Consensus at zero acquaintance: replication, behavioral cues, and stability.

That observers tend to agree in their ratings of a target even if they have never interacted with that target has been called consensus at zero acquaintance. The basic finding that consensus is highest for judgments concerning a target's degree of extraversion (EV) and somewhat weaker for judgments of conscientiousness is replicated. Several potential observable cues that might be used by judges when rating targets are examined. The finding that ratings of physical attractiveness correlate with judgments of EV is replicated. In Study 1, rapid body movements and smiling were also found to correlate with EV judgments. The level of consensus declined when initially unacquainted Ss interacted one-on-one (Study 2), but did not decline--and even increased--when Ss interacted in a group (Study 3). Ss judged as extraverted at zero acquaintance were also seen as extraverted after interacting with others.     

Comparing the Accuracy of Personality Judgments by the Self and Knowledgeable Others

ABSTRACT In this article we compare the accuracy of personality judgments by the self and by knowledgeable others. Self- and acquaintance judgments of general personality attributes were used to predict general, videotaped behavioral criteria. Results slightly favored the predictive validity of personality judgments made by single acquaintances over self-judgments, and significantly favored the aggregated personality judgments of two acquaintances over self-judgments. These findings imply that the most valid source for personality judgments that are relevant to patterns of overt behavior may not be self-reports but the consensus of the judgment of the community of one's peers.     

Attributional style, depression, and perceptions of consensus for events

This study examined differences between depressed and nondepressed individuals' implicit perceptions of consensus, which may contribute to differences in their attributional styles. Subjects rated the extent to which positive, negative, and neutral events happen to themselves and to the average college student and completed measures of depth of depression and attributional style. Perceptions of consensus were highly correlated with all components of attributional style for negative and positive events. Hierarchical regression analyses revealed that ratings of others explained variance in attributional style beyond that explained by ratings of the self for positive but not for negative events. Path analyses, however, indicated that the indirect path from perceptions of consensus to depression mediated through attributional style was nonsignificant for positive events, although it was significant for negative events. These findings are discussed in terms of the role of perceptions of others as precursors of attributional style and depression.     

Attributional versus preattributional variables in self-esteem and depression: a comparison and test of learned helplessness theory

Predictions made according to the attributional reformulation of learned helplessness theory concerning the cognitive determinants of low self-esteem and depression were tested in two samples of undergraduates; real and hypothetical life events were used. As predicted, internal attributions for hypothetical success and failure were correlated with self-esteem, but there was an unexpected correlation with global attributions for negative outcomes. Two "preattributional" variables, consensus and consistency judgments, were also related to self-esteem and depression. In contrast to learned helplessness theory, a path analysis indicated that these variables were not attributionally mediated. Consensus judgment was as strong a predictor of depression as the number of recent distressing life events that subjects had experienced. Other evidence that links depression to perceived low consensus is described, and a possible etiological role for this variable is outlined.     

“I Believe in Cusk”: The Effect of Explicit Belief Statements on Children’s Reality Status Judgments and Beliefs about Consensus

Children learn about the world through others’ testimony, and much of this knowledge likely comes from parents. Furthermore, parents may sometimes want children to share their beliefs about topics on which there is no universal consensus. In discussing such topics, parents may use explicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution is real”) or implicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution happened over millions of years”). But little research has investigated how such statements affect children’s beliefs. In the current study, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 102) were shown videos of their parent providing either Explicit (“Cusk is real”) or Implicit (“I know about cusk”) belief testimony about novel entities. Then, children heard another speaker provide either Denial (“Cusk isn’t real”) or Neutral (“I’ve heard of cusk”) testimony. Children made reality status judgments and consensus judgments (i.e., whether people agree about the entity’s existence). Results showed that explicit and implicit belief statements differentially influenced children’s beliefs about societal consensus when followed by a denial: explicit belief statements prevented children from drawing the conclusion that there is societal consensus that the entity does not exist. This effect was not related to age, indicating that children as young as 4 use these cues to inform consensus judgments. On the reality status task, there was an interaction with age, showing that only 4-year-olds were more likely to believe in an entity after hearing explicit belief statements. These findings suggest that explicit belief statements may serve as important sources of both children’s beliefs about novel entities and societal consensus.     

The False Consensus Effect in Unfavorable (Suicide) and Favorable (Honor) Events1

According to the false consensus effect (FCE), people view their own judgments, choices, and characteristics as common; judgments, choices, and characteristics which are not their own are viewed as uncommon and deviant. To test the FCE both for unfavorable and favorable characteristics and for positive and negative events, 135 undergraduate subjects were divided into four groups based on median splits of their self-attributions of intelligence and psychological disturbance. They then read a history about a 19-year old youth who either committed suicide or received an honor and they rated the youth and both parents on psychological disturbance and intelligence. Subjects who viewed themselves as relatively intelligent viewed others as relatively intelligent, whereas subjects who viewed themselves as relatively psychologically disturbed viewed others as relatively disturbed. These results partially support the FCE as opposed to attributive projection. It may be helpful to explain these results to bereaved families so that they can better understand and anticipate the reactions of others.     

