学习策略在思维风格与数学学业成就关系中的中介效应研究

以227名大学二年级理科生为被试,采用问卷调查法,探讨了学习策略在思维风格与数学学业成就关系中的作用。结果表明：（1）认知策略、元认知策略在等级制风格与数学学业成就关系中起完全中介的作用,而资源管理策略在等级制风格与数学学业成就间的中介效应不显著。（2）认知策略、元认知策略在整体性风格与数学学业成就关系中起部分中介的作用,而资源管理策略在整体性风格与数学学业成就间的中介效应不显著。（3）认知策略、元认知策略和资源管理策略在开放性风格与数学学业成就关系中起部分中介的作用。（4）元认知策略在等级制风格与数学学业成就间的中介作用以及在开放性风格与数学学业成就间的中介作用都是相对较大的。     

学习策略在动机和英语成绩间的中介效应分析

探讨英语学习策略在学习动机和英语成绩之间的中介作用.随机选取某综合性大学330名大一学生为研究对象,结果表明,(1)内部动机一方面直接促进英语成绩,一方面通过认知策略和元认知策略的中介作用间接影响英语成绩;(2)外部动机主要是直接对英语成绩有削弱作用,认知策略和元认知策略中介作用较小.     

知觉运动学习中的背景干扰效应和元认知监测

选取大学生为被试,采用两因素混合实验设计,以预期按键反应作为知觉运动学习任务.在运动学习任务中,设置了集中练习和分散练习两种练习方式以及三个练习一测试组块.通过分析不同练习方式和练习-测试组块对练习成绩、测试成绩以及元认知监测的影响,考察运动知觉学习的背景干扰效应、练习伴随低估效应以及元认知监测的依据.结果发现: (1)缩短练习与测试之间的时间间隔,经典的背景干扰效应没有出现; (2)在知觉运动学习的多组块练习过程中.元认知监测准确性没有出现练习伴随低估效应; (3)集中练习组更多地以当前的练习成绩作为依据进行预测,从而导致了对预测的高估.     

学习动机、元认知对学业成就的影响

以202名大学生为被试,测量研究了学习动机、元认知与学业成就的关系．结果表明,元认知、学习动机与学业成就之间是相关的。认知驱动力、自我提高内驱力与元认知和学业成就呈正相关,而附属内驱力与学业成就呈负相关。认知驱动力和自我提高内驱力对学业成就和元认知存在显著回归效应。     

得失框架效应的分离—— 来自收益与损失型跨期选择的研究

本研究通过创设收益和损失跨期选择情境, 采用不同表征方式(得框架、失框架)的跨期选择任务, 分别探讨了收益和损失情境下的跨期选择是否存在得失框架效应, 及其是否会受任务难度的影响。结果发现：(1)收益型跨期选择只在任务容易时存在得失框架效应, 与失框架相比, 被试在得框架下选择即时获益的概率更高; 任务困难时得失框架效应消失(实验a); (2)损失型跨期选择中不存在得失框架效应(实验b)。结果表明, 得失框架效应在损、益型跨期选择中出现了分离, 收益型跨期选择中的得失框架效应的内在认知机制很可能与风险决策中的框架效应类似并且是一种较为初级的认知加工过程。     

自然情境下舌尖效应的认知年老化——日记研究

舌尖效应是一种话到嘴边却说不出来的单词提取失败现象(Tip-of-the-Tongue, TOT)。本研究通过TOT回溯问卷和日记记录方法对青年人和老年人进行了为期28天的追踪, 考察了自然情境下舌尖效应认知年老化的发生特点及机制。结果表明：(1)自然情境下TOT存在认知老化现象, 老年人TOT发生频率比青年人更高; (2) TOT发生时, 个体存在替代词和语义相关信息的提取, 且青年人比老年人产生了更强烈的兴奋感和疲惫感的元认知体验; (3) TOT发生后目标词几乎都能获得提取, 老年人TOT的解决时间比青年人长, 但其解决率无年龄差异。TOT的解决时间受目标词熟悉性、是否存在替代词和个体主观体验的认知和元认知因素影响。(4)对TOT认知状态和元认知状态的记录会影响后续发生TOT的状态, 且延长其解决时间, 表明被试付出了更多努力和时间解决TOT。TOT的认知状态和元认知状态的因素都对TOT的解决时间产生了影响。     

元认知监控的机制:认知灵活性的调节作用

元认知监控作为元认知的核心成分,是内隐程度较高的心理活动。研究采用认知操作法,以MasterMind游戏任务为载体,从执行功能中认知灵活性的角度,探讨了元认知监控的内部机制。结果发现:元认知监测对元认知控制的作用受到认知灵活性的调节作用。对于高认知灵活性的学生,元认知监测水平越高,元认知控制越好;对于低认知灵活性的学生,元认知监测水平的高低不会引起元认知控制水平的显著变化。研究结果表明,高认知灵活性的学生能根据元认知监测进行有效元认知控制,而低认知灵活性的学生其元认知监测水平的提高没有影响元认知控制。结合元认知监控与执行功能进行了讨论。     

