Evaluations of moral and conventional intergroup transgressions

To investigate children's understanding of intergroup transgressions, children (3–8 years, N = 84) evaluated moral and conventional transgressions that occurred among members of the same gender group (ingroup) or members of different gender groups (outgroup). All participants judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional transgressions. However, when asked to make a judgment after being told an authority figure did not see the transgression, younger participants still judged that moral violations were less acceptable than conventional transgressions, but judged both moral and conventional transgressions with an outgroup victim as more acceptable than the corresponding transgressions with an ingroup victim. Older children did not demonstrate the same ingroup bias; rather they focused only on the domain of the transgressions. The results demonstrate the impact intergroup information has on children's evaluations about both moral and conventional transgressions.     

Predicting moral attitudes and antisocial behavior in young team sport athletes: A self‐determination theory perspective

Identifying the factors associated with prosocial and antisocial behaviors in youth sport may provide evidence to inform interventions aimed at promoting prosocial behaviors and minimizing rule transgressions in young athletes. We investigated relations among social‐contextual factors (e.g., social support), personal motivational factors (e.g., psychological need satisfaction and motivation), young athletes’ attitudes toward prosocial (e.g., keeping winning in proportion) and antisocial (e.g., acceptance of cheating and gamesmanship) behaviors, and their actual rule violations during matches in two samples of athletes. Participants in Sample 1 were young team sport athletes (N = 355) and participants in Sample 2 were young male futsal players (N = 296). Athletes in Sample 1 completed validated self‐report measures of perceived autonomy support, basic need satisfaction, and autonomous and controlled motivation from self‐determination theory, moral attitudes, and past cheating behaviors. Athletes in Sample 2 completed identical measures and two additional behavioral measures: athletes’ self‐reported number of yellow cards received during competition in the last 6 months and the number of yellow cards athletes received from referees in the subsequent 2 months from competition records. We found significant relations between psychological need satisfaction and self‐determined motivation, and athletes’ moral attitudes in both samples. These effects held when statistically controlling for past behavior. Importantly, our prospective analysis of Sample 2 indicated that attitudes toward antisocial behaviors predicted athletes’ rule violations during subsequent tournament matches. Findings indicate that promoting autonomous motivation and need satisfaction through autonomy support may foster attitudes toward prosocial behaviors, and minimize rule transgressions, in young athletes.     

When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness

Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00–9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice—a hallmark of moral agency—is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.     

Superstars are not necessarily role models: Morality perceptions moderate the impact of competence perceptions on supervisor role modeling

There is a general assumption that we choose role models from the ranks of those who have demonstrated extraordinary competence. However, the person perception literature supports the expectation that morality may also matter, and that we may be most likely to role model competent individuals if we also believe that they have good moral character. To test this possibility, we conducted four studies of adults’ role modeling of workplace supervisors. Study 1 (N = 245) and Study 2 (N = 110) showed that workplace supervisors’ perceived competence was most strongly associated with role model perceptions when the supervisor was also seen as moral. Study 3 (N = 492) and 4 (N = 335) replicated these findings with pre‐registered experiments, and revealed indirect effects of supervisor attributes on role modeling through emulation. Results suggest that we choose organizational role models who have achieved success in ways that are in line with our moral values.     

Adolescents' evaluations of those who challenge exclusive and inclusive peer norms

Early and middle adolescents' judgements and reasonings about peers who challenge exclusive and inclusive peer group norms were examined across three studies with varying intergroup contexts. Study 1 participants included (N = 199) non-Arab American participants responding to an Arab American/non-Arab American intergroup context. Study 2 included (N = 123) non-Asian and (N = 105) Asian American participants responding to an Asian/non-Asian American intergroup context. Study 3 included (N = 275) Lebanese participants responding to an American/Lebanese intergroup context. Across all three studies participants responded to ingroup and outgroup deviant group members who challenged their peer groups to either include or exclude an outgroup peer with similar interests. Findings indicated that adolescents approved of peers who challenged exclusive peer norms and advocated for inclusion of an ethnic and cultural outgroup, and disapproved of peers who challenged inclusive group norms and advocated for exclusion. Non-Arab and non-Asian American adolescents displayed ingroup bias when evaluating a deviant advocating for exclusion. Additionally, age differences were found among Asian American adolescents. Findings will be discussed in the light of intergroup research on those who challenge injustices.     

