心理理论的比较认知研究

非人灵长类的心理理论是比较认知研究的重要内容,它对于揭示心理理论的起源和本质,具有重要的意义。该文综述了近年来有关心理理论比较认知的现场观察研究和实验室研究,分析了关于非人灵长类对视觉知觉经验的理解,对意图和目的的理解,以及对愿望和信念理解研究的方法和结果。许多研究关于实验设计,实验结果以及对结果的解释存在争议。如非人灵长类对意图和目的的理解,是运用心理表征,还是刺激－反应的联结,非人灵长类理解同种个体和理解人类个体的心理状态存在什么差异,实验设计是否可靠而有效地测量了非人灵长类的心理理论等。该文提出实验结果和理论解释的差异和争议,可能与研究者所持的理论假设,实验任务和设计等有关。关于非人灵长类的心理理论概念的界定,从社会生态学效度和文化差异等角度综合考虑,设计恰当的实验来考察非人灵长类的心理理论,是解决目前争议必须解决的问题,也是心理理论比较认知研究面临的困难。     

人类数能力的演化基础——数能力比较研究的启示

人类的数能力可以发展到很高的抽象水平,但大量研究表明,人类婴儿和非人灵长类也具有基本的数表征和数推理能力。文章从表征内容和表征形式两个方面系统地比较了人类婴儿和非人灵长类的数能力,并对比了成人和非人灵长类数表征的生理基础。人类和非人灵长类在这三方面存在的相似性揭示了他们可能享有相同的数表征系统。在今后的研究中,进一步探讨这两者相似的数表征核心系统,可以加深我们对人类数能力起源和本质的理解     

空间观点采择过程中自我视角表征的旋转和回位

观点采择是用于理解别人的想法、观念的能力,允许人们从另一个人的观点和视角来看待事物和客体。已有研究表明空间观点采择涉及自我旋转(self-rotation),在此基础上,我们假设自我视角表征在旋转到目标位置后将缓慢旋转回位,提出了"旋转-回位"的假说。通过两个包含连续观点采择任务的实验,研究结果表明两个任务的目标之间角度差越大,判断所需反应时越长,且角度差与反应时间的关系类似于单个空间观点采择任务中目标与被试位置间的角度与反应时的关系;且两个任务间时间间隔的增长减弱了角度差对反应时的影响。研究初步支持了"旋转-回位"假说:空间观点采择过程中个体的自我视角表征先向目标位置旋转,在任务完成后逐渐回位。这一结果和结论巩固并补充了现有的关于观点采择的理论,并对理解观点采择过程中对视角表征进行的认知操作具有启发意义。     

4岁儿童对他人记忆的评判与错误信念理解的关系

从观点采择的角度考察儿童对他人记忆的评判及其与错误信念理解的关系。与他人分享记忆时,个体需要同时处理自我与他人对过去的表征和看法;而要顺利完成错误信念任务,个体需要同时加工自我的真实信念与他人的错误信念。因此个体对他人记忆的评判能力可能会与其对错误信念的理解相关。40名4岁儿童完成一系列错误信念任务和评判他人记忆是否正确任务,情境包括视觉、意图解释和情绪解释。结果表明,控制年龄、语言和记忆能力等因素后,被试评判他人记忆的成绩仍然可以预测其对错误信念的理解。这些结果为幼儿在回忆叙述中谈及他人越多,其心理理论越好提供了进一步的证据和可能的解释     

幼儿心理理论愿望信念理解与情绪理解关系研究

考察了幼儿心理理论信念愿望理解与情绪理解的发展状况及相互关系.运用实验法对256名3~6岁儿童施测.结果表明:(1)幼儿心理理论愿望-信念理解与情绪理解的发展在3~6岁期间随年龄逐渐提高.4岁是基于信念的情绪理解能力发展的关键年龄;4~5岁是幼儿情绪观点采择能力发展的关键年龄.(2)幼儿基于信念的情绪理解能力的发展晚于错误信念理解能力的发展.(3)幼儿心理理论的愿望-信念理解与情绪理解之间相关显著.     

观点采择任务在心理理论脑机制研究中的应用

以往的心理理论脑机制研究主要采用经典的错误信念任务或其变式。近年来,研究者开始将观点采择实验任务融入心理理论脑机制的研究中,得到了更为精确的研究结果。研究发现,心理理论涉及额叶—顶叶—颞叶的神经网络,它们是完成心理理论加工必不可少且功能各异的脑区。文章阐述了观点采择任务在心理理论脑机制研究中的具体应用,并指出今后应着重在发展认知神经科学的框架中,融合镜像神经元的最新成果展开对该领域的研究。     

人类社会认知的神经机制:来自社会脑研究的证据

社会认知是指从环境互动的过程中推测他人意图、情感和思想等内部状态的心理加工过程。社会脑假说认为,包括人类在内的灵长类大脑内肯定存在着一个旨在认识和理解他人表情的神经机制,在社会交往中通过该中枢迅速处理与他人相互作用的各种信息。本文通过回顾社会脑的构成与基本功能,镜像神经元的发现及功能,以及社会脑、镜像神经元对社会认知影响的相关研究,提出了人类社会认知不同于其他物种的三个主要区别。     

