The scope of teleological thinking in preschool children

These studies explore the scope of young children's teleological tendency to view entities as ‘designed for purposes'. One view (‘Selective Teleology') argues that teleology is an innate, basic mode of thinking that, throughout development, is selectively applied by children and adults to artifacts and biological properties. An alternative proposal (‘Promiscuous Teleology') argues that teleological reasoning derives from children's knowledge of intentionality and is not restricted to any particular category of phenomena until later in development. Two studies explored the predictions of these two hypotheses regarding the scope of children's functional intuitions. Using different methods, both studies found that, unlike adults, preschoolers tend to attribute functions to all kinds of objects – clocks, tigers, clouds and their parts. A third study then explored this finding further by examining whether the developmental effect was due to differences in children's and adults' concept of function. It found that both children and adults predominantly view an object's function as the activity it was designed to perform. Possible explanations for the developmental differences found in the first two studies, and implications for notions of a teleological stance are discussed.     

British and American children's preferences for teleo-functional explanations of the natural world

Teleological-functional explanations account for objects by reference to their purpose. They are a fundamental aspect of adults' explanatory repertoire. They also play a significant role in children's reasoning although prior findings indicate that, in contrast to adults, young children broadly extend teleological explanation beyond artifacts (e.g. chairs) and biological properties (e.g. eyes) to the properties of non-living natural phenomena (e.g. clouds, rocks). The present study extends earlier work with American children to explore British children's application of teleological explanation. The motivation is that while Britain and America are, culturally, as close to a minimal pair as the global context affords, there are differences in the religiosity of the two nations such that British children might be less inclined to endorse purpose-based explanation. Results reveal that young British children also possess a promiscuous teleology although they differ in the kinds of purposes that they attribute. Additional findings include a replication of earlier effects using a modified task with young American children.     

Time to get a new mountain? The role of function in children's conceptions of natural kinds

Prior research indicates that young children are promiscuously teleological, attributing purpose not only to artifacts, but also to living and non-living natural entities. This study further examines the role of function in children's reasoning about different object kinds by indirectly probing children's intuitions about what types of entities can be rendered functionless. Specifically, children were asked to decide whether entities that could no longer perform certain activities should be fixed/replaced (e.g. "Do you need to get a new one?"). Results reveal that young children broadly view both artificial and natural kinds that can no longer perform certain activities as needing to be fixed or replaced. These findings suggest that the teleo-functional bias not only influences children's explanatory preferences but also their category judgments.     

Why did this happen to me? Religious believers’ and non-believers’ teleological reasoning about life events

People often believe that significant life events happen for a reason. In three studies, we examined evidence for the view that teleological beliefs reflect a general cognitive bias to view the world in terms of agency, purpose, and design. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that individual differences in mentalizing ability predicted both the tendency to believe in fate (Study 1) and to infer purposeful causes of one’s own life events (Study 2). In addition, people’s perception of purpose in life events was correlated with their teleological beliefs about nature, but this relationship was driven primarily by individuals’ explicit religious and paranormal beliefs (Study 3). Across all three studies, we found that while people who believe in God hold stronger teleological beliefs than those who do not, there is nonetheless evidence of teleological beliefs among non-believers, confirming that the perception of purpose in life events does not rely on theistic belief. These findings suggest that the tendency to perceive design and purpose in life events—while moderated by theistic belief—is not solely a consequence of culturally transmitted religious ideas. Rather, this teleological bias has its roots in certain more general social propensities.     

What do children want to know about animals and artifacts? Domain-specific requests for information

Children's questions may reveal a great deal about the characteristics of objects they consider to be conceptually important. Thirty-two preschool children were given opportunities to ask questions about unfamiliar artifacts and animals. The children asked ambiguous questions such as "What is it?" about artifacts and animals alike. However, they were more likely to ask about the functions of artifacts, but about category membership, food choices, and typical locations of animals. They never asked questions about either artifacts or animals that would be considered inappropriate by adults. The results indicate that children hold different expectations about the types of information important for categorizing living and artifact kinds. Young children conceive of artifacts in terms of functions, but conceive of animals in terms of biologically appropriate characteristics. Such results speak to debates about the role of function in children's biological reasoning and to accounts of children's artifact concepts.     