The duality of virtue: Deconstructing the moral hypocrite

The present study examined the processes giving rise to moral hypocrisy, a phenomenon in which individuals judge their own transgressions to be less morally objectionable than the same transgressions enacted by others. Two alternative models of the source of hypocrisy were compared to determine whether hypocrisy results from automatic or volitional biases. Findings demonstrated not only that participants viewed their own transgressions as significantly more “fair” than the same transgressions enacted by others, but also that this bias was eliminated under conditions of cognitive constraint. These findings support the view that hypocrisy stems from volitionally-guided justifications, and thereby suggest that at a more basic level, humans possess a negative response to violations of fairness norms whether enacted by themselves or others.     

Causal and moral responsibility: Antecedents and consequences of group‐based guilt

In six studies (N = 1045) conducted in three European countries, we demonstrate distinctions between causal responsibility, group‐based guilt, and moral responsibility. We propose that causal responsibility is an antecedent of group‐based guilt linking the ingroup to previous transgressions against the victim group. In contrast, moral responsibility is a consequence of group‐based guilt and is conceptualized as a sociomoral norm to respond to the consequences of the ingroup's transgressions and the current needs of the victim group. As such, moral responsibility can be stimulated by group‐based guilt and directly predicts individual action intentions. Studies 1 and 2 focus on the conceptual distinctions among the three constructs. Study 3 tests the indirect effect of causal responsibility on moral responsibility via group‐based guilt. The remaining studies explore the mediating role of moral responsibility in associations between group‐based guilt and compensatory action tendencies, that is, financial compensation (study 4), approach and avoidance tendencies (study 5) and public apology (study 6). Together these studies show that causal and moral responsibility are psychologically distinct concepts from group‐based guilt and that moral responsibility plays an important role in shaping the effects of group‐based guilt on behavioral intentions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Group evaluations as self-group distancing: Ingroup typicality moderates evaluative intergroup bias in stigmatized groups

Outgroup favoritism among members of stigmatized groups can be seen as a form of self-group distancing. We examined how intergroup evaluations in stigmatized groups vary as a function of ingroup typicality. In Studies 1 and 2, Black participants (N = 125,915; N = 766) more strongly preferred light-skinned or White relative to dark-skinned or Black individuals the lighter their own skin tone. In Study 3, overweight participants (N = 147,540) more strongly preferred normal-weight relative to overweight individuals the lower their own body weight. In Study 4, participants with disabilities (N = 35,058) more strongly preferred non-disabled relative to disabled individuals the less visible they judged their own disability. Relationships between ingroup typicality and intergroup evaluations were at least partially mediated by ingroup identification (Studies 2 and 3). A meta-analysis across studies yielded an average effect size of r = .12. Furthermore, higher ingroup typicality was related to both ingroup and outgroup evaluations. We discuss ingroup typicality as an individual constraint to self-group distancing among stigmatized group members and its relation to intergroup evaluations.     

Solidarity across group lines: Secondary transfer effect of intergroup contact,perceived moral distance,and collective action

We tested, in three studies, whether the generalization of contact effects from primary to secondary outgroups—the secondary transfer effect (STE)—occurs for collective action. The results supported a serial mediation model: contact with immigrants by advantaged group members (Italians: Study 1, N = 146, 121 females, M_age = 28.31 years; Study 3, N = 406, 239 females, M_age = 36.35; British people, Study 2, N = 160, 113 females, M_age = 32.31) was associated with lower perceived moral distance toward primary outgroups, which in turn was associated with more positive attitudes and greater collective action intentions toward primary outgroups, and lower perceived moral distance toward secondary outgroups. Lower perceived moral distance toward secondary outgroups and stronger collective action intentions toward the primary outgroup were associated with higher collective action intentions toward secondary outgroups (results were inconsistent for attitudes). We discuss the findings with a focus on how a consideration of perceived moral distance extends current theorizing, and the relevance of generalized prejudice for the STE.     