儿童对假装中的心理表征及意图的理解

心理表征和意图是假装中两种最重要的心理成分,关于年幼儿童是否能理解假装中的这两种心理成分,研究者们得出了不尽相同的结论。一种观点认为3岁儿童就能理解到假装中的心理层面(心理表征、意图);另一种观点则认为儿童到了6岁都仅仅把假装理解为一种外表上看起来像某物的行为,并不能理解到假装中的心理层面(心理表征、意图),而恰恰对假装中的心理层面的理解才是假装理解的关键方面。这些争论可能与测试问题的推论方向与提问方式、对抑制控制能力的要求、假装动作与心理状态的平衡、任务情景与现实生活情景的联系、实验材料呈现方式等方面的差异有关。未来研究可以从结合执行功能、区分假装主体和假装旁观者、采用内隐的测试方法、关注与假装相关的其他能力的发展等角度,对儿童理解假装中的心理表征和意图这一问题进行深入研究。     

儿童对假装的认知发展的研究进展

1　引言　　近二十年来 ,儿童心理理论 (theoryofmind)的发展一直是一个非常重要的研究领域 ,在认知发展研究领域里占有主导地位。心理理论发展的研究主要探查了儿童最基本的心理状态方面的知识 ,这方面的一个关键问题是学前儿童何时能理解心理是对客观世界的表征 ,这种表征有时可能与客观现实不同。儿童对心理表征的理解的研究主要集中于儿童对错误信念的认知 ,儿童是否认识到人的信念并不总是与客观现实一致 ,人的信念可能错误地反映了客观现实。关于错误信念的研究已取得丰硕的成果 ,实验证明儿童在 4岁以后已能理解错误信念。据此研究者…     

视觉观点采择的发生发展及其影响因素

通过总结视觉观点采择的概念和研究范式,概括发展心理学和比较心理学中视觉观点采择演化发生和个体发展的已有研究,分析视觉观点采择与心理理论的关系及语言和文化等影响因素,指出将来的研究需要归纳测验不同水平视觉观点采择的一系列研究范式,系统考察不同物种间视觉观点采择的演化发生过程,还可将不同水平的实验范式与脑成像研究相结合来考察视觉观点采择的脑神经机制,并关注影响视觉观点采择发展的因素.     

Theory of mind in nonhuman primates

Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?," it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as "want" and "know." Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distinguish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses conditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept "see." Commentators are invited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives.     

There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: new directions in theory of mind research

For more than 30 years, researchers have focused on the important transition that children undergo between the ages of 3 and 5, when they start to solve mind‐reading problems that require reasoning about complex mental states, such as beliefs. The main question for debate has been whether, during that transition, children acquire new concepts about how the mind works (i.e. a more sophisticated ‘theory of mind’) or whether their more general cognitive abilities improve and help them deal with the general task demands. Recently, researchers have started to explore mind‐reading abilities in individuals outside of the classic 3–5 age span, showing early theory of mind abilities in ever‐younger children and infants, but also far from flawless performance in adults. In this article, we show how the results of these two new lines of research converge on the idea that there is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: there are various processes required to efficiently implement theory of mind concepts in our reasoning, and there may be, in fact, multiple mind‐reading routes available. We then highlight the emergent new directions for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spontaneous social orienting and gaze following in ringtailed lemurs (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Lemur catta</Emphasis>)

Both human and nonhuman primates preferentially orient toward other individuals and follow gaze in controlled environments. Precisely where any animal looks during natural behavior, however, remains unknown. We used a novel telemetric gaze-tracking system to record orienting behavior of ringtailed lemurs (Lemur catta) interacting with a naturalistic environment. We here provide the first evidence that ringtailed lemurs, group-living prosimian primates, preferentially gaze towards other individuals and, moreover, follow other lemurs’ gaze while freely moving and interacting in naturalistic social and ecological environments. Our results support the hypothesis that stem primates were capable of orienting toward and following the attention of other individuals. Such abilities may have enabled the evolution of more complex social behavior and cognition, including theory of mind and language, which require spontaneous attention sharing. This is the first study to use telemetric eye-tracking to quantitatively monitor gaze in any nonhuman animal during locomotion, feeding, and social interaction. Moreover, this is the first demonstration of gaze following by a prosimian primate and the first to report gaze following during spontaneous interaction in naturalistic social environments. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.     

Theory of mind and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions: A preliminary study

Ribeiro, L. A. & Fearon, P. (2010). Theory of mind and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions: A preliminary study. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology. Theory of mind ability has been associated with performance in interpersonal interactions and has been found to influence aspects such as emotion recognition, social competence, and social anxiety. Being able to attribute mental states to others requires attention to subtle communication cues such as facial emotional expressions. Decoding and interpreting emotions expressed by the face, especially those with negative valence, are essential skills to successful social interaction. The current study explored the association between theory of mind skills and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions. According to the study hypothesis, individuals with poor theory of mind skills showed preferential attention to negative faces over both non‐negative faces and neutral objects. Tentative explanations for the findings are offered emphasizing the potential adaptive role of vigilance for threat as a way of allocating a limited capacity to interpret others’ mental states to obtain as much information as possible about potential danger in the social environment.     