Teleology and the intentions of supernatural agents

Teleological beliefs about the natural world often exist implicitly, and there is a positive relationship between teleological endorsement and belief in supernatural agents. In the current study, participants judged a series of scientifically unwarranted teleological explanations of biological organisms and natural non-living objects, under speeded or un-speeded instructions. After controlling for belief in the existence of supernatural agents, rates of implicit (speeded) and explicit (un-speeded) teleological endorsement were moderated by the belief that supernatural agents intentionally interact with the world. Amongst non-religious individuals, rates of implicit endorsement were significantly higher than explicit endorsement, whereas for highly religious individuals the difference was non-significant. This interaction was driven predominantly by explanations of natural non-living objects. These results are consistent with an intention-based theory of teleology, and help to reconcile the finding of a positive relationship between teleological endorsement and belief in supernatural agents, with the those of an enduring teleological bias.     

Children's reliance on creator's intent in extending names for artifacts

When children learn a name for a novel artifact, they tend to extend the name to other artifacts that share the same shape—a phenomenon known as the shape bias. The present studies investigated an intentional account of this bias. In Study 1, 3-year-olds were shown two objects of the same shape, and were given an explanation for why the objects were the same shape even though they were intended to be different kinds. The shape bias disappeared in children provided with this explanation. In Study2, 3-year-olds were shown triads of objects, and were either given no information about the function of a named target object, told the function that object could fulfill, or told the functions all three objects were intended to fulfill. Only in the third condition did children overcome a shape bias in favor of a function bias when extending the name of the target object. These findings indicate that 3-year-olds' shape bias results from intuitions about what artifacts were intended to be.     

Revisiting preschoolers' living things concept: a microgenetic analysis of conceptual change in basic biology

Many preschoolers know that plants and animals share basic biological properties, but this knowledge does not usually lead them to conclude that plants, like animals, are living things. To resolve this seeming paradox, we hypothesized that preschoolers largely base their judgments of life status on a biological property, capacity for teleological action, but that few preschoolers realize that plants possess this capacity. To test the hypothesis, we taught 5-year-olds one of four biological facts and examined the children's subsequent categorization of life status for numerous animals, plants, and artifacts. As predicted, a large majority of 5-year-olds who learned that both plants and animals, but not artifacts, move in goal-directed ways inferred that both plants and animals, but not artifacts, are alive. These children were considerably more likely to draw this inference than peers who learned that the same plants and animals grow or need water and almost as likely to do so as children who were explicitly told that animals and plants are living things and that artifacts are not. Results also indicated that not all biological properties are extended from familiar animals to plants; some biological properties are first attributed to plants and then extended to animals.     

Young children’s learning and generalization of teleological and mechanistic explanations

Young children often endorse explanations of the natural world that appeal to functions or purpose—for example, that rocks are pointy so animals can scratch on them. By contrast, most Western-educated adults reject such explanations. What accounts for this change? We investigated 4- to 5-year-old children’s ability to generalize the form of an explanation from examples by presenting them with novel teleological explanations, novel mechanistic explanations, or no explanations for 5 nonliving natural objects. We then asked children to explain novel instances of the same objects and novel kinds of objects. We found that children were able to learn and generalize explanations of both types, suggesting an ability to draw generalizations over the form of an explanation. We also found that teleological and mechanistic explanations were learned and generalized equally well, suggesting that if a domain-general teleological bias exists, it does not manifest as a bias in learning or generalization.     

Why are rocks pointy? Children's preference for teleological explanations of the natural world

Teleological explanations are based on the assumption that an object or behavior exists for a purpose. Two studies explored the tendency of adults and first-, second-, and fourth-grade elementary-school children to explain the properties of living and nonliving natural kinds in teleological terms. Consistent with the hypothesis that young children possess a promiscuous teleological tendency, Study 1 found that children were more likely than adults to broadly explain the properties of both living and nonliving natural kinds in teleological terms, although the kinds of functions that they endorsed varied with age. Study 2 was an attempt to reduce children's broad teleological bias by introducing a pretrial that described, in nonteleological terms, the physical process by which nonliving natural kinds form. In spite of this attempt, Study 2 replicated the effects of Study 1, with only fourth graders showing any shift in preference for teleological explanation.     