Anomalous moral intuitions in juvenile offenders with psychopathic traits

Since the historical conception of psychopathy, researchers have been interested in understanding moral functioning among psychopathic individuals. The present study investigated the association between psychopathic traits and moral intuitions among incarcerated juvenile offenders (N = 178). Participants were assessed using the Psychopathy Checklist:Youth Version (Forth, Kosson, & Hare, 2003) and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011), which defines five core moral foundations: Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. As expected, psychopathy in juvenile offenders negatively predicted endorsement of all five foundations. This study is the first to demonstrate broad abnormalities in Haidt et al.’s moral foundations in a juvenile sample and can help explain delinquent behavior in juveniles with psychopathic traits. Implications for theories of psychopathy are discussed.     

Defensive emotions and evaluative judgements: Sensitivity to anger and fear predicts moral judgements,whereas sensitivity to disgust predicts aesthetic judgements

Aesthetic and moral evaluations engage appetitive and defensive emotions. While the role played by pleasure in positive aesthetic and moral judgements has been extensively researched, little is known about how defensive emotions influence negative aesthetic and moral judgements. Specifically, it is unknown which defensive emotions such judgements tap into, and whether both kinds of judgement share a common emotional root. Here, we investigated how participants' individual sensitivity to disgust, fear, anger and sadness predicted subjective judgements of aesthetic and moral stimuli. Bayesian modelling revealed that participants who were more sensitive to anger and fear found conventional and moral transgressions more wrong. In contrast, participants who were more sensitive to disgust disliked asymmetrical geometric patterns and untidy rooms more. These findings suggest that aesthetic and moral evaluations engage multiple defensive emotions, not just disgust, and that they may rely on different defensive emotions as part of their computational mechanism.     

The moral compass and life skills in navigating radicalization processes: Examining the interplay among life skills,moral disengagement,and extremism

The present study investigated the interplay among deficient life skills, moral disengagement, and extremist attitude across two national contexts. Using a sample of young students in high school or college (N = 686), the present study found significant indirect effects between deficient life skills (agency and structure) and various aspects of an extremist mindset through moral disengagement. These findings suggest that these two psychological concepts of life skills and moral disengagement are relevant for understanding and countering violent radicalization processes; that is to say that morality can direct the life skills toward either violent extremism or nonviolent, legal civil participation. Furthermore, the development and empowerment of life skills could enhance individual resilience to morally disengaging narratives and radicalized ideologies.     

Post-conventional moral reasoning and reputation

Kohlberg’s theory of moral development conceives conventional and post-conventional moral reasoning as consecutive levels in a developmental sequence. This claim was examined in terms of the relationship between preference for these two styles of reasoning on the one hand and moral identity as perceived by others (reputation) and as self-perceived and on the other. Participants (n = 172), in groups of four mutual acquaintances, provided ratings of one another’s standing, and estimates of their own standing and reputation, on four trait dimensions (moral responsibility, consideration for others, respect for authority, and political orientation). Post-conventional moral reasoning, assessed using the Defining Issues Test, was not significantly related either to reputation or to self-rating on any dimension except political orientation. Conventional reasoning was related to politics though in the opposite direction, but additionally to both self- and other-ratings of moral responsibility and to the corresponding ratings of respect for authority. Findings do not support the view that the conventional/post-conventional distinction in moral reasoning is a developmental difference. An alternative proposed is that these are independent domains of moral thought, related to quite different aspects of social behaviour and political attitudes.     

Who Is to Blame? Children's and Adults' Moral Judgments Regarding Victim and Transgressor Negligence

Research has documented that individuals consider outcomes, intentions, and transgressor negligence when making morally relevant judgments (Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Engelhardt, 2017). However, less is known about whether individuals attend to both victim and transgressor negligence in their evaluations. The current study measured 3- to 6-year-olds (N = 70), 7- to 12-year-olds (N = 54), and adults' (N = 97, ages 18–25 years) moral judgments about scenarios in which an accidental transgression occurred involving property damage or physical harm. Participants were either assigned to conditions where the victim or the transgressor was negligent. Results revealed attention to negligence among all participants across a range of different moral judgment measures (including acceptability judgments, punishment judgments, and attributions of blame), with age-related increases in attention to negligence evident. Results provide novel evidence that children and adults consider not just outcomes and intentions, but also the role of negligence in both victims and transgressors, when making social decisions.     

