Sensory memory of illusory depth in structure-from-motion

When multistable displays (stimuli consistent with two or more equally plausible perceptual interpretations) are presented intermittently, their perceptions are stabilized by sensory memory. Independent memory traces are generated not only for different types of multistable displays (Maier, Wilke, Logothetis, & Leopold, Current Biology 13:1076–1085, 2003), but also for different ambiguous features of binocular rivalry (Pearson & Clifford, Journal of Vision 4:196–202, 2004). In the present study, we examined whether a similar independence of sensory memories is observed in structure-from-motion (SFM), a multistable display with two ambiguous properties. In SFM, a 2-D planar motion creates a vivid impression of a rotating 3-D volume. Both the illusory rotation and illusory depth (i.e., how close parts of an object appear to the observer) of an SFM object are ambiguous. We dissociated the sensory memories of these two ambiguous properties by using an intermittent presentation in combination with a forced-ambiguous-switch paradigm (Pastukhov, Vonau, & Braun, PLoS ONE 7:e37734, 2012). We demonstrated that the illusory depth of SFM generates a sensory memory trace that is independent from that of illusory rotation. Despite this independence, the specificities levels of the sensory memories were identical for illusory depth and illusory rotation. The history effect was weakened by a change in the volumetric property of a shape (whether it was a hollow band or a filled drum volume), but not by changes in color or size. We discuss how these new results constrain models of sensory memory and SFM processing.     

Perceptual adaptation to structure-from-motion depends on the size of adaptor and probe objects,but not on the similarity of their shapes

Perceptual adaptation destabilizes the phenomenal appearance of multistable visual displays. Prolonged dominance of a perceptual state fatigues the associated neural population, lowering the likelihood of renewed perception of the same appearance (Nawrot & Blake in Perception & Psychophysics, 49, 230–44, 1991). Here, we used a selective adaptation paradigm to investigate perceptual adaptation for the illusory rotation of ambiguous structure-from-motion (SFM) displays. Specifically, we generated SFM objects with different three-dimensional shapes and presented them in random order, separating successive objects by brief blank periods, which included a mask. To assess the specificity of perceptual adaptation to the shape of SFM objects, we established the probability that a perceived direction of rotation persisted between successive objects of similar or dissimilar shape. We found that the strength of negative aftereffects depended on the volume, but not the shape, of adaptor and probe objects. More voluminous objects were both more effective as adaptor objects and more sensitive as probe objects. Surprisingly, we found these volume effects to be completely independent, since any relationship between two shapes (such as overlap between volumes, similarity of shape, or similarity of velocity profiles) failed to modulate the negative aftereffect. This pattern of results was the opposite of that observed for sensory memory of SFM objects, which reflects similarity between objects, but not volume of individual objects (Pastukhov et al. in Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 75, 1215–1229, 2013). The disparate specificities of perceptual adaptation and sensory memory for identical SFM objects suggest that the two aftereffects engage distinct neural representations, consistent with recent brain imaging results (Schwiedrzik et al. in Cerebral Cortex, 2012).     

The ties that keep us bound: Top-down influences on the persistence of shape-from-motion

The phenomenon of perceptual persistence after the motion stops in shape-from-motion displays (SFM) was used to study the influence of prior knowledge on the maintenance of a percept in awareness. In SFM displays an object composed of discontinuous line segments are embedded in a background of randomly oriented lines. The object only becomes perceptible when the line segments that compose the object and the lines that compose the background move in counterphase. Critically, once the movement of the line segments stops, the percept of the object persists for a short period of time. In the present study, perceptual persistence for digits exceeded that reported for nonsense shapes composed of the same line segments. This result is taken as evidence that the processes involved in the persistence of SFM, and therefore sustained perception, are sensitive to top-down influences.     

