False memory and importance: Can we prioritize encoding without consequence?

Given the large amount of information that we encounter, we often must prioritize what information we attempt to remember. Although critical for everyday functioning, relatively little research has focused on how people prioritize the encoding of information. Recent research has shown that people can and do selectively remember information assigned with higher, relative to lower, importance. However, the mechanisms underlying this prioritization process and the consequences of these processes are still not well understood. In the present study, we sought to better understand these prioritization processes and whether implementing these processes comes at the cost of memory accuracy, by increasing false memories. We used a modified form of the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which participants studied DRM lists, with each list paired with low, medium, or high point values. In Experiment 1, encoding higher values led to more false memories than did encoding lower values, possibly because prioritizing information enhanced relational processing among high-value words. In Experiment 2, disrupting relational processing selectively reduced false memories for high-value words. Finally, in Experiment 3, facilitating relational processing selectively increased false memories for low-value words. These findings suggest that while prioritizing information can enhance true memory, this process concomitantly increases false memories. Furthermore, the mechanism underlying these prioritization processes depends on the ability to successfully engage in relational processing. Thus, how we prioritize the encoding of incoming information can come at a cost in terms of accurate memory.     

Can children resist making interpretations when uncertain?

In two experiments, we examined young children's ability to delay a response to ambiguous input. In Experiment 1, 5- and 6-year-olds performed as poorly when they needed to choose between basing an interpretation on ambiguous input and delaying an interpretation as when making explicit evaluations of knowledge, whereas 7- and 8-year-olds found the former task easy. In Experiment 2, 5- and 6-year-olds performed well on a task that required delaying a response but removed the need to decide between strategies. We discuss children's difficulty with ambiguity in terms of the decision-making demands made by different procedures. These demands appear to cause particular problems for young children.     

Can we perceive mental states?

Synthese - In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some mental states in a direct, non-inferential way. First, I discuss how the question of...     

Can we really do without self-esteem? Comment on Crocker and Park (2004)

Because self-esteem plays a central role in managing anxiety and provides a superordinate goal that organizes much human behavior, the authors conclude that it would be extremely difficult and probably impossible for people to stop pursuing self-esteem. Although they agree that investment in others' welfare may circumvent some of the negative consequences of self-esteem pursuit, the authors argue that the self-esteem implications of other-oriented behavior will inevitably be a powerful motivating force. Finally, the authors propose that self-esteem derived from self-determined standards of value may reduce defensiveness, closed-mindedness, and indifference to others, as well as promote personal growth, but they acknowledge the daunting barriers to the attainment of such self-determined bases of self-worth.     

Can Life Be Meaningful without Free Will?

Philosophia - If we lack deep free agency, like that supposed by metaphysical libertarianism, should we view life as meaningless, pointless, or not worth living? Here I present a new argument in...     

Kvashchev's experiment: Can we boost intelligence?

In an effort to improve performance of high school students on intelligence tests, a large-scale study involving 296 students was carried out. Members of the experimental group (N = 149) were given exercises in creative problem solving 3 to 4 times a week over a period of 3 years and performance was assessed on four occasions—at the beginning of the experiment, at the end of it, and twice during the fourth year of High School. The test battery contained 28 measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence. The results indicate that it is possible to achieve small improvement in performance and that this improvement remains 1 year after the end of training. The improvement is more pronounced with measures of fluid intelligence than with measures of crystallized intelligence.     

Can we modify maladaptive attributions for fatigue?

Research has shown that those with insomnia focus primarily on their sleep as a cause of daytime fatigue rather than the multitude of other possible causes of fatigue. This can create sleep-related anxiety and further perpetuate the sleep disturbance. In order to lessen the increased focus on sleep, the present study investigated whether people could learn to consider other attributions for fatigue via an information-based manipulation. Undergraduate students (N = 88) were randomized to two information groups: They either received information about common factors that could explain daytime fatigue (the fatigue information condition) or received generic sleep-related information (the control condition). Each group was tested pre- and post-intervention. Fatigue information participants were significantly more likely to consider non-sleep-related attributions for fatigue at post-intervention, relative to control participants. These results demonstrate that attributions for fatigue may be amenable to change via an information-based intervention; thus, this research explores a preliminary step toward investigating refinements to insomnia treatments.     

Can we neurologise about spiral after effect duration?

Spiral After Effect (SAE) durations and measures of judgmental delay on an audio shift task were taken from 26 subjects. The importance of a general dispositional factor relative to specific neurological factors in determining SAE duration was investigated.A significant correlation was found between the two test measures (r = 0.79, P < 0.001). The validity of the SAE as a measure of ‘arousal modulation’ (Claridge, 1967; Blowers, 1979) is brought into question, and an alternative account of the reported duration of after-effect is given in terms of a general disposition for decision making under conditions of uncertainty, determined by social conditioning factors.     

Can we facilitate posttraumatic growth in combat veterans?

The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program, currently under development for the U.S. Army, will include a component designed to increase the possibilities for posttraumatic growth in the aftermath of combat. In this article, we briefly review studies that provide evidence for this phenomenon in combat veterans, and we suggest elements that such a program might include to facilitate posttraumatic growth. We urge the Army to conduct randomized controlled trials testing the efficacy of the program prior to its implementation.     

Can we have a distinctive theory of memory?

The current status of the concept of distinctiveness an applied to memory research is discussed. In spite of the fact that distinctiveness is difficult to define, an increasing number of memory phenomena have been explained in terms of distinctiveness. These phenomena are grouped into four classes, which vary in how distinctiveness is operationalized. Distinctiveness has different effects on memory performance, depending on how it is defined, suggesting that the concept of distinctiveness has been overapplied. In addition, current theoretical explanations of the effects of distinctiveness on memory fail to specify what the different definitions of distinctiveness have in common, and fail to encompass adequately the broad range of phenomena to be explained. A limited theory of distinctiveness is proposed, in order to explain why conceptually incongruent material is remembered well.     

Can we measure out a life in coffee spoons?

Public policy decisions in medicine and other fields necessitate careful weighing of choices and consequences. Cost-benefit analyses have been offered as one way to facilitate such decisions. In "Quantifying the value of human life," L. Eugene Arnold asserts that mathematical models such as his offer greater clarity in making public policy decisions than is possible with the "intuitive" or "emotional" approach. In our opinion, problems associated with this quantitative analysis demonstrate a need for caution in applying such mathematical models to public policy decisions....     

Can we correctly perceive the reaching range of others?

Little is known about our ability to predict the motor capacities of other people. This study explored how observers perceive the reaching range of another person by asking them to judge the reachability of a moving object. Experiments 1 and 2 found that observers overestimated the reaching ranges of both short and tall people. Estimates were larger when objects moved towards rather than away from the person. Experiment 3 showed that perceived reaching range depended on the observer's viewing perspective. Compared with previous findings, these results suggest that observers use different cognitive operations to mentally simulate actions for themselves vs. others. They also inform the current debate about motor imagery and action understanding.     

Can we imagine how objects look from other viewpoints?

Many psychologists who study cognition believe that perception achieves object-centered representations that make it possible to extract representations of how the object would appear from differing viewpoints. Others believe we can achieve representations of how an object would appear by a process of visualization or mental rotation. We report experiments in which the subject tries to imagine how three-dimensional novel wire objects would appear from positions other than the one they are in. Subjects are unable to perform this task unless they make use of strategies that circumvent the process of visualization. It is suggested that the linear increase in time required to succeed in mental rotation tasks as a function of the angular discrepancy between the figures compared is the result of increasing difficulty rather than of the time required for rotation.