Examining the role of emotional valence of mind wandering: All mind wandering is not equal

To evaluate the role of emotional valence on the impact of mind wandering on working memory (WM) and sustained attention, we reanalyzed data from three independently conducted studies that examined the impact of stress on WM (Banks & Boals, 2016; Banks, Welhaf, & Srour, 2015) and sustained attention (Banks, Tartar, & Welhaf, 2014). Across all studies, participants reported the content of their thoughts at random intervals during the WM or sustained attention task. Thought probes in all studies included a core set of response options for task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) that were negatively, positively, or neutrally emotionally valenced. In line with theories of emotional valenced stimuli on capture of attention, results suggest negatively valenced TUTs, but not positively valenced TUTs, were related to poorer WM and sustained attention in two studies. Neutral TUTs were related to poorer WM but not sustained attention performance. Implications for models of mind wandering are discussed.     

The non-specificity of theory of mind deficits: Evidence from children with communicative disabilities

The aim of the present paper was to investigate the performance on theory of mind tasks of four different clinical groups: children with deficits in attention, motor control and perception (DAMP), children with autism, children with Asperger syndrome, and non-vocal cerebral-palsied children. The children with DAMP performed on the same level as the comparison group on the first and second order theory of mind task. The children with autism and Asperger syndrome performed somewhat lower than the children with DAMP and the comparison group. However, in respect of the specifcity issue, only 6 out of 14 of the non-vocal participants successfully solved the first order theory of mind task, while 13 out of 14 children in a comparison group did. The children were matched for chronological age and IQ. The findings suggest that deficits in theory of mind are not specific to the autistic continuum, but can be found in other groups with communicative disabilities, implying that linguistic and communicative skills are important precursors in the development of theory of mind. The study also shows that severe dysfunction in attention, motor control, and perception is not associated with any theory of mind difficulties.     

Wandering eyes: Eye movements during mind wandering in video lectures

Video lectures are increasingly prevalent, but they present challenges to learners. Students' minds often wander, yet we know little about how mind wandering affects attention during video lectures. This paper presents two studies that examined eye movement patterns of mind wandering during video lectures. In the studies, mind wandering reports were collected by either self-caught reports or thought probes. Results were similar across the studies: mind wandering was associated with an increased allocation of fixations to the instructor's image. For fixations on the slides, the average duration increased but the dispersion decreased. Moreover, preliminary evidence suggested that fixation duration and dispersion can diminish soon after self-caught reports of mind wandering. Overall, these findings help advance our understanding of how learners' attention is affected during mind wandering and may facilitate efforts in objectively identifying mind wandering. Future research is needed to determine if these findings can extend to other instructional formats.     

The restless mind

This article reviews the hypothesis that mind wandering can be integrated into executive models of attention. Evidence suggests that mind wandering shares many similarities with traditional notions of executive control. When mind wandering occurs, the executive components of attention appear to shift away from the primary task, leading to failures in task performance and superficial representations of the external environment. One challenge for incorporating mind wandering into standard executive models is that it often occurs in the absence of explicit intention--a hallmark of controlled processing. However, mind wandering, like other goal-related processes, can be engaged without explicit awareness; thus, mind wandering can be seen as a goal-driven process, albeit one that is not directed toward the primary task.     

Theories of mind in infancy

This paper reviews and evaluates various theories of the origins of theory of mind in infancy. In what a theory of mind consists is first considered. It is argued that any theory of mind has two important features. Firstly, a theory of mind recognizes, at least, the existence of psychological relations between agents and objects, including some relations which involve “action at a distance”. Secondly, in a theory of mind, self and other are equivalent in that both can act equally as agents of psychological relations. Any theory of the development of theory of mind must explicate how it is possible to acquire an understanding of these two features. With this requirement in mind, four main types of recent theories are considered — modularity theories, Piagetian theories, matching theories, and intersubjectivity theories. While no decision is made amongst these theories, suggestions for further improvement in theorizing on this topic are presented.     

The group-member mind trade-off: attributing mind to groups versus group members

People attribute minds to other individuals and make inferences about those individuals' mental states to explain and predict their behavior. Little is known, however, about whether people also attribute minds to groups and believe that collectives, companies, and corporations can think, have intentions, and make plans. Even less is known about the consequences of these attributions for both groups and group members. We investigated the attribution of mind and responsibility to groups and group members, and we demonstrated that people make a trade-off: The more a group is attributed a group mind, the less members of that group are attributed individual minds. Groups that are judged to have more group mind are also judged to be more cohesive and responsible for their collective actions. These findings have important implications for how people perceive the minds of groups and group members, and for how attributions of mind influence attributions of responsibility to groups and group members.