The role of attention and study time in explicit and implicit memory for unfamiliar visual stimuli

The effects of limited attentional resources and study time on explicit and implicit memory were studied using Schacter and Cooper’s possible and impossible objects in their recognition and object decision paradigm. In one experiment, when attention at study was limited by a flanking digits procedure, object recognition was diminished but object decision priming for possible objects was unaffected; in another experiment, limiting attention plus reducing stimulus study time impaired object recognition and eliminated object priming. Recognition memory and perceptual priming for previously unfamiliar visual stimuli were both influenced by attention, although to different degrees. The intervening variable of study time determined the degree to which priming was affected by attentional resources. These results support a limited capacity attentional model for both recognition and perceptual priming of unfamiliar visual stimuli, and they highlight the need for assessing the interaction of attentional resources and study time in explicit and implicit memory tasks.     

Redundancy effects in the perception and memory of visual objects

Is visual representation of an object affected by whether surrounding objects are identical to it, different from it, or absent? To address this question, we tested perceptual priming, visual short-term, and long-term memory for objects presented in isolation or with other objects. Experiment 1 used a priming procedure, where the prime display contained a single face, four identical faces, or four different faces. Subjects identified the gender of a subsequent probe face that either matched or mismatched with one of the prime faces. Priming was stronger when the prime was four identical faces than when it was a single face or four different faces. Experiments 2 and 3 asked subjects to encode four different objects presented on four displays. Holding memory load constant, visual memory was better when each of the four displays contained four duplicates of a single object, than when each display contained a single object. These results suggest that an object's perceptual and memory representations are enhanced when presented with identical objects, revealing redundancy effects in visual processing.     

Transfer between vision and haptics: Memory for 2-D patterns and 3-D objects

Explicit memory tests such as recognition typically access semantic, modality-independent representations, while perceptual implicit memory tests typically access presemantic, modality-specific representations. By demonstrating comparable cross- and within-modal priming using vision and haptics with verbal materials (Easton, Srinivas, & Greene, 1997), we recently questioned whether the representations underlying perceptual implicit tests were modality specific. Unlike vision and audition, with vision and haptics verbal information can be presented in geometric terms to both modalities. The present experiments extend this line of research by assessing implicit and explicit memory within and between vision and haptics in the nonverbal domain, using both 2-D patterns and 3-D objects. Implicit test results revealed robust cross-modal priming for both 2-D patterns and 3-D objects, indicating that vision and haptics shared abstract representations of object shape and structure. Explicit test results for 3-D objects revealed modality specificity, indicating that the recognition system keeps track of the modality through which an object is experienced.     

Structure-from-motion: dissociating perception, neural persistence, and sensory memory of illusory depth and illusory rotation

In the structure-from-motion paradigm, physical motion on a screen produces the vivid illusion of an object rotating in depth. Here, we show how to dissociate illusory depth and illusory rotation in a structure-from-motion stimulus using a rotationally asymmetric shape and reversals of physical motion. Reversals of physical motion create a conflict between the original illusory states and the new physical motion: Either illusory depth remains constant and illusory rotation reverses, or illusory rotation stays the same and illusory depth reverses. When physical motion reverses after the interruption in presentation, we find that illusory rotation tends to remain constant for long blank durations (T _blank ≥ 0.5 s), but illusory depth is stabilized if interruptions are short (T _blank ≤ 0.1 s). The stability of illusory depth over brief interruptions is consistent with the effect of neural persistence. When this is curtailed using a mask, stability of ambiguous vision (for either illusory depth or illusory rotation) is disrupted. We also examined the selectivity of the neural persistence of illusory depth. We found that it relies on a static representation of an interpolated illusory object, since changes to low-level display properties had little detrimental effect. We discuss our findings with respect to other types of history dependence in multistable displays (sensory stabilization memory, neural fatigue, etc.). Our results suggest that when brief interruptions are used during the presentation of multistable displays, switches in perception are likely to rely on the same neural mechanisms as spontaneous switches, rather than switches due to the initial percept choice at the stimulus onset.     