Eavesdropping on character: Assessing everyday moral behaviors

Despite decades of interest in moral character, comparatively little is known about moral behavior in everyday life. This paper reports a novel method for assessing everyday moral behaviors using the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR)—a digital audio-recorder that intermittently samples snippets of ambient sounds from people’s environments—and examines the stability of these moral behaviors. In three samples (combined N = 186), participants wore an EAR over one or two weekends. Audio files were coded for everyday moral behaviors (e.g., showing sympathy, gratitude) and morally-neutral comparison language behaviors (e.g., use of prepositions, articles). Results indicate that stable individual differences in moral behavior can be systematically observed in daily life, and that their stability is comparable to the stability of neutral language behaviors.     

Counter‐intuitive moral judgement following traumatic brain injury

Several neurological patient populations, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximize the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggest that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 2011, 393). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counter‐intuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI.     

Moral/non‐moral domain shift in young adolescents in relation to delinquent behaviour

Because moral transgressions are considered more serious than non‐moral (i.e. conventional or personal) transgressions, it is less threatening to self‐esteem to interpret one's own delinquent act as a non‐moral transgression rather than a moral transgression. This ‘domain shift’ could be a way of reducing cognitive dissonance. It was expected that adolescents who report a certain category of delinquent behaviour would evaluate hypothetical transgressions in the same category as more non‐moral than would adolescents who did not report that category of delinquent behaviour. A group of 278 students from the first (M(age)=13.1), second (M(age)=14.3) and third (M(age)=15.2) grade of intermediate secondary schools in the Netherlands participated in the research. The results showed a domain shift from the moral towards non‐moral domains in the evaluation of hypothetical situations about delinquent behaviour reported by the adolescent. At the same time, this domain shift did not occur in situations concerning delinquent behaviour not reported by the adolescent, even when delinquent behaviour occurred in the adolescent's peer group. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the domain shift takes place as a consequence of cognitive dissonance. The results also showed that the attitude towards delinquent behaviour and the prevalence of delinquent behaviour in the peer group both predicted a unique part of the variance in reported delinquent behaviour (RDB; 28% and 10%, respectively). The level of moral reasoning (measured by the Sociomoral Reflection Measure–Short Form [SRM‐SF]) did not appear to be a significant predictor of RDB.     

The influence of war on moral judgments about harm

How does war influence moral judgments about harm? While the general rule is “thou shalt not kill,” war appears to provide an exception to the moral prohibition on intentional harm. In three studies (n = 263, n = 557, n = 793), we quantify the difference in moral judgments across peace and war contexts, and explore two possible explanations for the difference. The findings demonstrate that third-party observers judge a trade-off of one life for five as more morally acceptable in war than in peace, especially if the one person is from an outgroup of the person making the trade-off. In addition, the robust difference in moral judgments across “switch” and “footbridge” trolley problems is attenuated in war compared to in peace. The present studies have implications for moral psychology researchers who use war-based scenarios to study broader cognitive or affective processes. If the war context changes judgments of moral scenarios by triggering group-based reasoning or altering the perceived structure of the moral event, using such scenarios to make decontextualized claims about moral judgment may not be warranted.     

The moral disengagement in doping scale

Statement of problemThe use of banned substances to enhance performance occurs in sport. Therefore, developing valid and reliable instruments that can predict likelihood to use banned substances is important.MethodWe conducted three studies. In Study 1, football players (N = 506) and athletes from a variety of team sports (N = 398) completed the Moral Disengagement in Doping Scale (MDDS). In Study 2, team sport athletes (N = 232) completed the MDDS and questionnaires measuring moral disengagement in sport, doping attitudes, moral identity, antisocial sport behavior, situational doping temptation, and task and ego goal orientations. A week later, a subsample (n = 102) completed the MDDS and indicated their likelihood to use a banned substance in a hypothetical situation. In Study 3, athletes (N = 201) from a variety of individual sports completed the MDDS and indicated their likelihood to use a banned substance in a hypothetical situation.ResultsThe results of Study 1 showed that a one-factor model fitted the data well, and the scale had measurement invariance across males and females. In Study 2, we provided evidence for convergent, concurrent, discriminant, and predictive validity, as well as test-rest reliability, of the scale. In Study 3, doping moral disengagement was positively related with reported likelihood and temptation to use a banned substance. The scale exhibited very good internal consistency across the three studies.ConclusionsIn conclusion, the MDDS can be used to measure moral disengagement in doping in team and individual sports.