Thinking about psychoanalytic curricula: an epistemological perspective

The author discusses the role that curriculum development can play in preparing psychoanalytic candidates to understand the challenges created by theoretical pluralism in our field and by the growth of knowledge in neighboring disciplines. Curriculum design can be used to encourage the development of epistemological perspectives that can serve as organizing frameworks to help candidates think critically about psychoanalytic knowledge. It is possible to teach these complex matters in a way that students find accessible and useful. The author presents exemplars taken from the curriculum at the Columbia University Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research in New York.     

Pollock on probability in epistemology

In Thinking and Acting John Pollock offers some criticisms of Bayesian epistemology, and he defends an alternative understanding of the role of probability in epistemology. Here, I defend the Bayesian against some of Pollock's criticisms, and I discuss a potential problem for Pollock's alternative account.     

关注精神世界谱写道德文章--罗国杰学术思想简论

作为新中国伦理学事业的开拓者之一,罗国杰教授在四十多年的学术生涯中,关注人的精神世界,关注不断发展的社会道德生活,发表和出版了大量颇有影响的研究成果,为中国伦理学事业的发展做出了重要贡献,本文从以下四方面做了简要评介:一、坚持马克思主义立场,努力探索和建立中国特色的马克思主义伦理学的理论体系;二、坚持一元价值导向,致力于研究和完善集体主义道德理论;三、坚持批判继承、正确对待、积极弘扬中华民族的优良道德传统;四、关注道德建设,探索建立适应社会主义市场经济的道德体系.     

When an Object Appears Unexpectedly: Object Circumvention in Adults

Obstacles often appear unexpectedly in our pathway and these require us to make immediate adjustments. Despite how regularly we encounter such situations only few studies have considered how we adjust to unexpected obstacles in the pathway that require us to walk around them. The authors considered how adults adjust to the possibility of an obstacle appearing and then also how foot placement is adjusted to circumvent an obstacle. Fifteen healthy adults walked down an 11-m walkway, initially they were told this was a clear pathway and nothing in the environment would change (no gate), they then performed a series of trials in which a gate may (gate close) or may not (gate open) partially obstruct their pathway. The authors found that mediolateral trunk velocity and acceleration was significantly increased when there was the possibility of an obstacle but before the obstacle appeared. This demonstrates an adaptive walking strategy that seems to enable healthy young adults to successfully circumvent obstacles. The authors also categorized foot placement adjustments and found that adults favored making shorter and wider steps away from the obstacle. They suggest this combination of adjustments allows participants to maintain stability while successfully circumventing the obstacle.     

对几种临床定势思维的思考

思维定势有权威定势、从众定势、经验定势、唯书本定势、情感定势。思维定势制约我们创新思想的发展,要更好实践临床工作,必须客观评价各种思维定势,主动进行创新思维训练。本文分别对各种思维定势在临床工作中的体现、优劣进行表述,并举例说明。     

对几种临床定势思维的思考

思维定势有权威定势、从众定势、经验定势、唯书本定势、情感定势.思维定势制约我们创新思想的发展,要更好实践临床工作,必须客观评价各种思维定势,主动进行创新思维训练.本文分别对各种思维定势在临床工作中的体现、优劣进行表述,并举例说明.     

Thinking Outside the Disciplinary Box: a Reply to the Comments

This article is a reply to the comments on my target article, “Presentism and diversity in the history of psychology” (Brock Psychological Studies, 60, 2015a). The most controversial aspect of the article by far was my views on what it is appropriate to call, “psychology” and what it is not. Having established that psychology has its origins in Europe, I refer to the efforts of psychologists from outside the Western world to construct an “indigenous psychology”. I conclude by discussing the view of Staeuble (2006) that the disciplinary order of the social sciences is “Eurocentric” in that it reflects the assumptions of the culture in which it was produced. As long as psychologists outside the Western world continue to unquestioningly adopt a disciplinary order that reflects its cultural origins in the West, and even insist on projecting it backwards onto their own intellectual traditions, the process of indigenisation will be incomplete.     

Thinking about the Needy: A Reprise

This article discusses Jan Narveson’s “Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Today’s World,” and “Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy?” and their relation to my “Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations.” Section 2 points out that Narveson’s concerns differ from mine, so that often his claims and mine fail to engage each other. For example, his focus is on the poor, mine the needy, and while many poor are needy, and vice versa, our obligations may differ regarding the poor than regarding the needy. Also, Narveson invokes a narrow conception of morality as those rules that government or society may compel people to follow. Given a broader, more plausible, conception of morality, many of Narveson’s claims actually support my substantive views. Section 3 shows that many of Narveson’s claims are relevant to the best means of aiding the needy, but do not challenge the validity of that end. This is true, for example, of his claims about the role of poor governments, the importance of freedom, the undesirability of mere “handouts,” and the effects of bad economic policies. Section 4 defends the importance of my distinction between acting justly and acting for reasons of justice. It illustrates that on several widely shared conceptions of justice there might be agent-neutralreasons of justice to aid the needy, even if from an agent-relative perspective one would not be acting unjustly if one failed to do so. Section 5 contests Narveson’s portrayal of egalitarianism as concerned about inequality of wealth, per se, as insensitive to prior wrongs, and as holding that the worse-off have a right to be made better off at the expense of the well-off. In addition, it rejects Narveson’s contention that egalitarians violate impartiality, and aim to impose their personal tastes on others. Section 6 challenges a fundamental assumption underlying Narveson’s doctrine of mutual advantage. In addition, it denies that egalitarians are irrational merely because equality can conflict with the pareto principle. More generally, by appealing to impersonal ideals, it challenges the widely held view that the pareto principle is a condition of rationality. Section 7 argues that Narveson’s meta-ethical assumptions are controversial, internally inconsistent, in tension with his normative views, and ultimately a version of skepticism. In addition, it challenges Narveson’s view about the role intuitions play in moral theory. Section 8 clarifies points where Narveson’s discussion of my views may be misleading. Finally, the paper notes the role that moral reasons may play in deliberation and action, but emphasizes the philosophical and theoretical nature of my work. My aim is to determine the moral considerations that are relevant to how people should act regarding the needy. Whether people will actually be moved to so act, for those reasons or otherwise, is another matter.     

Thinking about luck

Luck looms large in numerous different philosophical subfields. Unfortunately, work focused exclusively on the nature of luck is in short supply on the contemporary analytic scene. In his highly impressive recent book Epistemic Luck, Duncan Pritchard helps rectify this neglect by presenting a partial account of luck that he uses to illuminate various ways luck can figure in cognition. In this paper, I critically evaluate both Pritchard’s account of luck and another account to which Pritchard’s discussion draws our attention—viz., that due to Nicholas Rescher. I also assess some novel analyses of luck that incorporate plausible elements of Pritchard’s and Rescher’s accounts.