Berkeley,Meaning and Minds: Remarks on Glezakos’ Comments

This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict, and (3) whether the texts support my reading.

Why a "word order difference" is not always a "word order" difference: a reply to Weyerts,Penke, Münte,Heinze, and Clahsen

We present evidence that the supposed processing advantage for an SV_finO word order over an SOV_fin word order in German argued for by Weyerts, Penke, Münte, Heinze, and Clahsen (2002) is supported by neither experimental nor theoretical evidence. Specifically, we show (a) that the frontocentral negativity for an SOV_fin in comparison to an SV_finO word order in Weyerts et al.'s Experiments 2 and 3 is reducible to more general differences in the electrophysiological responses elicited by nouns versus verbs in a sentence context, and (b) that the P600 difference between the two word orders in Experiment 2, as well as the reading time differences in Experiment 1, result from the fact that the two supposedly ungrammatical conditions actually differ in their degree of ill-formedness. We conclude that there is no evidence for a processing disadvantage for SOV_fin, thus reconciling Weyerts et al.'s results on German sentence processing with the grammatical regularities of German.     

Remarks on the identifiability of thurstonian ranking models: Case V, case III, or neither?

It is well-known that the representations of the Thurstonian Case III and Case V models for paired comparison data are not unique. Similarly, when analyzing ranking data, other equivalent covariance structures can substitute for those given by Thurstone in these cases. That is, we may more broadly define the family of covariance structures satisfying Case III and Case V conditions. This paper introduces the notion of equivalence classes which defines a more meaningful partition of the covariance structures of the Thurstonian ranking models. In addition, the equivalence classes of Case V and Case III are completely characterized.     

When meaning matters,look but don’t touch: The effects of posture on reading

Much of the reading that we do occurs near our hands. Previous research has revealed that spatial processing is enhanced near the hands, potentially benefiting several processes involved in reading; however, it is unknown whether semantic processing—another critical aspect of reading—is affected near the hands. While holding their hands either near to or far from a visual display, our subjects performed two tasks that drew on semantic processing: evaluation of the sensibleness of sentences, and the Stroop color-word interference task. We found evidence for impoverished semantic processing near the hands in both tasks. These results suggest a trade-off between spatial processing and semantic processing for the visual space around the hands. Readers are encouraged to be aware of this trade-off when choosing how to read a text, since both kinds of processing can be beneficial for reading.     

Characteristics of spatial memory span: Is there an analogy to the word length effect, based on movement time?

In studies of verbal short-term memory it has been shown that the length of words to be remembered affects the size of memory span. This word-length effect is attributed to relationships between the rate of rehearsal of verbal material and the time it takes to speak the words being rehearsed. For spatial memory span there may also be an internal rehearsal system linked to overt responding, and if there is a strong analogy to be drawn between the verbal and spatial domains then movement time between spatial targets should predict the number of spatial locations that can be recalled. In the experiments reported here the time taken to move between spatial targets is varied by altering the size of targets and the distance between them. No difference between span performance on a nine-block spatial span task were found, either on immediate recall or on recall after an interval. When recall is of items from an array of 27, grouped in nine sets of three, with only one location in any set being presented on any trial, there is an effect of display size. This effect is consonant with the argument that movement time is related to spatial rehearsal, but other explanations are also possible. However, if recall in this task is scored over the nine sets rather than over the 27 items, then there is no difference between the displays. The results indicate that performance on the normal nine-block spatial-span task cannot be predicted by movement time.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">On Seeing</Emphasis>: Remarks on Metzger’s Laws of Seeing

Nowadays cognitive science often views sensorial presentations and mental presentations as mutually exclusive, and they are also given separate treatment by neurophysiologists and by cognitive scientists, and some phenomena (like anomalous surfaces or various types of imagery) are reduced to either the former or the latter. Since no adequate methods for its investigation have been developed, the level of perceptual experiences analysed by Gestaltists and magnificently illustrated by Metzger in his Laws of Seeing remains unexplored. Starting from Metzger’s analyses the paper deals with the question of the theoretical value of experimental phenomenology to the theory of knowledge and ontology.     

Detection of words versus good old counting: A note on Mizrahi and Dickinson, “The analytic-continental divide in philosophical practice”

In a recent Metaphilosophy article, Moti Mizrahi and Michael Dickinson argue against characterizing the divide between analytical and continental philosophy as a divide in the use of arguments. This hypothesis is rejected on the basis of a text-mining approach. The present paper argues that the results they extracted do not answer the questions they set out to answer as well as would have been possible. This is due to Mizrahi and Dickinson's choice to disregard duplicate occurrences of argument word pairs, their main indicator for the occurrence of arguments in articles. This paper reconstructs their method by now also counting duplicates. A small corpus (n = 436) of recent (2015–2021) analytical and continental articles is used to rerun the experiment; the results oppose Mizrahi and Dickinson's and suggest that arguments (as operationalized by Mizrahi and Dickinson) occur more in analytical articles. The paper argues that part of the discrepancy derives from the specific methodological choices they made.     