The effects of depression and cognitive vulnerability to depression on judgments of similarity between self and other

The present research was conducted to investigate the effects of mild levels of depression, and cognitive vulnerability to depression, on people's perceptions of their similarity to others. Depression level was assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory, and cognitive vulnerability was measured with the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale. Subjects rated their similarity to others on a 7-point scale and also generated a list of attributes thought to typify the average other person. In terms of similarity judgments, individuals perceived themselves to be less similar to others as depression level increased. Furthermore, and also as predicted, only individuals scoring high on the vulnerability measure exhibited this pattern. Given the consistently positive view of others expressed by all subjects, this latter finding suggests that vulnerable individuals saw themselves as increasingly distinctive with respect to their own negative attributes, as depression level increased. This social comparison interpretation is consistent with previous research indicating that vulnerable individuals change from a focus on self-referent positive traits when nondepressed to a focus on negative traits when depressed. This pattern is also identified as a possible contributor to the social isolation and interpersonal difficulties characteristic of depression.     

Sex differences in judgments of physical attractiveness: a social relations analysis

Men and women rated the physical attractiveness of other men and women who were sitting nearby and were rated by them in return. They also provided meta-perceptions of how they thought those others rated them. Attractiveness ratings were partly a function of both the target being rated and the perceiver providing the ratings regardless of the sex of the perceiver or target, but the highest levels of consensus occurred when men judged the attractiveness of women and the highest levels of idiosyncrasy occurred when men rated other men. Meta-perceptions were also idiosyncratic; some believed that they were consistently considered attractive, whereas others thought they were seen as unattractive. People were aware of what others thought of them and, in particular, women's meta-perceptions were highly related to men's judgments of them. People agree about others' attractiveness, and those who are attractive to others know they are pretty or handsome.     

Brief exposures: Male sexual orientation is accurately perceived at 50 ms

People have proved adept at categorizing others into social categories, at least when the categorical distinction is perceptually obvious (e.g., age, race, or gender). There remain many social groups whose boundaries are less clear, however. The current work therefore tested judgments of an ambiguous social category (male sexual orientation) from faces shown for durations between 33 ms and 10,000 ms. The sexual orientation of faces presented for 50 ms, 100 ms, 6500 ms, 10,000 ms, and at a self-paced rate (averaging 1500 ms), was categorized at above-chance levels with no decrease in accuracy for briefer exposures. Previous work showing impression formation at similar speeds relied on consensus to determine the validity of judgments. The present results extend these findings by providing a criterion for judgmental accuracy—actual group membership.     

Myopic social prediction and the solo comparison effect

Four experiments explored the psychological processes by which people make comparative social judgments. Each participant chose how much money to wager on beating an opponent on either a difficult or a simple trivia quiz. Quiz difficulty did not influence the average person's probability of winning, yet participants bet more on a simple quiz than on a difficult quiz in the first 3 experiments. The results suggest that this effect results from a tendency to attend more closely to a focal actor than to others. Experiment 4 directly manipulated focusing; when participants were led to focus on the opponent instead of themselves, the effect was reversed. The discussion relates the results to other literatures including overly optimistic self-evaluation, false consensus, overconfidence, and social comparison.     

Induced power changes the sense of agency

Power differentials are a ubiquitous feature of social interactions and power has been conceptualised as an interpersonal construct. Here we show that priming power changes the sense of agency, indexed by intentional binding. Specifically, participants wrote about episodes in which they had power over others, or in which others had power over them. After priming, participants completed an interval estimation task in which they judged the interval between a voluntary action and a visual effect. After low-power priming, participants judged intervals to be significantly longer than judgments after high-power or no priming. Thus, intentional binding was significantly changed by low-power, suggesting that power reduces the sense of agency for action outcomes. Our results demonstrate a clear intrapersonal effect of power. We suggest that intentional binding could be employed to assess agency in individuals suffering from anxiety and depression, both of which are characterised by reduced feelings of personal control.     

Judging Yourself as You Judge Others: Moral Development and Exculpation

This study investigated two main issues: Whether people's judgments about real-life moral transgressions are affected by the role they play in them and whether self-serving biases in such judgments vary with level of moral development. One-hundred twenty university students took Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) test of moral judgment and made open-ended and rating-scale judgments about three real-life transgressions they considered moral in nature. As expected, participants made more exculpatory judgments about transgressions they committed than they did about transgressions others committed, but participants did not judge transgressions committed against them more harshly than they judged transgressions committed against others. The higher participants scored on Kohlberg's test the less they externalized and excused their moral transgressions. Contrary to expectation, this relation also applied to moral judgments about transgressions committed by others against others. These findings have important implications for models of moral development and social cognition.     