Functions and mental representation: the theoretical role of representations and its real nature

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history (Swampman). In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation.     

Young Children's Conception of the Biological World

ABSTRACT— What are the components of children's biological-knowledge system before systematic teaching at school? Can this knowledge system be called naive biology? We propose that young children's biological-knowledge system has at least two essential components—(a) the knowledge needed to identify biological entities and phenomena and (b) teleological and vitalistic causality—and that these components constitute a form of biology. We discuss how this naive biology serves as the basis for performance and learning in socially and culturally important practices, such as health practices and biology instruction.     

A Mutually Facilitative Relationship Between Learning Names and Learning Concepts in Preschool Children: The Case of Artifacts

Two studies investigated the relationship between learning names and learning concepts in preschool children. More specifically, we focused on the relationship between learning the names and learning the intended functions of artifacts, given that the intended function of an artifact is generally thought to constitute core conceptual information about an artifact's category. We asked whether learning the intended function of a novel artifact facilitates retention of its name and whether learning the name of a novel artifact prompts the search for information about its intended function. In Experiment 1, 3- and 4-year-old children better retained the names of novel artifacts when the intended functions of these artifacts were revealed. The comparison condition involved providing perceptually relevant and conceptually irrelevant information about the objects. In Experiment 2, 4-year-old children who were provided with the names of novel artifacts were more likely to seek out information about the objects' functions than children provided with conceptually irrelevant information about the artifacts. Together, the studies demonstrate the intimate and mutually facilitative relationship between names and concepts in young children.     

A teleological account of Cartesian sensations?

Alison Simmons, in Simmons (1999), argues that Descartes in Meditation Six offered a teleological account of sensory representation. According to Simmons, Descartes’ view is that the biological function of sensations explains both why sensations represent what they do (i.e., their referential content) and why they represent their objects the way they do (i.e., their presentational content). Moreover, Simmons claims that her account has several advantages over other currently available interpretations of Cartesian sensations. In this paper, I argue that Simmons’ teleological account cannot be sustained for both theoretical and textual reasons and that it does not have the advantages it is claimed to have.     

God’s categories: The effect of religiosity on children’s teleological and essentialist beliefs about categories

Creationism implies that God imbued each category with a unique nature and purpose. These implications closely correspond to what some cognitive psychologists define as an essentialistic and teleological stance towards categories. This study assessed to what extent the belief in God as creator of categories is related to the mappings of these stances to categories in different domains. Israeli secular and orthodox Jewish 1st and 5th graders responded to questions assessing these three types of beliefs. The results revealed that secular children did not differ from orthodox children with respect to their essentialist beliefs about the stability of animal category membership, and their teleological construal of artifacts. In turn, secular children did differ from orthodox children with respect to their essentialist beliefs about the stability of social category membership, and their teleological construal of both animal and social categories. These findings intimate that while essentialist beliefs about animals, and teleological beliefs about artifacts do not require cultural input in order to emerge, essentialist beliefs about social categories, and teleological beliefs about both animal and social categories do.     

Conditions under which function information attenuates name extension via shape

Children often extend names to novel artifacts on the basis of overall shape rather than core properties (e.g., function). This bias is claimed to reflect the fact that nonrandom structure is a reliable cue to an object having a specific designed function. In this article, we show that information about an object's design (i.e., about its creator's intentions) is neither necessary nor sufficient for children to override the shape bias. Children extend names on the basis of any information specifying the artifact's function (e.g., information about design, current use, or possible use), especially when this information is made salient when candidate objects for extension are introduced. Possible mechanisms via which children come to rely less on easily observable cues (e.g., shape) and more on core properties (e.g., function) are discussed.