the lab and in a TV game show) invest more effort into goal-directed behavior the closer they get to the end of the game. The moderation of expectancy and value was, however, modest. Interestingly, participants’ self-reports suggest that their dynamic changes in behavior were unintentional and perceived as non-instrumental. Findings are related to theories of goal pursuit and illusory control, and contrasted to the principle of resource conservation, according to which such behavior should not occur.     

Big Picture,Bad Outcomes: When Visual Perspectives Harm Health Goal Pursuit

People often fail to achieve health goals, which compromises their well‐being. Prior research suggests that seeing events through an observer's eyes (i.e., adopting a third‐person perspective) should facilitate goal pursuit. However, we find that third‐person perspectives discourage goal‐consistent intentions and behavior for health goals when goal centrality is low (i.e., the goal is peripheral to one's self‐concept). In Experiment 1, people who adopted a third‐person perspective chose more sugary foods if they considered a healthy eating goal to be more peripheral to the self. Experiment 2 examines why a third‐person perspective can hinder goal pursuit; it encourages a breakdown in implemental thinking which, in turn, increases negative self‐conscious emotions. While high goal centrality buffers people from negative effects on goal intentions, low centrality does not. Experiment 3 demonstrates that this effect is robust when goal centrality is manipulated. We recommend that consumers pursuing health goals (and individuals who support them) exercise caution when employing perspective‐based strategies, as they may backfire for people at greatest risk of goal abandonment.     

The end justifies the means, but only in the middle

Achieving goals often requires the completion of sequential actions, such as finishing a series of assignments to pass a class. In the course of pursuing such goals, people can decide how closely to follow their personal standards for each action. We propose that actions at the beginning and end of a sequence appear more diagnostic of the pursuer's personal standards than do actions in the middle. Therefore, people are more likely to adhere to their standards at the beginning and end of goal pursuit-and slack in the middle. We demonstrate this pattern of judgment and behavior in adherence to ethical standards (e.g., cheating), religious traditions (e.g., skipping religious rituals), and performance standards (e.g., "cutting corners" on a task). We also show that the motivation to adhere to standards by using proper means is independent and follows a different pattern from the motivation to reach the end state of goal pursuit.     

Subgoals as substitutes or complements: the role of goal accessibility

The self-regulation process often involves breaking an ongoing goal (e.g., keeping in shape) into many individual, constituent subgoals that monitor actual actions (e.g., eating healthy meals, going to the gym). The article examines how pursuing each of these subgoals may influence subsequent goal pursuit. The authors show that when people consider success on a single subgoal, additional actions toward achieving a superordinate goal are seen as substitutes and are less likely to be pursued. In contrast, when people consider their commitment to a superordinate goal on the basis of initial success on a subgoal, additional actions toward achieving that goal may seem to be complementary and more likely to be pursued. These predictions were tested in four studies that explored the conditions under which subgoals attainment have a counterproductive versus favorable effect on further pursuit of similar actions.     

On the emergence of deprivation-reducing behaviors: Subliminal priming of behavior representations turns deprivation into motivation

Building on recent research into the emergence of human motivation and goal pursuit in the absence of the conscious awareness of the source of this pursuit, the present article aimed to shed light on how states of deprivation (e.g., deprivation of fluid) actually produce the motivation and corresponding behavior that lifts the deprivation. Two studies established that when participants were relatively deprived of fluids, they experienced enhanced motivation to drink and consumed more fluid in an alleged tasting test, and these effects were more pronounced when the concept of drinking was rendered accessible by subliminal priming. These results suggest that specific motivational goal states and corresponding behaviors do not arise directly from deprivation per se, but that accessible goal-related cognitions play a role in this process. Implications for theory and research on deprivation and non-conscious goal pursuit are briefly discussed.     

Silence and table manners: when environments activate norms

Two studies tested the conditions under which an environment (e.g., library, restaurant) raises the relevance of environment-specific social norms (e.g., being quiet, using table manners). As hypothesized, the relevance of such norms is raised when environments are goal relevant ("I am going there later") and when they are humanized with people or the remnants of their presence (e.g., a glass of wine on a table). Two studies show that goal-relevant environments and humanized environments raise the perceived importance of norms (Study 1) and the intention to conform to norms (Study 2). Interestingly, in both studies, these effects reach beyond norms related to the environments used in the studies.     