认知抑制——问题解决研究的新视角

抑制是一种领域一般(domain-general)的认知过程,它使儿童和成人能够抗拒习惯、自动化、诱惑、分心物或干扰从而适应存在冲突的情境(Diamond,2013)。抑制控制模型认为儿童或成人在问题解决中的失败并非是缺少相关知识与概念,而是抑制控制失败造成的。研究者采用负启动研究范式和脑成像技术在类皮杰任务、数学和科学问题解决中证实了认知抑制的作用。未来研究应把认知抑制与元认知的研究结合起来,探究认知抑制的发展轨迹及二者在问题解决中的相对重要性。同时,针对认知抑制训练的干预研究也值得重视。     

眼睛注视的知觉及其线索效应

对眼睛注视知觉、眼睛注视线索效应及其影响因素等相关研究进行了总结和分析。结果发现:(1)婴儿从一出生就对眼睛注视线索表现出强烈的敏感性,眼睛注视知觉对语言和社会等能力的发展有很大影响;(2)颞上沟是加工眼睛注视线索的特异神经结构,它与实时监控情绪和情感的杏仁核存在神经联结,成为社会认知神经系统的重要组成部分;(3)对眼睛注视线索的早期加工显示出特异的脑电活动模式;(4)眼睛注视线索效应与外周线索的反射式效应相类似,但持续时间较长;(5)眼睛注视线索效应不仅受面部结构信息的影响,也受自上而下加工等高水平认知因素的调节,并显示出明显的个体差异。对眼睛注视线索效应的进一步研究应涉及人格判断、喜好评价和心理理论等高级社会认知活动。     

认知还是元认知：口语产生中舌尖效应的心理机制

舌尖效应(Tip-of-the-tongue, TOT)在口语产生领域存在认知和元认知两种研究视角。认知视角主要针对口语产生的词汇通达过程, 认为信息激活或提取不充分是TOT发生的主要原因。元认知视角则主要关注口语产生的元认知过程, 认为个体对目标词提取状态的监测引发了TOT。TOT的元认知过程不仅可以监测目标词的提取状态及词汇通达过程中相关信息的提取, 而且可以控制词汇通达过程, 使目标词在TOT发生后成功地提取出来。两种研究视角在TOT发生的认知机制、影响因素以及生理基础方面均存在分离。未来研究应该探讨TOT监测和控制口语产生的作用机制和生理基础, 关注汉语背景下TOT发生规律及其对口语产生年老化的积极影响。     

Metacognitive Development

Traditional developmental research in memory and reasoning, as well as current investigations in such disparate areas as theory of mind, epistemological understanding, knowledge acquisition, and problem solving, share the need to invoke a meta-level of cognition in explaining their respective phenomena. The increasingly influential construct of metacognition can be conceptualized in a developmental framework. Young children's dawning awareness of mental functions lies at one end of a developmental progression that eventuates in complex metaknowing capabilities that many adults do not master. During its extended developmental course, metacognition becomes more explicit, powerful, and effective, as it comes to operate increasingly under the individual's conscious control. Enhancing (a) metacognitive awareness of what one believes and how one knows and (b) metastrategic control in application of the strategies that process new information is an important developmental and educational goal.     

Reply to Commentaries

In our response, we address four themes arising from the commentaries. First, we discuss the distinction between cognition and metacognition and show how to draw it within our framework. Next, we explain how metacognition differs from social cognition. The underlying mechanisms of metacognitive development are then elucidated in terms of interaction patterns. Finally, we consider measures of metacognition and suitable methods for investigating it. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Metacognitive model of mindfulness

Mindfulness training has proven to be an efficacious therapeutic tool for a variety of clinical and nonclinical health problems and a booster of well-being. In this paper we propose a multi-level metacognitive model of mindfulness. We postulate and discuss following hypothesis: (1) mindfulness is related to the highest level of metacognition; (2) mindfulness depends on dynamic cooperation of three main components of the metacognition (metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences and metacognitive skills); (3) a mindful meta-level is always conscious while the other meta-cognitive processes can occur implicitly; (4) intentionally practiced mindfulness decreases dissociations between awareness and meta-awareness; (5) components of mindful meta-level develop and change during continuous practice. The current model is discussed in the light of empirical data and other theoretical approaches to mindfulness concept. We believe that presented model provides some helpful avenues for future research and theoretical investigations into mindfulness and the mechanisms of its actions.     

Meditation focused on self-observation of the body impairs metacognitive efficiency

In the last decade of research on metacognition, the literature has been focused on understanding its mechanism, function and scope; however, little is known about whether metacognitive capacity can be trained. The specificity of the potential training procedure is in particular still largely unknown. In this study, we evaluate whether metacognition is trainable through generic meditation training, and if so, which component of meditation would be instrumental in this improvement. To this end, we evaluated participants’ metacognitive efficiency before and after two types of meditation training protocols: the first focused on mental cues (Mental Monitoring [MM] training), whereas the second focused on body cues (Self-observation of the Body [SoB] training). Results indicated that while metacognitive efficiency was stable in MM training group, it was significantly reduced in the SoB group after training. This suggests that metacognition should not be conceived as a stable capacity but rather as a malleable skill.     