Empathy,Einfühlung,and aesthetic experience: the effect of emotion contagion on appreciation of representational and abstract art using fEMG and SCR

Since the advent of the concept of empathy in the scientific literature, it has been hypothesized, although not necessarily empirically verified, that empathic processes are essential to aesthetic experiences of visual art. We tested how the ability to “feel into” (“Einfühlung”) emotional content—a central aspect of art empathy theories—affects the bodily responses to and the subjective judgments of representational and abstract paintings. The ability to feel into was measured by a standardized pre-survey on “emotional contagion”—the ability to pick up and mirror, or in short to “feel into”, emotions, which often overlaps with higher general or interpersonal empathetic abilities. Participants evaluated the artworks on several aesthetic dimensions (liking, valence, moving, and interest), while their bodily reactions indicative of empathetic engagement (facial electromyography—EMG, and skin conductance responses—SCR) were recorded. High compared to low emotion contagion participants showed both more congruent and more intense bodily reactions (EMG and SCR) and aesthetic evaluations (higher being moved, valence, and interest) and also liked the art more. This was largely the case for both representational and abstract art, although stronger with the representational category. Our findings provide tentative evidence for recent arguments by art theorists for a close “empathic” mirroring of emotional content. We discuss this interpretation, as well as a potential tie between emotion contagion and a general increase in emotion intensity, both of which may impact, in tandem, the experience and evaluation of art.     

‘In the Court of a Great King’: Some Remarks on Leo Strauss’ <Emphasis Type="Italic">Introduction to the Guide of the Perplexed</Emphasis>

In the second half of this essay (begun in Sophia 50:141–158), we continue our reading of Leo Strauss’ important later essay on Maimonides, ‘How to Begin to Study the Guide of the Perplexed’. Our method is to try, as best as we are able, to read this essay as Strauss directs us to read esoteric texts in Persecution and the Art of Writing. As a means of testing and attempting to confirm our reading of this difficult later essay on Maimonides, we will close by situating our reading of ‘How to Begin to Study’ and Strauss’ partly concealed positions there on philosophy, prophecy and the Torah alongside the claims of his earlier, much less esoteric, but also rarely studied 1930s essay: ‘Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi’. Because of the widely recognised foundational importance of Maimonides in understanding Leo Strauss’ own lasting positions, this work aims at making a contribution to the continuing, and presently highly contentious, task of trying to understand Strauss’ thoughts on Athens and Jerusalem, reason and revelation, the city and man.     

‘In the Court of a Great King’: Some Remarks on Leo Strauss’ Introduction to the <Emphasis Type="BoldItalic">Guide for the Perplexed</Emphasis>

This essay, which will be divided between two SOPHIA editions, proposes to test the consensus in Maimonidean scholarship on the alleged intellectualism of Leo Strauss’ Maimonides by making a close interpretive study of Strauss’ 1963 essay ‘How to Begin to Study the Guide for the Perplexed’. While the importance of this essay, which is Strauss’ last extended piece on the Guide, is established in Maimonidean scholarship, its recognised esotericism has been matched by a dearth of detailed studies of the piece. We aim in this essay to try to rectify this situation, by reading ‘How to Begin to Study’ as Strauss directs us to read esoteric texts in Persecution and the Art of Writing. As one control on our exegetical claims, we will close by situating our reading of ‘How to Begin to Study’ and Strauss’ positions there on philosophy, prophecy and the Torah alongside the claims of his earlier, much less esoteric, but also rarely studied: ‘Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi’. Because of the now widely recognised foundational importance of Maimonides in understanding Leo Strauss’ own lasting positions, this work will have wider importance in Strauss scholarship, and hopefully make a contribution to the continuing task of trying to understand Strauss’ important thoughts on Athens and Jerusalem, reason and revelation, the city and man.     

Is it smart to play the horses? Comment on "A day at the races: a study of IQ, expertise, and cognitive complexity" (Ceci & Liker, 1986)

Ceci and Liker (1986b) presented data that they contended shows two things: (a) Handicapping harness races is a cognitively complex undertaking that can be captured by a multiple regression model, and (b) neither overall skill at handicapping nor the complexity of the mental model used is related to standard measures of intelligence. The first contention is not at issue. But the second contention, that handicapping performance is unrelated to IQ, is not supported by the data presented; in fact, the opposite conclusion seems more likely. The purpose of this comment is to point out errors frequently made in individual-differences research concerning population definition, sample selection, dependent and independent variable reliability and validity and interpretation of results.     

Making sense of the lived body <Emphasis Type="Italic">and</Emphasis> the lived world: meaning and presence in Husserl,Derrida and Noë

I argue that Husserl’s transcendental account of the role of the lived body in sense-making is a precursor to Alva Noë’s recent work on the enactive, embodied mind, specifically his notion of “sensorimotor knowledge” as a form of embodied sense-making that avoids representationalism and intellectualism. Derrida’s deconstructive account of meaning—developed largely through a critique of Husserl—relies on the claim that meaning is structured through the complication of the “interiority” of consciousness by an “outside,” and thus might be thought to lend itself to theories of mind such as Noë’s that emphasize the ways in which sense-making occurs outside the head. But while Derrida’s notion of “contamination” rightly points to an indeterminateness of meaning in an outside, extended, concrete lived world, he ultimately reduces meaning to a structure of signification. This casts indeterminateness in terms of absence, ignoring the presence of non-linguistic phenomena of embodied sense-making central to both the contemporary enactivist program and to the later Husserl, who is able to account for the indeterminateness of meaning in lived experience through his distinction between sense (Sinn) and more exact linguistic meaning (Bedeutung). Husserl’s transcendental theory of meaning also allows for a substantive contribution to sense-making from the side of the perceived object—an aspect missing from Noë’s account. Thus, in contrast to Derrida and to Noë, Husserl accounts for sense-making in terms of both the lived body and the lived world.