A memory span of one? Object identification in 6.5-month-old infants

Infants' abilities to identify objects based on their perceptual features develop gradually during the first year and possibly beyond. Earlier we reported [Káldy, Z., & Leslie, A. M. (2003). Identification of objects in 9-month-old infants: Integrating 'what' and 'where' information. Developmental Science, 6, 360-373] that infants at 9 months of age are able to use shape information to identify two objects and follow their spatiotemporal trajectories behind occlusion. On the other hand, another recent study suggests that infants at 4-5 months of age cannot identify objects by features and bind them to locations [Mareschal, D., & Johnson, M. H. (2003). The "what" and "where" of object representations in infancy. Cognition, 88, 259-276]. In the current study, we investigated the developmental steps between these two benchmark ages by testing 6.5-month-old infants. Experiment 1 and 2 adapted the paradigm used in our previous studies with 9-month-olds that involves two objects hidden sequentially behind separate occluders. This technique allows us to address object identification and to examine whether only one or both object identities are being tracked. Results of experiment 1 showed that 6.5-month-old infants could identify at least one of two objects based on shape and experiment 2 found that this ability holds for only one, the last object hidden. We propose that at this age, infants' working memory capacity is limited to one occluded object if there is a second intervening hiding. If their attention is distracted by an intervening object during the memory maintenance period, the memory of the first object identity appears to be lost. Results of experiment 3 supported this hypothesis with a simpler one-screen setup. Finally, results of experiment 4 show that temporal decay of the memory trace (without an intervening hiding) by itself cannot explain the observed pattern of results. Taken together, our findings suggest that at six months of age infants can store but a single object representation with bound shape information, most likely in the ventral stream. The memory span of one may be due to immaturity of the neural structures underlying working memory such that intervening items overwrite the existing storage.     

注意促进运动知觉判断的时间进程

本研究通过控制深度视觉线索, 分析3D SFM (structure from motion)知觉中的眼动特征, 探讨注意对SFM知觉判断的影响及其时间进程。结果显示, 有线索刺激比模糊刺激的判断更加快、更加肯定(百分比更高); 眼睛移动方向和微眼跳方向都分别与知觉判断的运动方向具有一致性; 微眼跳频次、峰速度和幅度也都分别表现出深度线索的促进效应。实验结果表明, SFM知觉过程大致分为速度计算和构建三维结构两个阶段; 注意对SFM知觉的调节作用主要发生在构建三维结构阶段; 注意从150 ms开始指向选择对象, 驻留持续约200 ms后, 从局部运动矢量流转移到整体运动方向的知觉判断。     

Mechanisms of priming of pop-out: Stored representations or feature-gain modulations?

Previous research has shown that repetition of a task-relevant attention-capturing feature facilitates popout search. This priming of pop-out effect is due to some residual memory from recent trials. We explore two possible mechanisms of priming of pop-out: a top-down attentional benefit from a memory of the previous target representation that is stored in visual short-term memory (VSTM) and a bottom-up change of attentional gains from perceptual features of the previously attended target. We manipulated participants’ ability to form a memory trace in VSTM by occupying it with a distractor task and found that occupying VSTM did not interfere with priming of pop-out. We next manipulated attentional gains associated with feature values by inserting an irrelevant task between pop-out searches. We found that the color of the target from the intervening perceptual task influenced pop-out search: The current pop-out search was facilitated when the intervening task’s target matched the target color of the pop-out search. These results suggest that priming of pop-out might not be due to a memory trace of the previous targets in VSTM but, rather, might be due to changes in attentional control based on priming from relatively low-level feature representations of previously attended objects.     