Metacognitive-like information seeking in lion-tailed macaques: a generalized search response after all?

Previous research has demonstrated that Old World primates (both apes and monkeys) seek information about the location of a hidden food item, unless they are privy to the hiding process. This has been cited as evidence of metacognition. However, these results could also be interpreted using non-metacognitive accounts, including a generalized search response to uncertainty, in which subjects reach for food when it is seen, or search for food until it is spotted. In the present research, lion-tailed macaques were tested on an object-choice task. Conditions varied with respect to the visibility of the baiting process, and whether the location of the hidden food could be inferred by logical exclusion. Additionally, the hidden food could be located visually before a choice was made, by peering under the objects through a Plexiglas tray. Across conditions, monkeys consistently looked for the food when it had not been seen, even if its location could be inferred, despite the fact that these monkeys are capable of inference by exclusion. This suggests that apparently ‘metacognitive’ information seeking in monkeys may instead reflect a generalized search strategy. Alternatively, it is possible that monkeys only have metacognitive access to certain types of knowledge, including that obtained visually. Results are discussed with respect to the likelihood of metacognition in this species and the evolutionary emergence of metacognition across species.     

元认知的神经机制:元认知功能、脑区与脑网络

元认知是指个体对当前进行的认知活动的监测和调节。通过对元认知神经机制研究的梳理,归纳出两条研究主线:一条主线以具体元认知加工的脑区激活研究为主,主要考察元认知与认知过程的分离及典型元认知加工的共享性和特异性。研究发现元认知加工主要与前额叶有关,还涉及脑岛、顶叶、颞叶和楔前叶等部分脑区。另一条主线探讨广泛的元认知功能与广泛大脑网络的相关。研究提出了大脑的“元认知网络”的概念,发现脑损伤或病变造成的元认知功能损伤与脑功能网络有关,而非固定在某一特定脑区。建议未来的研究应重视四个方面的研究:元认知加工的具体脑区和脑功能网络,元认知神经机制的分离,元认知脑功能的损伤和元认知训练的改善作用,以及基于神经机制研究的元认知模型的建构与修正。     

Social influence on metacognitive evaluations: The power of nonverbal cues

Metacognitive evaluations refer to the processes by which people assess their own cognitive operations with respect to their current goal. Little is known about whether this process is susceptible to social influence. Here we investigate whether nonverbal social signals spontaneously influence metacognitive evaluations. Participants performed a two-alternative forced-choice task, which was followed by a face randomly gazing towards or away from the response chosen by the participant. Participants then provided a metacognitive evaluation of their response by rating their confidence in their answer. In Experiment 1, the participants were told that the gaze direction was irrelevant to the task purpose and were advised to ignore it. The results revealed an effect of implicit social information on confidence ratings even though the gaze direction was random and therefore unreliable for task purposes. In addition, nonsocial cues (car) did not elicit this effect. In Experiment 2, the participants were led to believe that cue direction (face or car) reflected a previous participant's response to the same question—that is, the social information provided by the cue was made explicit, yet still objectively unreliable for the task. The results showed a similar social influence on confidence ratings, observed with both cues (car and face) but with an increased magnitude relative to Experiment 1. We additionally showed in Experiment 2 that social information impaired metacognitive accuracy. Together our results strongly suggest an involuntary susceptibility of metacognitive evaluations to nonverbal social information, even when it is implicit (Experiment 1) and unreliable (Experiments 1 and 2).     

Domain-specific and domain-general processes underlying metacognitive judgments

Metacognition and self-awareness are commonly assumed to operate as global capacities. However, there have been few attempts to test this assumption across multiple cognitive domains and metacognitive evaluations. Here, we assessed the covariance between “online” metacognitive processes, as measured by decision confidence judgments in the domains of perception and memory, and error awareness in the domain of attention to action. Previous research investigating metacognition across task domains have not matched stimulus characteristics across tasks raising the possibility that any differences in metacognitive accuracy may be influenced by local task properties. The current experiment measured metacognition in perceptual, memorial and attention tasks that were closely matched for stimulus characteristics. We found that metacognitive accuracy across the three tasks was dissociated suggesting that domain specific networks support an individual’s capacity for accurate metacognition. This finding was independent of objective performance, which was controlled using a staircase procedure. However, response times for metacognitive judgments and error awareness were associated suggesting that shared mechanisms determining how these meta-level evaluations unfold in time may underlie these different types of decision. In addition, the relationship between these laboratory measures of metacognition and reports of everyday functioning from participants and their significant others (informants) was investigated. We found that informant reports, but not self reports, predicted metacognitive accuracy on the perceptual task and participants who underreported cognitive difficulties relative to their informants also showed poorer metacognitive accuracy on the perceptual task. These results are discussed in the context of models of metacognitive regulation and neuropsychological evidence for dissociable metacognitive systems. The potential for the refinement of metacognitive assessment in clinical populations is also discussed.