两种道德情境下中学生的自我与他人情绪判断

将246名中学生分为三个年龄组,运用情境故事考察其在犯过和亲社会道德情境下的自我与他人情绪判断。进行卡方检验发现,在犯过情境中,12岁组的自我和他人情绪判断均以消极情绪为主,14和16岁组的自我和他人情绪判断之间存在差异,表现为他们对犯过情境中损人者的情绪判断多为积极情绪,而对自己的情绪判断则多为消极情绪;在亲社会情境中,三个年龄组的自我和他人情绪判断之间不存在差异,多以积极情绪判断为主。     

Consensus in personality judgments at zero acquaintance

This research focused on the target effect on a perceiver's judgments of personality when the perceiver and the target are unacquainted. The perceiver was given no opportunity to interact with the target, a condition we refer to as zero acquaintance. We reasoned that in order to make personality judgments, perceivers would use the information available to them (physical appearance). Consensus in personality judgments would result, then, from shared stereotypes about particular physical appearance characteristics. Results from three separate studies with 259 subjects supported this hypothesis. On two of the five dimensions (extraversion and conscientiousness) on which subjects rated each other, a significant proportion of variance was due to the stimulus target. Consensus on judgments of extraversion appears to have been largely mediated by judgments of physical attractiveness. Across the three studies there was also evidence that the consensus in judgments on these two dimensions had some validity, in that they correlated with self-judgments on those two dimensions.     

The other way around: Effects of causal attributions on estimates of consensus,distinctiveness, and consistency

It was hypothesized that the attributed cause of a given person's behavior will affect inferences about its generalizability over persons (consensus), stimuli (distinctiveness), and circumstances (consistency). Moreover, these effects were expected to parallel the effects of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information on causal attributions. Experiment 1 provided support for these predictions but also showed that attribution affected consensus judgments less than it affected judgments of distinctiveness and consistency, particularly when consensus was not the first characteristic estimated. Using a different set of stimulus materials and a different manipulation of attribution, Experiments 2 and 3 provided further evidence for the effects of attribution on inferences of consensus information. Experiment 3 indicated that the false consensus effect—actors' tendency to assume that the majority of people share their behavior—may be due to actors' tendency to attribute their behavior to situational factors. Implications of the present studies for biased estimates of consensus and the use of consensus and attribution as mediating variables are discussed.     

Analyzing Consensus to Personality Judgments: A Variance Components Approach

ABSTRACT Although peer raters of personality traits do tend to agree, the strength of their consensus is often modest. This article focuses on methods for analyzing determinants of consensus. Variance components methods adapted from generalizability theory have some untapped potential for understanding gradations in consensus. The methods allow explicit analysis of how social categories of targets might affect judgments of raters from the same or different social categories. Limitations of the variance components approach are also discussed. The methods are illustrated with artificial data.     

Defining traits differently for self and others

Identical trait labels may be understood differently in thinking about self and in thinking about others. Specifically, when making self-judgments, individuals define traits primarily in terms of unobservable manifestations, e.g., how one feels. However, in making other-judgments, particularly in making judgments about relatively unfamiliar others, individuals define traits primarily in terms of observable manifestations, e.g., how one looks. This prediction was tested in three experiments (Exp. 1: N = 96, Polish undergraduates including 19 men, 77 women; Exp. 2: N = 96, U.S. undergraduates including 18 men, 78 women; Exp. 3: N = 74, Polish undergraduates including 18 men, 56 women). Participants were asked to perform a generic trait judgment task followed by a specific trait judgment task in which the same traits were preceded by a qualifier "feels" or "looks". As expected, in the case of self-judgments, generic judgments predicted feels judgments better than looks judgments. This pattern did not occur for judgments of others and was reversed for judgments about others who were relatively unfamiliar.     

Relationships Between Dimensions of Depressive Experience and Perceptions of the Lives of People in General

This study examines relationships between depression and perceptions of the lives of people in general. One hundred fourteen college students completed the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977), the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire (Blatt, D'Afflitti, & Quinlan, 1976), and two instruments that asked subjects to make judgments about the frequency of various positive and negative outcomes in other people's lives. Highly Dependent and highly Self-Critical women perceived people's lives as characterized by much misfortune, failure, and unhappiness. Unexpectedly, Efficacy scores, which are negatively related to depression, were also associated with negative perceptions of people's lives in women. Among the men, overall depression was not related to perceptions of how frequently people succeed at specific, concrete life tasks, but depressed subjects perceived others as experiencing a tow level of subjective well-being. Implications for the notion of a depressive negative bias toward the self are discussed.     

Relationships between dimensions of depressive experience and perceptions of the lives of people in general

This study examines relationships between depression and perceptions of the lives of people in general. One hundred fourteen college students completed the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977), the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire (Blatt, D'Afflitti, & Quinlan, 1976), and two instruments that asked subjects to make judgments about the frequency of various positive and negative outcomes in other people's lives. Highly Dependent and highly Self-Critical women perceived people's lives as characterized by much misfortune, failure, and unhappiness. Unexpectedly, Efficacy scores, which are negatively related to depression, were also associated with negative perceptions of people's lives in women. Among the men, overall depression was not related to perceptions of how frequently people succeed at specific, concrete life tasks, but depressed subjects perceived others as experiencing a low level of subjective well-being. Implications for the notion of a depressive negative bias toward the self are discussed.