A motor similarity effect in object memory

In line with theories of embodied cognition (e.g., Versace et al. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 21, 522–560, 2009), several studies have suggested that the motor system used to interact with objects in our environment is involved in object recognition (e.g., Helbig, Graf, & Kiefer Experimental Brain Research, 174, 221-228, 2006). However, the role of the motor system in immediate memory for objects is more controversial. The objective of the present study was to investigate the role of the motor system in object memory by manipulating the similarity between the actions associated to series of objects to be retained in memory. In Experiment 1, we showed that lists of objects associated to dissimilar actions were better recalled than lists associated to similar actions. We then showed that this effect was abolished when participants were required to perform a concurrent motor suppression task (Experiment 2) and when the objects to be memorized were unmanipulable (Experiment 3). The motor similarity effect provides evidence for the role of motor affordances in object memory.     

Orientation congruency effects for familiar objects: coordinate transformations in object recognition

How do observers recognize objects after spatial transformations? Recent neurocomputational models have proposed that object recognition is based on coordinate transformations that align memory and stimulus representations. If the recognition of a misoriented object is achieved by adjusting a coordinate system (or reference frame), then recognition should be facilitated when the object is preceded by a different object in the same orientation. In the two experiments reported here, two objects were presented in brief masked displays that were in close temporal contiguity; the objects were in either congruent or incongruent picture-plane orientations. Results showed that naming accuracy was higher for congruent than for incongruent orientations. The congruency effect was independent of superordinate category membership (Experiment 1) and was found for objects with different main axes of elongation (Experiment 2). The results indicate congruency effects for common familiar objects even when they have dissimilar shapes. These findings are compatible with models in which object recognition is achieved by an adjustment of a perceptual coordinate system.     

Working memory load and distraction: dissociable effects of visual maintenance and cognitive control

We establish a new dissociation between the roles of working memory (WM) cognitive control and visual maintenance in selective attention as measured by the efficiency of distractor rejection. The extent to which focused selective attention can prevent distraction has been shown to critically depend on the level and type of load involved in the task. High perceptual load that consumes perceptual capacity leads to reduced distractor processing, whereas high WM load that reduces WM ability to exert priority-based executive cognitive control over the task results in increased distractor processing (e.g., Lavie, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(2), 75–82, 2005). WM also serves to maintain task-relevant visual representations, and such visual maintenance is known to recruit the same sensory cortices as those involved in perception (e.g., Pasternak & Greenlee, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6(2), 97–107, 2005). These findings led us to hypothesize that loading WM with visual maintenance would reduce visual capacity involved in perception, thus resulting in reduced distractor processing—similar to perceptual load and opposite to WM cognitive control load. Distractor processing was assessed in a response competition task, presented during the memory interval (or during encoding; Experiment 1a) of a WM task. Loading visual maintenance or encoding by increased set size for a memory sample of shapes, colors, and locations led to reduced distractor response competition effects. In contrast, loading WM cognitive control with verbal rehearsal of a random letter set led to increased distractor effects. These findings confirm load theory predictions and provide a novel functional distinction between the roles of WM maintenance and cognitive control in selective attention.     

Enhanced perceptual priming for neutral stimuli in a traumatic context: A pathway to intrusive memories?

Clinical observations suggest that re-experiencing symptoms are triggered by stimuli that are perceptually similar to those present shortly before the trauma or its worst moments. Two experiments investigated the possible role of perceptual priming in this phenomenon. Volunteers (N = 28, N = 62) watched a series of “traumatic” and neutral picture stories, and completed blurred object identification (priming) and recognition memory tasks. Neutral objects that immediately preceded the “traumatic” stories were more strongly primed, but not better recognised, than objects from neutral stories. Enhanced priming predicted subsequent re-experiencing symptoms. The results support the role of perceptual priming in re-experiencing.     