When planning is needed: Implementation intentions and attainment of approach versus avoidance health goals

OBJECTIVE: This study tested whether forming implementation intentions is an effective strategy for attaining health goals focused on trying to avoid a negative state. DESIGN: Participants chose to either eat more healthy snacks (i.e., an approach goal) or eat fewer unhealthy snacks (i.e., an avoidance goal) over two weeks and were randomly assigned to create an implementation intention to do this or not. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: The authors measured fat and calorie intake after one week and after two weeks. RESULTS: After two weeks, the participants who ate most unhealthily were those who pursued an avoidance goal and did not form an implementation intention. CONCLUSION: These results suggest that forming implementation intentions for avoidance goal pursuit can help people attain important health goals.     

Behavioral Goals Constrain the Selection of Visual Information

Although there is agreement that attentional processes are limited, the necessary conditions for such limitation have not been determined. We investigated whether behavioral goals are sufficient to constrain the selection of visual information. In two tasks, subjects were presented with targets and distractors that varied on two dimensions (e.g., color and letter). In separate conditions, the subjects' goal was to identify only one dimension of the target while ignoring the second dimension and ignoring the distractors. In both tasks, peripheral distractors interfered with target selection only when the targets and distractors differed on the goal-relevant dimension. When the goal was changed, the pattern of interference from the same stimuli was reversed, so that distractors affected target selection only according to the new goal. These results suggest that behavioral goals constrain the selection of visual information to a greater extent than the physical characteristics of the visual information.     

Automatic goal inferences

The social psychological literature on automatic social inferences has focused on one construct that helps explaining human behavior—traits (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Trope, 1986; Winter & Uleman, 1984). The dispositional roots of behavior, however, go beyond relatively stable constructs such as traits to include more transient causes such as one’s intentions and goals. Evidence from young infants and adult chimpanzees, knowledge acquired in the text-comprehension literature and hypotheses derived from the Automatic Causal Inferences framework (Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2002), seems to converge: they all suggest that perceivers may automatically infer goals from behaviors. This paper reports four studies that examine this hypothesis. The first two use surprise cued-recall, and look at goal inferences when the road to goal achievement seems straightforward and when it seems blocked. Studies 3 and 4 use on-line methodologies—probe recognition task and lexical decision—to examine whether these inferences are made at encoding.     

Multinomial models reveal deficits of two distinct controlled retrieval processes in aging and very mild Alzheimer disease

Dual-process models of episodic retrieval reveal consistent deficits of controlled recollection in aging and Alzheimer disease (AD). In contrast, automatic familiarity is relatively spared. We extend standard dual-process models by showing the importance of a third capture process. Capture produces a failure to attempt recollection, which might reflect a distinct error from an inability to recollect when attempted (Jacoby et al. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134(2), 131–148, 2005a). We used multinomial process tree (MPT) modeling to estimate controlled recollection and capture processes, as well as automatic retrieval processes, in a large group of middle-aged to older adults who were cognitively normal (N = 519) or diagnosed with the earliest detectable stage of AD (N = 107). Participants incidentally encoded word pairs (e.g., knee bone). At retrieval, participants completed cued word fragments (e.g., knee b_n_) with primes that were congruent (e.g., bone), incongruent (e.g., bend), or neutral (i.e., &&&) to the target (e.g., bone). MPT models estimated retrieval processes both at the group and the individual levels. A capture parameter was necessary to fit MPT models to the observed data, suggesting that dual-process models of this task can be contaminated by a capture process. In both group- and individual-level analyses, aging and very mild AD were associated with increased susceptibility to capture, decreased recollection, and no differences in automatic influences. These results suggest that it is important to consider two distinct modes of attentional control when modeling retrieval processes. Both forms of control (recollection and avoiding capture) are particularly sensitive to cognitive decline in aging and early-stage AD.