Perceptual distinctiveness produces long-lasting priming of pop-out

Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994) demonstrated memory influences in singleton search from one trial to the next, an effect they termed priming of pop-out (PoP). This effect was described as resulting from the persistence of an implicit memory trace, the influence of which could be observed for around five to eight subsequent trials. The seemingly short-lived nature of this priming effect has been attributed to decay of the underlying memory representation that occurs when attention is directed to intervening search items, even when such items are perceptually dissimilar from the search trials upon which PoP is measured (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 2000). The present study reexamines the role of perceptual similarity as a mechanism of interference by examining the influence on PoP of rare search trials that were perceptually distinct with respect to the other, common trials. Long-lasting (n − 16) PoP was observed for rare trials that were composed of distinct target/distractor colors, suggesting that PoP can be observed across at least twice as many trials as has previously been reported. Thus, the time span across which PoP can be measured depends heavily on the nature of the intervening search displays, a result that must be accommodated by current theoretical accounts of PoP.     

Enhanced perceptual priming for neutral stimuli in a traumatic context: A pathway to intrusive memories?

Clinical observations suggest that re-experiencing symptoms are triggered by stimuli that are perceptually similar to those present shortly before the trauma or its worst moments. Two experiments investigated the possible role of perceptual priming in this phenomenon. Volunteers (N = 28, N = 62) watched a series of "traumatic" and neutral picture stories, and completed blurred object identification (priming) and recognition memory tasks. Neutral objects that immediately preceded the "traumatic" stories were more strongly primed, but not better recognised, than objects from neutral stories. Enhanced priming predicted subsequent re-experiencing symptoms. The results support the role of perceptual priming in re-experiencing.     

The time course of object encoding

Four experiments examined the effects of encoding time on object identification priming and recognition memory. After viewing objects in a priming phase, participants identified objects in a rapid stream of non-object distracters; display times were gradually increased until the objects could be identified (Experiments 1-3). Participants also made old/new recognition judgments about previously viewed objects (Experiment 4). Reliable priming for object identification occurred with 150 ms of encoding and reached a maximum after about 300 ms of encoding time. In contrast, reliable recognition judgments occurred with 75 ms of encoding and continued to improve for encoding times of up to 1200 ms. These results suggest that recognition memory may be based on multiple levels of object representation, from rapidly activated representations of low-level features to semantic knowledge associated with the object. In contrast, priming in this object identification task may be tied specifically to the activation of representations of object shape.     

A neural network model of implicit memory for object recognition

People name well-known objects shown in pictures more quickly if they have studied them previously. The most common interpretation of this priming effect is that processing is facilitated by an implicit memory trace in a perceptual representation system. We show that object priming can be explained instead as a bias in information processing, without recourse to an implicit memory system. Assumptions about psychological decision-making processes and bias were added to a neural network model for object identification, and the model accounted for performance both qualitatively and quantitatively in four object identification experiments.     

The perception of object versus objectless motion

Wertheimer, M. (Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, 61:161–265, 1912) classical distinction between beta (object) and phi (objectless) motion is elaborated here in a series of experiments concerning competition between two qualitatively different motion percepts, induced by sequential changes in luminance for two-dimensional geometric objects composed of rectangular surfaces. One of these percepts is of spreading-luminance motion that continuously sweeps across the entire object; it exhibits shape invariance and is perceived most strongly for fast speeds. Significantly for the characterization of phi as objectless motion, the spreading luminance does not involve surface boundaries or any other feature; the percept is driven solely by spatiotemporal changes in luminance. Alternatively, and for relatively slow speeds, a discrete series of edge motions can be perceived in the direction opposite to spreading-luminance motion. Akin to beta motion, the edges appear to move through intermediate positions within the object’s changing surfaces. Significantly for the characterization of beta as object motion, edge motion exhibits shape dependence and is based on the detection of oppositely signed changes in contrast (i.e., counterchange) for features essential to the determination of an object’s shape, the boundaries separating its surfaces. These results are consistent with area MT neurons that differ with respect to speed preference Newsome et al (Journal of Neurophysiology, 55:1340–1351, 1986) and shape dependence Zeki (Journal of Physiology, 236:549–573, 1974).